



**ABRIR TOMO II - ANEXO VIII**

and practice their religious beliefs. This strength is not present in Soviet society. In fact, there is much to be optimistic about in terms of America's role in the world and less to fear from the future than some doomsday commentators try to portray.

The comparison between the two societies can be made more convincing by an enumeration of the serious challenges which will confront the Soviet Union during the next few decades. It is not uncommon to encounter the vague impression among members of the public that the Soviet Union is somehow on the ascendant, that it faces fewer problems in the world than does the United States. A comprehensive examination of the prospects for both nations in the future, however, reveals that the Soviet leadership will in fact be faced with a number of very serious dilemmas in the immediate future and a few major problems which will not be susceptible to short-term solution. The economic prospects for the USSR are perhaps the most readily apparent. The Soviet Union is saddled with a rigid and unresponsive economic decision-making bureaucracy which has never been able to deal adequately with production shortages and maldistribution of resources. Agricultural production has been a chronic problem in the USSR. The

Soviet Union may develop an energy crisis within the next decade. Many of the production goals in the latest five-year plan have not been met. Soviet industry is facing shortages of young, skilled labor. In general, the economy of the Soviet Union is stagnating and is not likely to improve substantially in the near future.

On top of the economic situation, there are serious internal difficulties which will continue to plague the Soviet leadership. No one -- inside or out of the Kremlin -- can be precisely sure how the succession to the post-Brezhnev era will be handled. The recent campaign of repression directed against internal dissidence will not stem the campaign for human rights within Soviet society. The Soviet leadership will also have to contend with the increasing complexity of managing a nation which is largely a federation of discrete national and ethnic groups, many of which seek greater individual autonomy.

The international situation poses a number of potential challenges to the Soviet Union as well. NATO has become newly united in its determination to resist any Soviet encroachments upon the independence of West Europe. The People's Republic of China has adopted an aggressive foreign policy which is largely oriented toward countering Soviet influence throughout the world. China alone has become a major preoccupation for Soviet defense planners, and its potential as a military rival has tied up a substantial portion of the Soviet defense effort. The USSR can no

longer count on the unified support of Eastern Europe; a number of Warsaw Pact nations have embarked upon their own foreign policy initiatives and have their own domestic problems. Marshall Shulman's partly facetious observation that the Soviet Union has a great deal to be worried about since, after all, it is the only nation in the world that is completely surrounded by hostile Communist countries, remains a very successful way of putting the Soviet challenge in perspective for most audiences.

Speakers are sometimes asked to speculate on why the Soviets may be interested in a successful conclusion to the SALT TWO negotiations. We cannot, of course, be certain as to the exact motivations of the Soviet leadership, but for one thing, SALT ratifies the Soviet Union's status as a global superpower. Then, to the extent that SALT TWO may relieve the Soviet Union of the need to spend additional funds on the deployment of strategic weapons to stay abreast of the United States, it may, to a limited degree, provide some relief for other, ailing sectors of the Soviet economy. Third, there is some reason to believe that certain portions of the present Kremlin leadership have invested a great deal of personal prestige in the policy of detente in general and the SALT process in particular. A failure of the SALT talks would be interpreted as a failure of the policies of these individuals. Finally, the Soviets will be obtaining certain



limited restrictions on a few U.S. weapons systems which they view with particular concern. The principal such example is the range limitations on cruise missiles, but even here the restrictions in the agreement are useful from a Soviet point of view only for their precedential effect since all of the limitations will have expired by the time the United States is ready to deploy cruise missiles.

Naturally, it would be nice if the Department's speakers could truthfully say that the SALT TWO agreement will wholly and one-sidedly favor the United States. Most audiences accept the fact, however, that such an outcome is simply not a realistic prospect in a bargaining situation between two powerful nations in which each side must be willing to compromise and negotiate in good faith. What we can assert is that SALT TWO will benefit both the United States and the Soviet Union and is therefore likely to be a stronger, more effective agreement. Both sides win in SALT TWO, and there are conspicuous benefits for the world at large as well. The SALT process has contributed to the maintenance of international stability and has made it less likely than ever before that nuclear weapons will ever be used. Our basic strategic policy is, after all, to maintain sufficient strength to ensure that any other nuclear power is effectively deterred from actually using nuclear weapons. SALT TWO will place a cap on the nuclear arms race and further the goal of

A-111/10/19

- 14 -

mutual deterrence by holding the strategic arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union within certain, verifiable bounds.

Occasionally, a speaker may be asked whether there is any enforcement mechanism to deal with infractions of the agreement and how such a mechanism would work. While there is no supranational authority that will have the power to enforce compliance with the terms of SALT TWO, there is the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) which will be charged with handling questions of interpretation that may be raised with regard to the agreement's terms and resolving ambiguous situations that may arise with regard to the deployment of strategic weapons covered by the agreement. As is the case with an ordinary contract, it is impossible to foresee every eventuality that may occur in the future and provide for all possible contingencies. The SCC, which was created by the SALT ONE treaty and is composed of representatives of both the United States and the Soviet Union, is a standing body that is designed to facilitate the orderly implementation of the SALT agreements and discuss matters of concern relating to their operation. In the case of a major violation which could not be resolved by the SCC, of course, the United States would be free to abrogate the SALT TWO agreement and proceed with its strategic programs in a completely unrestrained

fashion. The SCC has done a good job in the past, however, and we expect that the Soviet Union will live up to its obligations in SALT TWO.

There have been a number of charges in the past that the Soviet Union has "violated" the SALT ONE agreements. All of these charges were examined in some detail in a report which the Department published in February, 1978. While it is true that certain ambiguous situations have arisen with regard to SALT ONE, the United States has never had occasion to charge the Soviet Union with an actual violation of that agreement. It is an interesting fact to many audiences that the Soviet Union has had occasion to challenge certain activities undertaken by the United States, and has raised these issues in the SCC. In particular, the history of the environmental shelters constructed by the United States during the course of its silo modernization program provides a graphic illustration of the fact that an innocuous activity may provide the basis for a discussion in the Standing Consultative Commission.

It is a rare audience that manifests a strong interest in learning about the precise details of the SALT TWO agreement or the arcana of strategic theory. There is, however, one concern that does surface from time to time, and that is the Soviet superiority in throwweight and warhead yield. There is relatively little that can be said regarding throwweight except to note that the Soviet emphasis in this area

A-VIII/10/21

was probably dictated years ago by their inability to match the United States in miniaturization technology. In the preMIRV era, the deployment of large yield weapons then followed largely as a matter of course. The United States currently leads the Soviet Union in the number of warheads deployed by a factor of more than two to one, but we have chosen to concentrate upon the development of smaller yield weapons for valid reasons of basic strategic policy.

Very large nuclear warheads tend to be less efficient than smaller warheads. The blast and radiation effects of a nuclear detonation radiate out from the epicenter of the explosion in three dimensions (as, roughly, a sphere).

Targets, however, are basically two dimensional in character. Thus, large explosions tend to dissipate much of their destructive power into the atmosphere. Four one-megaton weapons can cause about as much damage as one 16-megaton weapon. At optimal burst heights, a 100 kiloton explosion creates overpressures of 10 psi out to 1.3 miles, and increasing the yield tenfold, to one megaton, only doubles the radius at which the same overpressures are encountered.

While it is possible to deliver a very comprehensive speech on SALT TWO without ever describing the exact terms of the agreement, every speaker must be familiar with the nature of those provisions that have been made public. There are a few unresolved issues that remain under active negotiation, but the general outlines of the final document

have become generally known. The agreement will consist of three parts. The first part is the Basic Agreement which will last until the year 1985. The second part, a Protocol to the Basic Agreement, will be of shorter duration, and will expire several years before 1985. The third part is a Statement of Principles that will contain the agenda and set the goals for the SALT THREE negotiations which will begin after SALT TWO has been completed.

The Basic Agreement contains the overall, numerical limitations on how many strategic weapons the United States and the Soviet Union may have. This number will be equal for both sides, and it amounts initially, in the aggregate to 2,400 land-based ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and long-range, strategic bombers. During the period of the basic agreement, the allowable total will be reduced to 2,250. The Basic Agreement also contains separate limitations which restrict the number of MIRVed systems which each side may deploy and these sublimits will be 1,320 for the total number of MIRVed ICBMs, MIRVed SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped with long-range cruise missiles; 1200 for the total number of MIRVed missiles (both ICBMs and SLBMs); and 820 for MIRVed ICBMs alone.

The Protocol to the Basic Agreement contains the basic restrictions on certain types of new weapons which neither

side has yet deployed. It will ban the deployment (but not development) of mobile missiles. Finally, the Protocol will contain certain range limitations applicable to cruise missiles. The Protocol restrictions on both mobile missiles and cruise missiles will expire before the United States could be ready to deploy such weapons.

The Statement of Principles sets forth the objectives for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic weapons. The SALT talks are a continuing process, in which both sides seek to achieve a more stable strategic environment and an end to the nuclear arms race. Progress in this area cannot be achieved in rapid and dramatic advances, but only through the careful and patient persistence of both sides. Audiences are often interested in a history of SALT, which demonstrates the sophistication of the process, the care taken in its negotiation and the bi-partisan nature of the effort.

The concept of bilateral negotiations on the limitation of strategic weapons was first formulated in 1968 during the administration of President Johnson. The first session of the SALT ONE talks got underway the following year. The SALT ONE talks resulted in a treaty which prohibits the deployment of Anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems except for one site in defense of the national

A-VIII/10/24

capital of either side. SALT ONE also produced an Interim Agreement which froze the number of land-based missile launchers to the number in existence in 1972, and placed a ceiling on the number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles deployed by each nation. The SALT TWO negotiations commenced under Presidents Nixon and Ford; indeed, when the Carter Administration took office it inherited a text of the SALT TWO agreement which was roughly 70 percent complete. The SALT process has also benefited from extensive participation in the formulation of U.S. negotiating strategy by all of the agencies involved with the national security of the United States. Instructions to the Delegation in Geneva are approved in Washington after they have been reviewed and cleared by representatives of the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the intelligence community, and the National Security Council. Important decisions are personally approved by the President.

There are a number of related issues which affect the public's perception of the SALT TWO agreement. Most of these can be handled in the context of question and answer sessions, and because these particular topics are rather specific in nature they are difficult to integrate into the text of an actual speech. These major related issues

A-VIII/10/25

include the following: Soviet civil defense, ICBM vulnerability, cancellation of the B-1 bomber, Allied strategic forces, the role of China in strategic affairs, cruise missile limitations and their verification, and U.S. plans for a possible mobile basing system for landbased ICBMs. While it is ordinarily not necessary to address these questions directly in a prepared presentation, every speaker should be familiar with the policy guidance that has been developed for responding to public inquiries about these concerns. Material relating to each of these topics has previously been distributed separately.

Inevitably, each speaker will encounter a certain number of questions which have only a marginal bearing on the SALT TWO negotiations. It is impossible to formulate guidance on the full range of topics that can be raised by an audience, and each speaker will have to draw from his own background and expertise in coping with some of the questions that he or she may be asked. A useful approach in explaining the Department's concept of the role of public affairs in foreign policy is to note that it is difficult to make a firm distinction today between international events and domestic reaction. The Department has an obligation to seek out and consider the views of the American people when major foreign policy initiatives are under consideration. SALT TWO will undoubtedly be the most important foreign



- 21 -

policy issue before the American people in 1979, and the Department's speakers program is an effort to explain the Administration's policies in a clear and comprehensible manner. We do not intend to "lobby" the American people in any sense, but we do feel that the public has the right to a full explanation of our goals and objectives in the SALT process, and an accounting of how well we have preserved our national interests.

Matthew Nimetz  
October 13, 1978

*Instructions Subject File* *A-VIII/15/1*  
*SALT II* *Box 26* *12/22/75 - 2/23/77* *BA* (5-1)  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 22, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR

ANNE WEXLER  
MATT NIMETZ

SUBJECT: Draft SALT Cable

Attached is the "short" version of the draft SALT cable. I am working on a longer version which I will get to you early this afternoon. Let me know if you think the attached draft should be reoriented in any particular direction.

Roger Molander

Attachment  
Cable

DRAFT SALT MAILGRAM

TN

A-1111/15/2  
11:08 a.m.

The President has asked me to communicate to you his thoughts on the recent progress in the SALT negotiations and the Summit meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev scheduled for mid-January.

At the recent meetings in Geneva between Secretary Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, agreement in principle was reached on all of the major outstanding SALT issues. [While some additional work will be required to translate this agreement in principle into Treaty language, we are fully confident that the full text of an agreement will be ready for the President and General Secretary Brezhnev to sign at the Summit meeting in January.] <sup>emerging SALT TWO</sup> The/ agreement will be a major step in stabilizing our relationship with the Soviet Union and reducing the risk of nuclear war. It will ensure that a potentially wasteful and dangerous strategic arms race does not take place and will maintain the momentum of a process that has spanned ten years and four administrations.

The SALT TWO package will consist of a Basic Agreement lasting through 1985, a three-year Protocol to this agreement, and a Statement of Principles for SALT THREE. The Basic Agreement contains the overall, numerical limitations on the numbers of offensive strategic weapons that either side may deploy and a number of additional important qualitative limitations. The Protocol limits certain systems that neither side was willing to restrict for the length of the Basic Agreement, in essence keeping open certain arms control options while both sides decide how they want to proceed with these systems.

There are a number of important consequences from this agreement.

For example:

- Without SALT TWO, the Soviets could have nearly one-third more strategic forces by the late 1980s, and we would have no alternative but to keep pace with such deployments. We clearly can use those scarce resources in other vital defense and domestic programs, particularly now.
- Not only does the agreement provide for equal numbers of strategic arms but for the first time the Soviets will have to actually reduce their strategic force level. They will have to take a 10 percent cut in their strategic forces, over 250 missiles or bombers, when this agreement is fully implemented. At the same time, we will be free to increase slightly our own strategic force level if we choose.
- The qualitative limitations in the agreement restrict the Soviets to the development of only one new ICBM, whereas we would have expected two to three new ICBMs during this period based on past experience. At the same time, we can use our right to a new ICBM to go ahead with our M-X mobile ICBM program.
- The cruise missile limits in the agreement permit us to fully implement our plan to modernize our strategic bomber force with cruise missiles and proceed without restraint in our development and testing program for ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles.

Among the other important details of the agreement are numerous provisions related to verification which insure that this agreement is adequately verifiable by our own national means of verification, a critical consideration which insures that we do not have to depend on trust of Soviet good faith.

In sum, the emerging SALT TWO agreement is a major accomplishment in our continuing effort to stabilize our relationship with the world's other superpower and maintain the process of arms control rather than the building of more weapons as the safest and preferred way to enhance national security.

Upon signing, this agreement will go to the Congress and to the public for the detailed scrutiny that a document of this nature warrants. We believe it is an agreement that is very much in our interest and in the interest of the world as a whole, and we hope that you will give it your full support.

A-VIII/15/5

- SALT Briefing - <sup>Arat</sup> Nimitz, <sup>John</sup> Newhouse, <sup>Shen</sup> McCa  
[633-4404] <sup>Roger</sup> Mills  
NE
- Soviets will have dismantle 370 units
- took 6 years to negotiate; most lightly drawn agreement in history;
- verifiable important - great distrust of Soviet intentions
- 30 Senators have sat in on negotiating sessions
- Who is ahead? disagreement about military per-pare
- SALT + defense are two sides of same process; can try to outthink to reach equality or put a cap on equality now?
- we are able to detect violations immediately; don't believe S's have interest in doing so;
- Soviet economic base 1/2 size of U.S. nation power a function of wealth; economy badly in need of structural change; technological improvement
- \*\* - [Statement from MN or EM]
- expand arms control talks, proliferate things CTR, restrain conventional arms
- SALT II - will not expand human rights; will not do away with competition but minimize the risks that every world problem

A-1111/15/E

can lead to nuclear war

# - Opposition to SALT

1. Soviets took advantage of SALT I to deploy new set of ICBMs, mobile, capable of taking and land based missiles on first strike diminish U.S. will to establish presence or retaliate
  - 2 - submarine forces superior; 2-1 advantage in heavy bombers; technological advantages in missile guidance & targeting; MIRV superiority; 2-1 ratio of deliverable weapons + greater accuracy; greater balanced mix of forces - less vulnerable; fewer on sides
- we have advantage, but both sides can destroy other's society; # of deliverable weapons will be roughly comparable at end of SALT II
  - Soviets have advantage in time-weight
  - every European govt supportive of any interests in reaching SALT II agreement;
  - a progressively less stable nuclear relationship plus decreasing bilateral relationships increases risk of conflict in Europe where greatest concentration of conventional forces exists
  - SALT II will permit a continued technical improvement of NATO conventional forces
  - NATO wanted FBS out of agreement - ground based - aircraft; cruise missiles vs SS 20

backfire banger - primarily European theater weapon

- No agency of U.S. govt. order past compliance  
w/ the administration has found evidence of  
violations of SALT I;

- prohibits efforts to impede verification or  
efforts to conceal; SALT guarantees an  
right to monitor Soviets which is a  
great advantage for open society; have  
non-class capability to verify MIRV's;

- can see a net over a missile;

- how does it increase or security?  
how expensive for Soviet?  
what are consequences of failure?

- one missile hitting a street in X city  
everything destroyed

- SALT II permits an nation to withstand  
attack & retaliate with sufficient force  
to destroy nation - 60% of pop. 70% of  
economic capacity 60-70% of military force

- SALT I removed uncertainty of BM penetrating  
ABMs by removing ABMs

XXX - SALT I Compliance Document -

- at end of 7 years - would still be  
equivalent; if there had been full  
ABM employment would have cost \$ billions



- we are committed to maintaining balance — here — done — capability for increasing the destructive weapons or seeing agreement on growth & versatility of weapons — 4 administrations have done better — 1st done would maintain rough balance but gyroscope imbalance — SALT reduces uncertainties — spend & spend to stay in balance
- stronger than limitations
- one step in process; trying down uncertainties;

TALKING POINTS ON THE SALT TWO AGREEMENT  
FOR USE WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

I. TALKING POINTS TO BE USED ON FRIDAY MORNING PRIOR  
TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

-- The President has asked me to call you with a report on the ongoing negotiations on the SALT TWO Agreement between Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva.

-- Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister Gromyko met on Thursday and are still meeting today to try to resolve the remaining issues that separate the two sides in SALT TWO.

-- While we have not as yet reached final agreement on all of the details, the agreement that is emerging will insure that a potentially wasteful and dangerous strategic arms race does not take place. Without SALT TWO, the Soviets could have nearly one-third more strategic forces by the late 1980's, and we would have no alternative but to keep pace with such deployments. We can use those scarce resources in other vital defense and domestic programs, particularly now.

-- Second, for the first time we have an agreement that limits each side to equal numbers of strategic arms. The Soviets have had more strategic arms than we since 1972 and, as you know, SALT ONE froze numbers of ballistic missiles but left the inequality in overall strategic force levels.

-- Third, for the first time the Soviets will have to actually reduce their level of strategic arms. They will have to take a 10% cut in their strategic forces, over 250 missiles or bombers, when this agreement is fully implemented. At the same time, we will be free to increase slightly our own strategic force level if we choose.

-- Fourth, the Soviets will only be allowed to develop and test one new ICBM. We would have expected two to three new ICBMs during this period based on past experience. At the same time, we can use our right to a new ICBM to go ahead with our M-X program.

-- Fifth, the cruise missile limits in SALT have no impact on our plans for development, testing, or deployment of cruise missiles. In particular we can proceed to fully implement plan to modernize our bomber force with cruise missiles.

-- Sixth, we are confident that we can verify the terms of this agreement. We have strong provisions to enhance verification and preclude interference with, or impeding of, our technical means of verification such as photoreconnaissance satellites.

-- Finally, this agreement clearly will enhance our national security and reduce the risk of nuclear war -- the principal aim of our defense, arms control and foreign policy.

A-VIII/16/3

/CONTINGENCY TALKING POINTS -- IF ASKED:

-- Backfire. This issue is still being discussed. We want and expect to get adequate assurances that Backfire aircraft are not being produced at a rate in excess of the current production rate. We are free to counter the Backfire and we want to have greater certainty about the size of future deployment.

-- Minuteman Vulnerability. SALT TWO permits verifiable mobile or MAP systems that may be necessary to respond to the Minuteman vulnerability problem. It should be kept in mind that this is not a problem created by SALT. It is a problem of advancing technology making fixed land-based ICBMs increasingly vulnerable on both sides. However, SALT TWO will limit the Soviet threat to mobile or MAP systems which are the likely U.S. response to the Minuteman problem. In short, SALT TWO helps to make the Minuteman vulnerability problem manageable. Z

II. ADDITIONAL TALKING POINTS FOR DESCRIBING THE  
AGREEMENT IN MORE DETAIL

-- As you know, the SALT TWO package will consist of a Basic Agreement lasting through 1985, a three-year Protocol to this agreement, and a Statement of Principles for SALT THREE. The Basic Agreement contains the overall, numerical limitations on the numbers of offensive strategic weapons that either side may deploy. These systems, consisting of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, will be cut back to a ceiling of 2250. As I indicated, this will require the Soviets to dismantle over 250 operational strategic weapons.

-- There will also be a sublimit of 1320 on the number of MIRVed ICBMs, MIRVed SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped with long-range cruise missiles.

-- There will also be an additional sublimit of 1200 on MIRVed ICBMs and MIRVed SLBMs and a limit of 820 on MIRVed ICBMs.

-- The Basic Agreement also includes a number of qualitative limitations, including in particular a limit of only one new type of ICBM on each side.

-- The Protocol will last for approximately three years -- and will limit certain systems that neither side was willing to restrict for the length of the Basic Agreement. In essence, the Protocol keeps open certain arms control options while both sides decide how they want to proceed with these systems.

-- For example, the development and flight-testing of mobile missiles will be banned for the period of the Protocol. This will have no impact whatever on the M-X program since the first flight tests of the M-X missile are not scheduled until after Protocol expiration.

-- Similarly, the deployment of ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles over 600 km are banned for the Protocol, while at the same time there are no restrictions on the development and testing of these systems. This will have no impact whatever on U.S. ground- and sea-launched cruise missile programs since these missiles are not scheduled for deployment until after the Protocol period. In this context, it is important to note that there are no upper range limits of any kind on the air-launched cruise missiles which we plan to deploy on our strategic bombers.

-- The Statement of Principles for SALT THREE sets out the agenda and establishes basic ground rules for the follow-on negotiations.

-- We have consulted closely with our NATO Allies throughout the SALT TWO negotiations. They have expressed satisfaction with the course of the negotiations to date and believe that the emerging agreement does make a significant contribution to Alliance security.

III. ADDITIONAL TALKING POINTS ON THE STATUS OF THE  
NEGOTIATIONS

-- The major differences that remained before the Geneva talks were the following:

- \* Whether to limit conventionally-armed as well as nuclear-armed cruise missiles after expiration of the Protocol.

- \* The number of MIRVs that could be placed on any future ICBM.

- \* The number of air-launched cruise missiles that could be deployed on heavy bombers.

- \* The question of dealing with telemetry encryption so that its use in the future would not impede verification of the terms of the agreement.

- \* The duration of the Protocol to the SALT TWO Agreement, and the amount of time permitted for all dismantling and destruction activities.

- \* How to handle the assurances to be given us by the Soviets concerning the Backfire bomber.

IV. CONTINGENCY TALKING POINTS TO BE USED IF MOST OR ALL OF THE MAJOR OUTSTANDING ISSUES ARE RESOLVED AND A SUMMIT SCHEDULED

-- I am very pleased to be able to tell you that major progress was made on most of these issues. The two sides are now in general agreement on /almost/ all the major issues, and we believe a basis has now been laid for a summit meeting. Further work will be necessary on a range of technical questions which will be handled by our Delegations in Geneva. At the same time, we cannot rule out the possibility that one or two questions will have to be resolved at the summit.

-- Specifically, Vance and Gromyko have now agreed to settle the principal remaining issues on the following terms:

- \* ICBM Fractionation
- \* ALCM Number Limits
- \* Cruise Missile Definition
- \* Telemetry Encryption
- \* Backfire

/NOTE: We would describe the outcome on these issues when it is known./



V. SUMMARY COMMENTS

-- In summary, I would note that we have been negotiating SALT TWO for some six years and believe that we have an agreement that will serve the national security interests of the United States. Specifically, it provides for the first time that there be equal aggregates in strategic weapons. This will require the Soviets for the first time in any agreement to actually dismantle and destroy more than 250 presently operational systems, while we will not have to dismantle any.

-- Second, it provides for specific sublimits on their most formidable weapons -- MIRVed ICBMs.

-- Third, it provides for the first time real qualitative restrictions -- only one new type of missile to each side for the next seven years and limits on the number of warheads per missile.

-- Fourth, it does not impede any of our ongoing research and development programs -- including mobile missiles, cruise missiles, the M-X missile, or the Trident submarine.

-- Fifth, it contains strong provisions on verification to enable us to monitor Soviet compliance.

-- Sixth, it introduces an important element of stability into U.S.-Soviet relations and the world as a whole that significantly reduces the chance of nuclear war.

-- I hope that you will reserve your judgment until you have a chance to study the final text of the agreement and discuss it with us. Please feel free to contact me at any time should you have any questions about the Geneva talks or the agreement as a whole. We will be glad to give you or your staff a detailed briefing any time next week.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN

DATE: JANUARY 30, 1979

SUBJECT: SALT II RATIFICATION WORK PLAN

This notebook contains the work plan for the SALT II ratification effort. It was developed in close conjunction with Frank Moore and his staff.

The work plan is divided into six sections: Activities to Date, Present Activities, Summit Announcement, The Summit, The Hearings and Floor Debate.

In each section, tasks are broken down by function: Congressional Liaison, Public Outreach, Media, Press, etc. This format will help us establish priorities among the hundreds of tasks that must be completed if SALT II is to be ratified.

The Task Force will consist of myself, David Aaron, Frank, Jody, Jerry, and Anne from the White House staff; Warren Christopher and Matt Nimetz from State; General Seignious from ACDA; Charles Duncan from Defense; Frank Carlucci from CIA; and Dick Moe from the Vice President's staff.

Our first meeting will be this Monday, February 5, at 1:00 p.m.

A-VIII/17/2

#### ACTIVITIES TO DATE

During the last year, a solid foundation has been laid for the upcoming SALT II ratification effort. The work has been done quietly, without major press attention, and with a minimum of visible White House involvement.

#### Congressional Liaison

--Twenty pro-SALT Senators (the so-called "Cranston group") have been thoroughly briefed by the State Department. The Senators have developed both expertise and competent staff support; when a SALT II treaty is presented to the Senate, it will have a significant and well-prepared group of advocates.

--Twenty-one Senators have visited Geneva to witness the negotiations; fifteen have recently visited Moscow.

--All but sixteen Senators and their staffs have been briefed at least once during 1978.

#### Public Outreach.

A State coordinating committee under Matt Nimetz has initiated and directed a broad public outreach effort:

--Publications. Five general SALT brochures have been developed and over 300,000 copies distributed. Fifty additional publications have been prepared or are planned, including reprints of speeches, issue papers, and Q-and-A brochures.

--Public Speakers Program. Five full-time persons are staffing a speakers bureau; sixty speakers have been trained and over 600 live forums have been addressed to date.

--Media. State/ACDA spokesmen have participated to date in over 650 live and direct-wire TV, radio and print interviews.

--State Leadership Conferences. Seven full-time persons at State are organizing SALT conferences throughout the country. Eight very successful conferences have been held to date; twenty-seven others are planned over the next few months.

--Special Interest Briefings. ACDA has begun plans for a series of seven Washington conferences for special interest groups: women, veterans, etc.

Press

- Over 100 editorial board briefings have been held during 1978; nearly 500 individual editors have been briefed.
- Ongoing in-house conferences at State have been held for members of the regional press covering SALT and other foreign policy issues.
- High-level department officials have met regularly on SALT with selected reporters and columnists.
- SALT publications have been mailed to 6000 editors, columnists and broadcasters.

Major Public Figure Liaison

- The President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, which includes such prominent individuals as Tom Watson, Brent Scowcroft, Arthur Krim and McGeorge Bundy, has met for two days each month for the past year. Most members, acting as individuals, will lobby actively for SALT II.
- Major public figures (Kissinger, Laird, etc) have been informally contacted on SALT by Administration officials.

Allied Liaison

- Frequent SALT briefings have been held for the North Atlantic Council, the Defense Planning Committee, the Nuclear Planning Group; in addition, other bilateral and informal consultations have been held.

A-VIII/17/4

PRESENT ACTIVITIES

Until the negotiations are far enough along to announce a summit, the White House staff will avoid a highly visible role in planning for SALT II ratification: we will not give the appearance of promoting a treaty which is still being negotiated. Because the treaty is not available, we will be particularly vulnerable to opposition criticism during this period; we should be prepared to react quickly to criticism from hostile columnists and members of Congress. During this period, the task force will meet daily.

Congressional Liaison

- The President will continue meetings with key Senators.
- The briefings begun in January for the entire Senate and appropriate staff on the current status of negotiations will be completed.
- Selected members of the Cranston group will be consulted on our overall ratification strategy.
- A single, comprehensive, confidential congressional strategy memo will be prepared for you.
- Foreign policy briefings for House and Senate leadership will be held on February 1 and 5; the President, Secretary Vance, Secretary Brown and Brzezinski will brief.
- Briefings will be given to new Senators in early February by Brzezinski.

Public Outreach

- Ongoing outreach activities will continue. Leadership conference will be held during this period in Nashville, Minneapolis, Indianapolis, Birmingham, and Denver. ACDA briefings will be held for scientists, health professors and the Presidential Commission on Executive Management. The speakers bureau has 85 live forums with 100 follow-on media events scheduled for the month of February, plus a major conference on SALT in the context of Soviet-American relations, January 31, in Riverside, California.
- Detailed planning will begin for generating grassroots activity.
- Lists will be prepared of individuals in critical states who can call their Senators when a summit is announced.

A-VIII/17/5

- A comprehensive theme memo will be prepared which will reconcile the views of State, USC, DOD and ACDA and deal specifically with the key questions of linkage and verification.
- Contact will be made with networks producing SALT specials.
- The possibility of a televised town meeting will be explored with the Foreign Policy Association.
- Production of a film for TV and live forum use will be planned.

#### Press

- State and White House Media Liaison will cooperate on plans for a Washington conference for 500-700 out-of-town editors in February.

#### Public Figure Liaison

- The General Advisory Committee will be briefed, at their request, on ratification politics.
- Eight or ten major public figures will be briefed on the current status of negotiations, outstanding issues, etc.
- In Washington, New York and possibly Los Angeles, Hamilton Jordan and Secretary Vance will seek to pull together a loose alliance of prominent individuals (Edward Bennett Williams, Jane Pheiffer, etc) to help informally with the task of reaching leading opinion makers.

#### Other

- A strategy will be developed for coordinating the SALT II ratification effort with the Defense Department's effort to explain our overall defense posture and plans.

A-6111/17/6

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Finally, the Congressional leadership, the full Senate, and other key figures should be contacted in advance of the summit announcement. Senators will be asked either to support the treaty or to withhold comment until they have had ample time to study the entire text. During this period the task force will meet daily.

#### Congressional Liaison

--Two or three days before the expected conclusion of the talks, the Senate and key House leadership should receive notice of a summit announcement.

--Following the summit announcement, a letter from the President asking withholding of final judgement should be sent to the full Congress; the President should brief key congressional leaders at the White House; and detailed briefings for the entire Senate and appropriate staff should begin.

#### Public Outreach

--Anne Wexler's office will send telegrams to leaders of key constituencies urging an open mind. Detailed information will follow the telegrams.

--Supporters of SALT II in critical states will be asked to contact their Senators immediately after the announcement.

--Other ongoing outreach activities will continue through this period.

#### Media

--Vance, Brown, Brzezinski, et al will be scheduled for Sunday issue programs, morning talk shows, and other media appearances.

#### Press

--Prior to the announcement, background briefings for the Washington press corps will be conducted; and editors favorable to SALT II will be asked to take the lead in urging an open mind on the treaty.

--After the announcement, detailed briefings will begin for Pentagon and State Department press corps, editorial writers, commentators, etc.; background information will be mailed to editors; and periodic briefings for non-Washington editors will continue.



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the announcement, major figures such as Ford, Kissinger and Reagan will be contacted by the President, Secretary Vance, of Secretary Brown, offered a full briefing, and asked either to support the treaty or withhold final judgement.

- Major figures already sympathetic to SALT II will be asked to call Senators with whom they have influence to urge either support or an open mind.

#### Allied Liaison

- The North Atlantic Council will be briefed in Europe prior to the announcement.

During this period, all arrangements for the summit must be planned and coordinated. The summit will provide our first opportunity to explain the full treaty to the American public. In addition, it will be our best opportunity to address public concerns about Soviet-American relations.

The task force will meet daily during the period between the summit announcement and the actual summit meeting.

#### Congressional Liaison

- The entire Senate and key House leaders will be briefed in advance on the summit schedule.
- Congress will be involved in as many aspects of the summit as possible; Brezhnev will be given as much exposure to the Hill as possible.
- We will begin a series of one-on-one meetings with critical Senators, preferably at private residences by the Vice President, Secretary Vance, Secretary Brown and Brzezinski.

#### Public Outreach

During the summit period, the following groups will be briefed:

- arms control and defense groups
- foreign policy establishment organizations
- the scientific community
- church groups
- Administration officials
- Washington lobbyists
- veterans groups.

At this time, we will also assess the need for a moderate citizens committee on SALT, and begin planning post-summit speaking tours by Administration spokesmen.

#### Media/Press

A detailed media and press plan will be developed which will encompass public appearances by the President, the Vice President, Secretary Vance and Secretary Brown; background briefings for the networks and related press; and other appropriate efforts.

#### Major Public Figure Liaison

- Public figures will be included in one-on-one briefings on summit plans.

A-VIII/17/9

THE HEARINGS

Immediately after the summit, the Administration's activities should leave no doubt that we plan an all-out fight for facilitation. The President should make at least one major public appearance soon after the summit, possibly a town hall meeting, on SALT II. Secretary Vance, Secretary Brown, General Seignious and others will testify before Senate committees; in addition, they should make cross-country speaking trips to targeted states.

The MX basing mode decision may be made during this period.  
The task force will meet at least once per week.

Congressional Liaison

Ongoing lobbying efforts will continue. In addition, the Congressional Liaison staff will assist with the coordination of targeted state briefings and speaking tours.

Public Outreach

--Cross-country speaking tours will be made by Secretary Vance, Secretary Brown, Brzezinski, General Seignious and other Administration officials. At the same time, efforts will intensify to generate grassroots support in critical states, with the ultimate objective of generating mail during the floor debate period.

--White House briefings will begin for targeted state groups and special interest groups; the President, Vice President, Secretary Vance, Secretary Brown, Brzezinski, General Seignious, Stan Turner, and the Joint Chiefs will brief.

Media

--A major Presidential event soon after the summit will be coordinated and planned.

--Media exposure (talk shows, etc.) for Administration spokespersons will be coordinated.

--Coverage of the targeted state briefings will be provided to local media.

--Other ongoing media activities will continue.

Press

Briefings for out-of-town editors will continue; radio actualities will be targeted to local stations.

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Allied Liaison

--Prior to the summit, briefings will be scheduled with  
the North Atlantic Council and European heads of state.

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...support from prominent figures such as Bell, Kissinger, Clifford, et al will be encouraged and coordinated.

### ALL-120 Liaison

After the summit, A SALT endorsement will be sought from the North Atlantic Council and, collectively, from the heads of state of our European allies.

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Our objectives during this period will be to obtain maximum results from the work which has taken place in the earlier phases: we will seek the broadest possible support for the treaty through constituent contact, the press, supportive public figures, and our own lobby efforts. The task force will meet daily throughout the period of the floor debate.

#### Congressional Liaison

Presidential meetings with key Senators will be coordinated, and lobby efforts of Administration spokesmen and supportive prominent figures will continue.

#### Public Outreach

Efforts will be maximized to generate expressions of grassroots support for ratification, especially through congressional mail.

#### Media

Scheduling of Administration spokesmen on television talk shows will continue; coverage of targeted state briefings for the local press will also continue.

#### Press

Regional briefings and regular contact with editorial boards will continue. Just before the Senate vote, friendly editorial writers and commentators will be asked to make one last push on SALT.

#### Major Public Figure Liaison

Efforts will be maximized to encourage prominent public figures to support SALT II.

DETAILED AGENDA  
SALT TASK FORCE  
February 5, 1979

- Task force purpose and membership [Encourage members that task force should be for principals only with no substitutions; discourage bringing aides. In addition to principals you have only asked Butler, Beckel and Moffett to sit in.]
- Propose a regular time and meeting place [Eleanor suggests Mondays, 2:00 PM, Roosevelt Room. Beckel will be meeting regularly on Wednesdays with CL SALT group]
- Staff work [Staff work for the task force will be coordinated through Landon Butler. Butler and Beckel will coordinate CL/ task force components of SALT effort.]
- Possible time frame [Summit announcement - late Feb/early March  
Summit - mid/late March  
Hearings - April/May  
Floor debate - June/July]
- Description of Presidential memo [--Activities to date  
--Current activities  
--Summit announcement  
--Summit  
--Hearings  
--Floor debate]
- Congressional assessment [Frank and Bob]
- Assignments
  - 4(a) Completion of Congressional strategy memo - eyes only for the President [Frank/Bob - by February 12th]
  - 4(b) Preparation of lists of key supporters of critical Senators [Anne - by Feb. 12th] - 7/11/79
  - 4(c) Completion of plans for establishing grass-roots activity [Anne - by Feb. 12th]
  - 4(d) Begin preparation of graphs, other visuals [Nimetz - report progress on Feb. 12th]

A-VIII/18/2

- (e) Prepare recommendations for DoD program to explain U.S. defense posture and plans [Charles Duncan - by Feb. 12th]
  - (f) Brief General Advisory Council on ratification strategy [Bob - by Feb. 12th]
  - (g) Finalize public figure liaison strategy [Landon - by Feb. 12th]
  - (h) Initiate contact with prominent individuals in New York, Washington to help informally with the task of reaching leading opinion makers [Hamilton - by February 25th]
  - (i) Report on plans for production of film for TV, live forum use and on possible televised town meeting [Jerry - by Feb. 12th]
  - (j) Develop press strategy to deal on short notice with anti-SALT articles, commentary [Jody - by Feb. 12th]
  - (k) Develop estimates of added defense costs which would be incurred in the event of failure to ratify SALT [Charles - by Feb. 12th]
- Clearance [Remind task force that all testimony and responses to substantive questions from Congress and press must be cleared through Roger Molander; all Congressional contacts to be cleared through Frank Moore's office.]

*File in  
Charles  
Molander's  
file*



Speeches, Serial 116 A-VIII/19-1  
Speeches, Serial 116 B-VI/26  
Speeches, Serial 116 C-VI/17, 18

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QUESTIONS AMERICANS ARE ASKING.





Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union have been formally underway since 1969 during the administrations of three American presidents: Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and now Jimmy Carter. The purpose of the talks is to promote our national security by reducing the risk of nuclear war through negotiation of mutual limits on strategic nuclear arms. In 1972, the negotiations resulted in the first SALT agreements—the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms. Since then—during nearly six years of tough bargaining—both nations have arrived at the broad outlines of a new agreement, called SALT TWO, and accord has been reached on many of its specific provisions.

SALT—and all arms control policy—is part of national security policy. Our basic arms control policy and our specific negotiating positions are developed through the National Security Council with the participation of all the responsible agencies and their heads: the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Director of Central Intelligence. The U.S. SALT Delegation, which is negotiating with the U.S.S.R. Delegation in Geneva under instructions approved by the President, has representation from the agencies responsible for national security policy.

In the nuclear age, both military forces and arms control serve our national security. We need a strong and flexible military capability


to deter any potential aggressor from attacking and, if deterrence should fail, to defend ourselves and our allies. Our nuclear and conventional forces—land, sea, and air—are designed for these missions.

As the nuclear arms race developed, however, both the United States and the Soviet Union recognized that an unlimited arms race might endanger rather than preserve the security of both nations. This recognition gave birth to the SALT process, which, in its simplest terms, seeks equitable and adequately verifiable limitations on strategic arms to enhance the national security of both sides.

In SALT, the stakes are enormous. The fact that nuclear weapons have not been employed for over 30 years should not cause us to ignore

the devastating consequences of nuclear war. Weapons with intercontinental ranges and previously unimagined explosive power can destroy in minutes what it has taken centuries to build. Although we are confident of our ability to maintain nuclear deterrence and a clear balance in strategic forces without a new agreement, we could face the possibility of an escalating arms race, increased tension between this nation and the Soviet Union, and a greater risk of the catastrophe of nuclear war. SALT may well be the most important negotiation the United States has ever undertaken.


A national debate on this most serious of issues has already begun. Below are answers to some of the questions that Americans are asking about SALT and American security.



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## Which nation has stronger strategic forces today, the United States or the Soviet Union?



In terms of overall strategic nuclear power, the two nations are roughly equal. Both sides have immensely powerful strategic nuclear forces that can bring catastrophic devastation to each other or any other attacker.


In terms of specific forces, the United States leads in some categories; the Soviets lead in others. Today, for example, we have about twice as many deliverable strategic nuclear warheads. The Soviets have more and larger land-based missiles, but ours are more accurate. We have a substantially larger heavy bomber force, more of which is on alert, and our bombers are more capable. The Soviets have extensive air defenses, whereas U.S. air defenses are minimal. Both nations possess secure retaliatory weapons on ballistic missile-firing submarines. The Soviet Union possesses a larger number of submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), however, the United States has far more of its strategic nuclear weapons at sea on its submarines than does the Soviet Union.

Although the Soviets are making major efforts to catch up, we continue, in most cases, to be far ahead of the Soviet Union in economic and technological strength—important for preserving strong strategic capabilities in the future. Looking to this future, both sides are modernizing their forces so that each may always maintain powerful and secure strategic nuclear power.

## What will be in the SALT TWO agreement?

SALT TWO will consist of a Basic Agreement which will remain in force through 1985, a Protocol which will expire well before that date, and a Statement of Principles which will establish general guidelines for subsequent negotiations. SALT THREE.

Each country initially will be limited to an equal total number of 2,400 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, a ceiling which will be reduced to 2,250 well before 1985. Under the overall ceiling, there will also be three important sublimits: a 1,200 sublimit on launchers of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) equipped with multiple independent entry targetable warheads (MIRVs); launchers of MIRVed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and airplanes equipped for long-range cruise missiles; within the 1,200, a 1,200 sublimit on launchers of MIRVed ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs); and within the 1,200, an 820 sublimit on launchers of MIRVed ICBMs. The sublimits on MIRVs are important because the use of MIRVs rapidly increases the ability of each side to strike a greater number of targets on the other side. The Protocol may include such measures as a ban on the deployment of launchers of mobile ICBMs and limitations on cruise missiles.



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## What will the SALT TWO agreement mean for American security?

The new agreement will improve our security in several significant ways:

- It will place equal numerical limits on the overall U.S. and Soviet strategic forces. To comply, the Soviets will have to dismantle or destroy up to 300 strategic systems. We will not have to dismantle or destroy any systems that currently are operational.
- It will hold the deployment of Soviet strategic forces, including their most threatening intercontinental missiles, well below what they could deploy in the absence of an agreement.
- It will somewhat reduce uncertainty in our strategic planning, since we will know the maximum number of strategic systems the Soviet Union will be allowed to deploy.

—It will contain important provisions to help us determine that the Soviets are living up to their obligations in the agreement.

—It will allow us the flexibility we need to continue the strategic programs we require.


In sum, SALT TWO will provide a framework for maintaining essential equivalence between the United States and the Soviet Union, and it will, in conjunction with an aggressive U.S. strategic force modernization program, contribute to stability in the strategic balance.



## How can we be sure that the Russians will live up to the agreement?

In SALT, we do not rely on trust or Soviet good faith. The 1972 SALT ONE agreements established the principle that both nations would use their diverse and sophisticated intelligence capabilities—known as 'National Technical Means'—to monitor compliance. National Technical Means, such as satellite photography, are very effective. Through them, we are able to monitor the number of strategic nuclear delivery systems the Soviets have, their basic characteristics and when, where, and how they are tested. The SALT ONE agreements also prohibited any interference with these means and any deliberate concealment measures which could impede verification of compliance with the provisions of those agreements. SALT TWO will continue these prohibitions, and will in fact contain additional detailed provisions to increase our confidence that the Soviets are complying with the agreement. It should be noted that without a SALT agreement containing such prohibitions, the Soviets would be free to use any and all methods of concealment, making our overall monitoring task far more difficult.

The SALT ONE agreements also provided for the establishment of the joint Standing Consultative Commission, a forum in which the United States and the U.S.S.R. address questions about matters relating to the implementation of the agreements, including questions of compliance. In the Commission, both sides have raised a number of activities which they judged to be ambiguous or subject to question and which were thus a source of some concern. In each case the United States has raised the activity in question, has either ceased or additional information has allayed our concern. At the same time, both sides have made it clear that the dynamic nature of implementation and compliance could require the reopening of any of those subjects or the raising of new questions at any time. Consequently, the Soviets are well aware that the United States will call them to account for any questionable activities relating to their strategic programs and will expect satisfactory resolution of any problems involved.




## Under the SALT agreement, won't our Minuteman missiles be vulnerable to Soviet attack?

With or without SALT, our Minuteman missiles will become increasingly vulnerable to attack by Soviet ICBMs. This situation is the result of Soviet advances in missile accuracy coupled with the deployment of large numbers of ICBM-carried nuclear warheads. It is not the result of SALT. To guard against the potential vulnerability of any one part of our strategic forces is a major reason why the United States has maintained a balanced strategic nuclear force of land-based ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. Each element of this force has its own operational advantages and poses unique problems for the other side. Furthermore, although no decisions have been made, the United States is examining other options such as alternative, more survivable methods for basing ICBMs to compensate for the increasing vulnerability of fixed ICBMs. The SALT TWO draft, as presently agreed, explicitly permits deployment of mobile ICBM launchers after the expiration of the Protocol period—well before such systems would be ready for deployment.

The issue of Minuteman vulnerability must be viewed in perspective. The Soviets face substantial uncertainties in planning an attack on our Minuteman: how reliable and accurate will their missiles really be; can they avoid having the explosion of one attacking warhead damage the effectiveness of subsequent attacking warheads; can they be certain of the hardness of our missile silos; and would the United States launch its own ICBMs once it was determined that a massive Soviet ICBM attack was underway, thus leaving only empty holes for the Soviet missiles to hit?

Finally, as Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has stated, the vulnerability of the Minuteman—even if we did nothing about it—“would not be synonymous with the vulnerability of the United States, or even of the strategic deterrent.” This is because Minuteman missiles constitute only a part of our retaliatory forces. Any Soviet planner must realize that even a successful attack on the Minuteman would still leave the Soviet Union vulnerable to massive response by our ballistic missile-carrying submarines and heavy bombers. The damage these remaining forces could do would be devastating.



Official U.S. Navy Photo

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### What about Soviet civil defense?

Soviet civil defense cannot change the current strategic weapons balance or the fundamentally disastrous nature of a major nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union. The destruction that our retaliation would bring could mean only catastrophe for the Soviet Union. The immediate effects caused by blast, fire, and fallout would be followed by long-term consequences. Most industries would be destroyed and widespread starvation and death from disease would almost certainly occur. Social order would be weakened to the point of breakdown. There would, furthermore, be large-scale contamination of the environment with unpredictable consequences.

We are monitoring the Soviet civil defense program very carefully. Their civil defense program represents a substantially larger effort than ours. However, compared to the United States, the Soviet Union faces even more imposing civil defense problems: severe climatic conditions; more concentrated urban areas; more population located near industrial targets; and an inadequate transportation system for large-scale evacuation. Despite their civil defense program, there is no possibility that in an all-out nuclear war the Soviets could avoid the deaths of tens of millions of their citizens and the destruction of most of their industrial resources and urban areas. As a recently released analysis by the Central Intelligence Agency concluded, "We do not believe that the Soviets' present civil defenses would embolden them deliberately to expose the U.S.S.R. to a higher risk of nuclear attack."



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
## What about the Soviet "Backfire" bomber?

The Soviets have developed a modern swing-wing bomber which bears the NATO designation "Backfire." Its characteristics fall between the characteristics generally attributed to existing heavy bombers and those of medium bombers (tactical aircraft and medium bombers on both sides are not covered by the SALT ceilings). The Backfire can reach a significant number of targets in the United States on one-way, high-altitude, unrefueled missions. However, close observation over a period of years indicates that this bomber is currently being deployed for use in a theater or naval strike role and is a replacement for older Soviet medium bombers.

In this regard, it should be noted that the United States has a number of aircraft which, when deployed in forward bases such as in the European theater, are capable of sinking targets in the Soviet Union. We have refused

to include these aircraft in SALT because they are theater systems and the Soviet forces which they face are not covered by the SALT limits.


The United States has indicated to the Soviets that the Backfire can be excluded from the permitted overall SALT totals if, and only if, the Soviets undertake commitments which will inhibit the Backfire from assuming an intercontinental role in the future, as well as impose limits on its production rate. These commitments would have the same status as the SALT agreement, binding the Soviets to the commitments contained therein. Although there are no assurances that the Backfire would not be used against the United States in time of conflict, these commitments by the Soviet Union are designed to inhibit the Backfire from being given an operational intercontinental role and to limit its overall strategic potential.



UNITED STATES MILITARY POSTURE FOR FY 1979: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff

## Won't SALT TWO constrain the United States cruise missile program?

We have been careful to preserve those cruise missile options most important to our defense needs. The new agreement will permit us to go ahead with the deployment of the air-launched long-range cruise missiles we now have decided to deploy on heavy bombers. The principal limitations on cruise missiles will be contained in the shorter term Protocol. Even during the period of the Protocol we will be permitted to flight test all types of cruise missiles and to deploy ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles capable of ranges up to 600 kilometers (about 375 miles). We will be able to go ahead with development and testing programs for all types of cruise missiles without altering present schedules. After the Protocol expires, there will be no limitations on ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles unless mutually agreed upon in subsequent negotiations. Cruise missile limitations will be an agenda item for SALT THREE.



## Will SALT TWO stop us from developing mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles?

No. The Protocol will prohibit each side from deploying mobile ICBM launchers and flight-testing ICBMs from mobile launchers. Research and development programs short of flight-testing will not be affected.

At present, the United States is studying a number of mobile ICBM-basing concepts, including some involving alternate launch points for each missile. No decision has been made whether or not to deploy mobile ICBM systems. Nor have we decided which particular concept we would implement, if we were to elect to deploy a mobile ICBM system. The current and projected capabilities of our strategic forces give us time to study thoroughly questions of technical feasibility, military effectiveness, and cost prior to making decisions about deploying mobile ICBMs. The parts of the joint draft text of the SALT TWO


agreement that have already been agreed upon allow deployment of mobile ICBM systems of the types we are considering. The draft agreement explicitly permits deployment of mobile ICBM launchers during its term, after the expiration of an interim protocol period which would end well before mobile ICBM systems would be ready for deployment.

Any mobile ICBM basing system would, of course, have to be fully consistent with all provisions—including the verification provisions—of a strategic arms limitation agreement. The United States will not deploy a mobile ICBM system that would not permit adequate verification of the number of launchers deployed, and other provisions of the agreement. We will insist that any Soviet system meet the same verification standards.

## How will SALT TWO affect our NATO allies?

SALT TWO will not place any restrictions on the nuclear forces of France and Great Britain, and it will not limit any of America's nuclear weapons systems located in Europe. There will be no ban on the transfer of cruise missile and other sophisticated technology. SALT, furthermore, will not affect our important efforts to strengthen NATO's conventional forces. We have consulted closely with our allies throughout the course of the SALT negotiations and have taken into account allied security concerns in our negotiating positions.

Where there is a legend in the map, it is a legend for the map. The legend is not a legend for the map.






A-6111/19/9

**How do the cancellation  
of the B-1 bomber and  
the decision to defer produc-  
tion of the "neutron  
bomb" relate to SALT?**

The B-1 decision was not an arms control decision. It was made separately from SALT in the interest of providing the United States with a strong, efficient, and cost-effective national defense. Instead of the B-1 bomber, we have chosen to develop cruise missiles and particularly, in the near term, to equip some of our existing bombers with highly accurate, long-range cruise missiles to insure the continued effectiveness of our bomber force. This decision will result in a dual threat—manned penetrating bombers and cruise missiles—to Soviet air defenses in future years. The neutron warhead is not a strategic weapon and therefore has not been discussed at SALT. It is a tactical weapon designed to counter Soviet offensive forces in Central Europe. The neutron warhead has not been cancelled; the decision on its full production and deployment has been deferred—to see if appropriate, meaningful restraint by the Soviet Union will make its production and deployment unnecessary.

U.S. Air Force Bombing



A-111/19/10

### Why should we sign an agreement with the Soviet Union when that country promotes instability in Africa and other parts of the world?

Negotiating a SALT agreement does not mean that we approve of Soviet foreign or domestic policies or their form of government. The United States will continue to oppose Soviet policies where they conflict with ours. SALT is not a reward that we are giving the Soviet Union for good behavior. Rather SALT is worth pursuing only if, by itself, it promotes our national security. The emerging SALT agreement, in conjunction with our on-going defense programs, does improve our national security by supporting continued strategic nuclear stability and by reducing the risk of nuclear war.

### Will SALT TWO really slow the arms race?

Yes. While there is still a long way to go, and we wish more rapid progress, the SALT process has already slowed the arms race.

In SALT ONE, the United States and the Soviet Union curbed an expensive competition in defensive missiles by agreeing to mutual limitations on antiballistic missile (ABM) systems. Deployment of ABMs could have stimulated the expansion of offensive strategic forces to offset them. In the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms, the United States and the Soviet Union froze land-based and submarine ballistic missile launchers at the levels existing or under construction in 1972. The freeze stopped the Soviet buildup of ICBM launchers, although the agreement did permit the Soviets to have a greater number of total ICBM/SLBM launchers for the duration of the Interim Agreement than the United States. We, however, were left with more deliverable strategic warheads and other advantages.

SALT TWO will establish equal aggregate ceilings for strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers) and common subceilings on launchers for missiles carrying MIRVs. Establishment of such equality in numbers will require the Soviet Union to reduce a considerable number of strategic systems. In addition, SALT TWO will

provide for reductions below the initial overall ceiling, which will require a further reduction in the Soviet strategic force.

To limit the qualitative arms race in weapons technology, the new agreement will, for example, place constraints on the introduction of new types of ballistic missiles, although agreement has not been reached on the specific constraints. The Statement of Principles of SALT THREE will lay a general framework and foundation for further progress in reducing the nuclear arsenals of both sides and for further restrictions on qualitative improvements.

It is important to realize the price of not reaching agreement on SALT TWO. An expansion of the strategic arms competition at significant monetary cost could follow, with an increasing danger that future weapons systems could increase the incentives to resort to nuclear weapons in time of crisis.

SALT represents an opportunity to take a major step to enhance stability—based on achieving an equitable and adequately verifiable agreement—and therefore it should be pursued. A satisfactory agreement also will maintain the efforts of both sides to continue the search for further agreements on the entire range of arms limitations.

VI.

A-0011/19/11

If you would like to receive more information about SALT or if you would like to arrange for a speaker to address your school, church, group, or organization, please write to:

Bureau of Public Affairs  
Department of State  
Washington, D.C. 20520

or

Office of Public Affairs  
U.S. Arms Control and  
Disarmament Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20451

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## WE NEED YOUR HELP.

If you are one of the more than two-thirds of Americans who favor a nuclear arms treaty, you cannot remain silent on this issue.

We need you to raise public understanding and support for SALT in your community. We need you and your friends to urge your senators to vote for ratification. AMERICANS FOR SALT will supply materials explaining the treaty, work with you to organize local activities, provide speakers, and help you to make your views known on Capitol Hill.

We also need your financial help. Our ability to promote support for SALT depends entirely on raising adequate funds through citizen donations. Because your money will be used to build public support and lobby individual senators, it cannot be tax deductible. It may be the most important contribution you have ever made toward a **basic choice of national policy.**

**Please contact us for more information.**

Townsend Hoopes, Former Under  
Secretary of the Air Force

Charles Yost, Former United States  
Ambassador to the United Nations

*Co-chairs*

**AMERICANS FOR SALT  
324 Fourth Street, N.E.  
Washington, D.C. 20002  
202-547-8030**



# AMERICANS FOR SALT

**A national campaign to support the  
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty**

**In a few months, the United States Senate will make the most important foreign policy decision of this decade—whether to continue or to abandon nuclear arms control.**

A new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union is at hand, after six years of negotiations by two Republican presidents and President Carter. The Senate is expected to take up the treaty in early 1979. A two-thirds vote—67 senators—will be required for ratification.

Opinion polls show that over 70% of the American people favor a new nuclear arms treaty. Yet there is serious opposition to the treaty in the Senate. Opponents of SALT are making a strong effort to bring about its defeat. Without the votes of many undecided senators, the treaty will not be ratified.

### **THE SALT TREATY**

Basic provisions of the new SALT treaty have been made public by the State Department and the Department of Defense.

- The treaty will place equal ceilings on the numbers of US and Russian strategic delivery vehicles—missiles and bombers—for carrying nuclear weapons.
- It will set lower ceilings on the numbers of missiles carrying multiple nuclear warheads.
- It will impose temporary limitations on new types of delivery vehicles, to allow time for further negotiations on these weapons of the future.
- It will include an agreed agenda for the next round of SALT talks, which would begin shortly after ratification of this treaty.

These provisions would limit significantly the growth of nuclear arsenals, reduce the present number of Russian missiles, and lower the risk of nuclear war by making the military balance more stable.

### **WHY RATIFICATION IS IMPORTANT**

An equitable and verifiable SALT treaty will strengthen the national security of the United States. The alternative is no limits on numbers of nuclear strike weapons.

The Senate's action on SALT will determine for years the nature of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Ratification would demonstrate that despite fundamental differences, both superpowers seek to avoid nuclear war and will accept rational limits on their destructive power.

Rejection of this SALT treaty would increase uncertainty in Soviet-American relations, lead unnecessarily to more competition in military strength and spending, and unavoidably heighten tensions between two powerful nations.

Rejection would arrest two decades of momentum toward further and more effective arms control. The United States and the Soviet Union are parties to 15 agreements since 1959. No treaty has been broken.

Previous SALT talks have produced a permanent treaty banning anti-missile defenses, and a five year agreement freezing missile numbers which expired in October 1977.

If ceilings on the size of the two nuclear arsenals are not reestablished soon, the momentum of past agreements and the benefits of arms control could be lost.

### **AMERICANS FOR SALT**

AMERICANS FOR SALT are concerned citizens who want to inform the public about the SALT treaty and press the Senate for prompt ratification. Our supporters include leaders of business, education, labor, and religion.

The large majority of Americans clearly favors a new treaty. You can prevent a minority of 34 senators from rejecting a good treaty and abandoning nuclear arms control.

A-VIII/21/1

Speculation, not fact

Box 20

Box 20 - 2024/20 2A

TO:

Room:

From: Jennifer Brandt and Dee Sampson

Subject: SALT II Briefing Packet

For your convenience we have assembled this Briefing Packet on SALT issues. It is a condensation of our SALT II Information Kit containing key articles, reports and other information on the nearly completed SALT II agreements and their implications and the outlook for the upcoming debate over ratification.

The packet is divided into five sections:

- A. SALT II Highlights at a Glance
- B. Highlights and Assessments of SALT I
- C. Background and Analysis of SALT II
- D. The Issue of Verification
- E. Congressional Stand and Outlook for the Coming Debate

If you have any comments regarding the Briefing Packet or would like further information, please call the Information Center at x6500.

A. SALT II HIGHLIGHTS AT A GLANCE

- I. "Highlights of Expected SALT II Agreement." CQ Weekly Report,  
January 6, 1979..... p.1
- II. Contentious Issues..... p.2
- III. "U.S., Soviet Strategic Arms Lineup as of July 1978." CQ Weekly  
Report, January 6, 1979..... p.3
- IV. U.S.-Soviet Strategic Forces, 1967-1978..... p.4
- V. "Planned Improvements in Strategic Weapons." CQ Weekly Report,  
January 6, 1979..... p.5
- VI. Chronology of Events..... p.6-16

## Highlights of Expected SALT II Agreement

Provision	Effect on Announced U.S. Programs	Effect on Reported Soviet Programs
<b>Treaty (effective through 1985)</b>		
• Ceiling of 2,250 on all strategic launchers (effective as of 1982 — limit is 2,400 until then).	• None	• By 1982 must scrap about 150-200 older launchers. More would have to be scrapped sooner if additional missile submarines were built.
• Ceiling of 820 on ICBMs with MIRVed warheads.	• None. M-X (the only new ICBM) will not be deployed until about 1987.	• If ICBM production continues at rate of about 100-150 annually, replacement of older missiles with new MIRVed ICBMs would have to stop about 1982.
• Ceiling of 1,200 on ICBMs and SLBMs with MIRVed warheads.	• None until the 7th Trident submarine goes to sea (1984-85). Then, it could force retirement of Minuteman IIs or Poseidons to allow for more Tridents.	• Apparently would prevent replacing SSN-6 sea-based missile with MIRVed missile.
• Ceiling of 1,320 on all MIRVed missiles plus bombers carrying long-range cruise missiles.	• Could limit to 120 the number of B-52s modified to carry cruise missiles unless MIRVed missiles are retired to allow more. At the planned rate, the 120th plane would be modified at about the same time the treaty expired.	• None. Soviet cruise missiles apparently are not limited because of short ranges (less than 600 km.). These include one type transported by air, one-to-a-bomber, and about 300 of another type carried on 45 older submarines.
• No new land-based launchers for missiles larger than the Soviet SS-19.	• None. M-X is projected to be slightly smaller than the SS-19. U.S. will have no missiles the size of the Soviet SS-18.	• Limits to the current number (308-326) the number of launchers for SS-18s.
• Only one new type of ICBM could be tested or deployed during the life of the treaty.	• None. Only M-X is under development. (Theoretically limits MIRVed ICBM warheads to 1,650 and bars more accurate single warheads.)	• Allows only one of four new missiles reportedly under development. (Theoretically limits MIRVed ICBM warheads to 6,064.)
• No circumvention of treaty by transferring controlled weapons to any third country.	• Depending on final wording, could bar assistance to Britain and West Germany in developing cruise missiles, including non-nuclear armed versions.	• None. No Soviet allies have ever been given nuclear launchers with a range of more than a few hundred miles.
• No interference with techniques each country currently uses to verify other's compliance with treaty provisions.	• None	• Depending on final wording, could bar coding of information radioed from test missiles
<b>Protocol (effective through 1981 or 1982)</b>		
• No test or deployment of mobile ICBM.	• None. M-X would not be tested until after 1982.	• Prohibits deployment of mobile version of SS-16, testing of which has been completed.
• No deployment of ground-launched or sea-launched cruise missiles with more than a 600km. range.	• Depending on final wording, could bar (or at least delay) development of 1,000-mile-range cruise missile for use in NATO.	None



## CONTENTIOUS ISSUES

- **H**heavy ICBM Issues. The U.S. wants to limit the proliferation of "heavy" missiles (those with higher volume and throw-weight). The Soviets continue to replace older "light" missiles with "heavy" ones.

- **M**IRVS. Verification is greatly complicated when the same launches have been developed and deployed in MIRVed and unMIRVed modes, as have been the Soviet Delta Class submarine launchers.

The U.S. wants to limit the number of MIRVs allowed on a single ICBM to the maximum allowed in the Soviet SS-18s (about 10).

- **B**omber Issues. Disagreement exists on what to class as a "heavy" bomber and how to count them. The main sticking point has been the Backfire bomber, which could reach the U.S. if it were flown at high altitude at subsonic speed.

- **C**ruise Missiles. Disagreements still exist on a number of issues, including how to measure cruise missile ranges, limiting a multiple warhead capability, and distinguishing nuclear and conventionally armed cruise missiles..

- **M**obile ICBMs. Mobile missiles pose difficult verification problems. The Soviets have already tested a mobile missile, and may have deployed a few.

U.S., Soviet Strategic Arms Lineup as of July 1978<sup>1</sup>

## United States

## Soviet Union

	Number	Type	Warheads		Number	Type	Warheads
Land-based Missiles <sup>2</sup> (MIRVed)	550	Minute-man III	Carries 3 of 170 kilotons each (total: 1,650 warheads)		200	SS-19	1 of 5 megatons or 6 of 1-2 megatons (possibly 1,200 warheads)
					110	SS-18	1 of 18-25 megatons or 10 of 2 megatons <sup>3</sup> (possibly 1,100 warheads)
					60	SS-17	1 of 5 megatons or 4 of 900 kilotons (possibly 240 warheads)
Other <sup>4</sup> Land-based <sup>5</sup> Missiles	450	Minute-man II	1 of 1-2 megatons		60	SS-13	1 of 1 megaton
	54	Titan II	1 of 5-10 megatons		780	SS-11	1 of 1-2 megatons or 3 of 100-300 kilotons
					190	SS-9	1 of 18-25 megatons or 3 of 4-5 megatons
Sea-based Missiles (MIRVed)	496	Poseidon (on 31 submarines)	10 of 40 kilotons <sup>6</sup> (total: 4,960 warheads)				
Other Sea-based Missiles	160	Polaris (on 10 submarines)	3 of 200 kilotons		370	SSN-8 (on 28 submarines)	1 of 1-2 megatons
					524	SSN-6 (on 34 submarines)	1 of 1-2 megatons or 3 of 1 megaton
Bombers <sup>7</sup> Long-range	366	B-52	4 bombs larger than 1 megaton and up to 20 short-range missiles of 170 kilotons		135	Bear and Bison	(not known)
Medium-range	66	F-111	Up to 6 short-range missiles of 170 kilotons		60	Backfire	(not known)
Anti-ballistic missiles	0				64		
Anti-bomber defenses Interceptors	331				about 2,720		
Anti-aircraft missiles	0				10,000 launchers at 1,000 sites		

1. Only major weapons systems widely discussed in the context of SALT II are included. Omitted are long-range Soviet sea-based missiles as well as aircraft on which Soviet nuclear forces depend for their on-the-spot mission.

2. Includes only missiles on launchers. Excludes about 100 Minute-man II's and an unknown number of Soviet land-based missiles in storage.

3. The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) reports 3 warheads in the SS-18 version, but several other authoritative sources report 10 warheads.


4. The multiple warheads on missiles with MIRVs are not guided toward separate targets, but simply blanket a single target.

5. Theoretically, Poseidon can carry 10 warheads over a shorter range. In fact, all the missiles reportedly carry 10 warheads.



6. Deployment of new MIRVed missile SSN-18 to replace SSN-8 and SSN-12 to replace SSN-6 reportedly was beginning. See, p. 7.

7. See also 125 B-52s in mainbase and 44 B-52s in alert that still have some bugs.


SOURCE: Based on International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1978-1979*.

US AND USSR OPERATIONAL  
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WARHEADS/ BOMBS

## US AND USSR ICBM LAUNCHERS

US AND USSR  
INTERCONTINENTAL BOMBERS

## US AND USSR SLBM LAUNCHERS



U. S.-Soviet Strategic Forces 1967-1978

Source: Dept. of State, The SALT Process, June 1978

# Planned Improvements in Strategic Weapons

## United States

## Soviet Union

### Currently being deployed

- New warheads (Mark 12A) for MIRVed Minuteman III missiles with greater accuracy and twice the power (335-370 kilotons) of existing warheads.
- AWACS radar planes to direct interceptors deployed against Soviet bombers if they attacked the continental United States.

- MIRVed land-based missiles continue in production at a rate of 100-150 annually (replacing missiles without MIRV).
- Missile submarines continue in production at a rate of 5-6 annually (16 launchers each). MIRVed missiles (SSN-18) with three warheads (1-2 megatons each) are replacing SSN-8s. Longer range missiles (SSN-17) are replacing SSN-6s.
- Backfire bomber continues in production at a rate of 25-50 annually.

### Entering service by 1982

- 1,500-2,000-mile-range cruise missiles. Each of 163 newer B-52 bombers could carry up to 20 missiles with 200 kiloton warheads.
- Longer-range Trident missile with eight MIRVed warheads (100 kilotons each) replacing Polaris and some Poseidon missiles. Larger missile-carrying submarines (24 launchers) will enter service.

- Improved accuracy of MIRVed land-based missiles. Mobile, land-based missiles (SS-16) could be deployed (one warhead).
- New, larger missile submarines (20-24 launchers each).
- New anti-aircraft missiles (SA-10) designed to hit bombers flying at very low altitudes.

### Under development by 1982

- M-X mobile, land-based missiles. Current plans are for 200-300 missiles carrying 8-10 warheads (350-500 kilotons each).
- Longer-range Trident II missiles to replace existing Tridents.
- Maneuverable warheads (MaRV) for M-X and Trident II (able to home in on targets).
- Supersonic cruise missiles (ASALM) with anti-radar defenses.
- Land-based and sea-based cruise missiles with ranges of over 1,000 miles.

- Four new types of MIRVed land-based missiles.
- Radar plane comparable to AWACS to direct Soviet interceptors against low-flying bombers and cruise missiles.

## CHRONOLOGY p.14

## CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS:

- 09/27/78 — Secretary of State Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko began two days of meetings in Washington to discuss a SALT II Treaty and to prepare for a meeting with President Carter at the conclusion of their talks.
- 09/06/78 — U.S. officials were cited in reports that the U.S. and the Soviet Union were on the verge of a final SALT II agreement, following tentative compromises over issues related to bombers and testing of "new type" ICBMs.
- ACDA Director and Chief SALT Negotiator Paul Warnke announced his plans to resign sometime after the SALT II agreement is finally worked out.
- 09/04/78 — It was reported that the Administration was preparing to propose in mid-September SALT meetings that a new agreement prohibit the use of depressed-trajectory SLBMs, whose shortened ballistic flight path would reduce warning time.
- 08/24/78 — SALT Negotiator Paul Warnke said that a multiple aiming point mobile missile basing system would be consistent with a new SALT treaty, so long as decoys and dummies are not used, since "if it looks like a launcher, it counts as a launcher."
- Speaking for a bi-partisan group of Senators, Charles Mathias warned the Carter administration against attempts to submit a SALT treaty or any part of it as an executive agreement, as had been mentioned as a continuing possibility by ACDA Director Warnke the day before.
- 08/22/78 — In a speech in New Orleans, Secretary of Defense Brown reported that the draft SALT agreement "explicitly permits deployment of mobile ICBM launchers," while stressing that any such system would have to be "fully consistent with all provisions — including verification provisions" of a SALT agreement.
- 07/25/78 — Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Jones, in reference to mobil missiles and SALT limits, said, "I consider the mobiles are authorized and therefore MAP multiple aiming point basing is authorized. And to me that is not a matter for discussion negotiation."
- 07/23/78 — Administration officials said that, during meetings in Geneva, Soviet Chief negotiator Semynov informed U.S. negotiator Warnke that a U.S. proposal to permit multiple aiming point (MAP) deployment of ICBMs might not be compatible with the terms of the agreement being negotiated.

p.15

- 07/13/78 — After two days of meetings in Geneva, two primary issues were identified as sticking points in the progress toward a SALT agreement: (1) What "new" missile systems can be tested or developed during the life of the agreement? (2) What assurances will the U.S. accept of Soviet compliance with restrictions on Backfire bomber capabilities?
- 07/12/78 — Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary of State Vance met in Geneva for two days' discussions on strategic arms limitations.
- 07/10/78 — On the eve of his trip to meet Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva, Secretary of State Vance agreed that the growing strains in U.S.-Soviet relations could imperil the ratification of a SALT agreement in the Senate. He defended continuing negotiations against the background of Soviet dissidents' trials, saying that SALT talks "stand on their own two feet and have a special quality," and are not linked to any other discussions.
- 07/08/78 — Administration officials said that despite the added complications likely in completing a SALT agreement, the U.S. was adopting the position that a new accord must preserve U.S. freedom to deploy a mobile ICBM in the 1980s.
- 06/10/78 — Senate Majority Leader Byrd said that the Senate will not act to ratify a SALT treaty this year, even if one were completed for submission. "The White House has known for some time that a treaty will not be taken up this year," he added.
- 06/02/78 — The Washington Post reported authoritative government sources as saying that current domestic and international political climates have led the Carter Administration to effectively freeze SALT negotiations to preclude the possibility of an agreement in summer 1978. The White House responded to that report as "absolutely not true."
- 05/27/78 — Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko met with President Carter and Secretary Vance in Washington. Both sides reported limited gains toward a SALT agreement.
- 05/26/78 — In a speech before the United Nations special session on disarmament, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko said, "Immediately after signing the agreement now being prepared, the Soviet Union would be ready to enter into negotiations which should lead — with all the necessary factors taken into account — to a substantial reduction of the levels of strategic arms and to a further limitation of their qualitative improvement." This represented the first time the Soviets have publicly agreed to substantial cuts as a goal of "SALT III," as proposed in 1977 by President Carter.

p. 16

- 05/24/78 — In an address to the United Nations special session on disarmament, Vice President Mondale expressed hope that the United States and the Soviet Union would reach a SALT agreement "before too long," but criticized the "substantial increase in the nuclear threat of the Soviet Union" as exemplified by deployment of the SS-20 mobile MRBM.
- 05/20/78 — In a meeting in Peking with P.R.C. Foreign Minister Huang Hua, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brzezinski gave a detailed review of the SALT negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.
- 05/04/78 — The New York Times disclosed that U.S. and Soviet SALT negotiators have tentatively agreed to an overall limit on strategic weapons of 2,250, to be achieved by 1982. Also, an agreed sublimit of 1,200 on MIRV missiles will permit U.S. deployment of 120 cruise missile-armed aircraft without prejudice to the number of U.S. MIRV missile deployments.
- 04/25/78 — Soviet President Brezhnev noted "some progress" in the strategic arms talks just concluded with Secretary Vance in Moscow.
- 04/24/78 — The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was informed that under terms accepted during Secretary Vance's talks in Moscow, a SALT II agreement will not prohibit the transfer of cruise missile technology by the United States to its NATO allies. No other specific gains from the talks were reported.
- 04/22/78 — After three days of meetings in Moscow between Secretary of State Vance and Soviet officials, the U.S. spokesman concluded, "We are not in a breakthrough situation." No target date was set for concluding a SALT II agreement.
- 04/20/78 — Three days of Soviet-American talks began in Moscow between an American delegation headed by Secretary Vance and Soviet officials including Soviet President Brezhnev and Foreign Minister Gromyko.
- 04/12/78 — In an interview reported by Defense/Space Daily, DOD Salt Task Force Director Walter Slocombe outlined eight major issues still to be resolved in current negotiations for a SALT II Treaty.
- 04/07/78 — From the deck of a cruiser in Vladivostok, Soviet President Brezhnev criticized the Carter administration for "indecision and inconsistency" in its SALT negotiations and suggested that it was stalling for domestic political reasons.
- 03/17/78 — In a speech at Wake Forest University in North Carolina,

p. 17

President Carter warned against an "excessive Soviet buildup" of military forces and said he will insure that a new SALT agreement "reserves the strategic balance."

02/24/78 — A senior U.S. diplomat involved in SALT said that an agreement could not be concluded before summer, at the earliest.

— A statement from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee revealed that agreement has been reached on banning the deployment and testing of mobile land-based ICBMs during the life of the protocol being negotiated as part of the SALT II agreement. The expiration date of this protocol was stated as September 1980.

— An ACDA statement on SALT verification included the strongest public assurances to date about the verifiability of SALT II agreements, acknowledging the Soviets' ability to cheat on some aspects of the treaty, but claiming that "such cheating would not alter the strategic balance in view of U.S. programs"

02/11/78 — A Pravda editorial blamed the United States for lack of progress in SALT and warned of "a new spiraling race of the most dangerous means of warfare, which can have only one outcome — the steeply mounting danger of nuclear holocaust." Specifically mentioned were problems over cruise missiles, the Backfire bomber, and the modernization of weapons technology. In addition, the article suggested that the United States is threatening Senate rejection of a treaty to extract Soviet concessions.

01/21/78 — Congressman Charles Wilson, reporting on his observation of recent SALT negotiations, criticized

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS (SALT II): PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS  
"an almost total lack of verifiability of compliance" in the agreement, and concluded that the draft treaty in present form "would guarantee Soviet strategic superiority for the remainder of the century."

01/15/78 — In an interview reported by the Washington Star, SALT negotiator Paul Warnke said that when SALT II is concluded, "if we have any evidence of violation, even if it is something not of military significance, we will have every right and duty" to make an issue of it with the Soviets.

01/09/78 — Congressman Les Aspin released a study which concluded that "if the SALT II accords are not ratified by the Senate, the Russians could easily end up with half again as many missiles and bombers as the United States by the end of 1985."



p.18

- 01/06/78 — SALT Negotiator Paul Warnke predicted completion of a SALT agreement satisfactory to the U.S. and allies alike by the middle of 1978.
- 12/28/77 — An article published in Pravda raised anew the possibility that Soviet SALT negotiators would propose the inclusion of U.S. "forward-based systems" in arms limitation talks. The suggestion was apparently intended to counter U.S. expressions of concern that too many concessions in SALT were being made to the USSR.
- President Carter denied the existence of serious unresolved problems in the SALT negotiations and predicted completion of an agreement in 1978.
- 12/09/77 — Defense Department officials reported that the Soviet Union has agreed to permit testing of SLCMs, GLCMs, as well as ALCMs, over ranges of 1,550 miles. The protocol would still limit to 372 miles the range of ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles deployed during the next three years.
- 12/02/77 — Three members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senators McIntyre, Culver, and Bumpers, suggested to the President that several issues be satisfactorily addressed in a SALT agreement: (1) qualitative limits on Soviet technological improvements; (2) a definition for cruise missile range which takes sufficient account of evasive paths to a target; (3) a "type rule" to allow unambiguous distinction between aircraft carrying cruise missiles and those not; and (4) a constraint against the association of SS-16 ICBMs with existing SS-20 IRBM launchers.
- 11/17/77 — Administration officials reportedly announced that the Soviet Union would concede to U.S. testing and development of ground and sea-launched cruise missiles and deployment of air-launched cruise missiles with effective ranges of about 1,550 miles.
- 11/06/77 — Secretary of Defense Brown conceded that U.S. Minuteman ICBMs would be vulnerable to a Soviet nuclear first strike by 1985, but cautioned that "the Soviets would not be, or should not be, confident by that time that the Minuteman would not survive."
- Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin said that he expects a new SALT agreement to be reached by the end of 1977.
- 10/11/77 — SALT Negotiator Paul Warnke said in Geneva that "We have started to thrash out with the Soviets the framework of a new agreement." The proposed

p.19

treaty (through 1985) reportedly includes provisions for U.S. cruise missile deployment under the MIRV sub-limit, and U.S. concessions on the deployment of SS-18 ICBMs. Three-year limits would reportedly impose a 1,550 mile test limit on long-range cruise missiles and 327 mile test limits on ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles. See Table III in Appendix.

- 10/19/77 — The Senate agreed to a resolution which authorizes executive actions taken in accordance with the declaration of intent made by Secretary Vance.
- 10/14/77 — The Senate Armed Services Committee met in closed session for a briefing by Secretary of State Vance on the latest developments in SALT negotiations.
- 10/13/77 — The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations met in closed session to receive a briefing from Secretary Vance on recent developments in the "Middle East and in SALT negotiations.
- 10/11/77 — Representatives of three European NATO member nations expressed concern at a panel in Washington that current SALT negotiations leave the way open for the arming of European forces with tactical cruise missiles.
- 09/25/77 — Pravda announced the Soviet release of an "identical statement" that pledges Soviet observance of SALT I limitations beyond the October 3 expiration date, "provided that the United States shows the same restraint."
- 09/23/77 — Secretary Vance issued a statement declaring U.S. intent "not to take any action inconsistent" with SALT I ceilings, "provided that the Soviet Union exercises similar restraint."
  - At the conclusion of secretarial-level talks, Vance and Gromyko agreed that the two sides had "drawn closer" in their positions on SALT.
- 09/22/77 — Secretary of State Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko began two days of scheduled talks, primarily on SALT, at the White House.
- 09/20/77 — Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations for U.S. SALT position on air-launched cruise missiles are reported to support a 2500 km range limitation for three years only, in anticipation of needs after that time for longer stand-off distances.
- 09/10/77 — A spokesman for the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Arms Control insisted that "any formal agreement"

p.20

- between the United States and the Soviet Union to extend the terms of SALT I beyond Oct. 3, 1977 requires congressional approval.
- 09/01/77 — State Department spokesman Hodding Carter indicated that the Oct. 3 expiration of SALT I can be extended, stating that "We are exploring with the Soviets ways to handle that problem and we are and will be consulting with Congress on the subject."
- 09/15/77 — Aviation Week and Space Technology magazine reported that JCS Chairman Brown is requesting that test limits imposed by SALT proposals on cruise missiles be extended to 3,500 km. in compensation for target coverage lost with the cancellation of the 3-1 bomber. Subsequent report of DOD views on this subject cited concern over projected improvements in Soviet air defenses as well.
- 07/29/77 — President Carter indicated that any prospective extension of SALT I agreements would not be "in the form that would require any kind of congressional approval."
- 07/28/77 — U.S. negotiators have proposed a 600 km range limit on SLCM and GLCM tests. Soviets are pressing for such constraints to be included in a new treaty (2-year duration), while the United States seeks to incorporate those limits, as well as other contentious issues involving rapidly-changing technologies, in a protocol (3-year duration). Issues with little hope of early resolution reportedly are being relegated to a statement of general principles.
- 07/27/77 — Congressmen Robin Beard and Sam Stratton released their critique of current SALT proposals, questioning cruise missile and mobile ICBM restraints as "more designed for unclearly defined political objectives than clearly defined military objectives."
- 07/12/77 — President Carter reaffirmed U.S. positions on SALT, as well as on other U.S.-Soviet issues, as "carefully contrived and constantly reassessed," predicting that "calm and persistent and fair negotiations with the Soviet Union will ultimately lead to increased relationships with them."
- 06/08/77 — A meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group opened in Ottawa, where European members reportedly urged the United States to reject Soviet demands for limitations on cruise missiles.
- 05/26/77 — President Carter disclosed that the three-year protocol proposed as one element of a new SALT negotiating framework would introduce constraints on U.S. cruise missile development and on the Soviet Backfire and "very heavy missiles."

p.21

- 05/13/77 — Secretary of State Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko met in Geneva to begin two days of talks to include negotiations aimed at overcoming the SALT stalemate.
- 05/14/77 — Secretary Vance said that if the United States and the Soviet Union fail to reach an arms accord by October 3, "We can either extend the agreement if the Soviets are willing to do so, or we can continue to proceed without an agreement but on the assumption that we will continue as if there were a continuing agreement."
- 05/10/77 — U.S. SALT Delegation head Paul Warnke suggested that some degree of on-site inspection would be required under the terms of the "comprehensive" proposal made by the United States in March. Even agreements of lesser scope, should they include cruise missiles, might require on-site inspection, he said.
- 05/07/77 — Pravda editorial asserted Moscow's willingness to carry on continued SALT talks, urging closer attention to Soviet proposals and criticizing U.S. proposals for seeking "unilateral advantage."
- 05/06/77 — The U.S. "comprehensive" proposal, according to Paul Nitze, will continue to be rejected by the Soviet Union, even though it favors their position, because acceptance would require "great change" in Soviet strategic programs already planned and a "radical readjustment in long-accepted patterns of Soviet politico-military thinking." This change in Nitze's thinking was reported by the Christian Science Monitor.
- 05/04/77 — In an interview reported by the Boston Globe, Soviet SALT experts from the Institute of the USA and Canada in Moscow expressed unofficial views that the Soviets might agree to an arms pact including a 10% reduction in the Vladivostok strategic delivery vehicle ceiling, "some limitations" on Backfire deployment, a ban on naval and ground-launched cruise missiles, and "maybe a limitation on the number of tests" of ICBMs.
- 05/03/77 — Secretary of Defense Brown announced that production of Minuteman III ICBMs will be continued to provide ten additional replacements. The reversal of the administration's earlier decision to cancel production may have been designed to fill a gap until anticipated production of MX, and as a signal to Soviet arms negotiators.
- 05/01/77 — Soviet expert on U.S. affairs Georgi Arbatov stated in a speech that the Soviet Union is more concerned about the threat posed by the next generation of accurate ICBM warheads MX 12A with MS-20 guidance than about cruise missiles.

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p.22

- 04/29/77 — A Soviet official in Washington was quoted by the Washington Post as saying "We would prefer no cruise missile at all" to reciprocal limitations on range and deployment.
- 04/28/77 — The Annual IISS "Strategic Survey" issued for 1976 suggested that the impasse in recent arms negotiations was due to "the increasing inadequacy of the traditional instruments of arms control in a period of rapid technological change," and cautioned that recent U.S. proposals for reductions in strategic weapons could weaken mutual deterrent capabilities.
- Senator Alan Cranston suggested a "Vladivostok plus" formula for SALT which would include "reasonable" restrictions on the range of U.S. ALCMs and a "deferral" of U.S. SLCMs and GLCMs, in exchange for Soviet collateral constraints on Backfire.
- 04/15/77 — President Carter, denying that SALT talks were an an impasse, reiterated his hopes of meeting Soviet leader Brezhnev, but cautioned against pressures at such a meeting to produce agreement for agreement's sake.
- 04/14/77 — Communist Party newspaper Pravda editorial reaffirmed that Soviet rejection of U.S. nuclear arms reduction proposal was a "final answer" to a package which "cannot be the subject of serious discussion." The U.S. initiative was attacked as a destabilizing departure from the Vladivostok guidelines and follow-on formulas, especially with regard to cruise missiles.
- 04/13/77 — Secretary of Defense Brown asserted that the U.S. "comprehensive option" of March 30 would delay substantially the time when fixed ICBMs become vulnerable. Since the Soviets have a much larger portion of their strategic nuclear force in ICBMs than the United States, he "cannot see how anyone could claim that this arrangement would be inequitable." Security for ICBMs is gained, he said, "through controls to limit improvements in accuracy and through reductions in throwweight," lessening the need to deploy expensive mobile missiles.
- 04/11/77 — Senator Alan Cranston noted that President Carter's hopes for a balanced budget by 1981 are dependent upon achieving a meaningful arms agreement with the Soviet Union, especially in view of the Administration's indications that weapons development would be increased in the absence of such an agreement.
- 04/08/77 — President Carter alluded to a private message from Soviet leader Brezhnev as evidence of continued Soviet interest in successful arms talks. Although reiterating that U.S. proposals were "fair and equitable," Carter asserted that

p.25

- any inequity would willingly be corrected if subsequent reassessment justified it.
- 04/07/77 — Secretary of State Vance asserted that U.S. proposals on March 30 should have come as no surprise to Soviet negotiators, since they received at least one week's advance notice.
- 04/06/77 — Senator Henry Jackson praised President Carter's proposals to Moscow as "eminently reasonable and sensible." Although skeptical of public diplomacy in SALT, Jackson conceded that currently "We're the guys in the white hats."
- The Soviet rejection of U.S. SALT II proposals on March 30 may be linked to Soviet progress on a new family of nuclear arms, according to Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of CIA.
- 04/02/77 — Unidentified officials in the Carter administration reportedly conceded that the U.S. SALT II team may have "miscalculated" in Moscow. On April 4, however, both Secretary Vance and the White House flatly denied any such allegation.
- 03/30/77 — U.S.-Soviet talks in Moscow ended with Soviet rejection of U.S. SALT initiatives and U.S. insistence upon actual arms reductions as condition for meeting Soviet demands for limitations on U.S. cruise missiles.
- 03/28/77 — Kremlin meeting with Brezhnev and Vance opened in air of uncertainty attributed to aggressive U.S. position on international human rights.
- 03/24/77 — President Carter disclosed new SALT framework to be proposed by diplomatic mission to the Soviet Union, urging reductions in weapons below Vladivostok levels and offering a "fallback" position incorporating Vladivostok guidelines without consideration of later issues such as Backfire and cruise missile.
- 03/09/77 — After four days of heated debate, the Senate approved the nomination of Paul Warnke to be Director, ACDA, and to be chief SALT negotiator.
- 01/26/77 — Secretary of Defense Brown suggested that a new SALT agreement might come in two stages, with the first excluding Backfire and cruise missiles. He added that other possibilities could emerge, and that the administration was "committed" to reach a new agreement before SALT I expires in October 1977.
- 01/23/77 — In his first interview as President, Jimmy Carter indicated that the Backfire-cruise missile issue at SALT would not prevent agreement on strategic arms limitations.

A-VIII/21/1816

Self Copy  
Carter Libr

p. 24

- Secretary of State Vance said SALT would probably resume at the end of March, following his announced trip to Moscow that month.
- 01/18/77 — Soviet party leader Brezhnev said in a speech that the Soviet Union was prepared for a major advance in its relations with the United States, but that a first step was the conclusion of a SALT agreement, based on the principles agreed to at Vladivostok in 1974.
- 12/29/76 — In an interview, Soviet Party leader Brezhnev said he would favor a summit meeting with President-elect Carter if there were agreement at SALT.
- 12/27/76 — President-elect Carter said he would probably meet with Soviet party leader Brezhnev sometime before September 1977 to discuss a SALT agreement. Commenting on press reports regarding intelligence estimates of Soviet military capability, he said that the United States was still "by far stronger."
- 12/03/76 — Apparently in response to a public appeal by Soviet leader Brezhnev, President-elect Carter said he would move "aggressively" toward achieving a SALT agreement.

*Council's Office*

*State & Home Simulation Talks*

*100-1-3*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 28, 1979

*A-VIII/22/1*

*The state SALT person  
or persons will be  
submitted to the White  
House for an  
in dept briefing*

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ANNE WEXLER

FROM:

MARGARET MCKENNA

SUBJECT:

SALT

In order to disseminate information and educate citizens at the grass roots level, we will form a task force of individuals to do outreach and liaison with states. The task force will be composed of 20 to 30 individuals, the bulk of whom worked in the campaign and are now employed by the Administration (proposed list is attached).

The task force members will contact influential community leaders in 26 priority states (list attached). They will identify one or several individuals who are willing to be "the SALT person" from that state. The task force member will outline the type of education activities needed in the state and will remain in liaison with the local person through the summit and ratification. The task force person will provide the local SALT person with (1) ~~a state profile~~, (2) a list of individuals and organizations to contact, (3) a general suggested plan of action, (4) literature and a list of available speakers.

The general plan of action will be provided to each local person in the form of a memorandum or a handbook. The basic outline will be:

1. Identify influential community leaders and contact them to explain SALT. If possible, obtain endorsements and commitments from them to work on SALT.

3. Contact organizations -

a. Explain that speakers and literature are available.

b. Attempt to get resolutions of support for SALT II ratification.

c. Place articles in organization newsletters.

4. Identify and create forums, such as Rotary, Kiwanis, Chamber of Commerce, trade associations, lawyers



*Learned Office*  
*Appointments to the Foundation Talks*  
*Box 108*  
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

*(11)*  
A-0111/23/1

March 8, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: ANNE WEXLER  
FROM: MARGARET MCKENNA *mk*  
SUBJECT: SALT

In order to disseminate information and educate citizens at the grass roots level, we will form a task force of individuals to do outreach and liaison with states. The task force will be composed of 20 to 30 individuals, the bulk of whom worked in the campaign and are now employed by the Administration (proposed list is attached).

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2. Identify influential individuals throughout the state in business, academe, labor, etc., to be invited to White House briefings.

*Learned Office*  
*Heads to the front door folks*  
*Box 108*  
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

(11.1)  
A-VIII/23/1

March 8, 1979

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-2-

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5. Identify state conventions and national conventions held in state and insure that a SALT speaker is included.

6. Maximize dissemination of information through the media -

- A. TV and radio talk shows.
- B. Columnists, editorials, letters to the editor.
- C. Place articles in legal, scientific, and foreign policy journals.
- D. Brief foreign affairs editors of local papers.
- E. Give advance notice of SALT events and speakers and make information available.
- F. News releases and speakers for interviews.

We should plan to contact potential task force members this week and meet with them early next week.

A-VIII/23/3

New York

Indiana

Pennsylvania

Oklahoma

Connecticut

Nebraska

Virginia

California

North Carolina

Washington

South Carolina

Montana

Florida

Arizona

Georgia

South Dakota

Louisiana

Maine

Arkansas

Alabama

Texas

New Mexico

Kentucky

Delaware

Tennessee

Wyoming

Stan Bregman	Doug Coulter
Dick Israel	Bob Vincent
Mike Murray	Carla Reames
Maira Egan	Paul Sullivan
J. B. Blekley	Karen Voight
Chuck Parish	Bill Dixon
Mike Cardozo	Tim Smith
Chris Delaporte	Jim Free
David Hales	Joe Levin
Steve Englebert	Chester Davenport
Isabel Hyde	Emily Sheketoff
Randy Kinder	Iris Jacobson
Bill Heckman	John Podesta
Andy Manatos	Bill Albers
Toni Chayes	Mary Hanley

A-1111/24/1 (2.1)

2000-10-10

1st = letter in box 272

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 8, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: ANNE WEXLER

FROM: MARGARET MCKENNA *will*

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A-VIII/20/3

New York

Indiana

Pennsylvania

Oklahoma

Connecticut

Nebraska

Virginia

California

North Carolina

Washington

South Carolina

Montana

Florida

Arizona

Georgia

South Dakota

Louisiana

Maine

Arkansas

Alabama

Texas

New Mexico

Kentucky

Delaware

Tennessee

Wyoming



A-VIII/24/4

Stan Bregman

Doug Coulter

Dick Israel

Bob Vincent

Mike Murray

Carla Reames

Moirra Egan

Paul Sullivan

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Karen Voight

Chuck Parish

Bill Dixon

Mike Cardozo

Tim Smith

Chris Delaporte

Jim Free

David Hales

Joe Levin

Steve Englebert

Chester Davenport

Isabel Hyde

Emily Sheketoff

Randy Kinder

Iris Jacobson

Bill Heckman

John Podesta

Andy Manatos

Bill Albers

Toni Chayes

Mary Hanley

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

REMARKS OF DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT  
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
AT THE ANNUAL MEMBERS DINNER OF THE  
CHICAGO COMMITTEE OF THE  
CHICAGO COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS  
ART INSTITUTE OF CHICAGO  
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

SALT AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The United States and the Soviet Union are on the verge of an historic achievement: completion of a comprehensive agreement on limiting strategic offensive nuclear forces. Our nation has been striving to achieve this goal since the SALT negotiations began nearly ten years and three Administrations ago. Today, I want to talk with you about the importance of this SALT agreement in terms of our national security and our relations with the Soviet Union.

The signing of the SALT II agreement will engage us in a vigorous and, we hope, enlightening national debate leading to Senate ratification of the SALT II treaty. Equally important, this national dialogue should produce a fresh consensus for policies to ensure our national security in the 1980s. President Carter began this dialogue in his recent address at Georgia Tech. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown will be discussing military and defense aspects of the treaty tomorrow in New York City.

The security of the United States can only be achieved through the full participation of our elected leaders and of the American people. As we all realize, the issues which challenged us in negotiating SALT II will not disappear once the agreement is signed and ratified. Protecting our strategic interests and pursuing a constructive strategic relationship with the Soviet Union will remain on our national agenda as far into the future as we can see. As a result, our policies must be based on realism, patience, and wisdom about the future. The American people must understand these policies. So must our allies. So must the leaders of the Soviet Union.

SALT and U.S. Policy toward the USSR

As President Carter has stated, U.S.- Soviet relations will continue to be a mixture of competition and cooperation. Our policies must be designed to pursue both, and to draw an effective balance between the two -- seeking to broaden cooperation where we can, but effectively meeting the challenge of the competition where we must.

The Soviet Union is a military superpower that is now pressing forward to become a true global power. In some parts of the world, the Soviet Union challenges our security interests and those of our close friends and allies.

In pursuing its goals, the Soviet Union relies primarily on its military power. This is its strength -- strength which we match -- but in many ways it is also the source for its weakness. By diverting massive resources from its civilian economy to build its military machine, the Soviet Union has weakened the strength of its society.

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In contrast, the United States enjoys many unique assets; our economic and technological dynamism; our thriving and stable society; our government which can count on genuine public participation and support; our ability to count on allies who have joined with us in free association.

The Soviet Union's ideological appeal has flagged at home and abroad. Its economic and political systems are models for none. Perhaps most remarkable is its political isolation, as it has discovered that it is difficult to transform raw military power into political gain. It has allies, clients, and proxies. But these are associations usually defined by Soviet might, not by mutual respect or self-interest.

The limits on open and free Soviet political engagement with the community of nations -- relationships which we enjoy in full measure force the Soviet Union to concentrate on its military power to gain influence. This leads it to be both more assertive towards others and more fearful of its own position -- a combination that poses deep challenges to our steadfastness and resolve. We are meeting these challenges today; we will continue to do so in the future.

At the same time, the Soviet Union has gradually come to understand the risks of a competition that is so heavily influenced by military issues. It is a nation that directly suffered the full brunt of the worst conflict of modern times. With us, the Soviet Union has come to recognize that SALT can help contain the risks of nuclear holocaust which would flow from unrestrained competition in strategic arms. As a result, SALT, in the context of programmed U.S. strategic capabilities, can provide the needed strategic stability for progress in political relations between our two countries.

Even with this SALT agreement, the competitive elements of our relations with the Soviet Union will remain. We will need a sustained and long-term effort to protect our interests and those of our friends. But this competition can be managed more safely and effectively if our two nations can and will contain the dangers of nuclear confrontation, through the agreed and reciprocal exercise of restraint.

In pursuing mutual restraint through SALT, we are concerned not only about the Soviet Union of today, but also about the Soviet Union of tomorrow. During the next several years, the Soviet leadership will change. We cannot predict the character of the new leaders, or all the major aspects of future Soviet policy. But we can work now to ensure that Soviet leaders of the present and the future will understand the policies and purposes of the United States -- both our determination to protect our interests and those of our friends and allies, and our desire to broaden detente and cooperation.

When the next generation of Soviet leaders decides its policies towards strategic arms and towards the United States, we want them to face clear and agreed restraints on the competition in strategic arms. We want these to be the restraints of SALT II, not the milder restraints of the SALT I interim agreement. We want them to see convincing evidence that the United States recognizes its interests and will successfully defend them whatever the challenge. And we want them to know how they can join with us to further detente and cooperation.

That is a vital objective of the new SALT agreement: helping to determine the way in which the Soviet Union will see future relations with the United States -- setting limits now on its actions in the strategic field, and increasing the chances that limits on these arms can lead to more peaceful relations.

MORE

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### What is SALT?

Our goals in SALT are the same as our goals in overall strategic policy: to promote greater stability, to reduce incentives for either side to use nuclear force, to limit pressures to build up strategic arms, and to guarantee the security of our national interests and those of our friends and allies.

The SALT Treaty of 1972 sharply limited deployment of anti-ballistic missiles systems on both sides; it averted a costly and dangerous ABM competition which neither side wanted but which both feared the other was about to initiate. We reached a comprehensive agreement with relative ease because extensive ABM deployment had not yet begun, and neither side was confident that its ABM technology would be effective.

The challenges involved in negotiating a comprehensive agreement on limiting strategic offensive arms have been far greater because both sides already have large deployments of these systems. Moreover, marked differences in the composition of Soviet and American offensive forces have made it extremely difficult to define limitations that are both balanced and equitable.

But we have persevered, and the expected agreement will go far beyond the interim SALT agreement. It is much more comprehensive and better suited to America's strategic needs. Let me outline some of the major accomplishments of the SALT II agreement:

- For the first time, it sets equal ceilings on all major intercontinental strategic delivery systems, as well as important subcategories of MIRVed missiles.

- It imposes an effective upper limit on the number of warheads that can be placed on each MIRVed ICBM. This is critically important because it simplifies our future strategic planning and adds more certainty to our military projections.

- The treaty limits each side to developing and deploying one completely new ICBM before 1985. This provision will inhibit the qualitative expansion of the arms race, while still permitting us to develop an entirely new ICBM and a more secure basing mode for our ICBM force. This we need to do because improvements in Soviet military capacity are increasing the threat to our Minuteman ICBMs. The SALT treaty gives us the flexibility to solve this problem.

SALT II goes beyond SALT I, in all these provisions, by setting equal ceilings for the categories of weapons it covers. This requirement reflects a key demand expressed by the Senate when SALT I was negotiated. This negotiated principle of equality will require an actual reduction in the Soviet Union's intercontinental forces. They will have to eliminate more than 250 systems, and the importance of this step should not be underestimated. It may well be the forerunner of more substantial and significant reductions by both sides.

It is also important to recognize that the SALT II Treaty runs only through 1985. While our long-term goal is a permanent treaty, the development of offensive weapons remains far too dynamic for us to make confident predictions about the late 1980s and beyond. But the SALT II Treaty does markedly reduce our uncertainty about Soviet forces in the early 1980s -- a period in which we must improve our own strategic forces, especially to allow them to survive in the face of potential Soviet attack. These necessary improvements on our part would be far more costly, and we would be far less confident about their success if we were without the limits which SALT II will impose on Soviet forces.

MORE

A-1711/25/4

We have long recognized that SALT II would have little value if we could not be confident that its provisions were being followed by the Soviet Union. That is why verification was such an important issue in the negotiations. The treaty reflects our concerns. It unambiguously establishes that verification is a necessary component of arms control agreements in general, and SALT II specifically. It establishes that national technical means of verification, such as satellite photography, are legitimate tools for insuring compliance. It prohibits both interference with these tools and deliberate concealment that could impede the collection of necessary information. And the agreement mandates that both sides follow special procedures to make verification easier.

These important steps significantly reduce the uncertainty about the threat each country faces. One of the major triggers of increase arms competition is uncertainty about what might exist. And the SALT II Treaty takes a critical step toward reducing that uncertainty.

It should also be underscored that the SALT II Treaty allows us to proceed with the force improvements that we need within a structure of predictability and confidence.

#### What SALT Is Not

This is how the SALT II agreement will enhance our security and provide the basis for further limits on strategic arms in the future. But a sensible evaluation of the SALT II agreement also requires clear understanding of what it does not do ... and what it cannot do.

First, and most important, the SALT II Treaty is not an agreement based on trust. It stands on its own merits based on common interest expressed in hard bargaining and compromises. It provides for adequate verification of essential provisions, it is backed up by strong U.S. capabilities to respond to both present and future military needs.

Clearly, the SALT II Treaty will also not signal the end of East-West competition. Where our interests are threatened, we shall defend them. And where we can broaden detente, and achieve new forms of cooperation with the Soviet Union, we shall seek to do so, as well.

SALT II is not the end of military competition with the Soviet Union, even in strategic arms. During the last two decades, the Soviet Union has expanded and modernized its armed forces in all areas. Its steadily-growing defense budget consumes more than 10 percent of Soviet GNP. As a result, we are confronted in many areas with military competition to which we must respond.

The SALT II Treaty will keep those requirements lower than they would otherwise be in one area -- strategic arms -- but it will not end them. The most urgent problem we face is the growing vulnerability of our ICBM force. In addition, we must modernize and improve our theater nuclear and conventional forces. We can and shall do so, and nothing in the SALT II Treaty prevents us from taking these necessary steps on our own and with our allies.

MORE

No one should regard the SALT II Treaty as a way to impose comprehensive constraints on everything that the Soviet Union does in its military and foreign policy, much less on what it does within its own society. In our own national debate about SALT, some observers question whether we can sign an agreement when the Soviet Union continues to act against our interests in many areas abroad, and fails to recognize basic human rights at home. They thus insist on linkage.

Our position on linkage is clear. We believe that limitations on strategic arms are desirable in themselves. The quest for such limitations should not be held hostage either to other American or Soviet policies or to competition between us. We do not accept any linkage, for example, between closer U.S.- Chinese cooperation on a variety of issues and SALT, and we would strongly reject any Soviet effort to impose such a negative connection. By the same token, we cannot insist that the Soviet Union accommodate us in regard to matters of concern to us as a condition for an agreement with the United States on strategic limitations. To impose such a linkage would mean that no problem in the U.S.- Soviet relationship could be solved unless all major issues were resolved simultaneously. This is not a prescription for policy but for paralysis.

Accordingly, our task is to obtain a good SALT agreement and to meet as appropriate Soviet challenges where and when they arise.

MORE

A-0111/25/6

Criticisms and Rebuttals

In the weeks ahead, the SALT II agreement will be subjected to searching discussion by the Senate and by the people of the United States. And that, in our democracy, is the way it should be. It is impossible to negotiate an agreement on anything that will please everyone. Critics of the SALT II Treaty will raise a wide variety of objections. I think it might help to clear the air if I tried to answer some of the more common criticisms of this agreement.

It will be maintained that the agreement does not go far enough, that the ceilings are too high, and that the limitations are too modest. Let me assure you that no one agrees more sincerely with this criticism than President Carter. Yet he recognizes -- and we all need to -- that the pursuit of the best cannot be permitted to stand in the way of achieving the good. The achievements of the SALT II Treaty are useful and real. They move the prospects for peace and stability far ahead of where they would be in the absence of this Treaty. The road to achieving more ambitious strategic arms control lies in approving this agreement, and then moving ahead toward greater goals.

There will be those who will argue that this agreement -- despite the principle of equality on which its essential provisions are based -- will impose a degree of strategic inferiority on our nation. I believe these criticisms are unwarranted, alarmist, and I would like to explain why:

-- It will be said that the Soviet Union is permitted to have very heavy missiles, while ours are much lighter. Yet we have never had an interest in building heavier missiles ourselves, relying instead on our qualitative advantages. And we have achieved in SALT II a truly important restriction on how the Soviets can exploit their heavy missiles by limiting the number of warheads each can carry;

-- It will be said that the agreement fails to cover the backfire bomber, which could reach the United States. Yet, the agreement also does not constrain our F-111 bombers based in Britain, or other aircraft which could also be used against the Soviet Union;

-- It will be said that the agreement includes limits on cruise missiles which are more important to us than to the Soviet Union. Yet, we are permitted to mount a sizable force of air-launched cruise missiles, without a limit on their range. And limits on sea-launched and land-launched cruise missiles will expire well before we could deploy them.

I cite these examples -- and there will be more -- for a simple reason: we have gained or retained one or more advantages for ourselves for every one we have granted the Soviet Union. And where any Soviet capability truly presents a military problem, we are free, within the terms of the agreement to respond in appropriate ways to guarantee our security. This is what it means to have a good and equitable agreement; not symmetry of systems; but a framework for equal security.

MORE

A-6111/25/7

Furthermore, much criticism of the SALT II Treaty will focus on whether it can be adequately verified. We are fully confident that it can. We maintain a vast, sophisticated, and expensive array of means to detect and monitor what the Soviet Union is doing in its strategic programs. They are totally under our own control; in no way do they require us to simply trust Soviet good will. These means help us to overcome a major difference between our two countries -- our open society versus their closed one. We are able to monitor many aspects of the development, testing, production, deployment, training, and operation of Soviet strategic forces, despite the closed nature of Soviet society, and despite Soviet obsession with secrecy.

To be sure, no means of verification can be absolutely perfect. Yet, through our enormous efforts -- harnessing the world's most advanced technology and the skills of many tens of thousands of our most highly trained people -- we are confident that we can detect any significant violation of the SALT II agreement well before we would have to react militarily to such a violation. And the SALT II Treaty will continue the Standing Consultative Commission in Geneva, to which either we or the Soviets can refer any question of compliance with the Treaty.

While negotiating SALT II, it has been vitally important for us to protect the security and the interests of our NATO Allies, as well as our own. We have consulted with our Allies on SALT II at every step of the process, with a thoroughness and intensity that has few precedents.

We have assured our Allies that their interests will be fully met by this Treaty. The best evidence of the success of our continual efforts to work with our Allies on SALT II can be seen in their response: strong support for this treaty by Allied leaders, including public statements at Guadeloupe by Chancellor Schmidt, Prime Minister Callaghan, and President Giscard.

We are also determined that the continuing SALT process not divert our attention from the continuing challenge of Soviet military power or undermine our resolve to meet it. This resolve is unrelated to the merits of the proposed agreement, but rests instead on our own good sense and national will.

With or without the SALT talks, with this agreement or any conceivable alternative, we would still face the tasks of judging the military challenge to the United States and our Allies, and of responding effectively to it. In any event, we would have to provide for the common defense in sober and realistic terms. And in any event we will do so.

During the next several years, we will need to make a number of difficult choices about our force posture in several areas. We shall make these choices in the sober realization that the United States must have military strength sufficient to deter any attack on us or our Allies, to enable us to deal successfully with any attack and at any level -- should an attack occur, and to defend our interests and those of our friends and Allies around the world.

MORE



A-1111/25/8

### The Future of SALT

The SALT II agreement is a major step forward in strategic arms control. But it is only one step. In the future, it will be important for us to move promptly on a complex agenda of arms control issues, including significant reductions in strategic weapons, further qualitative limitations on weapons, and still further improvements in our ability to verify arms control agreements. And at every step of the way, we will work closely with our NATO Allies, to ensure that our efforts in SALT III will advance their security as well as our own.

We shall continue to press for more and better strategic arms control agreements. But we shall not hold our own needed defense programs hostage to the uncertain prospects of future arms control. Nor shall we hesitate to halt any defense program whose military requirement is effectively and safely removed by successful arms control agreements.

Finally, as we judge the SALT II Treaty, we must remember precisely what is being achieved. The SALT process is an effort unique in human history. Never before have two very different and powerful competing nations engaged in an effort to limit their freedom of action in matters vital to their own survival and that of mankind. Never before have two such nations recognized that greater security can come from mutual self-restraint in building their most destructive weapons, rather than from continuing an unbridled competition. This mutual understanding is not based upon trust, or upon ignoring our deep and continuing differences. Rather, it is a recognition of the critical importance of reducing strategic uncertainties and the risks of nuclear crises and devastation. Our efforts in controlling nuclear weapons will continue to be difficult, halting, and uncertain. It will require our patience, wisdom, and unparalleled efforts to make sound judgments. But I think you will agree that it is a noble effort to achieve goals that are vital to ourselves and to all mankind.

# # #

A-111/26/7

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

APRIL 24, 1979

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

There is no more important responsibility for me as President than ensuring the safety and security of our nation. Like Presidents before me, I am meeting this responsibility: (1) by maintaining sufficient military forces to protect ourselves and our Allies; and (2) by seeking equitable and verifiable arms control measures to reduce the risk of war. The attached report is a summary of the actions taken through the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1978 toward this latter goal.

The SALT process, which has been carried forward by four Administrations since 1967, is the most fundamental of our arms control efforts. A SALT II agreement to limit strategic offensive weapons will serve as the linchpin of all of our other arms control efforts, including: SALT III, where we hope to achieve further strategic arms limitations; a ban on tests of nuclear explosives; mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe; limitations on antisatellite capabilities, chemical weaponry, and conventional arms transfers; and prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation.

To prevent war -- and to redirect the resources of nations from arsenals of war to human needs -- will be a formidable challenge to all mankind in this last quarter of the 20th Century. It is a challenge that I am determined to meet.

JIMMY CARTER

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
April 23, 1979.

# # # # #

*Full Meeting* *A-6/11/27/1* *(3-2)*  
*... ..*  
President Jimmy Carter  
American Newspaper Publishers Association  
New York City, New York  
Wednesday, April 25, 1979

I want, first of all, to commend and endorse the theme of this convention: the defense of the First Amendment and the freedom of the press.

Liberty of expression is our most important civil right, and the freedom of the press is its most important bulwark. We can never afford to grow complacent about the First Amendment. On the contrary, we must actively protect it always.

The American press has grown enormously since our nation's early days -- not only in size and breadth, but in its conception of its own duties and responsibilities. The highest of those duties is to inform the public on the important issues of the day. And no issue is more important than the one I want to discuss with you today -- the control of nuclear arms.

Each generation of Americans faces a choice that defines its character -- a choice that is also important for what it says about our nation's outlook on the world.

In the coming months, we will almost certainly be faced with such a choice: whether to accept or to reject a new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. The decision we make will profoundly affect our lives -- and the lives of people all over the world -- for years to come.

We face this choice from a position of strength -- as the strongest nation on earth -- politically, economically, and militarily.

Our alliances are firm and reliable. Our military forces are strong and ready. Our economic power is unmatched. Along with the other industrial democracies, we lead the way in technological innovation. Our combined economies are more than three times as productive as those of the Soviet Union and its allies. Our political institutions are based on human freedom. Our open system encourages individual creativity -- and that, in turn, strengthens our whole society. Our values and our democratic way of life have a magnetic appeal for people around the world which a materialistic and totalitarian philosophy can never hope to rival.

For all these reasons, we have a capacity for leadership in the world that surpasses that of any other nation.

That leadership imposes many responsibilities upon us, but our noblest duty is to use our strength to serve our highest interest: the building of a secure, stable, and peaceful world. We perform that duty in the spirit proclaimed by John F. Kennedy in 1963: "Confident and unafraid," he said, "we labor on -- not toward a strategy of annihilation but toward a strategy of peace."

In our relations with the Soviet Union, the possibility of mutual annihilation makes a strategy of peace the only rational choice for both sides.

Because our values are so different, it is clear that the United States and the Soviet Union will be in competition for as far ahead as we can see.

Yet we have a common interest in survival and we share a common recognition that our survival depends, in a real sense, on each other. The very competition between us makes it imperative that we bring under control its most dangerous aspect -- the nuclear arms race. That is why the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are so important. This effort by the two great nations to limit vital security forces is unique in human history.

As the Congress and the American people consider the SALT Treaty which is now nearly complete, the debate will center around four basic questions:

- Why do we need SALT II?
- How is the Treaty related to our overall defense strategy?
- Can Soviet compliance be verified?
- How does the Treaty relate to Soviet activities which challenge our interests?

Let me address each question in turn.

First, why do we need a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty?

We need it because it will contribute to a more peaceful world -- and to our own national security.

Today, we and the Soviet Union, with sharply different world outlooks and interests, both have the ominous destructive power literally to destroy each other as a functioning society, killing tens of millions of people in the process. And common sense tells us -- as it tells the Soviet Union -- that we must work to make our competition less dangerous, less burdensome, and less likely to bring the ultimate horror of nuclear war.

Indeed, the entire world has a vital interest in controlling the strategic arms race.

We have consulted closely with our Allies who count on us not only to maintain strong military forces to offset Soviet military power, but also to manage successfully a stable East-West relationship. SALT is at the heart of both these crucial efforts. That is why the leaders of France, Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, and other nations have voiced their support for the emerging Treaty.

Some nations which have so far held back from building nuclear weapons will be strongly influenced by whether the two nuclear superpowers will restrain our own weapons. Rejection of the new Strategic Arms Treaty would seriously undermine the effort to control proliferation of these deadly weapons. And nothing would more surely damage our other critical efforts in arms control -- from a ban on all nuclear testing to preventing dangerous satellite warfare in space; from equalizing NATO and Warsaw Pact forces to restraining the spread of sophisticated conventional weapons.

Every President since the dawn of the nuclear age has pursued the effort to bring nuclear arms under control. This is and must be a continuing process.

-- President Kennedy, building on the efforts of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, signed the first agreement with the Soviet Union in 1963 to stop the poisonous testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere.

-- In 1968 under President Johnson, the United States and the Soviet Union joined other nations in signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- an important step in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

-- In 1972 under President Nixon the SALT I agreement placed the first agreed limits on the number of offensive weapons, and

-- The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty made an enduring contribution to our security.

President Ford continued at Helsinki and at Vladivostok. Each negotiation builds on the accomplishments of the last. Each agreement provides the foundation for further progress toward a more stable nuclear relationship.

Three Presidents have spent more than six years negotiating the next step in this process -- the SALT II agreement. We have all negotiated carefully and deliberately. Every step of the way we have worked with our military leaders and experts, and we have sought the advice and counsel of the members of Congress.

An overwhelming majority of the American people recognize the need for SALT II. Our people want and expect continued step-by-step progress toward bringing nuclear weapons under control. Americans will support a reasoned increase in our defense effort, but we do not want a wholly unnecessary return to the Cold War and an all-out arms race, with vastly greater risks and costs. Through strength, we want world peace.

Let me turn to the second question -- how SALT II is related to our overall defense strategy.

The strategic forces of the United States and the Soviet Union today are essentially equivalent.

They have larger and more numerous land-based missiles. We have a larger number of warheads, and significant technological and geographical advantages.

Each side has the will and the means to prevent the other from achieving superiority. Neither side is in a position to exploit its nuclear weapons for political purposes, nor to use strategic weapons without facing almost certain suicide.

What causes us concern is not the current balance, but the momentum of the Soviet strategic buildup. Over the past decade, the Soviets have steadily increased their real defense spending, while ours has had a net decrease. In areas not limited by SALT I, they have launched ambitious programs to strengthen their strategic forces. At some future point, they could achieve a strategic advantage -- unless we alter these trends.

That is exactly what I intend to do -- with the support of the American people and the bipartisan support of Congress.

We must move on two fronts at the same time:

-- First, within mutually accepted limits, we must modernize our own strategic forces. Along with the strengthening of NATO, that is a central purpose of the increased defense budget I have submitted to the Congress -- improvements necessary even in a time of fiscal restraint.

-- Second, we must place more stringent limits on the arms race than are presently imposed by SALT I. That is the purpose of the SALT II Treaty.

The defense budget I have submitted will ensure that our nuclear force continues to be essentially equivalent to that of the Soviet Union.

This year we have begun to equip our submarines with new, more powerful and longer-range Trident I missiles. Next year, the first of our new, even more secure Trident submarines will be going to sea, and we are working on a more powerful and accurate Trident II missile for these submarines.

Our cruise missile program will greatly enhance the effectiveness of our long-range bomber force. These missiles will be able to penetrate any air defense which the Soviet Union could build in the foreseeable future.

We are substantially improving the accuracy and power of our land-based Minuteman missiles. But in the coming decade missiles of this type based in fixed silos will become increasingly vulnerable to surprise attack. The Soviets have three-quarters of their warheads in such fixed-site missiles, compared to only a quarter of ours. Nevertheless, this is a serious problem -- and we must deal with it sensibly and effectively.

The Defense Department now has under consideration a number of options for responding to this problem, including making some of our ICBMs mobile. I might add that the options we are evaluating would be far more costly -- and we would have far less confidence in their effectiveness -- in the absence of SALT II limits. For without these limits on Soviet warheads, the Soviet Union could counter our effort simply by greatly increasing the number of warheads on their missiles.

Let me emphasize that the SALT II agreement preserves adequate flexibility for the United States in this important area.

Our strategic forces must be able to survive any attack, and to counterattack military and civilian targets in the aggressor nation. We have had this capacity -- which is the essence of deterrence -- in the past; we have it today; and SALT II plus the defense programs I have described will ensure it for the future.

The SALT II agreement will slow the growth of Soviet arms and limit the strategic competition, and by helping to define future threats we might face, SALT II will make our defense planning more effective.

Under the agreement, the two sides will be limited to equal numbers of strategic launchers for the first time, ending the Soviet numerical advantage permitted in the currently effective SALT I agreement.

To reach these new and lower levels, the Soviets will have to reduce their overall number of strategic delivery systems by 10 percent -- more than 250 Soviet missile launchers or bombers. Naturally, the Soviets will choose to phase out their older systems, but these systems are still formidable. The missiles to be torn down are comparable in age and payload to our Minuteman II and Polaris missiles. Under the agreement, they will not be permitted to replace these systems with modern ones. Our own operational forces have been kept somewhat below the permitted ceiling. Thus, under the agreement, we could increase our force level, if necessary.

SALT II will also impose the first limited but important restraints on the race to build new systems and improve existing ones -- the so-called "qualitative" arms race.

In short, SALT II places serious limits on what the Soviets might do in the absence of the agreement. For example, without SALT II, the Soviet Union could build up to some 3000 strategic weapons by 1985. With SALT, we will both be limited to 2250 such weapons.

This new arms control agreement will obviously serve our national interests. It will reduce the dangerous levels of strategic arms and restrain the development of future weapons. It will help to maintain our relative strength compared to



the Soviets, and will avert a costly, risky, and pointless buildup of missile launchers and bombers -- at the end of which both sides would be even less secure.

Let me turn now to the third of the four questions I listed at the beginning: How can we know whether the Soviets are living up to their obligations under this SALT agreement?

No objective has commanded more energy and attention in our negotiations. We have insisted that the SALT II agreement be made verifiable. We are confident that no significant violation of the treaty could take place without the United States detecting it.

Our confidence in the verifiability of the agreement derives from the size and nature of the activities we must monitor and the many effective and sophisticated intelligence collection systems which we possess.

For example, nuclear submarines take several years to construct and assemble. Missile silos and their supporting equipment are large and visible. Intercontinental bombers are built at a few plants and need major airfields. Our photoreconnaissance satellites survey the entire Soviet Union on a regular basis and give us high confidence that we will be able to count accurately the numbers of all these systems.

But our independent verification capabilities are not limited only to observing these large-scale activities. We can determine not only how many systems there are, but what they can do. Our photographic satellites and other systems enable us to follow technological developments in Soviet strategic forces with great accuracy. There is no question that any cheating which might affect our national security would be discovered in time for us to respond fully.

For many years we have monitored Soviet strategic forces and Soviet compliance with the SALT I agreement with a high degree of confidence. This overall capability remains. It was certainly not lost with our observation stations in Iran, which was only one of many intelligence sources we use for following Soviet strategic activities.

We are concerned with that loss, but we must keep it in perspective.

This monitoring capability relates principally to the portion of the agreement dealing with the modernization limits on ICBMs and to only a portion of such modernization.

The sensitive intelligence techniques cannot be disclosed in public, but the bottom line is that if there is an effort to cheat on the SALT agreement -- including the limits on modernizing ICBMs -- we will detect it, and we will do so in time fully to protect our security.

We must also keep in mind that quite apart from SALT limits, our security is affected by the extent of our information about Soviet strategic forces. With this SALT II Treaty, that vital information will be much more accessible to us.

The agreement specifically forbids interference with the systems used for monitoring compliance. It prohibits any deliberate concealment that would impede verification. Any such concealment activity would itself be detectable, and a violation of this agreement would be so serious as to give us grounds to cancel the Treaty itself.

As I have said many times, the stakes are too high to rely on trust -- or even on the Soviet's rational inclination to act in their own best interest. The Treaty must -- and will be -- verifiable from the day it is signed.

Finally, how does SALT II fit into the context of our overall relations with the Soviet Union?

Because SALT II will make the world safer and our own nation more secure, it is in our national interest to control nuclear weapons even as we compete with the Soviets elsewhere in the world.

A SALT agreement in no way limits our ability to promote our interests and to answer Soviet threats to those interests.

We will continue to support the independence of Third World nations who struggle to stay free.

We will continue to promote the peaceful resolution of local and regional disputes, and to oppose efforts by any others to inflame those disputes with outside force.

And we will continue to work for human rights.

It is a delusion to believe that rejection of SALT would somehow induce the Soviet Union to exercise new restraint in troubled areas. The actual effect might be precisely the opposite. The most intransigent and hostile elements of the Soviet power structure would be encouraged and strengthened by a rejection of SALT. The Soviets might well feel that they have little to lose by creating new international tensions.

A rejection of SALT II would have significance beyond the fate of a single treaty. It would mean a radical turning away from America's long-term policy of seeking world peace, the control of nuclear weapons, and the easing of tensions between Americans and the Soviet people under a system of international law based on mutual interests.

The rejection of SALT II would result in a more perilous world. As I said at Georgia Tech on February 20: "Each crisis, each confrontation, each point of friction -- as serious as it may be in its own right -- will take on an added measure of significance and an added dimension of danger. For it would occur in an atmosphere of unbridled strategic competition and deteriorating strategic stability. It is precisely because we have fundamental differences with the Soviet Union that we are determined to bring this most dangerous element of our military competition under control."

For these reasons, we will not try to impose binding linkage between Soviet behavior and SALT -- and we will not accept any Soviet attempts to link SALT with aspects of our own foreign policy of which they may disapprove.

Again, SALT II is not a favor we are doing for the Soviet Union. It is an agreement carefully negotiated in the national security interest of the United States.

\* \* \*

I put these issues to you today because they need discussion and debate, and because the voices of the American people must be heard.

In the months ahead, we will do all in our power to explain the Treaty clearly and fully to the American people. I know that Members of Congress from both parties will join in this effort to insure an informed public debate.

A-VIII/22/10

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During this debate, it is important that we exercise care. We will be sharing with the Congress some of our most sensitive defense and intelligence secrets. And the leaders in Congress must insure that these secrets will be guarded carefully so that the debate itself does not undermine our security.

As the national discussion takes place, let us be clear about what the issues are -- and are not.

--Americans are committed to maintaining a strong defense. That is not the issue.

--We will continue to compete -- and compete effectively -- with the Soviet Union. That is not the issue.

The issue is whether we will move ahead with strategic arms control or resume a relentless arms competition. That is the choice we face -- between an imperfect world with SALT II and an imperfect, and more dangerous, world without it.

With SALT II, we will have:

--significant reductions in Soviet strategic forces;

--far greater certainty in our defense planning and in the knowledge of the threats we face;

--flexibility to meet our defense needs;

--the foundation for further controls on nuclear and conventional arms; and

--our own self-respect and the earned respect of the world for a United States committed to the works of peace.

Without SALT, the Soviets will be unconstrained and capable of an enormous further buildup.

Without SALT, there would have to be a much sharper rise in our own defense spending.

Without SALT, we would end up with thousands more strategic nuclear warheads on both sides, with far greater costs -- and less security -- for our citizens.

A-611/27/11

11

Without SALT, we would see improved relations with the Soviet Union replaced by heightened tensions.

Without SALT, the long, slow process of arms control, so central to building a safer world, would be dealt a crippling blow.

Without SALT, the world would be forced to conclude that America had chosen confrontation rather than cooperation and peace.

This is the inescapable choice we face. For the fact is that the alternative to this treaty is not a perfect agreement drafted unilaterally by the United States in which we gain everything and the Soviets nothing. The alternative, now and in the foreseeable future, is no agreement at all.

I am convinced that the United States has the moral and political will to control the relentless technology which could constantly devise new weapons of mass destruction. We need not drift into a dark nightmare of unrestrained arms competition. We Americans have the wisdom to know that our security depends on more than maintaining our unsurpassed defense forces. Our security and that of our Allies also depend on the strength of ideas and ideals, and on arms control measures that can stabilize and finally reverse a dangerous and wasteful arms race which neither side can win. This is the path of wisdom -- and of peace.

# # # #

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN *HJ*  
DATE: MAY 9, 1979  
SUBJECT: SALT II PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT CALLS

Here are the names that we suggest you call before the 3pm SALT II announcement today:

- > Senator Patrick Moynihan. (L-) *Will send order ~~for~~ speech text - refused to support - Frank arrange luncheon date soon.*
  - > Senator Henry Bellmon. (Und)
  - > Senator Dale Bumpers. (L+)
  - > Speaker Thomas O'Neill. *"good luck"*
  - > President Ford. I suggest that you offer President Ford a SALT II briefing by a high Administration official; David Aaron is prepared to make the trip within the next week. This will be calling President Nixon; David can brief Nixon on the same trip. *Will call Jdis for Aaron's briefing*
  - > Tom Watson. The General Advisory Committee of ACDA, which Tom Watson chairs, will be very helpful during the ratification debate. The GAC will be holding a two-day meeting tomorrow and Friday, and they hope to agree on a unanimous statement of support for SALT II; a call from you at this time would be especially timely. *will help*
- You should ask Tom to make sure that the members of his committee take part in the ratification debate.
- > Clark Clifford. Mr. Clifford is co-chair of Americans for *HAVE AN* SALT, a group that is becoming an important asset. A call *SEE HIM* from you at this time would acknowledge the role that we hope the group will play, and will help Mr. Clifford in *TO PLAN TOGETHER* his organizing and fundraising efforts.
  - > President Nixon too busy until 7/1 for briefing. *Will call Jdis when ready.*



A-VIII/29/1

FILE COPY

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NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

-6/21/79  
127  
for

THE CHAIRMAN

June 11, 1979

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. B. Aronson  
The White House

FROM: Joseph Duffey *JD*

I have been asked to provide some suggestions for the arrival statement and "the Toast" in Vienna. I attach some language and references prepared by Bob Tucker at Princeton. While I think there may be some ideas here, my only caution would be to check carefully "the proverb" since quoting proverbs with Russians is tricky business.

The following quotation comes from the end of Volume I of Democracy in America. Speaking for the US and the USSR, Touquille writes "Their starting point is different and their courses are not the same yet each of them seems marked out by the will of heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe."

Jefferson was a frequent correspondent with Alexander I "there is a bust of A in Monticello and Jefferson recommended that John Paul Jones go to Russia to study the Navy as a prototype for the US Fleet.

One more suggestion. Bill Boder of the Senate FR Committee, knows and has written about the history of US/USSR Tensions and Negotiations on Vienna, effectively resolved 25 Years ago.

I attach a copy of an article by James Billington which has some references which maybe suggestive.

Attachments

Rec'd AM  
6/14/79  
11:52

#### ARRIVAL AT AIRPORT

A little over 25 years ago a new era started in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. A new era that was marked first of all by the conclusion of the treaty whereby Austria again achieved independence, and it is fitting that the leaders of our two countries--the United States and the Soviet Union--should meet here in Vienna, the capital of the country whose independence and neutrality was assured by this first agreement of the new era.

#### IN THE TOAST

We have come here to conclude an agreement on mutual regulation of the deadly destructive weapons that our two States possess in unique quantities. This agreement is the fruit of long and arguess negotiations. It will serve our two countries interest in greater security, and these interests coincide with all other nations equally vital interests in a world with improved prospects of peace.

The Russian people, I am told, have a proverb that says "a ~~poor~~<sup>bad</sup> peace is better than a ~~fine~~<sup>good</sup> fight", but it will not be in that spirit, I hope, that we conclude this agreement on regulation of armament. For what we, and the world need now, is something more than a quote for peace. We need a far greater measure of understanding and active cooperation among nation-states toward the solution of our ever mounting problems.




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The United States and the Soviet Union, as I see it, have a special obligation here. Not only must we cooperate in this and other agreements to improve the prospects of world peace, we can and must, and I pray we will, show an example of responsible actions in what we do as individual nation-states and in what we do cooperatively towards the resolution of conflict situations toward assuaging local conflicts rather than aggravating them toward assisting troubled areas to find peaceful solutions of their problems.

It is not only our great size and strength as nation-states that lay this obligation to responsible action upon us. It is the ideals to which our peoples have traditionally aspired. The American people, so diverse in origin, in religion, in color, are united in dedication to universalists ideals. And your peoples, too, are no strangers to those ideals. Just 99 years ago this week, your great writer *Fyodor Dostoyevsky* speaking in Moscow at the dedication of the monument to *Pushkin* spoke of the meaning and mission of the Russian people. He said this mission was to foster, in the future, a reconciliation of "European contradictions" in the spirit of universal brotherhood. Now it is not only European but world contradictions that need to be reconciled, but I would like to believe that it is the joint mission of the American people and the Russian and other peoples of the Soviet Union to cooperate in that cause. We have stood together in the past, in the dark days of 1941 to 1945, let us now learn to cooperate toward the creation of a peaceful and orderly world based on human values.



J. H. Bullyt  
"The Spirit  
Russia"  
- The Arts of Russia  
Houghton Mifflin  
1920

modern Leningrad like a crown jewel in a new base metal setting; or medieval Suzdal, largely untouched by modernity and currently being restored to its former glory. These cities inspire the imagination in ways no modern city can—least of all those built by Soviet architects as they moved from monstrosity under Stalin to monotony under his successors.

Even more than the monuments, the memories of Old Russia are well preserved. For Russia is rich in oral folklore and has long experience in keeping alive aspects of past history and present aspiration that have been denied expression in the officially controlled written culture and that have only occasionally and belatedly been written down for a wider audience. As in its early religious art, Russia's enduring oral folklore is the anonymous and usually collective work of the Russian people themselves, more than of any individual craftsman.

The Russian people perhaps bear comparison with the American more than with any other people, despite obvious differences in cultural heritage and political development. Like America, Russia is a relatively new civilization that grew from Christian roots on the periphery of Europe to become one of the world's two great industrial superpowers. During parallel periods of expansion from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries, the two civilizations moved toward

each other across the Northern Hemisphere, their pioneer settlements overlapping briefly in Northern California, where the old Russian Fort Ross (from *Rossia*) may still be seen fifty miles northwest of San Francisco.

Russians developed their own frontier spirit and psychology. The earliest Russian epic, *The Lay of Igor's Campaign*, is a Cowboys-and-Indians tale of a raid out of Kiev against the Poloversian peoples of the steppe; and this tale was transposed in the nineteenth century into perhaps the most popular of Russian national operas, Alexander Borodin's *Prince Igor*. The rugged Cossacks who established military outposts on the frontier and thus carried Russian civilization down the Dnieper, the Don, and the Volga—then on into Siberia—recall the stockade settlers and freebooters of the early American West. They inspired a rich literature from Nikolai Gogol's *Taras Bulba* through Mikhail Sholokhov's epic of the Russian Revolution and Civil War, *And Quiet Flows the Don*. The schismatic Old Believers who sought refuge in the hitherto vacant wastelands of the Russian north and east recall the Mormons and other American sects who set off into forbidding virgin territory in search of freedom from religious persecution. They too inspired many Russian writers and became the all-consuming interest of Modest Mussorgsky, who made them the subject of his unfinished operatic masterpiece, the "popular musical drama" *Khovanshchina*.



*Pre-Christian Greeks and Scythian tribesmen from Asia Minor came to southern Russia c. 650 B.C. and soon were carrying on a lively trade, the nomads exchanging grain, furs, and hides for Greek metalwork, jewelry, and pottery. The Greek gold comb (opposite), decorated with battling tribesmen, was made for a Scythian chief. The Scythian griffin with a stag's head in its mouth (right) was made of wood and leather to ornament the top of a pole. Its design and craftsmanship testify to the sophistication of the Scythians' animal art.*

Out of the frontier society's need for discipline amidst physical adversity, and out of the imperatives of an ascetic monasticism that championed the colonization of the Russian interior, there arose the strain of moralism and repressed or deferred sexuality that Russian culture shared with American culture. Where the pioneering settlers were not missionary monks, they were cossacks and fur traders forced to accept long periods of celibacy. Even more than the early Puritans in relatively temperate North America, Russians had to forego personal indulgence for communal survival.

Since the Russian frontier communities tended to assimilate rather than annihilate the pre-existent native communities, they were influenced in many subtle ways by the animistic, naturalistic cults that had preceded Christianity. The official Orthodox culture felt compelled to suppress the earthy impulses that had been evoked by a lustier paganism and by a life on the steppe and in the forest that was heavily dependent on the cycles of nature. The tradition of *doueverie*, or "duality of belief," persisted, however, and helped enable the Russians of the "silver age"—the period after the revolution of 1905 and the subsequent repeal of censorship—to produce a culture of passion, color, and sensuality that astonished the European world.

Another legacy of the pioneer spirit in both Russia and America was a passion for the practical and demonstrable, a

suspicion of the abstract and intellectual. Medieval Kiev's Prince Vladimir, who embraced Orthodox Christianity for Russia in 988, had himself been converted by the beauty of Constantinople, not by the ideas of Byzantium; and the Russian people sought to embellish this heritage, not to criticize it—to vindicate it by deeds of physical construction and conquest, not by philosophical arguments. The Moslems to the south and east were the people of the book; and Russian culture remained remarkably resistant to the assimilation of Islamic learning. Russia was equally opposed to the assimilation of philosophic thought from Western Christendom. The first printers were driven out of Moscow in the 1560's; the attempt to print corrected versions of the basic Church books precipitated a schism in the Church in the 1660's; and it was not until the reign of Catherine in the 1760's that the large-scale printing of secular books on philosophical subjects gained official approval. Not before the early nineteenth century did a vernacular version of the complete bible become widely available or a university offer a full course of instruction in the Russian language. Thus, prior to the nineteenth century, critical, intellectual activity was largely conducted in French, German, or even Latin, rather than in the august Church Slavonic which controlled the literary culture or in the vernacular used for the practical tasks of war, commerce, and administration.



Like America, Russia was and remains a multi-cultural melting pot, the conglomerate Great Russians of the central and northwestern U.S.S.R. providing only a slim majority of the population. While subduing pre-existing native populations that ranged from Eskimos in the north to desert nomads in the south, both countries drew on successive waves of emigration from Europe (though these became increasingly more important and numerous in America than in Russia during the nineteenth century). Both countries contain men of many races and creeds not always successfully integrated into the often parochial mainstream. If Russia had few blacks to persecute, it had a large Moslem population on which to visit various forms of discrimination. Fleeing Western oppression in the late Middle Ages, the Jews moved East and were gradually absorbed into the western portion of the Russian empire, which became the leading center of world Jewish culture before renewed persecution in the late nineteenth century began a new exodus, largely to America.

But for all its prejudice and provincialism, Russia like America was more often a source of refuge from old persecutions than a source of new ones. Oppressed German sects of the eighteenth century emigrated not only to the land of the Pennsylvania Dutch, but to the equally virgin lower Ukraine and Crimea newly wrested by Catherine the Great from the

Mongols. Those who had opposed the successful French revolution of 1789 tended to flee to tsarist Russia, while partisans of the unsuccessful revolutions of 1848 generally fled to America. Far more than is realized, Russia as well as America offered both the space and the freedom for a fresh start to a wide variety of western Europeans. Scratch a Russian and you are likely to find not so much a Tatar (as the old saying has it), but a European who emigrated East rather than West.

Like America, Russia experienced a marked tension between the culture of its interior regions and that of its semi-European cities. Just as an American once said that Europe extends to the Alleghenies and America lies beyond, so many Russians have felt that Europe extended to the Valdai Hill (just to the east of Novgorod and Petersburg), and that Russia lay beyond. A special world of commerce and culture that was as self-contained in its own day as it is forgotten in ours grew up among the rich forests, mineral resources, and river trade routes of the Old Russian interior. A key role in developing a continent-wide civilization in Russia as in America was played by one great central river with innumerable navigable tributaries. Mother Volga, no less than of man river, dominated the imagination and controlled the commerce of a heartland culture that lay within—but pointed beyond—Europe.



*"Far away above the rye there rose up a white gleaming tower with a blue onion dome upon it, close by another tower with a golden dome, then a cluster of five towers and domes together, to the left—a high, slender belfry, and still more to the left the pink walls of a monastery like the walls of a fortress with turrets along it. . . ." Thus a contemporary Russian writer describes the approach to Suzdal, one of the earliest Slavic settlements in northern Russia. Founded in the 900's, Suzdal was a flourishing city when Moscow was a hamlet; until it was overrun by the Mongols in 1238 it was a major agricultural and commercial center. A key role in the development and protection of such settlements was played by the monasteries, which served as religious havens and military outposts. Suzdal's Pokrovsky Monastery is at left.*

Russians like Americans in the nineteenth century felt a special compulsion to explain who they were and how they differed from Europeans. Writers felt obliged to find meaning for an expansive but still relatively inarticulate populace that was dominated by, but no longer felt secure in, its older religious traditions. One can find American parallels for many Russian ideological preoccupations and literary personalities. The metaphysical answers that Herman Melville sought in southern seas, Fedor Dostoevsky found in the Siberian camps—after each had experienced an almost simultaneous spiritual crisis in the Europeanized parts of his native land. Ivan Turgenev and Henry James feared the intolerance and anti-aristocratic plebianism of their native lands and fled to western Europe, where they became friends. Yet their elegant fiction returns incessantly for subject matter to the lands they left behind. Maxim Gorky, like Jack London (a special favorite of Russians—even of Stalin), glorified the world of the unspoiled interior and the rough egalitarianism associated with it. Then, in the early twentieth century, from the interior of each country came a romantic figure who personified the dream of middle-class America and lower-class Russia. Scott Fitzgerald of Minnesota and Sergei Yesenin of Ryazan longed to be literary voices in touch with the new order being built in the urban centers closer to Europe. But each moved on through the

Paris that lay beyond New York and Leningrad to alcoholic despair and premature death.

The links and affinities that have been detected between Russians and Americans by such disparate observers as Alexis De Tocqueville, Nehru, and Mao Tse-tung are now based on more than geographic and psychological similarities; for, in the Soviet period, Russia resolved first to imitate and then to "overtake and surpass" American industry. More recently the two powers have extended competition into the heavens.

Beyond politics, however, stands the undoubted responsiveness of the one to anything that is authentically exuberant in the popular culture of the other—as attested by the fascination of ordinary Russians with American jazz and ordinary Americans with Moiseev dancing. It was not simply cold war curiosity that produced either the extraordinary popularity in America of the writers Boris Pasternak and Alexander Solzhenitsyn or the extraordinary curiosity in Russia about new material trends and spiritual unrest in America. Plagued by inadequate exposure and imperfect understanding, many citizens of each superpower feel a simple childlike desire, as well as a responsible adult need, to know more about the other. It is to such that this essay is addressed; for it is not an inventory or guide, but only an invitation addressed by a citizen of the one to an adventure in discovering the civilization of the other.

A-VIII/30/1

The first draft of the Toast did not contain the word " homeland " so I doubt that either State or NSC is particularly wedded to it. Both Ed Sanders and Jerry Shecter agree that this particular word will be a disaster. If and when the Toast is re-written, here on in Vienna, you might make sure that this phrase is not used.

Today, Mr. President, we discussed a range of arms control and international issues important not only to us but to the entire world. On some of the issues, particularly in the arms control field, we were able to give further impetus to our joint efforts to develop rules to curb the military competition between us. On other issues, particularly international problems that confront us in troubled areas of the world, we did not agree, and we were not able to develop a common approach.

Our discussion demonstrates the danger and risks to both our countries that stems from the profound changes sweeping many parts of the world today. As the two major nuclear powers, we have a special historic responsibility to deal with that change.

I believe that two roads lie before us.

-- There is the road of competition, confrontation and even conflict should either of our nations seek to exploit the turbulence that exists in various parts of the world. The United States can and will protect its vital interests if this is the route we must follow.

-- But there is another path. And that is the path of restraint and, where possible, cooperation in bringing about peaceful change..

A-VIII/30/3

Self Copy  
Carter Library

We prefer the second path just as we are prepared to pursue the first if need be.

We hope, Mr. President, that the island of detente which has been created in Europe can be expanded to other regions of the world. It is our hope that we can work together so that the rules of restraint, the mutual respect accorded each other's interests, and the recognition of the danger of unbridled competition will lead to a more stable peace in Europe -- indeed to the revival of this very city -- and can progressively be applied to other troubled regions of our planet.

In Southern Africa, there is a struggle for racial justice. Americans know from personal experience how difficult a struggle it is. We also know that violence is not the solution and, so, we seek peaceful resolution of the conflicts there.

In Southeast Asia, war continues. We believe that the war in Cambodia must end and can only end by the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces which invaded Cambodia months ago.

In the Middle East, Israel and Egypt have taken an historic step toward a comprehensive peace. The violence and wars and bloodshed and terrorism of three decades brought us no closer to peace; only the courage of Egyptian and Israeli leaders have enabled us to start down the road of a



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comprehensive peace that must include recognition of the right for a homeland for the Palestinians.

On all these major international questions, the United States stands for the peaceful resolution of disputes, the reconciliation of differences, and against the use of force, violence and war.

So, too, we stand for measures to control the instruments of war.

The SALT Agreement which we will sign here provides a firm foundation for strengthening the peace everywhere. The other arms control initiatives which we are pursuing together can reinforce that foundation but, in the end, we must build on that foundation -- not an arena for conflict but a meeting house where we can resolve our differences and implement in practical ways the principles of restraint, respect for the independence and territorial integrity of all nations, and regard for the value of every human being.

Mr. President, in the history of all mankind, no two nations have had a greater responsibility to act with restraint and to seek mutual accommodation, and never before has the world undergone such enormous transition and change. Despite our differences in history, ideology, and economic and social systems, I am nonetheless confident that with goodwill we can make progress in the differences that divide us and strengthen those that unite us.

A-VIII/81/1

June 18, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Jerry Rafshoon *Jerry*  
Rick Hertzberg *Rick*

Subject: Signing statement and Joint Session Speech  
(attached)

The signing statement incorporates the changes you have made to date as well as suggestions from Secretary Vance and Zbig. It also incorporates the best lines from other drafts which you did not see.

Draft #3 of the address to the Joint Session has been totally revised, and incorporates the changes suggested by Messrs. Vance, Brown and Brzezinski. They have signed off on it.

We are sending a copy to Washington to be held in our office awaiting changes, so that we can release the text before our arrival.

We suggest that after you have reviewed and made changes on the Congressional speech that you let go of it in time to get a few hours' sleep on the plane and that you then rehearse it in the two or three hours before landing. In other words: please don't work on it and then take a nap just before you have to deliver it.

Please be sure to wear a dark suit for both the signing ceremony and the speech.

Sorry for the screwup on getting approvals yesterday.

DEPARTURE STATEMENT

Mr. Vice President, Members of the Congress, Friends:

Thirty-five years ago at another summit meeting in  
Potsdam, a brief message was brought in to President Truman.  
Just before dawn on the desert of Alamogordo man had  
unleashed the power of matter itself -- and changed the  
world forever.

Since then the unchanging duty of every President  
of the United States has been to avoid nuclear war while  
maintaining the security of our nation. That is the purpose  
of my mission to Vienna. We are a strong nation committed  
to the patient search for peace. We know that progress in  
the ways of peace is measured in inches not in miles. And  
we know that the only way to have peace in the end is to  
have kept it all along.

The Vienna Summit will be the tenth time American

and Soviet leaders have met since World War II. Our differences with the Soviet Union are considerable, and they require the most careful discussion.

We will make clear to the Soviet Union what our views and goals in the world are, so that there can be no dangerous misunderstandings as we pursue our separate courses.

We will try to broaden our communications with the Soviet leadership and create new channels of understanding for the future.

We will seek new areas where more cooperation and less competition are possible. The arms limitation treaty which President Brezhnev and I will sign on Monday embodies that spirit and gives us hope for the future.

And with SALT II, we will continue the thirty year search for ways to avoid nuclear war. That was the goal of

the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and of SALT I. It was the goal of three Presidents from both parties who worked for seven years to make SALT II fair, balanced and verifiable. That will be our goal as we begin to discuss further limitations and reductions in SALT III.

No one treaty can take us back to a time before we learned to arm ourselves with nuclear weapons. Just as no one summit can end the sharp competition between us.

We and the Soviet Union can, however, agree that the security of both our nations and the stability of the world depends on avoiding a nuclear conflict that some may survive -- but no one can win.

I approach this Summit in Vienna full of hope, but without false expectations.

The goals which lie at the heart of my mission today --

improving our nation's security and avoiding nuclear war --  
transcend all other issues that I will face during my life  
in public office.

I am grateful for your guidance and for your good  
wishes.

Because of them I go to Vienna with the confidence  
which can only come from representing the greatest, the  
strongest, and the freest society in the world.

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DEPARTURE STATEMENT

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Thirty-five years ago <sup>during</sup> ~~at~~ another summit meeting in

Potsdam, a brief message was brought in to President Truman.

Just before dawn on the desert of Alamogordo, man had <sup>The first atomic bomb exploded --</sup>

unleashed the power of matter itself, ~~re~~ and changed the world forever.

Since then the unchanging duty of every President of the United States has been to avoid nuclear war while maintaining the security of our nation. That is the purpose of my mission to Vienna. ~~We are a strong nation committed~~

~~to the patient search for peace.~~ We know that progress in

<sup>this search</sup> ~~the ways of peace~~ <sup>often</sup> is, <sup>and</sup> measured in inches, not in miles. And

we know that the only way to have peace in the end is to

<sup>we've peace</sup> have ~~kept it~~ all along, <sup>from a position of national strength.</sup>

The Vienna Summit will be the tenth time American

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do A-VIII/33/2  
We have

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I am grateful for your guidance and for your good  
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Because of them I go to Vienna with the confidence  
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strongest, and the <sup>most</sup> free society in the world.

# # # #

6/17/79

Exchange of Letters

Paris [Paris]

Upon Signing of II Treaty  
Vienna

The most powerful currents of history have been the

A-1111/34/1

ones that have swept nations to war.

Yet as we look back on the causes of so many wars,  
we can make out times when a more watchful course, even a  
small careful shift, might have guided nations that much  
further, kept them that much longer in the ways of peace.

That is what we have tried to do here in Vienna.

Today, the threat of a nuclear holocaust that no one  
can win still hangs over us -- as it has for more than  
thirty years. Our two nations are now armed with thousands  
of nuclear weapons, each capable of causing devastation beyond  
measure and imagination. A dozen other nations stand ready  
to take the steps necessary to deploy nuclear arms. And  
as weapons technology advances, so too does the danger  
that the arms race might escalate out of control.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, which have gone on for more than ten years without interruption, represent the realization that a nuclear arms competition without shared rules, without verifiable limits, and without continuing dialogue is an invitation to disaster. It tempts fate and the future in a way that insults our intelligence and threatens humanity.

It also challenges our courage and our creativity. If we cannot control our power to destroy, we can never guide our fate.

Like SALT I, the ABM Treaty, and the Vladivostok accords before it, SALT II is based on the real security needs of our two nations. It will not end the need for continued military strength and readiness on both sides. But SALT II does place important new limits on both the number and quality of nuclear arms. And it allows us to continue on course towards a safer world with even more

substantial limitations and reductions in SALT III.

I am entrusted with the security of the United States America. I would never take any action that would jeopardize that sacred trust. Mr. President, we both have children and we want them to live, and to live in peace. We have both worked hard to give our nation's children that security.

No one treaty, no one meeting can guarantee the future safe passage of our nation. 1979 is but a moment on the clock of history. And in the end, peace can only be won if we have maintained it all along.

Here today, as we draw boundaries to our power, we begin to set limits on our fears of each other and of the unknown.

As we contain those fears, we stand a better chance

of guiding our own course towards the future.

And as we remain watchful and determined on that course -- the destiny of human kind need not be its own destruction.

We who can explore the stars, who can find the essence of matter -- must find the power to preserve ourselves and our earth. Each of us has only one nation. Each of us has only one world.

We know that as we set our hands to this treaty -- we set our nations on a safer course.

We have labored long to make this a careful and useful chart.

Let us use it to continue our passage towards peace.

# # #

Office of the White House Press Secretary  
(Vienna, Austria)

A-6911/35/1

THE WHITE HOUSE

TEXT OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S  
TOAST AT WORKING DINNER  
SOVIET EMBASSY  
JUNE 17, 1979

Today, Mr. President, we discussed a range of issues important not only to each of us but to the entire world. On some of the issues, particularly in the arms control field, we were able to further our joint efforts to develop rules curbing the military competition between us and to lay the groundwork for further progress on the control and regulation of nuclear weapons. On some other issues we did not agree, and we were not able to develop a common approach. We agreed, however, to continue searching for peaceful resolution of these differences.

Both our countries face risks that stem from the changes sweeping many parts of the world today. As the two major nuclear powers, we have a special responsibility to deal with that change.

I believe that two possible roads lie before us. There is the road of competition and even confrontation. Any effort by either of our nations to exploit the turbulence that exists in various parts of the world pushes us toward that road. The United States can and will protect its vital interests if this becomes the route we must follow.

But there is another way -- the path of restraint and, where possible, cooperation. This is the path we prefer.

I hope, Mr. President, that the detente which has been growing in Europe can encompass other regions of the world. I hope that we can work together so that the rules of restraint, the mutual respect accorded each other's interests, and the recognition of the danger of unbridled competition will lead to an even more stable peace in Europe and can progressively be applied to other troubled regions of our planet.

In Southern Africa, there is a struggle for racial justice. We Americans know that violence is not the solution, and so we seek peaceful resolution of the conflicts there.

In Southeast Asia, war continues, with national territories being invaded and occupied by foreign troops. We believe that the war in Kampuchea can only end by the withdrawal of foreign forces and the honoring of national independence and international borders. We must all show compassion for the tens of thousands of suffering people who have been driven from their homes and their homeland. The callous indifference with which the world ignored refugees in the Europe of the 1930's must not be repeated in the Asia of the 1970's.

In the Middle East, Israel and Egypt have taken an historic step toward a comprehensive peace. Thirty years of hatred had brought only war and terrorism. Only the courage of Egyptian and Israeli leaders has now enabled us to start down the road of a comprehensive peace.

On all these major international questions, the United States stands for the peaceful reconciliation of differences, and against the use of force.

MORE

(OVER)

So, too, we stand for measures to control the instruments of war.

The SALT Agreement which we will sign here provides a good foundation, one that will be strengthened by the other arms control initiatives we are pursuing together. Let us build on that foundation so that we can narrow our differences in a spirit of respect for the independence of all nations and the value of every human being.

Let us both agree never to use offensive weapons against any nation in an act of aggression.

Let us discourage the use of foreign forces in troubled regions of the world, and encourage the peaceful settlement of disputes among the people who are directly involved.

Mr. President, in the world's history, no two nations have ever had a greater responsibility to act with restraint, and to seek mutual accommodation, than the United States and the Soviet Union. We have many differences of history, ideology and economic and social systems. Mr. President, we are both concerned about the future, and I am sure that with honesty and goodwill we can make progress toward a safer, more peaceful world.

# # #



JUNE 13, 1979

Office of the White House Press Secretary  
(Vienna, Austria)

A-6111/3611

THE WHITE HOUSE

TEXT OF REMARKS OF PRESIDENT CARTER  
UPON SIGNING SALT II TREATY

The most powerful currents of history have often been the ones that swept nations to war.

Yet as we look back on the causes of so many wars, we can see times when a more watchful course, even a small careful shift, might have guided nations that much better, that much further in the ways of peace.

That is the purpose of what we have done here in Vienna.

Today, the threat of nuclear holocaust still hangs over us, as it has for more than thirty years. Our two nations are now armed with thousands of nuclear weapons, each capable of causing devastation beyond measure and beyond imagination. Several other nations now have nuclear arms, and even more have the ability to develop the same destructive power. Weapons technology has continued to advance, and so have the dangers and the obvious need to control and to regulate this arms competition.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, which have gone on for nearly ten years without interruption, represent the realization that a nuclear arms competition without shared rules, without verifiable limits, and without continuing dialogue is an invitation to disaster. Such an unrestrained competition would tempt the fate and the future, and would insult our intelligence and threaten the existence of humanity.

This prospect is a challenge to our courage and our creativity. If we cannot control our power to destroy, we can neither guide our fate nor preserve our future.

Like SALT I, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the Limited Test Ban Treaty before it, this SALT II Treaty is based on the real security needs of our two nations. It will not end the continuing need for military strength and readiness on both sides. But SALT II does place important new limits on both the number and quality of nuclear arms. And it allows us to continue on course towards a safer world with even more substantial limitations and reductions in SALT III. We cannot interrupt or endanger this process.

I am entrusted with the security of the United States of America. I would never take any action that would jeopardize that sacred trust. Mr. President, we both have children and we want them to live, and to live in peace. We both have worked hard to give our own and our nations' children that security.

We realize that no one treaty, no one meeting can guarantee the safe future of our nations. In the end, peace can be won only if we have pursued it and struggled tenaciously to keep the peace all along. Yet this fight for peace has often seemed the most difficult victory to win.

Here today, as we set careful limits on our power, we draw boundaries around our fears of one another. As we begin to control our fears, we can better insure our future.

We can now continue to explore the planets. We can discover the essence of matter. We can find the power to preserve ourselves and our earth.

MORE

Each of us has only one nation. We both share the same world.

Not one nation on this earth, not one people, not one human being is harmed, threatened or deprived by this victory in the battle for peace. A victory is here for all.

In our lifetime, we have learned to make war by unlocking the atom -- the power of creation itself. To make peace we must limit our use of that power by sharing our courage, wisdom and faith.

These fundamental strengths of human kind have brought us to this table today.

In setting our hands to this treaty, we set our nations on a safer course.

We have labored long to make SALT II a safe and useful chart toward the future.

Let us pledge to use this treaty as we continue our passage to peace.

# # #

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

A-611/32/1  
JUNE 18, 1979

Office of the White House Press Secretary  
(Vienna, Austria)

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EXCHANGE OF REMARKS  
BETWEEN  
THE PRESIDENT  
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
AND THE  
GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION  
AND PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET,  
LEONID I. BREZHNEV  
UPON  
SIGNING THE SALT II TREATY

The Redoutensaal,  
Vienna, Austria

1:02 P.M. CET

(Note: President Brezhnev spoke in Russian. The following is the English translation provided at the signing ceremony.)

PRESIDENT BREZHNEV: President Carter and I have affixed our signatures to the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Related Documents. This has been an event long awaited by the Soviet and American peoples, by the peoples of other countries, by all those who desire a durable peace and realize the danger of a further build-up of nuclear arsenals.

In signing this treaty, we are helping to defend the most sacred right of every individual - the right to live. Many representatives of our two countries have worked long and hard to draft the treaty. I think it will be fair to specially mention the contributions made by Secretary Vance and Minister Gromyko, Secretary Brown and Minister Ustinov. President Carter and I have also had to do a good deal of work.

To act in such a way as to prevent an outbreak of nuclear war is an obligation that the Soviet Union and the United States have jointly assumed. The treaty that has been signed today reaffirms our desire to fulfill that obligation. In terms of both quantitative and qualitative limitations of strategic arms, it goes far beyond the SALT I agreement.

MORE

OVER

The entry into force of this treaty opens up the possibility to begin elaborating subsequent measures to not only limit but also reduce strategic arms. By concluding the SALT II treaty, we are making a major step forward along the road of an overall improvement of Soviet-American relations and consequently of the entire international climate.

For the Soviet Union, this is a logical continuation of the peaceful foreign policy line defined by our Party Congresses, a line that we intend to go on following.

The signing of the treaty has appropriately crowned the Soviet-American summit meeting here in Vienna. On this auspicious occasion, we express our sincere gratitude to the President, the Chancellor and the Government of the Austrian Republic and to the people of Austria for the warm hospitality and cordiality extended to us.

MORE

THE PRESIDENT. Mr. President, fellow citizens of the world: Unfortunately, in the past the most powerful currents of history have often been the ones which swept nations to war. Yet as we look back on the causes of so many wars, we can see times when a more watchful course, even a small careful shift, might have guided nations that much better, that much further in the ways of peace.

That is the purpose of what we have done here in Vienna.

Today, the threat of nuclear holocaust still hangs over us, as it has for more than 30 years. Our two nations are now armed with thousands of nuclear weapons, each capable of causing devastation beyond measure and beyond imagination. Several other nations now have nuclear arms, and even more have the ability to develop the same destructive weapons. Weapons technology has continued to advance, and so have the dangers and the obvious need to control and to regulate this arms competition.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, which have gone on for nearly ten years without interruption, represent the realization that a nuclear arms competition without shared rules, and without verifiable limits, and without a continuing dialogue, would be an invitation to disaster. Such an unrestrained competition would tempt fate in the future and would insult our intelligence and threaten the very existence of humanity.

This prospect is a challenge to our courage and to our creativity. If we cannot control the power to destroy, we can neither guide our fate nor preserve our own future.

MORE

A-VIII/97/4

Like SALT I, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the Limited Test Ban before it, this SALT II Treaty is based on the real security needs of our two nations. It will not end the continuing need for military strength and for readiness on both sides.

But SALT II does place important limits on both the number and the quality of nuclear arms. And it has allowed us to continue on course toward a safer world with even more substantial limitations and reductions in SALT III. We cannot interrupt nor endanger this process.

I, as President, am entrusted with the security of the United States of America. I would never take any action that would jeopardize that sacred trust. President Brezhnev, you and I both have children and grandchildren and we want them to live, and to live in peace.

We have both worked hard to give our own and our nations' children that security.

We realize that no one treaty, no one meeting can guarantee the future safety of our nations. In the end, peace can be won only if we have pursued it and struggled tenaciously to keep the peace all along. Yet this fight for peace has often seemed the most difficult victory to win.

Here today, as we set very careful limits on our power, we draw boundaries around our fears of one another. As we begin to control our fears, we can better ensure our future.

We can now continue to explore the planets. We can discover the essence of matter. We can find the power to preserve ourselves and to preserve our earth.

Each of us has only one nation. We both share the same world.

Not one nation on this earth, not one people, not one single human being is harmed or threatened or deprived by this victory in the battle for peace. Indeed, a victory is here today for all.

In our lifetime, we have learned to make war by unlocking the atom -- the power of creation itself. To make peace we must limit our use of that power by sharing our courage, our wisdom and our faith.

MORE

A-111/37/5

These fundamental strengths of humankind have brought us to this very table today.

In setting our hands to this treaty, we set our nations on a safer course.

We have labored long to make SALT II a safe and useful chart toward the future.

Let us pledge now all together to use this treaty as we continue our passage to peace.

END

(AT 1:25 P.M. CET)

TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:

I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, known as SALT II, including the Protocol thereto, both signed in Vienna, Austria, on June 18, 1979.

I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the Report of the Secretary of State with respect to the Treaty, together with the following related documents:

1. a series of Agreed Statements and Common Understandings concerning the obligations of the Parties under particular articles of the Treaty;
2. a Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines on the Limitation of Strategic Arms concerning the next phase of negotiation on this subject;
3. a Soviet statement on the Backfire bomber, together with a U.S. response;
4. a Memorandum of Understanding that will establish an agreed data base by categories of strategic offensive arms along with associated statements of current data.

For thirty years the United States has pursued a fundamentally bi-partisan foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, with the objectives of deterring aggression by maintaining strategic forces second to none, creating a pattern and



A-VIII/38/2

tradition of negotiation to settle differences, building a strong framework of allies, and stabilizing the globe by halting the uncontrolled growth and spread of nuclear weapons.

SALT II strengthens each of these objectives. The seven years of negotiations, under three administrations representing both political parties, were carried out in closer consultation with Congress and under greater public scrutiny than any other arms limitation treaty. SALT II is truly a national accomplishment.

*negotiated*  
*security*  
It is my ~~best~~ judgement and firm belief that these ~~hard~~ *patiently* agreements further the long-standing goals ~~of~~ *for* our nation's ~~foreign policy~~. They improve our strategic situation and allow for further improvements in the future. They reaffirm our leadership of the world in the cause of nuclear arms control. They allow us to negotiate for peace from strength in SALT III.

Like SALT I, the Test Ban Treaty, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, SALT II is another important step forward towards our basic goal of a secure America at peace in a stable world.

*Full cooperation & my*  
Therefore I pledge the ~~most~~ conscientious attention to ~~administration in helping to explain or elaborate the~~ *request for explanation or elaboration of the agreements* details and principles ~~of the agreements~~ *of the agreements*.

Therefore I request with a sense of special urgency the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate to ratification of the SALT II Treaty.

# # #

MEMORANDUM TO THE SALT WORKING GROUP

FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN 7/25

DATE: JULY 25, 1979

SUBJECT: WORKING GROUP CHAIRMANSHIP

As you know, the scope of my activities has been expanded as a result of my assumption of the duties of Chief of Staff. Accordingly, it will be necessary for me to relinquish my role as chairman of the interagency task force which since February has been coordinating our SALT ratification efforts.

Effective immediately, I have asked Landon Butler to assume my previous responsibilities as Chairman of the SALT Working Group. As you may know, Landon has been engaged in SALT activities since the spring of 1977; he drafted the master work plan which has outlined and detailed our entire ratification strategy.

In addition, I have asked George Moffett to work full-time with Landon in overseeing on a day-to-day basis the implementation of assignments made to the working group in the areas of Media and Press, Allied Liaison, Public Outreach and Public Figure Liaison; it will be George's responsibility to make sure that the work done in these areas complements our SALT Congressional Liaison efforts. George is a veteran of our successful effort on the Panama Canal treaties and has worked closely with Landon in the development of our ratification plans.

The SALT Working Group has been singularly effective in presenting our case for the treaty and in helping to sustain the momentum for ratification. I know you will continue to give the Working Group your best efforts in the critical months ahead.

A-VIII/40/1

CHAIRMAN

Hamilton Jordan

456-6797

STAFF DEPARTMENT

Warren Christopher  
Matt Nitets

632-9640  
632-4404

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

David Aaron

456-2236

ACDA

General George Seignious

632-9610

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

Charles Duncan

695-6352

C.I.A.

Frank Carlucci

351-6464

VICE-PRESIDENT'S OFFICE

Dick Moe

456-6606

WHITE HOUSE

-Congressional Liaison

Frank Moore  
Bob Beckel

456-2230  
456-6652

-Press Office

Jody Powell

456-2100

-Public Liaison

Anne Wexler

456-2270

-Communications

Jerry Rafshoon

456-6223

-Appointments

Phil Wise

456-2168

-Jordan's Office

London Butler  
George Moffatt

456-2361  
456-2332/4361

8/27/79

A-6/11/4/1

SALT II and Defense -- themes

Like every major defense decision President Carter has made, the MX decision was freely debated and minutely examined, both within the Administration and outside it. Every option was considered, and the President made his decision in the light of a careful assessment of the national interest.

Today America is strong and secure. To stay that way, we must counter the growing military power of the Soviet Union. In particular, we must deal with the prospective vulnerability of our land-based missiles, one of the three legs of our nuclear deterrent.

We are meeting these threats in two ways: by modernizing our own military forces, and by pursuing arms limitation.

In the nuclear age, arms control and a strong defense are complementary -- not contradictory. It is precisely our strength that enables us to negotiate with confidence. And arms control -- equitable, verifiable, painstakingly negotiated arms control -- has defense as its guide and security as its result.

These two paths lead in the same direction -- toward security, and away from the final horror of nuclear war.

That is why the nation has followed both paths ever since the dawn of the nuclear age.

But during the debate over SALT II and its implications for national security, we are seeing a disturbing drift by some toward the view that their answer -- whether it is arms control or more defense spending -- is the only answer.

I have no doubt that every participant in this debate shares our goals of protecting the United States and avoiding nuclear confrontation. But if we adopt either of these narrow, polarized views -- arms control without more defense, or more defense without arms control -- we will end up fighting for peace with one hand tied behind us. And we may end up forfeiting both our security and our leadership of the democratic world.

Our allies -- for whom Soviet power is no abstraction, but a tangible reality that looms close to their borders -- find opposition to SALT II almost incomprehensible. They support SALT II -- because they know it is crucial to their security. They support it because it will help avert a destabilizing, open-ended increase in the strategic arms competition. They support it because it opens the way for further improvements in Western security through other arms control measures, such as MBFR and theater nuclear force reductions. And they support it because it will help

us in the United States to concentrate our resources on meeting our commitment to strengthen NATO. President Carter has kept that commitment in his 1980 budget -- and he intends to go on keeping it.

Let neither our adversaries nor our friends doubt our national will to compete -- and compete effectively -- with the Soviet Union. And let neither doubt our will to work for a safer, saner world.

Nothing we are doing to strengthen our defense conflicts with the goal of continued arms control. And nothing in SALT II conflicts with our commitment to maintain a strong defense.

In this time of passionate debate it is tempting to take an absolutist position -- to turn away from arms control or to turn away from the need to meet the Soviet military threat. But the times call for something else. The times call for the political wisdom to see the need for a national consensus -- and the political courage to build one.

Without that kind of consensus, we will be paralyzed, and our security -- as well as our leadership of the alliance of free nations -- will be gravely threatened.

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SALT II / Defense Themes

decision

The MX decision, like every major defense ~~action taken by the~~  
~~Carter has made, was~~  
President and this administration, has been freely debated and minutely  
within the Administration and outside it.  
examined, ~~in the most minute detail.~~ All ~~of~~ the options ~~have~~ <sup>were</sup>  
been considered, and a decision has been made which we believe  
~~is in the best interest of our country.~~ <sup>The President based his decision on a careful</sup>  
~~is in the best interest of our country.~~

Today, America is strong and secure. ~~But we cannot ignore~~  
~~the threat posed by the military power of the Soviet Union, and~~ <sup>To stay that way, we</sup>  
~~by the growing vulnerability of a vital leg of our nuclear~~ <sup>In particular, we must</sup>  
deterrent. <sup>our land-based missiles, one of the three legs</sup>  
~~We will meet that threat in two ways -- by~~  
modernizing our <sup>own</sup> ~~strategic and conventional~~ military forces  
and by pursuing arms limitation.

In the nuclear age, ~~equitable and verifiable arms control and~~  
~~must go hand in hand with a strong defense.~~ <sup>are complementary -- not contradictory,</sup>  
makes arms control possible, for it is precisely <sup>our strength</sup> ~~because we~~  
~~are strong and intend to stay so that we are not afraid to~~  
~~pursue the cause of peace.~~ And arms control, <sup>-- equitable, verifiable</sup> ~~carefully~~  
~~negotiated and vigilantly monitored,~~ has defense as its  
guide and security as its result.

These <sup>two</sup> ~~are the twin paths~~ <sup>lead in the same direction -- toward security,</sup> followed by every President  
since the dawn of the nuclear <sup>age.</sup> ~~era.~~ But today, as we debate  
the SALT II treaty and its implications for national security,  
we see a disturbing drift by some toward a view that their  
answer -- whether it is arms control or increased defense  
spending -- is the only answer.

and away from the final  
answer of nuclear war.  
That is why both  
have been

I have no doubt that their goals are the same as ours -- to protect the United States and to avoid the dangers of nuclear confrontation. But however well-intentioned their narrow view may be, it is a myth, and it threatens not only our security, but our position of leadership in the free world.

Our allies rely on us to lead the way in both arms control and military strength. They support SALT II and they support our commitment to modernize our defense forces. And they expect action, not endless debate and paralysis.

Our allies support SALT II because it will help avoid a destabilizing and unregulated increase in the strategic arms competition. It will enhance the chances of further improving Western security through other arms control, such as MBFR and theater nuclear force reductions. And they support SALT because it will help ensure that our resources will not be diverted from our commitment to strengthen NATO. That is a commitment President Carter has made in his 1980 budget, and it is a commitment he intends to keep.

There can be no doubt -- among either our friends or our adversaries -- about our national will to compete and compete effectively with the Soviet Union. But there can also be no doubt about our desire to work toward a safer world with less, not more nuclear weapons.


None of the defense decisions we have made conflicts with the goal of continued arms control -- and nothing in SALT II conflicts with our commitment to maintain a strong defense.



It may be easier in this time of intense national debate to take an absolute position on either side -- to turn our backs on arms control or on the need to respond to the Soviet military threat. But the times call for political courage, they call for compromise, and they call for consensus.

Without that consensus, we will be paralyzed, and our security -- as well as our leadership of the alliance of free nations -- will be gravely threatened.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM TO HAMILTON JORDAN  
FROM: LONDON BUTLER   
DATE: SEPTEMBER 6, 1979  
SUBJECT: M-X ANNOUNCEMENT

The argument against having the President personally read a statement in front of the cameras goes as follows:

The M-X announcement must be considered in the context of an unfolding SALT and defense debate, along with the defense budget decision, negotiations with Senator Church over amendments to the SALT II treaty, and, now, the Cuba situation. Under these circumstances, the President should not personally get involved in the details of the debate as it unfolds, but rather should attempt to have the last word prior to Senate floor debate. If the President personally makes the statement tomorrow, he runs the risk that he will be personally associated with any surprise arguments (technical, cost, etc.) that develop about the basing mode decision immediately after its announcement. The result would be to trivialize the President's role.

It may be far better to plan now for a major speech in early October which wraps up all of the loose ends of the various components of the SALT II debate, and then summarizes the President's mainstream position in advance of Senate floor debate.

Whether or not the President decides to make the M-X announcement personally, we should still begin now to plan for a major speech in October.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Box 15  
A-4411/4311  
OCTOBER 1, 1979

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT  
IN AN ADDRESS TO THE NATION

The Oval Office

9:00 P.M. EDT

Good evening.

I want to talk with you about a subject that is my highest concern, as it has been for every President. That subject is peace and the security of the United States.

We are at peace tonight, as we have been at peace throughout the time of my service in this office. The peace we enjoy is the peace of the strong. Our national defenses are unsurpassed in the world. Those defenses are stronger tonight than they were two years ago; and they will be stronger two years from now than they are tonight, because of carefully planned improvements that are going forward with your support and with the support of the Congress.

Our program for modernizing and strengthening the military forces of the NATO alliance is on track, with the full cooperation and participation of our European allies. Our strategic nuclear forces are powerful enough to destroy any potential adversary many times over, and the invulnerability of those forces will soon be further assured by a new system of powerful mobile missiles. These systems are designed for stability and defense.

Beyond these military defenses, we are on the threshold of a great advance in the control of nuclear weapons -- the adoption of the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, SALT II.

This evening, I also want to report to you about the highly publicized Soviet brigade in Cuba and about its bearing on the important relationship between our Nation and the Soviet Union.

This is not a simple or easy subject.

The United States and the Soviet Union are the two most powerful nations on earth, and the relationship between us is complex because it involves strong elements of both competition and cooperation.

Our fundamental philosophies conflict. Quite often, our national interests conflict as well. As two great nations, we do have common interests and we share an overwhelming mutual concern in preventing a nuclear war. We must recognize therefore that nuclear arms control agreements are vital to both our countries, and that we must also exercise self-restraint in our relations and be sensitive to each other's concerns.

MORE

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Recently we obtained evidence that a Soviet combat brigade has been in Cuba for several years. The presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba is of serious concern to us.

I want to reassure you at the outset that we do not face any immediate, concrete threat that could escalate into war or a major confrontation.

But we do face a challenge. It is a challenge to our wisdom -- a challenge to our ability to act in a firm, decisive way without destroying the basis for cooperation that helps to maintain world peace and control nuclear weapons. It is a challenge to our determination to give a measured and effective response to Soviet competition and to Cuban military activities around the world.

Now let me explain the specific problem of the Soviet brigade and describe the more general problem of Soviet-Cuban military activism in the Third World.

Here is the background on Soviet forces in Cuba: As most of you know, 17 years ago in the era of the Cold War, the Soviet Union suddenly attempted to introduce offensive nuclear missiles and bombers into Cuba. This direct threat to the United States ended with the Soviet agreement to withdraw those nuclear weapons, and a commitment not to introduce offensive weapons into Cuba thereafter.

At the time of that 1962 missile crisis, there were more than 20,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba. Most of them were withdrawn, and we monitored their departure. It was believed that those who stayed behind were not combat forces, but were there to advise and train Cubans and to perform intelligence functions.

Just recently American intelligence obtained persuasive evidence that some of these Soviet forces had been organized into a combat unit. When attention was then focused on a careful review of past intelligence data, it was possible for our experts to conclude that this unit had existed for several years, probably since the mid-1970s and possibly even longer.

This unit appears to be a brigade of two or three thousand men. It is armed with about 40 tanks and other modern military equipment. It has been organized as a combat unit. Its training exercises have been those of a combat unit.

This is not a large force, nor an assault force. It presents no direct threat to us. It has no airborne or seaborne capability. In contrast to the 1962 crisis, no nuclear threat to the United States is involved.

MORE

Nevertheless, this Soviet brigade in Cuba is a serious matter. It contributes to tension in the Caribbean and the Central American region. The delivery of modern arms to Cuba and the presence of Soviet naval forces in Cuban waters have strengthened the Soviet-Cuban military relationship. They had added to the fears of some countries that they may come under Soviet or Cuban pressure.

During the last few years, the Soviets have been increasing the delivery of military supplies to Cuba. The result is that Cuba now has one of the largest, best equipped armed forces in this region. These military forces are used to intrude into other countries in Africa and the Middle East.

There is a special relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union. The Cubans get their weapons free. Other Soviet satellite countries have to pay for their military supplies.

The Communist regime in Cuba is an economic failure that cannot sustain itself. The Soviet Union must send to Cuba about \$8 million in economic aid every day.

Fidel Castro does not pay money for Soviet arms; the Cuban people pay a much higher price. In every international dispute, on every international issue, the Cuban regime automatically follows the Soviet line.

The Soviet brigade is a manifestation of Moscow's dominance of Cuba. It raises the level of that dominance -- and it raises the level of responsibility that the Soviet Union must take for escalating Cuban military actions abroad.

Now I want to report further on what we are doing to resolve these problems and to counter these activities.

Over the past three weeks, we have discussed this issue at great length with top Soviet officials.

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We have made it clear that the presence of a Soviet combat unit in Cuba is a matter of serious concern to us. The Soviet Union does not admit that the unit in question is a combat unit. However, the Soviets have made certain statements to us with respect to our concern:

-- That the unit in question is a training center, that it does nothing more than training, and can do nothing more;

-- That they will not change its function or status as a training center. We understand this to mean that they do not intend to enlarge the unit or to give it additional capabilities;

-- They have said that the Soviet personnel in Cuba are not and will not be a threat to the United States or to any other nation;

-- That they reaffirm the 1962 understanding and the mutually agreed upon confirmation in 1970 and will abide by it in the future. We, for our part, reconfirm this understanding.

These assurances have been given to me from the highest level of the Soviet Government.

Although we have persuasive evidence that the unit has been a combat brigade, the Soviet statements about the future non-combat status of the unit are significant.

However, we shall not rest on these Soviet statements alone. First, we will monitor the status of the Soviet forces by increased surveillance of Cuba. Second, we will assure that no Soviet unit in Cuba can be used as a combat force to threaten the security of the United States or any other nation in this hemisphere.

Those nations can be confident that the United States will act in response to a request for assistance to meet any such threat from Soviet or Cuban forces.

This policy is consistent with our responsibilities as a member of the Organization of American States and a party to the Rio Treaty. It is a reaffirmation in new circumstances of John F. Kennedy's declaration in 1963 "that we would not permit any troops from Cuba to move off the Island of Cuba in an offensive action against any neighboring countries."

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Page 5

Third, I am establishing a permanent, full-time Caribbean joint task force headquarters at Key West, Florida. I will assign to this headquarters forces from all the military services responsible for expanded planning and for conducting exercises. This headquarters unit will employ designated forces for action if required. This will substantially improve our capability to monitor and to respond rapidly to any attempted military encroachment in this region.

Fourth, we will expand military maneuvers in the region. We will conduct these exercises regularly from now on. In accordance with existing treaties, the United States will, of course, keep our forces in Guantanamo.

Fifth, we will increase our economic assistance to alleviate the unmet economic and human needs in the Caribbean region and further to ensure the ability of troubled peoples to resist social turmoil and possible communist domination.

The United States has a worldwide interest in peace and stability. Accordingly, I have directed the Secretary of Defense to further enhance the capacity of our rapid deployment forces to protect our own interests and to act in response to requests for help from our allies and friends. We must be able to move our ground, sea and air units to distant areas -- rapidly and with adequate supplies.

We have reinforced our naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

We are enhancing our intelligence capability in order to monitor Soviet and Cuban military activities -- both in Cuba and throughout the world. We will increase our efforts to guard against damage to our crucial intelligence sources and our methods of collection, without impairing civil and constitutional rights.

These steps reflect my determination to preserve peace, to strengthen our alliances, and to defend the interests of the United States. In developing them, I have consulted not only with my own advisers, but with Congressional leaders and with a bipartisan group of distinguished American citizens as well. The decisions are my own, and I take full responsibility for them as President and as Commander-in-Chief.

I have concluded that the brigade issue is certainly no reason for a return to the Cold War. A confrontation might be emotionally satisfying for a few days or weeks for some people, but it would be destructive to the national interest and to the security of the United States.

We must continue the basic policy that the United States has followed for 20 years, under six Administrations of both parties -- a policy that recognizes that we are in competition with the Soviet Union in some fields and that we seek cooperation in others -- notably maintaining the peace and controlling nuclear arms.

MOFE

My fellow Americans, the greatest danger to American security tonight is certainly not the two or three thousand Soviet troops in Cuba. The greatest danger to all the nations of the world -- including the United States and the Soviet Union -- is the breakdown of a common effort to preserve the peace, and the ultimate threat of a nuclear war.

I renew my call to the Senate of the United States to ratify the SALT II Treaty.

SALT II is a solid treaty. Ensuring compliance with its terms will not be a matter of trust. We have highly sophisticated national technical means, carefully focused on the Soviet Union to ensure that the treaty is verifiable. This treaty is the most important step ever taken to control strategic nuclear arms.

It permits us to strengthen our defense and to preserve the strategic balance at lower risk and lower cost. During the past few years we have made real increases in our defense expenditures to fulfill the goals of our five-year defense plan. With SALT II we can concentrate these increases in areas where our interests are most threatened and where direct military challenge is most likely.

The rejection of SALT would seriously compromise our Nation's peace and security.

Of course we have disagreements with the Soviets. Of course we have conflicts with them. If we did not have these disagreements and conflicts, we would not need a treaty to reduce the possibility of nuclear war between us.

If SALT II is rejected, these disagreements and conflicts could take on a new and ominous dimension. Against the background of an uncontrolled nuclear arms race, every confrontation or dispute would carry the seeds of a nuclear confrontation.

In addition, SALT II is crucial to American leadership and to the further strengthening of the Western Alliance. Obviously a secure Europe is vital to our own security.

The leaders of our European allies support SALT II -- unanimously. We have talked to a number of those leaders in the last few days. I must tell you tonight that if the Senate fails to approve the SALT Treaty, these leaders and their countries would be confused and deeply alarmed. If our allies should lose confidence in our ability to negotiate successfully for the control of nuclear weapons, then our effort to build a stronger and more united NATO could fail.

I know that for Members of Congress this is a troubling and difficult issue in a troubling and difficult time. But the Senate has a tradition of being the greatest

MORE



deliberative body in the world, and the whole world is watching the Senate today. I am confident that all Senators will perform their high responsibilities as the national interest requires.

Politics and nuclear arsenals do not mix.

We must not play politics with the security of the United States. We must not play politics with the survival of the human race. We must not play politics with SALT II. It is much too important for that -- too vital to our country, to our allies, and to the cause of peace.

The purpose of the SALT II Treaty and the purpose of my actions in dealing with Soviet and Cuban military relationships are exactly the same -- to keep our Nation secure and to maintain a world at peace.

As a powerful nation -- as a superpower -- we have special responsibilities to maintain stability even when there are serious disagreements among nations.

We have had fundamental differences with the Soviet Union since 1917. I have no illusions about these differences. The best way to deal with them successfully is to maintain American unity, American will, and American strength.

That is what I am determined to do.

The struggle for peace -- the long, hard struggle to bring weapons of mass destruction under control of human reason and human law -- is a central drama of our age.

At another time of challenge in our Nation's history, President Abraham Lincoln told the American people: "We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last best hope of earth."

We acted wisely then, and preserved the Nation. Let us act wisely now, and preserve the world.

END

(AT 9:20 P.M. EDT)

BIRCH BAYH, IND., CHAIRMAN  
CARRY GOLDSWORTHY, ARIZ., VICE CHAIRMAN  
ALBERT E. STEVENSON, ILL.  
ALLEN D. HUGHES, KY.  
JOSEPH M. BIDEN, JR., DEL.  
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, N.Y.  
DANIEL K. INOUE, HAWAII  
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ROBERT C. BYRD, W. VA., EX OFFICIO  
HOWARD M. BAKER, JR., TENN., EX OFFICIO  
WILLIAM C. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR  
FRED D. EISENHOWER, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 429, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 5, 1979

IN REPLY PLEASE  
REFER TO N# 117

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence I transmit a copy of the unclassified principal findings by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the capabilities of the United States to monitor the SALT II Treaty, which will be released later today. These findings and the full classified report of the Committee were approved unanimously at a meeting of the Committee on September 25, 1979.

I want to thank you for the assistance given over the past two years to the Committee by the intelligence community and other parts of the Executive branch. I would be happy to review with you the full classified report and its findings should you wish.

With kind regards,

Respectfully,

*Birch Bayh*  
Birch Bayh  
Chairman

Enclosure

① A-VIII/44/1  
Push to  
Today - In  
most sections, the  
negative is emphasized  
& more favorable. but  
SALT preparations on  
Cancera -  
J

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS BY THE SENATE  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE  
ON THE CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES  
TO MONITOR THE SALT II TREATY

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In approaching the duty given to us by the Senate to examine the ability of the intelligence community to monitor Soviet compliance with the SALT II Treaty, the Committee has kept in mind that our reconnaissance system cannot provide absolute certainty. In the past our monitoring system has, in some instances, underestimated the rate of deployment of some strategic weapon systems of the Soviet Union. In other instances it has overestimated the deployment of some strategic weapon systems.

Since 1970, the estimating record has improved as a direct consequence of improvements in the technical capabilities of the United States reconnaissance systems and in the intelligence community's analysis of that data. These improved technical collection and analytical capabilities have resulted in a reduction in uncertainties about the state of development, testing, and deployment of Soviet strategic weapons. Because we are forced by history to bear in mind the analytic error of the "missile gap," as well as the underestimating of the rate of deployment of some strategic weapons systems, the Committee has conducted an independent review and assessment of United States monitoring capabilities. As a result of this review, the Committee has made findings with respect to the following issues:

- A. Implications of SALT I record for monitoring SALT II Accords;
- B. The degree to which United States SALT II negotiating positions were based on monitoring capabilities;
- C. Providing the necessary resources for the United States monitoring system;
- D. Improved analysis;
- E. Congressional oversight; and
- F. The ability of the United States to monitor the SALT II Treaty.

The subject of U.S. monitoring capabilities is so complex that Senators are strongly encouraged to read and study the full text of the classified Report and its accompanying attachments, in order to fully understand these brief Findings.

A. Implications of SALT I Record for Monitoring SALT II Accords

On the basis of the SALT I record, the Committee believes that the Soviet Union will push to the greatest extent possible any advantages which the provisions or ambiguities of the SALT II Treaty might permit. Further, the Soviet Union will probably continue nearly all its present concealment and deception practices, and additional concealment and deception practices

may be attempted. The record also indicates, however, that the Standing Consultative Commission is a valuable forum for resolving compliance issues, and possible ambiguities in intelligence information and Treaty interpretation, when the United States aggressively pursues them. For example, in the case of the expanded pattern of Soviet concealment activities, vigorous pursuit by the U.S. of this issue in the Standing Consultative Commission halted the expansion.

Therefore, the United States must expect that unanticipated Soviet activities may occur during the course of the SALT II Treaty and be willing to raise and aggressively pursue questions of Soviet compliance with the Treaty in the Standing Consultative Commission, which will play an even more significant role during SALT II.

B. The Degree to Which United States SALT II Negotiating Positions Were Based on Monitoring Capabilities

The Committee has also reviewed in detail the substance and process of SALT II diplomatic negotiations to see how the need for effective monitoring was factored into the actual negotiations in Geneva and elsewhere. Members of the Committee have gone to Geneva repeatedly to observe firsthand the negotiation process, paying particular attention to monitoring ques-

tions. We have also examined the diplomatic record of these negotiations, the historical record of the SALT I and ABM Treaties, and the Proceedings of the Standing Consultative Commission in order better to understand Soviet SALT behavior and the monitoring record concerning those agreements. We have also studied the specific verification provisions of the SALT II Treaty and Protocol and have made our own judgments as to the monitoring requirements of these provisions.

The Committee has reviewed the extent to which the provisions of the SALT II accords contribute to monitoring compliance. There are provisions which enhance our monitoring capability; there are other provisions which reduce monitoring difficulties but retain substantial ambiguities; and there are provisions which impose very difficult monitoring burdens.

The Committee believes that, in most cases, monitoring requirements were given high priority during Treaty negotiations, and that monitoring necessities were reflected in the Treaty provisions. In some cases, however, Treaty provisions were not drawn precisely because of negotiated trade-offs and U.S. and Soviet interest in not impairing the flexibility of some of their respective weapons development programs.

C. Providing the Necessary Resources for the  
United States Monitoring System

Although our national reconnaissance system is complex and comprehensive, some of its components are fragile. In order

for the reconnaissance system to be effective, sufficient back-up and redundancy must be provided during the period of SALT II.

In order to provide these resources a very high budget priority must be given to the intelligence collection systems, as well as to processing and analysis functions.

The Committee finds that continued improvement and investment will be required during this period to ensure that United States monitoring systems keep pace with the monitoring tasks they must perform. Arbitrary resource constraints must not curtail these needed improvements and investment.

The Committee also recommends that increased analytic attention to SALT monitoring should be accompanied by the intelligence community's full and careful attention to other areas of Soviet military, political and economic activity and to military, political, social and economic developments in other countries. It is for this reason that we recommend a very high budget priority for processing and analysis, as well as for intelligence collection systems.

D. Improved Analysis

The Soviets unanticipated ability to emplace the much larger SS-19 in a slightly enlarged SS-11 silo circumvented

the safeguards the United States thought it had obtained in SALT I against the substitution of heavy for light ICBMs. Similarly, the range of the SS-N-8 missile on the Delta class Soviet ballistic missile submarine was greater than expected. This reduced the significance of the Soviet "geographical disadvantage" on the basis of which we conceded to the Soviets in SALT I the right to build a larger number of ballistic missile submarines than were permitted to the United States. The Committee is of the view that the intelligence community should make every effort to minimize intelligence surprises. Recognizing that predicting the future is a very difficult, if not impossible task, the Committee recommends the following:

Soviet SALT negotiating strategy and tactics should be exhaustively studied for hints about future developments which the Soviets may have been trying to protect. On the basis of this analysis, "warning signs" should be formulated whose appearance would alert the analyst to the possibility the Soviets are taking unexpected steps in their weapons development program.

Various possible Soviet "cheating scenarios" should be developed, using technical experts outside the intelligence community who have been given briefings containing information about U.S. intelligence sources and methods roughly comparable to what the Soviets may be expected to possess. On the basis of these scenarios, similar "warning signs" should be formulated.



Competitive analysis, reflecting a full range of expert points of view, should be conducted periodically on important topics in Soviet strategic weapons developments. The results should be analyzed to provide "warning signs" and to suggest collection strategies which would minimize the differences and uncertainties.

#### E. Congressional Oversight

It is clear from the SALT I record that intelligence of possible Soviet violation of the Treaty was, in some cases, and for a time, withheld from Executive branch officials who had a need for such information. Lacking an oversight committee for intelligence matters, the Congress was not supplied the intelligence information on SALT I monitoring.

In the course of the hearings held by the Committee on the SALT I monitoring record, the responsible officials in the intelligence community were asked if they would "fully and currently" supply to the Committee intelligence on the monitoring of SALT II Treaty provisions, as required by S.Res. 400 and by Executive Order 12036. The Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Director of DIA have said they understood it was their duty to do so. Procedures for handling such reporting have already been established by the Committee.

Other committees of the Senate with the task of SALT II oversight are the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee. Under S.Res. 400, the Select Committee on Intelligence is obliged to keep these committees informed of any intelligence information that might be of significance in carrying out their mandated duties.

The Committee wishes to point out that monitoring compliance with the new strategic arms agreement is only the first step in the SALT process. The capability to determine whether the Soviets had violated the SALT II agreement would be of little consequence if at the same time the United States did not have the will and determination to pursue an aggressive verification policy.

In order to assure effective oversight of monitoring of SALT II, the Committee finds that the Select Committee on Intelligence should be kept fully and currently informed on all intelligence concerned with the monitoring of the SALT II Treaty. The Committee undertakes to keep the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee informed of any significant information affecting their mandated duties. Further, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence should receive a detailed intelligence annex, to be maintained under the security provisions of S. Res. 400, along with the semi-annual monitoring report supplied by ACDA to the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee.

F. Evaluation of the Ability of the United States to Monitor the SALT II Treaty

The Committee's examination of the United States monitoring capabilities show that, under current Soviet practices, most counting provisions can be monitored with high or high-moderate confidence. Monitoring qualitative limitations on weapons systems is a far more difficult task and is dependent on the collective capability of a large number of systems. In general, these qualitative limitations present some problems but most can, on balance, be monitored with high to moderate confidence. There are some provisions of the Treaty which can be monitored with only a low level of confidence. \*

The Committee also finds that the present capabilities of the national reconnaissance system could be degraded by the use of changed practices on the part of the Soviet Union and through concealment and deception. Some of these changed practices would be permitted under the Treaty; other changed practices which involve deliberate concealment and deception would constitute serious violations of the Treaty. The impact of those changed practices permitted under the Treaty may decrease

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\* The terms "high," "high moderate," "moderate," and "low" refer to the monitoring uncertainties (in terms of quantitative measures or probabilities of detection) and do not suggest the military significance of the resulting monitoring uncertainties.

-10-

our confidence in our ability to monitor counting provisions, and a combination of such changed practices could greatly complicate our task of monitoring those provisions involving qualitative limitations.

Overall, the Committee finds that the SALT II Treaty enhances the ability of the United States to monitor those components of Soviet strategic weapons forces which are subject to the limitations of the Treaty. The Treaty permits measures short of "deliberate concealment" which could impede monitoring, and does not indicate what types of collection systems are to be considered national technical means. In the absence of the SALT II Treaty, however, the Soviets would be free to take more sweeping measures, such as unrestrained concealment and deception, which could make monitoring these strategic forces still more difficult.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

5  
A-VIII/45/L 26

October 12, 1979

Administratively Confidential

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: LLOYD CUTLER

Lnc

SUBJECT: SALT

Senators Byrd and Cranston had a very constructive two-hour lunch meeting today in pursuit of their effort to develop a consensus among defense-minded Senators and Senators interested in more rapid progress on deep cuts. Attending the meeting, in addition to Byrd and Cranston, were Senators Moynihan, Nunn, Mathias, McGovern, Inouye, Percy, Muskie, Morgan, Hart, Church, Stennis, Chafee, and Bellmon.

The group discussed a possible internal U.S. government understanding, not requiring Soviet consent, that would commit the Senate in principle to support the authorizations and appropriations for the five-year defense program, and that would instruct the SALT III negotiators to achieve significant deep cuts. The specifics were not discussed, except for a suggestion of Senator McGovern's that if SALT III with significant deep cuts was not signed within three years, the Senate would not ratify it. This led Senator Byrd to raise the question of whether the NATO allies would object to such a Senate position, because of their own keen interest in a theatre nuclear limitation agreement as part of or parallel to SALT III.

During the discussion Senator Nunn said that he would not insist on any specific percentage increase on defense expenditures or on Congressional (e.g., Senate and House) enactment or approval of the 1981 defense budget. Senator Bellmon was also more affirmative about SALT than in his recent statements.

The group established two sub-committees: a sub-committee on deep cuts with Moynihan as chairman and McGovern, Bellmon, and Chafee, and a sub-committee on defense expenditures with Cranston as chairman and Morgan, Nunn, and Hart. The sub-committees have been instructed to work with us on trying to frame the specifics of the understanding.

My original report on the meeting was from Senator Cranston. Later in the day I happened to meet with Church, Mathias, Percy, and Moynihan, each of whom confirmed the same positive impression of the meeting.

LNC

cc: Vice President Mondale  
Secretary Vance  
Secretary Brown  
Hamilton Jordan  
Dr. Brzezinski  
Hedley Donovan  
Frank Moore  
Bob Beckel

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NOVEMBER 9, 1979

Office of the White House Press Secretary

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THE WHITE HOUSE

The President is deeply gratified by the vote of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to favorably report the SALT II Treaty to the Senate floor. We are particularly grateful for the thoroughness with which the Committee has explored all aspects of the Treaty.

The President would like to express special appreciation to Senators Church and Javits for their leadership during the extended hearings and markup of SALT II.

It is the President's hope that all Senators will explore the SALT II Treaty and related issues with the same intensity as the Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We believe after such study Senators will reach the conclusion that SALT II is in the best interests of the United States and will vote to ratify the Treaty.

# # #



A-1111/47/1

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

DECEMBER 17, 1979

Office of the White House Press Secretary

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THE WHITE HOUSE

The following is the text of a letter being sent by the President to 19 members of the Senate:

Thank you for your letter concerning the Senate's view of the SALT II agreement. I welcome your commendation of the statements Secretary Brown and I have made relating to the Five Year Defense Program.

I have also noted your comments about certain aspects of SALT II's terms and about the shift in the comparative military positions of the Soviet Union and the United States, and your views on a number of further considerations bearing on various aspects of the Soviet-American relationship.

The issues you raise have been probed in depth during the hearings before the Senate committees, and will be further examined in preparing for the floor debate and in the course of the debate itself. I therefore share your interest in discussing these matters in detail with me and members of my Administration.

I also share your desire to achieve a bipartisan consensus on these issues of long-range national security strategy and arms control, and to that end we should begin these meetings at an early date. I am confident we can find the common ground on which the prompt ratification of this treaty, so important to our own national security and the peace of the world, will be achieved.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER

# # #



A-VIII/48/1

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JANUARY 3, 1980

Office of the White House Press Secretary

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THE WHITE HOUSE

The following is the text of a letter sent to Senator Robert Byrd by the President today:

Dear Senator Byrd:

In light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, I request that you delay consideration of the SALT II Treaty on the Senate floor.

The purpose of this request is not to withdraw the Treaty from consideration, but to defer the debate so that the Congress and I as President can assess Soviet actions and intentions, and devote our primary attention to the legislative and other measures required to respond to this crisis.

As you know, I continue to share your view that the SALT II Treaty is in the national security interest of the United States and the entire world, and that it should be taken up by the Senate as soon as these more urgent issues have been addressed.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER

# # #

Self Copy  
Carter Library

A-6111/49/L

1-8-80

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

1-8-80  
Tom Toul  
Dick Helms

Dear Senator Durenberger:

capacity Thank you for your letter of December 12, 1979, concerning the U.S. capabilities to monitor the SALT II Treaty.

and analysis As I noted in the correspondence with Senators Bayh and Goldwater on this issue, we plan substantial investments in a number of programs aimed at strengthening our intelligence collection capabilities, as well as our production and analytical capabilities. Substantial increases are planned in programs specifically applicable to SALT monitoring tasks in the FY 81 Intelligence Budget. I will soon submit to the Congress. This budget will greatly enhance the robustness of our monitoring capability by providing for back-up systems as well as new, and multiple approaches to collection to avoid excessive dependence on any single system. The 1981 Intelligence budget will have real growth of almost ten percent. I believe that this substantial increase and our projected intelligence programs over the next five years reflect the commitment to excellence called for in the Intelligence Committee report on SALT monitoring.

that I appreciate the serious consideration which you and your colleagues have given to the SALT process and the SALT II Treaty. I understand that you recently discussed these matters with members of my staff. We look forward to a time in the future when it is more appropriate for the Senate to consider the SALT II Treaty. I hope that at that time, you will conclude, as I have, that this Treaty is in the national security interest of the United States. My apologies for the delay in responding to your letter.

Sincerely,

The Honorable David Durenberger  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

A-VIII/49/2

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Leahy:

Thank you for your letter of December 13, 1979, concerning ~~the~~ U.S. capabilities to monitor the SALT II Treaty.

*and analysis*  
*in order*  
As I noted in the <sup>1979</sup> correspondence with Senators Bayh and Goldwater on this issue, we plan substantial investments in a number of programs aimed at strengthening our intelligence collection capabilities, as well as our production <sup>and analytical</sup> capabilities. Substantial increases are planned in programs specifically applicable to SALT monitoring tasks in the FY 81 Intelligence budget. This budget will provide for back-up systems as well as new, and multiple approaches to collection to avoid excessive dependence on any single system. The real growth of almost ten percent planned for the 1981 Intelligence budget and our projected intelligence programs over the next five years reflect my firm commitment to keeping our reconnaissance systems effective.

*know* *about*  
As you ~~are aware~~, I have requested that the Senate delay further consideration of the SALT II Treaty so that the Congress and I can assess Soviet actions in Afghanistan <sup>there</sup> and our response to this crisis. I wish to assure you and other supporters of the Treaty in the Senate that this represents ~~no diminution~~ of my commitment to the fundamental goals of the strategic arms limitations talks. <sup>it is our intent</sup>

*determination to retain*  
I appreciate the support which you and others have <sup>given</sup> provided to the SALT process and the SALT II Treaty. I can assure you of my ~~commitment to maintaining~~ that support through continued diligence in the maintenance and design of effective intelligence programs.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

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Sincerely,

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United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

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I appreciate the serious consideration which you and your colleagues have given to the SALT process and the SALT II Treaty. I understand that you recently discussed these matters with members of my staff. We look forward to a time in the future when it is more appropriate for the Senate to consider the SALT II Treaty. I hope that at that time, you will conclude as I have that this Treaty is in the national security interest of the United States. My apologies for the delay in responding to your letter.

Sincerely,

The Honorable David Durenberger  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 4, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI *ZB*  
SUBJECT: Speech Additions

Here are some minor additions to the original speech draft from which you worked. You might consider adding them or rewording the appropriate passages.

At the early afternoon meeting I will bring with me the more important wording recommendations on commercial and agricultural relations, and I will have with me comments by Stu, Lloyd and others on the original draft (though many of them may now be OBE). If you want those comments earlier, I will rush them to you.

**Electrostatic Copy Made  
for Preservation Purposes**

PARAGRAPH ON ALLIED RESPONSE

We are in close touch with our allies, to make sure that our actions are supported and that no advantage is taken of the sacrifices we are making for the sake of peace and our common interests. I have been encouraged by their initial responses. We will continue to stress that international solidarity is essential in meeting this Soviet threat to international peace and stability.

ADDITIONAL OR AMENDED PARAGRAPHS

1. P.1, second paragraph:

"By moving fifty thousand Soviet troops into Afghanistan; by its complicity in the murder of that country's President; by fighting and attempting to overwhelm Afghanistan's armed forces; by forcibly installing a puppet regime in the capital; by continuing its military actions to this day; and by attempting to obscure the facts about its aggression, the Soviet Union has laid bare its intention to destroy the independence of Afghanistan; to hammer a small but sovereign country into the new shape of a captive state." (Changes underlined)

2. Fisheries:

"I have also directed the Department of State to withhold any further allocations to the Soviet Union for fishing rights within the U.S. 200-mile fishery zone. This action will result in the immediate loss to the Soviet fish industry of approximately 360,000 tons, an amount equivalent to approximately 5% of their total fish catch around the world."

3. Vice references to levels of Soviet diplomatic personnel and Soviet press, substitute:

"I have directed that the necessary steps be taken to insure that strict reciprocity is enforced with regard to the numbers of Soviet diplomatic representatives and media personnel in the United States. And we will also act on the basis of strict reciprocity in restrictions on official Soviet travel in this country."



4. New paragraph on aid to Pakistan:

"I am asking the Congress to remove restrictions on American assistance to Pakistan. The United States Government must be able to provide the military equipment, food and other assistance to Pakistan that is necessary to help that nation, which borders on Afghanistan, deal effectively with the seriously increased threat that it faces from the north. I believe that we can develop, together with the Congress, a means of balancing our continuing concerns about Pakistan's nuclear activities with the urgent need to respond, in a clear and credible manner, to the Soviet challenge to peace in Asia."

5. Suggested addition at conclusion:

"The United States, for its part, will meet its responsibilities. This will require certain sacrifices on our part. I am determined that the burdens of this sacrifice be carried, as fairly as possible, by our society as a whole. I am certain that our nation, as a whole, will bear this burden courageously and in unity. I am confident our allies will join us in our efforts.

"We have sacrificed, before, to oppose aggression. Our position in the world, and our pride, cannot be sold at any price. We will never place our profits ahead of our freedom. This is what has always made our nation strong. It makes us strong today."

Final approved draft - with President handwritten

Notes #3

A-VIII/50/1

3

to discuss the

I come to you this evening with an extremely important and  
~~and sober explanation of the~~ rapidly changing circumstances  
in Southwest Asia.

President's Final/Approved  
Draft

I continue to share with you the sense of outrage and  
impatience because of the kidnapping of innocent American  
hostages and the holding of them by militant terrorists with  
the support and approval of Iranian officials.


Our purposes continue to be the protection of the  
long-range interests of our nation and the safety of the  
American hostages.

the Americans

We are attempting to secure the release of the hostages

through the International Court of Justice, through the  
United Nations, and through public and private diplomatic efforts.

We are determined to accomplish this goal, <sup>we hope to do so</sup> without bloodshed  
and without <sup>to</sup> further endanger the lives of our 50 fellow Americans.



In these efforts we continue to have the strong support  
of the world community. 152

*and common sense*  
The unity of the American people ~~and your patience~~  
under such trying circumstances are *essential to* ~~an integral part of~~ the  
success of our efforts.

\* \* \*

Recently there has been another very serious development  
which threatens the maintenance of peace in Southwest Asia.

*16* ~~In a drastic departure from recent policy of the Soviet Union,~~  
~~Massive~~ Soviet military forces have invaded the small non-aligned,  
sovereign nation of Afghanistan, which had hitherto not been  
an occupied satellite of the Soviet *Union*

Fifty thousand heavily armed Soviet troops have crossed  
the border, and are now dispersed throughout Afghanistan,  
attempting to conquer the fiercely independent Muslim people  
of that country.

The Soviets claim falsely that they were invited into Afghanistan to help protect that country from some unnamed outside threat. But President Amin, who had been the leader of Afghanistan before the Soviet invasion, was assassinated -- along with several members of his family -- <sup>after</sup> ~~while~~ the Soviets <sup>gained</sup> ~~of~~ controlling the capital city of Kabul.

<sup>several days</sup>  
Only <sup>later</sup> was the <sup>new</sup> puppet leader even brought into Afghanistan by the Soviets. 33

This invasion is an extremely serious threat to peace -- because of the threat of further Soviet expansion into neighboring countries in Southwest Asia, and also because such an aggressive military policy is unsettling to other peoples throughout the world.

It is a callous violation of international law and  
the United Nations Charter.

It is a deliberate effort of a powerful atheistic  
government to subjugate an independent Islamic people.

We must recognize the strategic importance of Afghanistan

to end of stability and peace, ~~in this region of the world.~~

The United States wants all nations in the region  
to be free and to be independent. <sup>354</sup> If the Soviets are encouraged

in this invasion by eventual success, and if they maintain  
their dominance over Afghanistan and ~~then extend this kind~~ <sup>then extend their control</sup>  
of action to <sup>adjacent countries</sup> ~~other parts of the region~~ -- the stable, strategic

and peaceful balance of the world will be changed. This would  
threaten the security of all nations including, of course,  
the United States, our allies and friends. <sup>354</sup>

Therefore, the world cannot stand by and permit the  
Soviet <sup>Union</sup> to commit this act with impunity. <sup>354</sup>

→ A Soviet occupied Afghanistan threatens  
both Iran and Pakistan and is a stepping  
stone to <sup>their possible control</sup> ~~control~~ over much of the  
world's oil supplies.

~~Me and~~ <sup>IM</sup> more than 40 other nations have petitioned the United Nations Security Council to condemn the Soviet Union and to demand the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

We realize that under the United Nations Charter the Soviets <sup>Union</sup> and other permanent members ~~have the right to~~ <sup>may</sup> veto action of the Security Council.

If the will of the Security Council should be ~~subverted~~ <sup>this is led</sup> in this manner, then an immediate action would be appropriate in the General Assembly of the United Nations where no Soviet veto exists. <sup>455</sup>

<sup>to</sup> ~~neither the U.S. nor~~ <sup>any other nation which is</sup>  
In the meantime, we ~~and other like-minded nations~~

~~who~~ are committed to world peace and stability cannot continue <sup>to do</sup> business as usual with the Soviet Union.

I have already recalled the United States Ambassador from Moscow to Washington. He is working with me and my other senior advisers in an immediate and comprehensive evaluation of the whole range of our relations with the Soviet Union.

\* \* \*

The successful negotiation of the SALT II Treaty has been a major goal and a major achievement of this Administration -- and we, <sup>Americans</sup> the Soviet <sup>Union,</sup> and indeed the entire world will benefit from the successful control of Strategic Nuclear Weapons through the implementation of this carefully negotiated Treaty. 556

However, because of the Soviet aggression and the impossibility of ratification of the Treaty at this time, I have asked the United States Senate to defer ~~for the time being~~ any further consideration of the SALT II Treaty.

As circumstances change in the future we will, of course, keep the ratification of SALT II under active review and in consultation with the leaders of the Senate.

→ so that the Congress and I can assess Soviet actions and intentions and devote our primary attention to the legislative and other measures required to respond to this crisis.

not only of the economic and  
economic situation -  
constantly under review  
will be  
definitely

We will delay opening of any new American or Soviet  
(Embassy and) Consular facilities, and I have decided to halt  
or reduce exports to the Soviet Union in three areas that  
are particularly important to them. These new policies will  
be coordinated with those of our allies. "57

-- I have directed that no sales of high technology  
or other strategic items will be licensed for sale to the  
Soviet Union until further notice, while we revise our licensing  
policy.

-- Fishing privileges for the Soviet Union in  
United States waters will be severely curtailed.

-- The 17 million tons of grain ordered by the  
Soviet Union in excess of that amount which we are committed  
to sell under a five-year agreement will not be delivered.  
This grain was not intended for human consumption  
but was to be used for building up Soviet livestock herds.



American or  
Soviet

We will delay any opening of new Embassy and Consular facilities, and ~~will insist on strict reciprocity in the number of diplomats assigned to each country; travel restraints on visiting officials, and media representation.~~

Commercial trade with the Soviet Union will be severely restricted, and I have directed that no sales of high technology <sup>or other strategic items</sup> ~~to the Soviet Union~~ <sup>for sale until further notice, while we</sup> will be licensed. These new policies <sup>reverse our licensing policy.</sup> will be coordinated with those of our allies. <sup>57</sup>

Fishing privileges for the Soviet Union in United States waters will be severely curtailed, ~~resulting in a loss to the Soviet Union of 200,000 tons of fish this year.~~

~~All but the most essential~~ <sup>most of the</sup> cultural and economic exchanges currently under consideration with the Soviet Union will be ~~either deferred or suspended.~~ <sup>deferred.</sup> ~~completely cut back.~~

~~The 17 million tons of grain destined for~~ <sup>ordered by</sup> ~~the Soviet Union in excess of that~~ <sup>grain ordered by</sup> amount which we are committed to sell under a five-year agreement will not be delivered. ~~This involves a substantial quantity~~

I have decided to ~~halt or reduce exports to the Soviet Union in three areas that are particularly~~ <sup>important to them.</sup>

I am determined to minimize any adverse impact on the American farmer from this action. The undelivered grain will be removed from the market through storage and price support programs and through purchases at market prices. We will also use increased amounts of grain to alleviate hunger in poor countries and for gasohol production here at home. 758

After consultation with other principal grain exporting nations, I am confident that they will not replace these quantities of grain by additional shipments to the Soviet Union.

These actions will require some sacrifice on the part of all Americans,

A-1111/10/10

*This grain was not intended*  
~~of grain - none of which was destined~~ for human consumption  
*building up Soviet*  
but was to be used for feeding ~~livestock~~ *herds,*

We will take action through price support and reserve storage policies of the Department of Agriculture to remove this grain from the market.

The use of grain for gasohol fuel production and to alleviate hunger in poor countries will minimize any adverse effect on the American farm community.

After consultation with other principal grain exporting nations, I am confident that they will not replace these quantities of grain by additional shipments to the Soviet Union.

These actions will require some sacrifice on the part of all Americans, ~~those~~ involved in agriculture, trade and commerce, ~~and those~~ who are taxpayers required to finance the additional budget expenditures.

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*minimize any adverse impact on*  
I am determined to ~~take the necessary~~  
~~steps to ensure that~~ the American farmer ~~does~~  
~~not suffer from this action.~~ ~~all of~~ The undelivered  
embargoed grain will be removed from the market  
through storage and price support programs and through  
purchases at market prices. We will also use in excess of  
amounts of grain to alleviate hunger in poor countries and  
~~for gasohol production here at home.~~

A-11/150/11

but there is no doubt that these actions are in the interest of world peace and the security of our own nation, and are also compatible with actions being taken by our own major trading partners and other nations who share our deep concern about this new Soviet threat to world stability.

although the <sup>US</sup> would prefer not to  
~~At this time we do not contemplate withdrawing~~ from the

<sup>Games</sup>  
World Olympic scheduled in Moscow this summer, but, the Soviets

<sup>its</sup>  
must realize that their continued aggressive actions

will endanger both the participation of athletes and the travel to Moscow by spectators who would normally wish to attend the Olympic games.

<sup>Along</sup>  
~~We will work~~ with other <sup>Countries we will</sup> ~~nations~~ <sup>A</sup> provide military

equipment, food, and other assistance ~~to Pakistan~~ -- to help

~~that nation, which borders on~~ Afghanistan, deal effectively

Pakistan defend its independence and national security against

A-10/10/12

~~with~~ the seriously increased threat it <sup>now</sup> faces from the North.

The United States also stands ready to help other nations  
in the region in similar ways.

Neither our allies nor our potential adversaries should  
have the slightest doubt about our willingness, our determination,  
and our capacity to take the measures I have outlined.

History teaches perhaps few clear lessons. But surely  
one such lesson learned by the world at great cost is that  
aggression unopposed becomes a contagious disease.

The response <sup>of</sup> the international community to the  
Soviet attempt to crush Afghanistan must match the gravity  
of the Soviet action. The United States will meet its  
responsibilities.

With the support of the American people and working  
with other nations, we will deter aggression, protect our nation's  
security, and preserve the peace.

. . .

I have consulted with the leaders of Congress  
and am confident they will support legislation that  
may be required to carry out these measures. 9/12

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

MARCH 7, 1980

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

CH 441  
file copy  
A-600/51/2  
DATE 11/17/81  
B-26

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

I am pleased to transmit to you the annual report for 1979 of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Over the past few years SALT has tended to dominate our thinking about the arms control activities of the United States. It is one of many arms control endeavors which this report will describe.

Last June in Vienna, I signed the SALT II Treaty with Soviet President Brezhnev and submitted it for the Senate's advice and consent to ratification. Since that time, SALT has been the subject of an intense national debate and of hearings by three committees of the Senate. In November, the Committee on Foreign Relations reported the Treaty favorably to the Senate.

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, I asked that the Senate delay consideration of the SALT II Treaty on the floor so that the Congress and the executive branch can devote our primary attention to the legislative and other matters required to respond to this crisis. But I intend to ask the Senate to take up this treaty after these more urgent matters have been dealt with. As I said to you in my State of the Union address, "especially now in a time of great tension, observing the mutual constraints imposed by the terms of (such) treaties will be in the best interests of both countries and will help to preserve world peace." When the full Senate begins its debate on SALT II, I am convinced that those who are concerned about our national security will support the Treaty as a wise and prudent step.

This Administration continues to believe that arms control can make genuine contributions to our national security. We remain deeply committed to the process of mutual and verifiable arms control, particularly to the effort to prevent the spread and further development of nuclear weapons.

Those of you who have an opportunity to read and reflect upon the attached report will find a compelling case for the importance of the work described -- to us, our allies, and those who look to us for leadership in the world. We must diligently pursue negotiated, verifiable solutions to the many arms races upon which nations are now embarked. We must be prepared to work with others to bring peace and stability to the world.

While we depend upon the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Department of Defense and other agencies to be vigilant in their duties, none of us should forget the danger that confronts us all individually and collectively, and that threatens us as a sovereign nation and as a part of the world of nations.

JIMMY CARTER

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
March 7, 1980.

# # # #

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Jeff Leasing

6/12/80 [1] (A11 II) Box 171

FOR THE RECORD:

BRZEZINSKI RECEIVED A COPY OF THE  
ATTACHED.

JD 3334

A-6111/52/2

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 11, 1980

Zby  
J

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI ZB.  
SUBJECT: Draft Policy Statement on SALT II

Enclosed is the statement prepared by Muskie, and approved by Brown and myself, regarding SALT and Afghanistan. If you approve, I will use it in my Platform Committee presentation; and Muskie may use it, if the press doesn't pick it up after my use, in his press conference on Friday.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the attached statement.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ AS AMENDED ☒ \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

J



A-4/11/52/3

DRAFT POLICY STATEMENT ON SALT II

A strong American response to the illegal and brutal Soviet invasion of Afghanistan serves our nation's security interests. It must and will be sustained, so long as Soviet troops remain there.

The SALT II treaty also serves our security interests. It is a vital step in an arms control process that can begin to lift from humanity the shadow of nuclear war. That process, also, must be sustained.

~~While~~ Soviet aggression against Afghanistan has delayed the course of ratification of the SALT II treaty, ~~[there must~~  
~~but we will continue to pursue~~  
~~be no question about our commitment to]~~ both security priorities: deterrence of Soviet aggression and balanced arms control agreements. ~~[For a central purpose of our foreign policies is to bring about Soviet restraint: in its actions and in its military programs.]~~ Both our response to Afghanistan and the SALT II treaty serve this purpose.

Through the measures we are taking, including both denial of economic benefits and the Olympic boycott, as well as our efforts to enhance the security of the region most directly affected, it is our purpose to make the Soviets pay a price for their act of international <sup>aggression</sup> ~~cannibalism~~. We will continue to do so. We will also continue our efforts to strengthen our national defense. We cannot let this attack across an international border, with the threat it poses to the region and thus to the strategic balance, go unanswered. Only firmness now can prevent new adventures later.

*treaties*  
The SALT II ~~treaty~~ is also an important way of restraining Soviet behavior.

*II*  
Without SALT, the Soviets could have hundreds more missiles and thousands more nuclear warheads than the Treaty permits. Under the Treaty, they would have to eliminate many nuclear weapons they already have.

And the Treaty helps sustain a strong American position in the world. Our allies, <sup>other</sup> and nations around the world, ~~know~~ believe the SALT II treaty serves their security interests as well as ours. Our support for arms control is important to our standing in the international community, the same community that has rebuked the Soviets for <sup>their attempted suppression of</sup> Afghanistan. It is also important ~~[to our position of leadership within the Alliance, and thus crucial]~~ to our efforts to organize an enduring response ~~to the growing threat of the Soviet SS20 nuclear missiles and~~ to Soviet aggression <sup>(to Europe)</sup> in Afghanistan.

I am confident the American people want the arms control process to continue, just as they want us to sustain strong policies against Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. For they understand that both build peace and make our nation more secure. Accordingly, we will persist in our strong policies regarding the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan as long as that aggression continues, and we will seek ratification of SALT ~~as soon as it is possible~~ <sup>when the Soviets take some positive steps</sup> toward improving the international climate.

## **ANEXO IX**

- A-IX/1 a A-IX/17 Documentos campaña SALT II. Presidential Files: Briefings, Memorandums y Correspondencia (prensa, grupos sociales y opinión pública), 1977 - 1980
- A-IX/18 Humor de la New Age

A-IX/1/2

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NA 01  
Leaks  
SMO001

United States Senate  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Nov. 21 '77

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CONGRESSIONAL  
LIAISON

NOV 22 1977

Dear Mr. President,

I wanted to let you know  
how strongly I am opposed  
to anonymous leaks on SALT,  
from whatever source.

I have conveyed my views  
to Mr. Aaron in lieu of  
Dr. Brzezinski. I enclose for  
you a copy of my public  
statement on this matter.  
Respectfully - John Culver



NEWS FROM

A-1x/1/2

# JOHN C. CULVER

SENATOR FOR IOWA

344 Russell Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20510

FOR RELEASE:  
IMMEDIATELY  
FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1977

For More Information Contact:  
Don Brownlee 202-224-3744  
703-527-6190

## CULVER ASKS HALT TO ADMINISTRATION SALT LEAKS

(WASHINGTON, D.C., Nov. 10) -- Senator John Culver (D-Iowa) today called on President Carter "to halt the selective disclosures by administration sources of sensitive details of the SALT negotiations and to lay before the American people as much about the emerging agreement as can properly be released at this time."

As an example of new SALT leakage, this time by the executive branch, Culver cited a front page article in today's New York Times under the headline, "Major Concession on Cruise Missiles by Soviets Reported." The article said the Soviet Union had altered its previous position on the testing, deployment and range of the cruise missile.

Culver said he had telephoned the White House to protest the Times story.

"These negotiations are too critical to our national and global security to be subjected to a guerrilla war of leaks," Culver commented. "One leak begets another. I cannot believe that the continuing negotiations are helped in any way by a running series of stories about who conceded what this week."

"Less than two weeks ago," Culver said, "a number of my Senate colleagues and I condemned and called for an investigation of apparent leaks regarding hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee." Culver noted that he had previously deplored the leaks of sensitive information, by advocates as well as opponents of the tentative agreements, as being harmful to the negotiations.

---FORD---

CULVER/SALT LEAKS RELEASE  
first add

In the past, there have been other potentially damaging revelations attributed to executive branch sources. Now we have yet another anonymous account that appears to be part of an administration selling job. All of these apparently unauthorized disclosures should be thoroughly investigated."

"The public is entitled to know as much about the ongoing negotiations as can be told without hurting our national security interests in these crucial talks.

In order to clear the atmosphere, the administration should set ground rules regarding disclosure that are fair and understandable to all parties concerned.

"If some of the people now providing information to the press have the authority to declassify sensitive details, then they should speak openly, accurately and on the record.

"And decisions about what can be safely disclosed should not be made by individuals at will, but only after a careful review process by responsible authorities that balances the public's right to know with the precise requirements of diplomatic confidentiality."

Speeches, Subject File

"SALT II" Box 26

A-IX/2/1

Folder 12/22/78 - 2/22/79 B.H.


E. CONGRESSIONAL STAND AND OUTLOOK FOR THE COMING DEBATE

- I. Voting Analysis: How Senators Have Voted on Key Foreign Policy Issues..... p. 105-106
- II. "Leaning Right." Newsweek, November 20, 1978..... p. 107
- III. Senate Committees Which Will Consider the SALT Treaty..... p. 108
- IV. "Tough Sledding for SALT," by Alan Baron. Politics Today, January/February 1979..... p. 109-110
- V. "Carter's Plan to Win on SALT II." Business Week, October 30, 1978..... p. 111
- VI. "The Coming Battle Over SALT" Public Opinion, November-December 1978..... p. 112-113  
    "How to Build Public Support," by Milton Viorst..... p. 112-113  
    "How to Defeat the Treaty," by Patrick J. Buchanan..... p. 112, 114
- VII. "House Panel Urges Rejection of SALT," by Alton K. Marsh. Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 1, 1979..... p. 120-121

	ADMINISTRATION POSITION	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	+	-	0
ALABAMA	Stevenson (D) -									
ALASKA	Gravel (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	6	0	0 55 20
ARIZONA	McConaughy (R)	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	3	3	0 55 30
ARKANSAS	Goldwater (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	7	2	0 40 36
CALIFORNIA	Summers (D)	N	N	N	Y	N	N	2	4	0 0 100
COLORADO	Griest (D) -	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	0	0	0 75 15
CONNECTICUT	Granston (D)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	3	3	0 80 4
DELAWARE	Franklin (R)	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	3	3	0 5 96
FLORIDA	Hart (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	5	1	0 50 4
GEORGIA	Armstrong (R) -	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	6	0	0 75 8
HAWAII	Whitely (D)	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	2	3	1 50 39
IDaho	Miller (D)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	4	2	0 70 13
ILLINOIS	Roth (R)	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	7	4	1 20 99
INDIANA	Wells (D)	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	2	0 35 50
IOWA	Wells (D)	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	1	5	2 30 38
KANSAS	Turner (D)	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	2	0 20 64
KENTUCKY	McMurry (D)	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	2	3	1 15 61
LOUISIANA	Trammell (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	5	0	1 60 13
MAINE	McIntyre (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	5	1	0 80 4
MARYLAND	Church (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	1	0 65 21
MASSACHUSETTS	McClure (R)	N	N	N	Y	N	N	2	4	0 5 35
MICHIGAN	Garrison (D)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	5	1	0 60 -
MINNESOTA	Prescott (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	5	1	2 65 10
MISSISSIPPI	Baker (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	2	0 75 0
MISSOURI	Silber (R)	N	N	N	Y	N	N	2	4	0 10 51
MONTANA	Culver (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	6	0	0 85 4
NEBRASKA	Gipson (R) -	N	N	N	N	Y	N	0	3	1 5 70
NEVADA	Wade (R)	N	N	N	N	Y	N	0	3	1 5 70
NEW HAMPSHIRE	Kastelbaum (R) -	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	4	2	0 50 27
NEW JERSEY	Ford (D)	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	1	1 45 19
NEW MEXICO	Huddleston (D)	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	3	3	0 25 52
NEW YORK	Johnson (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	5	0	1 10 46
NORTH CAROLINA	Long (D)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	5	1	0 90 13
NORTH DAKOTA	Mitchell (D)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	4	2	0 90 7
OHIO	Lawrence (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	6	0	0 75 14
OKLAHOMA	Mathias (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	4	2	0 45 4
OREGON	Kennedy (D)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	4	2	0 45 4
PENNSYLVANIA	Levin (D) -									
RHODE ISLAND	Levin (D) -									
SOUTH CAROLINA	Pugh (D)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	4	2	0 70 5
SOUTH DAKOTA	Dusenberger (R) -									
TENNESSEE	Boschert (R) -	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	3	3	0 5 78
TEXAS	Pennington (D)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	3	1	0 50 75
UTAH	Cothren (R) -	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	5	1	



	ADMINISTRATION POSITION	RHODESIA	WINNIKE	PANAMA	CONGO	ALGERIA	LIBERIA	SALES	NO. OF TIMES FORFEITED	ADMINISTRATION	ADMIN. KULING	ACA KULING
		Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	-	0			
NEW JERSEY	Bradley (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	5	1	0	95	7
	Williams (D)	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	0	5	1	5	70
NEW MEXICO	Schmitt (R)	Y	N	N	N	N	N	2	4	0	15	84
	Thompson (D)	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	3	3	0	70	17
NEW YORK	Chute (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	4	2	0	80	15
	Morgan (D)	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	5	1	0	40	60
N. CAROLINA	Hill (R)	N	N	N	Y	N	N	2	4	0	0	100
	Burdick (D)	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	3	3	0	50	22
N. DAKOTA	Young (R)	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	3	3	0	5	79
	Reber (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	5	1	0	60	19
OHIO	Hytrenbaum (D)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	4	2	0	90	7
	Bolen (D)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	4	2	0	90	7
OKLAHOMA	Bellinger (R)	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	5	1	0	20	64
	Hatfield (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	4	2	0	60	36
OREGON	Quarles (R)	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	2	2	0	45	42
	Leary (R)	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	3	3	0	50	31
PENNSYLVANIA	Leiber (R)	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	2	4	0	15	96
	Pell (D)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	5	1	0	80	8
RHODE ISLAND	Challie (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	6	0	0	45	24
	Holtz (D)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	3	3	0	30	52
S. CAROLINA	Shurford (R)	N	N	N	Y	N	N	2	4	0	5	75
	McLennan (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	6	0	0	80	0
S. DAKOTA	Greaser (R)	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	4	2	0	15	52
TENNESSEE	Greaser (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	4	2	0	60	5
	Wentzen (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	5	1	0	30	48
TEXAS	Tower (R)	N	N	N	Y	N	N	2	4	0	15	96
	Gunn (R)	N	N	N	Y	N	N	2	4	0	10	100
UTAH	Speth (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	5	1	0	80	15
VERMONT	Leary (D)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	5	1	0	45	22
	Stallard (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	5	1	0	45	22
VIRGINIA	Bald, H. (Ind.)	N	N	N	Y	N	N	2	4	0	5	96
	Harper (R)	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	3	5	0	80	22
WASHINGTON	Jackson (D)	Y	X	Y	N	N	Y	4	2	0	75	15
	Magnuson (D)	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	5	1	0	50	
W. VIRGINIA	Byrd, R. (D)	N	Y	N	N	N	N	2	4	0	40	
	Radolch (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	5	1	0	40	4
WISCONSIN	Tolson (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	5	1	0	70	37
	Robinson (D)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	5	1	0	70	37
WYOMING	Simmons (R)	N	N	N	Y	N	N	1	5	0	0	96
	Wallop (R)	N	N	N	Y	N	N	1	5	0	0	96



Source: Newsweek, November 20, 1978.

# Senate Committees Which Will Consider the Treaty

## Armed Services

### Democrats

John C. Stennis (Mississippi), *Chairman*  
Henry M. Jackson (Washington)  
Howard W. Cannon (Nevada)  
Harry F. Byrd (Virginia)  
Sam Nunn (Georgia)  
John C. Culver (Iowa)  
Gary Hart (Colorado)  
Robert Morgan (North Carolina)  
J. J. Exon (Nebraska)\*  
Carl Levin (Michigan)\*

### Republicans

John Tower (Texas)  
Strom Thurmond (South Carolina)  
Barry Goldwater (Arizona)  
Jesse A. Helms (North Carolina)  
John Warner (Virginia)\*  
Gordon Humphrey (New Hampshire)\*  
William S. Cohen (Maine)\*  
Roger Jepsen (Iowa)\*

## Foreign Relations

### Democrats

Frank Church (Idaho), *Chairman*  
Claiborne Pell (Rhode Island)  
George McGovern (South Dakota)  
Joseph R. Biden (Delaware)  
John Glenn (Ohio)  
Richard Stone (Florida)  
Paul Sarbanes (Maryland)  
Edmund Muskie (Maine)\*  
Edward Zorinsky (Nebraska)\*

### Republicans

Jacob Javits (New York)  
Charles H. Percy (Illinois)  
Howard H. Baker (Tennessee)  
Jesse A. Helms (North Carolina)\*  
S. I. Hayakawa (Hawaii)\*  
Richard G. Lugar (Indiana)\*

\*new committee members

# Tough Sledding for SALT

*New power alignments in the Senate cloud prospects for ratification.*

AS we go to press, negotiations for a new strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT) are proceeding, but not very rapidly. Nevertheless, White House aides remain confident that a treaty will be signed within the next few months.

Carter, they report, believes nuclear arms control to be a fundamental purpose of his presidency. And Soviet leader Brezhnev, while irritated with Carter's criticisms of Russian human rights violations, is also determined to conclude a treaty. The Soviet leader is primarily worried about China at this time, and he wants to build better relations with the West.

The key question in Washington is, if a treaty is signed, can it be ratified by the US Senate? That takes a two-thirds vote and, as of now, the prospects do not look good.

The difficulty Carter faces in the Senate is clear as soon as you review the numbers. A good way to start is to recall the close (63-32) vote on ratification of the Panama Canal treaties last year. Of the 100 Senators voting on that issue, 20 have since left (due to death, retirement or defeat). Of those, 13 voted for the treaties and 7 against. While it's not clear

how these senators' replacements would have voted on the Panama treaties—or how they're likely to vote on SALT—one can make some educated guesses.

- Four of the new senators are liberal Democrats who will almost certainly back the president. These include Bill Bradley of New Jersey, Paul Tsongas of Massachusetts, Max Baucus of Montana and Carl Levin of Michigan.

- Four of the new senators are very conservative Republicans who are almost certain to oppose a new SALT agreement. These include Roger Jepsen of Iowa, Bill Armstrong of Colorado, Gordon Humphrey of New Hampshire and Thad Cochran of Mississippi. The one senator in this group who might conceivably back SALT is Cochran, an independent thinker. But the odds are against it.

- Five of the new senators are moderate to conservative Democrats, and their votes will be crucial to the president. Of these, three—David Pryor of Arkansas, Donald Stewart of Alabama and Howell Heflin of Alabama—seem likely to support SALT, unless vehement opposition in their home states makes it impossible for them to do so. Stewart would be the

most sensitive to such pressures; his term expires in just two years. Two other moderate Democrats—outgoing David Boren of Oklahoma and James Exon of Nebraska—will probably be tougher votes for the president to obtain, but he still stands a better chance with them than he did with their predecessors, ultraconservative Republicans Carl Curtis and Dewey Bartlett.

- Five of the new senators are moderate Republicans. They include William Cohen of Maine, Larry Pressler of South Dakota, Rudy Boschwitz of Minnesota, David Durenberger of Minnesota and Nancy Kassebaum of Kansas. And two Republicans are moderate conservatives: Alan Simpson of Wyoming and John Warner of Virginia.


How will the seven stand on SALT? The odds now favor Carter getting four to six of them, if he's able to present a strong case and build public support. But there's little doubt he'll have to convince each of them individually on the merits of the case. And that will be a lot more time-consuming than it would have been to convince most of their predecessors, who were liberal Democrats.

Assume, for a moment, that Carter picks up all four liberal Democrats, four of the five moderate Democrats, all five moderate Republicans and neither of the two moderate/conservative Republicans for a SALT treaty. That would give him 13 of the 20 new votes—the same number he got for the Panama treaties.

The problem is, that's a big assumption. At least a third of the senators who supported Panama are not sure votes for SALT. The key to their decisions rests with two men.

The first is Howard Baker, the Senate minority leader. Baker's also a presidential candidate—and he did himself considerable damage with right-wing Republicans when he helped put Carter over the top on Panama. Baker's political advisers will urge him to oppose SALT to win back the right; such opposition would be a logical move. And Baker's opposition would influence other Republicans, both incumbent senators who supported Panama, like Henry Bellmon of Oklahoma and S. I. Hayakawa of California, and newly elected ones, particularly the moderates.

Baker's opposition, however, is no certainty. The Tennessean has put principle over politics before, not only on Panama, but also when he alienated Jewish Americans by backing Carter on



...and Greek ... the lifting of ... He could do ...

The other key force is Sen. Henry ... Jackson, the hard-line Democrat ... Washington. Jackson is respected ... hawks on both sides of the aisle and ... influential with numerous moderate Democrats (such as Magnuson of ... Washington, Moynihan of New York, ... Stone of Florida) who backed Carter ... Panama. If it's improbable that the ... can win on SALT without ... it's almost impossible to see him ... without Jackson.

And the administration knows it. ... that's why they intend to go along with

Jackson, more than at any time in the ... past, on defense spending. Early indica- ... tions are that defense will be the only ... major area of the federal budget enjoying ... a real (counting inflation) boost in ex- ... penditures. Furthermore, Jackson is ... being kept informed, on a continuing ... basis, of progress in the negotiations. ... Carter needs him; Carter knows it, and so ... does Scoop.

There are, it should be noted, a few ... anti-Panama senators who might back ... SALT: the key ones are two northwest- ... erners, John Melcher of Montana and ... Quentin Burdick of North Dakota. But ... they could hardly offset the defections ... that would result from either Jackson's or ... Baker's opposition.

So, unless Jackson and Baker go ... along, the prospects for ratification, on ... paper at least, don't look promising. But ... Carter could win if he gets the support of ... one of the two—and wages an impres- ... sive campaign for public backing.

Unlike the Panama treaties, after all, ... SALT is favored by the majority of the ... American people. And while all of the ... fire and fury was on the side of the oppo- ... sition on the Panama issue, that isn't the ... case on this one. Advocates of the ... Panama treaties had considerable diffi- ... culty convincing people that ratification ... would be personally advantageous to ... them. A much more direct and emotional ... case can be made for a slowdown in the ... nuclear arms race.

## Abortion: Is Détente Ahead?

THERE are few more explosive is- ... sues in American politics today than ... abortion. Advocates of legalized abor- ... tion see it as a fundamental human rights ... issue. Opponents see it as the legaliza- ... tion of murder.

Prior to the Supreme Court ruling that ... legalized abortions, the burden was on ... the proabortion—or prochoice—of choice ... advocates. They attempted to win re- ... peal of state laws banning abortions, but ... had only limited success.

Since the court ruling, however, the ... tide has been on the other foot. The ... right-to-life movement was created to ... win passage of a constitutional amend- ... ment banning abortions. But the right- ... to-lifers have had little success. Polls ... indicate that the public, by a large mar- ... gin, opposes such an amendment. And it ... takes the support to win the required ... two-thirds majority of Congress or ratifi- ... cation by three-fourths of the states.

But right-to-lifers have been generally ... successful in another area: they've won ... congressional approval of restrictions ... that end funding for nearly all abortions ... paid for through the Medicaid program ... for the poor. Yet that issue is far from ... settled, and it continues to play a major ... role in Congress—and in the congress- ... sional campaigns.

This year was no exception. Through ... intensive campaign activity, right-to- ... lifers were instrumental in the defeat of ... two "prochoice" Democratic legis- ... lators: Rep. Donald Fraser in Minneso- ... ta's Senate primary and Sen. Dick Clark ... of Iowa in the general election. Fraser ... and Clark weren't the only prochoice ... Democrats to lose. But in other races,



abortion was not as central an issue. In ... the Minnesota and Iowa campaigns, ... right-to-life forces waged intensive, ... well-organized drives to defeat the two ... liberals.

Prochoice advocates can also point to ... some important victories, including gov- ... ernorship races in New York, California, ... Illinois, Pennsylvania and Michigan, as ... well as Senate races in Michigan and ... Alabama. And they also won some key ... House races. Pennsylvania Democratic ... Congressman Robert Edgar and William ... Moorhead both were reelected, despite ... strong opposition in their heavily ... Catholic districts. A "prolife" Republi- ... can was defeated by a "prochoice" ... Democratic woman, Geraldine Ferraro, ... in the heavily ethnic Catholic Bronx ... district where the opening segment for ... Archie Bunker's "All in the Family" ... television program was filmed. And pro- ... life Republican Rep. John Cunningham,

of a Seattle, Washington, working-class ... district with a lot of Catholics, was de- ... feated by a prochoice Democrat.

But these results have not reassured ... liberal Democrats, who viewed the Clark ... and Fraser defeats with alarm. Overall, ... two factors stand out. First, the abortion ... issue costs votes mainly among middle- ... class Catholics, and, therefore, hurts ... Democrats most; second, there's a gen- ... eral impression that the issue is a more ... volatile one in the Midwest than any- ... where else.

That's important, because the mid- ... western coalition of working-class ... Catholics and progressive Protestants ... has been at the heart of American ... liberalism during the past three decades. ... Hubert Humphrey, Walter Mondale, ... Eugene McCarthy, Gaylord Nelson, ... George McGovern and their colleagues ... have provided the thrust of the progres- ... sive movement within the Democratic ... party.

While progressive Democrats still ... generally oppose denying abortions to ... poor women, they don't want to risk their ... seats over the issue. So far, most have ... voted prochoice, but some (like Nelson) ... have tempered that by supporting tuition ... tax credits for parochial schools.

Now, more than anything, they want ... the abortion issue to fade away. And in ... this session of Congress, it might just do ... that. Surveys indicate that the House, ... which had an antiabortion majority last ... year, will have an even larger one this ... year. And few Democratic senators are ... in the mood to risk what happened to ... Dick Clark.

The bottom line will probably be the ... position Jimmy Carter took after weigh- ... ing all the factors. A constitutional ... amendment? No. Medicaid abortions? ... No, again.

## Carter's Plan to Win on SALT II

Carter Administration is gearing up for its first big foreign policy battle of next Congress: the effort to win ratification by the Senate of the anti-nuclear Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

The treaty goes according to plan, negotiations will be concluded by Thanksgiving. Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev will sign the document by Christmas, and the treaty will be ratified by the Senate in January. As one of the top priorities of business before the 96th Congress, the SALT treaty will carry a weight of political symbolism. Carter's staff would love to nail down a foreign policy triumph to maintain the President's new momentum in the second half of his term.

Now, opponents of the treaty have been able to conduct the debate on their own terms—which weapons will or won't affect U.S. strategic and national security interests. But administration officials, who have been urged to remain silent so as not to undermine the negotiations themselves, believe that the most potent argument in the debate will be the public's desire for a treaty, even an imperfect one. More, advisers believe that the treaty will win the fight handily. "They are going to show that the public is generally in favor of the treaty," says a senior staff member.

Administration strategists are counting on Carter's new-found stature as a leader after his Camp David summit to put the opposition on the defensive. To bolster that image, aides are already talking about "trust me" chats by the President.

As the Administration gets its way, opponents won't have much ground to fight on. They will be forced to debate the treaty on narrow, technical issues: numbers of warheads, the range of weapons, all the arcane matters that put the uninformed to sleep.

The Administration's point man will be Defense Secretary Harold Brown, who is highly regarded on the Hill. Though Brown is no political whiz, he has down treaty opponents, such as Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) and Lloyd M. Bentsen Jr. (D-Tex.), on technical issues. He will stress a still-closed Soviet concession limiting

to 10 the number of warheads on their new and highly accurate SS-18 missile, which can carry up to 40 warheads. Meanwhile, White House political operatives will work on the 10 or 15 uncommitted senators in the middle.

Treaty backers already have a distinct advantage: Support for the treaty will have a bipartisan aura from the very beginning. Such liberal Republicans as Senator Jacob K. Javits (N.Y.), Charles McC. Mathias Jr. (Md.), and Charles H. Percy (Ill.) will favor the treaty. Democratic liberals, such as Senator Edward Kennedy (Mass.) and Senator Alan Cranston (Calif.), the majority whip, have already been meeting to prepare their support for the SALT treaty.

The treaty should also get an early boost from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Chairman John J. Sparkman (D-Ala.), who has been neutral to the point of invisibility, is retiring, and he will be succeeded by Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho), a longtime supporter of disarmament. After lengthy—and sympathetic—hearings, the treaty package should be dispatched to the floor with the support of a healthy majority of the committee.

The real locus of opposition is likely to be the Senate Armed Services Committee. At the urging of Jackson, its second-ranking member, the committee will almost certainly seek to hold its own hearings on SALT. Administration strategists expect that Jackson won't try to kill the treaty directly. Instead, they suspect that he will offer a series of reservations—reservations that the Soviets would find unacceptable. Opponents of the Panama Canal Treaty used the same tactic and came close to sinking the agreements.

To counter such tactics, supporters are likely to offer their own reservations, mild enough to be acceptable to the Russians but strong enough to offer political shelter to wavering senators.

The biggest potential threat to SALT ratification derives, as one Senate staffer puts it, from issues "extraneous to the treaty itself." If, for example, the Soviets renew the trials of dissident activists, or launch new adventures in Africa, the treaty could get lost in the resulting uproar. The betting, though, is that the Russians want SALT badly enough to keep the lid on anything that might jeopardize the treaty.

## Capital wrapup

**PEOPLE:** Already at odds with some of his labor supporters over the controversial labor-law reform bill, Senator Harrison A. Williams Jr. (D-N.J.), chairman of the Senate Human Resources Committee, may irritate them even more if he dissolves the labor subcommittee, which he also heads, and transfers its jurisdiction to the full committee. Under Senate rules, Williams can't remain chairman of both panels and also continue to head the securities subcommittee of the Senate Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs Committee. Dissolving the labor subcommittee will solve his problem at the expense of the unions, which consider the subcommittee their turf.

**REGULATION:** The nuclear industry, already impatient at the obstacles to the development of nuclear power, won't be cheered by a new report on nuclear waste disposal delivered to the President by an interagency task force. The report forecasts that the most critical high-level waste repository won't be ready for at least a decade. The report also makes no firm recommendation on the nature of underground storage.

**STOCKPILES:** Senator William Proxmire (D-Wis.) plans hearings in mid-November that could unravel a year of interagency study on the nation's \$8.6 billion strategic stockpile policy. Proxmire wants to reassess the policy's underlying assumptions, which have been accepted by the Carter Administration. One assumption: Critical materials must be sufficient to sustain a three-year conventional war. Proxmire considers such an assumption to be invalid.

**INFLATION:** The White House is reviving the "speakers' bureau" tactic used extensively during the fight for the energy package. Each Cabinet department is being asked to designate three top officials available for speaking engagements in support of the anti-inflation program.

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B A C K G R O U N D   B R I E F I N G

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(NOTE: This is essentially  
a verbatim transcript but has been  
edited for clarity.)

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

AT 3:40 P.M. EST

APRIL 23, 1979

MONDAY

THIS BRIEFING MAY BE ATTRIBUTED  
TO AN ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL.  
DIRECT QUOTATION IS NOT PERMITTED

MR. SCHECTER: Contrary to some reports, we aren't going to have any major announcement this afternoon. In fact, what we have arranged is a background briefing for attribution to an Administration Official.

This Administration Official has been working on the SALT problem since 1974, and what he plans to do this afternoon is to give you a broad overview of strategic systems, some basic definitions, the history of the negotiations, and then he will take your questions. He is not here to get into the politics of the SALT treaty or to defend it in a political sense, but rather to try and give you a basic factual and historical background and overview of the negotiations and to the extent possible answer questions on the technical side.

Now, I assume that you all understand the ground rules and will be bound by them.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I see some people in this room who I think should leave right away. (Laughter)

As Jerry said, what I want to try and do is just give you some of the technical background of SALT and strategic systems to provide a basis for the kind of writing which a lot of you are going to be doing over the next six to nine months.

Let me start by simply giving you a historical perspective on how we got to where we are today both in SALT and in terms of strategic systems.

First of all, there is the question of what is a strategic system which people frequently ask. In fact, it is a difficult question, and not easy to answer. It is more something that has emerged by example.

Certain things clearly end up in the class of strategic systems; for example, ICBMs and SLBMs -- submarine-launched ballistic missiles -- certainly do. Strategic systems, though, have the connotation of being different from tactical systems in that they would attack targets such as industry, leadership targets, targets away from the front line of battle, if you will, and deeper into countries. In general, then, what we are talking about is the longer-range nuclear delivery capability systems.

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The first strategic systems with a nuclear delivery variety were bombers -- improvements in the bombers that came out of World War II -- first the B-47 bombers, which the U.S. had in the late forties and early fifties. By the mid-fifties, really as a follow-up to the kind of V-2 capability that emerged in 1945 in Germany, people started getting interested in delivering nuclear warheads with ballistic missiles. Guidance systems had progressed to the point where people thought they could get accuracies good enough to deliver nuclear warheads at distances of thousands of miles, as opposed to the hundreds of miles which were used with the V-2s which delivered conventional warheads on England. Both the Soviet Union and the U.S. got into this business at about the same time. Sputnik spurred it on with a lot of gusto.

By the late 1950s, things were evolving in a particular direction for both sides. The United States was moving away from the B-47 bombers and towards the B-52 bombers, which would be based in the United States, with the capability, with refueling, of striking targets in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union itself was starting to build intercontinental bombers, the Bears and the Bisons, and both sides were working on ballistic missile systems.

Because of technological differences, the United States, shortly after Sputnik, was able to move very rapidly ahead in this area. We first came out with the Atlas and Titan ICBM systems, both liquid fueled, both somewhat unreliable, and not particularly accurate, but good enough to deliver nuclear warheads to the territory of the other side and at least hit cities with enough accuracy to essentially destroy them. The Soviets were working on land-based ballistic missile systems at the same time, intermediate and shorter-range systems for delivering warheads against Europe, longer-range systems, but very crude and unsophisticated, for delivering warheads against the United States.

Both sides were also at that time starting to work on submarine-launched ballistic missile systems. Somebody got the idea of putting ballistic missiles on submarines. I think it was something like the first five U.S. ballistic missile submarines had originally been designed to be regular tactical submarines -- what we call SSNs or attack submarines. But somebody did calculations that indicated that if you split the hull in half and put missile tubes in there, they really would work.

And the Soviets started working on the same thing, but because of technological disadvantages, they really couldn't put into a submarine ballistic missiles that had the capability of going to very long ranges. So they started deploying on a few nuclear-powered submarines and on a few conventional-powered submarines some very short-range ballistic missiles. Although a few of them showed up off the United States, they were really more appropriate for attack against European targets.

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By the time of the Cuban missile crisis, the U.S. had built up to the point where we had a clear and distinct advantage, in particular in ICBM systems, and you all know what happened there because of that situation.

As we moved into the mid-1960s, the situation which evolved in the United States, I would say, more by accident than deliberately found us devoting roughly the same amount of efforts to ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers.

We had, in the early 1960s, looking at the issue of follow-on systems to the Atlas and early Titans, decided to start building two systems, one the Titan II, a follow-on liquid-fueled system, very large, actually a heavy missile in today's language, and Minuteman solid-fueled ICBMs, which offered advantages in terms of handling and reliability. We decided to make the Minuteman small and deploy them in large numbers of silos because even then people were estimating that some day you might be able to target individual silos. So it was decided to proliferate numbers of silos as a means of hedging against this possibility.

The SLBM force was now, after the first few boats, a thing of its own. We were moving through successions of Polaris missiles on the same submarines -- just modernizing the missiles -- and went through the A-1, A-2 and A-3, gradually increasing the range.

On the bomber side, we toyed with a follow-on to the B-52, the B-70, which would have been a high-altitude supersonic bomber. But the situation which evolved with respect to air defenses on the Soviet side made it clear that they would be able to shoot down high-altitude bombers, so we abandoned the B-70 and instead went to low-altitude penetration for B-52s.

On the Soviet side, in contrast to the three relatively balanced U.S. efforts in terms of allocation of resources, they tended to emphasize, and still do emphasize, their ICBM force. They found it much easier to do that. They were at a disadvantage in terms of miniaturization of warheads to be delivered to intercontinental distances and built very large missiles to deliver their very large warheads. They also had a problem with the technology, not only of SLBMs, but of ballistic missile submarines. And they seemed to lose interest in the bomber business after, in the mid 1950s, building some 150-odd strategic bombers. They basically sat on that force and have not developed a long-range bomber subsequent to that period of time.

So they ended up with a real concentration in their ICBM force. By the mid-1960s, they were building an SLBM force, but it still was significantly less in capability than that of the United States.

By the time of about 1967 or 1968, another phenomenon had come on the scene. It actually started in the early sixties; that is, the idea of defending against ballistic

MORE

- 4 -

missiles. We started almost immediately to pursue this as a natural evolution of trying to defend onself against any attacking system that might be deployed on the other side. However, we were quickly persuaded that this was no mean technology. And although we spent quite a lot of money on R&D, we weren't getting systems on the drawing board that we were persuaded could do any significant blunting of an attack by somebody like the Soviet Union. The Soviets at the same time were also engaged in anti-ballistic missile efforts and I think starting in 1964 or 1963, they had deployed an ABM system around Moscow -- a very crude one -- one which was obvious to us we could easily penetrate. However, interest in ABM systems was mounting in the mid-1960s and, as you know, a very serious debate started in the United States as to whether it made sense for us, and whether it was feasible to defend against ballistic missile systems.

About this period of time, it was becoming clear that this was extremely difficult technology. The Administration was toying with the Sentinel system and other light area defensive systems and the idea emerged that maybe both sides would be better off if we simply did not have anti-ballistic missile systems.

It was really at this point that the concept of SALT began, probably initiated in the Pentagon under McNamara where the idea emerged of going to the Soviets and suggesting that the two sides negotiate on limitations on anti-ballistic missile systems.

It was a major step from a policy standpoint in the sense of admitting, since it was quite clear we would be talking about very restrictive limits on ABM systems, that we were not going to be able to defend the country, something which probably a lot of people didn't realize in 1965, 1966 and 1967. There was a lot of misinformation then insofar as what our capabilities were to defend against, say, an attack by the Soviet Union.

MORE

- 5 -

So with that in mind, under President Johnson, the Soviets were approached in -- I guess it was probably early 1968. I would refer you to Cold Dawn for the precise details. We approached them about the possibility of arms control negotiations to limit ABM systems. People had been encouraged by the Limited Test Ban Treaty, had been encouraged by progress toward -- and shortly to be completed in 1968 -- the Nonproliferation Treaty -- that arms control was a feasible way of working this particular problem.

The Soviets came back and said, "Fine, and let's talk also about the limitations on offensive systems." With that, the bureaucracies came to grips with the issue and by the summer of 1968, there were some reasonably well-developed analytical papers within the United States Government dealing with SALT limitations on both anti-ballistic missile systems and limitations on strategic offensive systems.

But in August of 1968, the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia and that was too much in terms of linkage. It put the whole idea of SALT on the back burner and it really didn't come up again until the start of the Nixon Administration.

Meantime, the United States was moving through generations of, for the most part, single warhead missiles -- although I should point out the Polaris A-3 is what we call an MRV missile, a multiple re-entry vehicle, or multiple warhead missile, but not one where there individual warheads can be independently targeted. But we were moving into the concept of what we call MIRVs, multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, the capability of deploying from a single missile separate warheads and putting them on individual targets.

So this was a problem that was immediately seen as a new and complicating factor in the arms control negotiations which then started in the fall of 1969 under the Nixon Administration:

There were a few things that became issues early on, one of which was, "Okay, we have decided to negotiate on strategic weapons. Just what are strategic weapons?" The Soviets started talking about including in the negotiations what we call forward-based systems -- aircraft like F-111s in England, A-6s and 7s on carriers in the Mediterranean and the Far East and the fact that we had forward bases for our submarines. All of these things they did not have and in one sense had given up when they got out of Cuba.

We also got tied up with the issue of what were strategic systems and looked into the possibility of including in SALT what are known as the intermediate-range or medium-range ballistic missiles in Europe which clearly aren't targeted on the United States since they can't get here. But the give-and-take led, in SALT I, to our dropping the idea of limitations on, if you will, intermediate and medium-range ballistic missiles.

MORE

- 6 -

The Soviets, in a slower move, eventually also in SALT I dropped the idea of limiting forward-based systems.

Another thing that they also brought up early in SALT I was the idea of including in the negotiations either compensation for or formally including the systems of our allies. For example, there were then and are now four British ballistic missile submarines with 16 launch tubes apiece for which the United States had provided the boosters. They were Polaris boosters built by Lockheed. The warheads were built by the British themselves. And the French had started into ballistic missiles, were starting to build their submarines and had intermediate range ballistic missiles deployed in France itself.

So anyway, after the first shuffle, we were left in SALT with anti-ballistic missile systems, intercontinental ballistic missile systems on both sides, submarine-based missile systems and strategic bombers.

Here again, there was an issue as to what constitutes a strategic bomber or what has been come to be called in SALT jargon, a heavy bomber. In contrast with ballistic missiles where the existence of oceans separating two sides provides clear delineation in terms of range, the range to cover most targets from the Soviet Union to Western Europe and China is on the order of 3,000 miles, but to really get to the United States, you are talking well in excess of that, 4,500 to 5,500 nautical miles.

In contrast for bombers, because they can be refueled, it is a much less clean proposition. People wrestled with this a lot in SALT I and the outcome was as follows: In terms of offensive systems, we gave up in SALT I on dealing with strategic bombers or heavy bombers. The SALT I interim agreement which emerged in May 1972 dealt only with submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers and ICBM launchers. There was no limitations on heavy bombers whatsoever.

Then there were the limitations on anti-ballistic missile systems. What happened in the course of the negotiations was that because there was felt to be a real priority in dealing with ABM systems -- that this was the technology that was really getting out of the bottle. There was some thought that MIRVs also fell in that category, a genie about to get out of the bottle, but it was of less concern.

The result was that the negotiations in SALT I ended up focusing on in detail anti-ballistic missile systems. Therefore, the ABM treaty was very detailed, very comprehensive, restricting both sides, in terms of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship, to negligible anti-ballistic missile systems. Each side was limited to two ballistic missile sites, one protecting national capitals, one protecting a missile area with 100 interceptors per site -- a piece of cake for either side to penetrate.

MORE

- 7 -

On the offensive weapons side, what came out of SALT I was essentially a freeze on the overall numbers of ballistic missile launchers. Because the Soviets at that time had moved to a point where they had more ballistic missile launchers than the U.S., this provided the Soviets, if you will, with a disparity under the interim agreement freeze -- the numbers something like 2350 to 1700-odd. But, as compensation, strategic bombers were not included, an area where we had a clear and distinct advantage.

This brought us out of SALT I and into SALT II where the priority was immediately to replace the interim agreement with a long-term agreement in the sense that the ABM treaty is a permanent agreement which is reviewed every five years. We completed a review of the ABM Treaty in the fall of 1977 with almost no noise whatever. Both sides agreed they would just let the treaty sit as it is.

And we were now trying to proceed in SALT II to replace the interim agreement with a long-term agreement -- originally thought to be maybe a permanent agreement, limiting offensive systems in the same way, in a comprehensive manner, that we had limited anti-ballistic missile systems.

Very early on in SALT II, the Soviets started testing a new generation of ICBMs. And it became clear that we really were about to look at a vastly improved Soviet ICBM force. I think it was by early 1973, and somebody could check this, the Soviets had even started testing these systems with MIRVs, and we then knew that they were going to have on the order of three times the payload capacity or throw-weight capacity that had existed in the earlier Soviet systems in terms of light missiles.

Let me first, since that is terminology we use, talk about just what that is. I am going to use a blackboard here because it is easier.

This is a ballistic missile. There is a shroud over the top. They come in one stage, two stages -- we do mostly three stages, but for the Soviets, it is generally two stages.

(Referring to sketch) These first two basic stages are called the booster. Everything above that is what is known as throw-weight. Throw-weight includes -- this is meant to represent a bus or what we call a post-boost vehicle, the mechanism for targeting each of the individual targets in a MIRVed system -- they sometimes are set up in stacks -- to their individual targets. And the throw-weight includes both the RVs, and what it really is a little rocket engine and guidance system.

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People had been concerned in SALT I about what came to be called heavy missiles. This was a group of Soviet missiles much larger than anything we had, much larger than the Titans -- almost twice the size of the Titans in terms of the throw-weight capability.

As a result, one of the things that came out of the SALT I interim agreement was a distinction between light missiles and heavy missiles. At that point, it was not defined in terms of what was a light missile and what was a heavy missile. But it became immediately clear in the early days of SALT II that what was needed was a very clean delineation between what was a light missile and what was a heavy missile because of what was happening -- the Soviets were tripling the throw-weight of their ostensible light missiles. And with all the potential for MIRVing capability that was now becoming a cause for concern and people started to realize that in fact the MIRV genie was about to get out of the bottle.

This led early in SALT II to a scramble to try and find some way to limit MIRV systems in a manner that we would find acceptable. We were at this time in a position where we had started to deploy MIRV systems on both our ICBMs and SLBMs and the Soviets really hadn't started. And we put together some proposals that were somewhat in a vein of what you might call enlightened self-interest -- proposals that would have provided a distinct advantage to the United States in terms of MIRV capability. We were saying, basically, "We will trade you an advantage in MIRV capability for the U.S. for an advantage in throw-weight capability for the Soviet Union. We will let you keep your heavy missiles but we are going to have more MIRVs, more warheads on top of our missiles." There was a struggle throughout the first two years of SALT II to work a compromise on this. It passed through the Nixon Administration and into the Ford Administration. Finally, at Vladivostok in 1974, we abandoned any effort to create some kind of fancy tradeoff of more throw-weight for them, more MIRVs for us. And out of Vladivostok came MIRV limitations and also an overall aggregate limitation on the number of ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers and strategic bombers.

The numbers agreed there were an aggregate of 2,400 on what we call strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, a jargon term which simply means, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers and a limitation of 1,320 on the number of launchers of missiles that could be equipped with MIRVs.

There was a perception in the immediate post-Vladivostok period that we really had broken the back of SALT II and would very quickly be able to move to completion of a SALT II agreement. Although we were not talking about restrictions that were going to cause either side to make drastic changes in their strategic posture, nevertheless they would perform the task of wrapping some blanket around the strategic competition, not only overall numbers of strategic delivery vehicles, but also numbers of launchers of MIRVed missiles.

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However, in the immediate post-Vladivostok period, we ran into problems in two areas. The first harkens back to the question of what is a heavy bomber. An issue came up as to whether a particular Soviet bomber, the Backfire, was going to be classified as a heavy bomber under SALT, a bomber which we believed was being deployed for theatre missions against Western Europe and against the Chinese. At the same time, our calculations indicated that at least on a one-way mission, flying at high altitude, and flying subsonically -- this is an aircraft designed to fly supersonically -- it could reach the United States. We proposed in the post-Vladivostok period that the Soviets include the Backfire bomber among the heavy bombers limited under the 2,400 on their side.

MORE

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Another problem that we ran into was the problem of cruise missiles. First, let me explain to you what a cruise missile is. Missiles generally fall into two categories, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. Ballistic missiles of the United States and the Soviet Union go outside the atmosphere, ~~reach altitudes on the order of~~, say, a thousand kilometers, and come down. The term "ballistic" means after the initial boost phase that lasts for three or four minutes -- think of it like throwing a baseball. The boost phase is when your arm still has the ball. After you let go of it, the ball is flying on a purely ballistic trajectory affected out here strictly by gravity and as it comes back inside the atmosphere (which, for purposes of impact on re-entry vehicles, is on the order of 30 kilometers) by the aerodynamic forces that are encountered as you come into the atmosphere.

Cruise missiles are strictly unmanned airplanes. They stay inside the atmosphere, are less efficient in the sense that it is a much more expensive and a much slower way to deliver nuclear warheads. They are generally air-breathing in the sense they carry their fuel on board and breathe air in the same way a jet airplane does. But some of them are also rocket-powered in the sense they carry both the rocket fuel and oxidizer on board. But the unique characteristic is that they stay in the atmosphere, generally at low altitude, but some fly like airplanes do at 20,000 or 30,000 feet.

We ran into a problem in the post-Vladivostok period on how cruise missiles were going to be handled in SALT. There had been some discussion on cruise missiles prior to Vladivostok and some discussion of air-to-surface missiles at Vladivostok. But in the post-Vladivostok period, the Soviets insisted there be comprehensive limitation on cruise missiles. Here we are talking about cruise missiles that would be launched from aircraft, from surface ships, from submarines, or from ground-based launchers. Cruise missiles are not new things. The V-1 was the first serious cruise missile. Both sides had lots of cruise missiles but generally of very short range, not designed for strategic applications. But we had moved into a realm through miniaturization of engines, miniaturization of warheads, where we could pack a fairly respectable cruise missile and a fairly respectable warhead in a fairly small volume.

So we could talk about delivering these things with nuclear warheads to ranges on the order of 2,000, 3,000, 4,000 kilometers. And it also offered the prospect of doing this at relatively low cost.

Well, the year of 1975 was spent wrestling with the two issues of Backfire and cruise missiles. We had the overall 2,400 and 1,320 agreed and it wasn't until January of 1976 that the two sides really got close in terms of working out ways to handle cruise missiles and the Backfire.

I will spare you the details of that. But in the period immediately after January 1976, where Kissinger had gone to Moscow, there was a little stutter step on

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where we were going to go with SALT and very rapidly the whole issue got bound up in the 1976 Presidential campaign and SALT ended up on the back burner for the balance of the Ford Administration.

This then brought in the Carter Administration in early 1977 where immediately one of the priority topics was the review of the U.S. position on SALT. At the analytical level, we were invited to look not only at just, if you will, trying to wrap up a SALT II agreement on the basis of the negotiating situation that prevailed in January and February of 1976, but also to look at maybe whether we wanted to try and do more in SALT II, either more reductions, more qualitative restraints or whatever.

This led to the March 1977 comprehensive proposal which, as you know, was not particularly well received in the Soviet Union

They clearly had hoped that we would be willing to move promptly to negotiate on the basis of the negotiating situation that prevailed in January of 1976.

However, as a testimony to the commitment of both sides to pursue SALT, by late April of 1977, the process was really back on track. And I think it was in May of 1977 that Secretary Vance met with Gromyko in Geneva and came up with what is now known as the three-tiered approach to SALT II. This is a comprehensive agreement which will last through 1985, a protocol which will last, we now know, until the end of 1981, and a statement of principles for SALT III which will provide a set of basic guidelines for the SALT III negotiations as well as note the commitment of both sides to pursue further qualitative limitations, further reductions, further efforts to enhance verification by thinking about more enlightened approaches to verification in terms of cooperation, et cetera.

However, May of 1977 is almost two years ago and we have spent the last couple of years working out the details. This involved continuing to work on the particular problems that had been left from January of 1976, but also to work on a new set of problems which are known as the ICBM modernization constraints, something that certainly had probably surprised the Soviets in March 1977, but yet something which they did not reject outright as testified to by the existence in the agreement today of a fairly comprehensive set of qualitative restraint on ICBMs and also to a lesser degree on SLBMs.

Nevertheless, it has taken a couple of years to work the details. As is frequently said, the devil is in the details, not in the agreement in principle. We have found that this has taken some time. However, we now, as you know, believe we are extremely close once again. One gets tired of saying these things, but we are within striking distance now of completing an agreement which we anticipate would be signed at a summit meeting between President Carter and President Brezhnev.

Let me tell you a little bit about where we have come in terms of the limitations, and then I will field questions of an informational nature about aspects of the agreement.

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The 2,400 limitation on overall strategic delivery vehicles, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers and heavy bombers will now be the level which comes into effect immediately upon the ratification of the agreement. However, the sides have agreed this level will be reduced to 2,250 by the end of 1981. Reductions will start at the start of 1981, and be completed during the year of 1981.

The 1,320 limitation from Vladivostok on launchers of MIRVed missiles has been replaced by a 1,320 limitation which includes not only launchers or MIRVed missiles but also heavy bombers equipped with air-launched cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

I will use the jargon term, and you will frequently hear the term used, "long-range" cruise missiles which really means range greater than 600 kilometers.

The previous 1,320 limitation on strictly launchers of MIRVed missiles has now been reduced to a level of 1,200. So there is a 1,200 limitation on launchers of MIRVed ICBMs, launchers of MIRVed SLBMs and I should also mention, although they are not in the inventory of either side, launchers of MIRVed ASBMs or air-to-surface ballistic missiles.

Think of this as an air mobile ICBM. One of the things you have heard about this type of system is that it is a possible replacement for the silo-based ICBM force. Here we are talking about any ballistic missile launched from an aircraft -- any ballistic missile which has a range in excess of 600 kilometers which is launched from an aircraft. (Such ballistic missiles are also included in the 2,400 and 2,250 limitations.

Within the 1,200 limit then, there is an 850 limitation on launchers of MIRVed ICBMs.

These are the basic numerical elements. On top of this are some important qualitative limitations. There is a limitation on ICBM modernization which permits each side one new type of ICBM during the period of agreement. But the term "new type" requires a definition.

One of the things we learned in SALT II is that we should define every term that we possibly can because any ambiguity can be exploited by the Soviets to their own advantage.

And we have a definition of a new type of ICBM that is based on physical characteristics of the missile such as its diameter, its length, its throw-weight (everything above the boost stages) what we call missile launch weight, which is the total weight of the missile -- if you took a missile out of a silo and put it on a scale, that is launch-weight -- and fuel type.

MORE

A-1X/3/13

- 13 -

What we have negotiated is a set of constraints on how much those individual parameters can be changed, and I am not prepared to tell you the particular details on that, but how much those parameters can be changed in the process of modernizing an existing missile before it goes over and becomes a new type. And the Soviets can, as I say, change or come out with a new missile that is significantly different from the existing missiles but there can be only one of them.

We, for our part, will almost certainly use our one chit, if you will, for the MX missile.

In addition to the limitations on modernization of this type, there are also what we call fractionation limits, which are limits on the number of warheads that can be placed on a missile. Under these limitations, existing types -- i.e., those that are not changed beyond the restricted parameters on what defines a new type -- are frozen at their existing fractionation levels. This means for the SS-17, 19, and 18 of the Soviet Union, four RVs, six RVs and ten RVs. Also there is a limitation on the number of RVs on the one new type of ICBM that is permitted each side and that is ten RVs as well.

It should also be pointed out that one new type that is permitted each side must be a light ICBM, where light ICBM is defined as anything that has a throw-weight less than that of the SS-19. Let me correct that. It is defined as anything which has a throw-weight or a launch weight, i.e., a total missile weight, less than that of the SS-19.

There is also a limit on the number of warheads that can be placed on an SLBM which is 14, which happens to be the maximum which has been tested to date. We have tested up to 14 RVs on the Poseiden SLBM.

There are a number of other qualitative limitations of lesser import which I will pass over for now. Shortly after the announcement, you will probably be able to get some more details on some of the individual provisions of the agreement. But I will start to pass into a realm of things that you have not heard of and probably won't write too much about in the future.

In the protocol to this agreement, there are some additional limitations. The protocol, as I indicated, will last through the end of 1981. The additional limitations in the protocol cover mobile ICBM systems, and ground-launched cruise missiles and what we call sea-launched cruise missiles. Sea-launched cruise missiles include cruise missiles launched from both surface ships and submarines. For the protocol, both sides are prohibited from deploying ground-launched or sea-launched cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. However, there are no restrictions whatever on the testing or any other aspects of the development of cruise missiles.

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So for that period of time, we can test cruise missiles to whatever range we want, which, as you have heard, has no impact whatever on the U.S. cruise missile program because we do not plan to deploy ground-launched or sea-launched cruise missiles with ranges in excess of 600 kilometers during the period of protocol.

The limitations on mobile ICBMs are that the testing and deployment of mobile ICBMs is banned for the period of protocol. Here, I am talking about, when I say mobile ICBM systems, both land mobile ICBM systems and what we call air mobile ICBM systems, those ASBMs or air-to-surface ballistic missiles that I referred to earlier. Here again there is no impact on U.S. programs in that we had not planned to test the MX until I think sometime early in 1983.

I will not go into the details of the Joint Statement of Principles because they are very general and in large part simply a commitment of both sides to continue to pursue the negotiations. There is nothing binding in terms of particular limitations, either numerical or qualitative, in the Joint Statement of Principles.

Let me go back and mention a few other things that are in the treaty itself. For one thing, as I alluded to earlier, there is a wide spectrum, or large number of definitions. We have defined in great technical detail such parameters as throw-weight, launch weight, what is a MIRV, what is a cruise missile, things which make certain that there will be no ambiguities on the two sides as to what these technical terms mean.

Another thing that is included is a number of what we call MIRV counting rules, things that ensure that the two sides either conduct themselves in a manner consistent with making an agreement verifiable, or, if you will, change practices in the future since both sides have tended to evolve in terms of strategic systems development in a manner not particularly concerned about verification.

Let me give you a couple of examples in terms of verifying the numbers of launchers of MIRVed missiles.

If a missile has been tested with MIRVs and single re-entry vehicles (No post-boost vehicles and just a single re-entry vehicle) as the Soviets have done with several of their missiles, all missiles of that type when deployed will still count as MIRVed. We do not have to take on the task of telling whether a missile once deployed has on it a single re-entry vehicle or MIRVs.

MORE

A-1x/8/15

- 15 -

Secondly, any launcher, any silo in the case of ICBMs or any launch tube on a submarine in the case of SLBMs, that has ever been used to launch a MIRVed missile, will also count as a MIRVed missile launcher regardless of what it contains. These are type rules or counting rules for MIRVed ICBMs which deal with some verification problems which we simply could not deal with otherwise, the inability to tell what a launcher contains once they have shut it up or an inability to tell whether a missile has multiple warheads or a single RV.

There are a number of other verification-related constraints. As in the SALT I agreement, there is a ban on interference with national technical means of verification. This is the SALT term for the satellite systems and other technical systems that are used to monitor the adherence of the other side to the agreement.

There is a ban on deliberate concealment measures which impede verification. That means you can't go out and erect a Barnum & Bailey tent over your missile silo for a year and let the other guy wonder what is happening underneath there or, in the case of submarine construction, you can't go out and cover the place where you do your submarine construction so the other side cannot count the number of launch tubes that are going into the submarine.

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That gives you a brief overview of where we have come, some of the important provisions of the agreement, and I now would invite you to question me about anything except why we did some of this stuff.

Q Doesn't the ban on one new missile per nation for development place the United States in a kind of strategic disadvantage because the Soviets could refit an SS-20, which is now an intermediate-range missile, with a booster which would automatically make that an ICBM, plus it would allow them to develop yet a second new missile as well?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Under the terms of the agreement, the SS-20 problem, if you will, is generally thought of in terms of converting an SS-20 to an SS-16, because it is generally conceded that the first two stages of the SS-16 are common with the two stages of the SS-20.

Further testing and deployment of the SS-16 is prohibited, period, under the SALT agreement. So that particular idea of just putting another third stage on top is not a possibility. Now, it is possible they could deploy a new SS-20 follow-on or something like that, but anything like that which has an intercontinental capability would count as the one new type. Once it is judged to have the intercontinental capability -- which is defined as range capability in excess of shortest distance between the continental United States and the continental Soviet Union or 5500 kilometers -- it would count. So we are really not concerned about that sort of possibility in terms of the one new type. There is some concern about the potential for breakout, if you will, in their ability to possibly put a third stage on top of the SS-20, but there are a lot of other reasons why we think we are in reasonable shape for that.

Q How did they settle Backfire?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There will be an exchange of statements that deals with the Backfire issue which will be made public at the summit meeting.

Q You haven't mentioned the constraints on a transfer of technology to our allies. How do you read that now? May we transfer cruise missile technology or any other kind of technology that bears on this treaty to our NATO allies and the Japanese?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is a question of interpretation. Let me avoid going into that because the United States will make a concrete statement about interpreting what is in the agreement on that.

First I will tell you how it came out. At the start of SALT II, the Soviets proposed a highly restrictive, what we call a non-transfer provision, which would have restricted the transfer of systems limited

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A-1x/3/17

by the agreement, or any technology associated therewith, or assistance in the development of such systems to third countries. If you will look at the non-transfer provision which is in the ABM treaty, in simple terms, they wanted to carry this over into the offensive agreement.

We resisted this on legitimate grounds in terms of interfering with legitimate programs of cooperation with our allies. And the outcome, if you will, on the negotiations was a very simple non-circumvention provision which commits both sides not to circumvent the provisions of the agreement through third states, or in any other manner.

One could go through a whole litany of questions about transfers or cooperation on cruise missiles, Poseidons, Tridents, and all sorts of things like that, but we do not want to get into that sort of thing.

Let me just say that at some time in the future some effort will be made to explain in more detail how we view that non-circumvention provision.

Q Can you say whether our allies are happy with what decision we have made?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think we can say the allies are satisfied with the outcome on that issue.

Q There must be some area which the United States suspects that the Soviets might try to violate the treaty or most liberally interpret the treaty in their favor. What is that area and what does the United States plan to do to monitor and make sure that there are no violations in that particularly sensitive area?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, our approach to the agreement has been to assume that the Soviets might in principle be interested in cheating in any area. That is presumably their approach as well. For that reason, we have not attempted to negotiate any particular provisions that we did not think we could adequately verify.

So I really couldn't answer your question. I could go through the whole list of provisions I have given you and say, yes, I can see reasons why the Soviets might try and cheat in each one of them. But we are, as has been stated, quite confident in our ability to adequately verify those provisions which have been negotiated. I wouldn't want to try and guess where they might cheat.

Q What does "adequate verification" mean, as opposed to "verification"?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me just refer to something here that will list for you a few things that should go into a consideration of what constitutes adequate verification.

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A-1x/3/18

Adequate verification, in the first place, means taking into account things other than simply monitoring uncertainties. It means taking into account possible motivations on the Soviet side for cheating, taking into account the strategic significance of possible cheating, taking into account our own programs that could conceivably respond to such cheating, and other factors of this nature.

It is not simply a consideration of some plus or minus 5 percent or plus or minus 10 percent monitoring uncertainty.

There is, we realize, an educational effort we have on our hands to make people understand this concept, which has been part of arms control since the very beginning. But it is one which has tended to be obscured in some of the debate that has already started on the SALT agreement. We will be making the case on the adequacy of verification, taking into account all of these factors, to the Senate, and are quite confident we can make that case.

Q Do we have any idea what the new Soviet missile will be? And is it your understanding when they finally bring on their 5th generation, that will be a modified missile as opposed to a new missile?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is some speculation as to what that new missile might be. There are several possibilities, and we don't know for sure.

Q One of the critics of SALT said this morning, Paul Nitze, he thinks that it is not quite clear to the Russians what the Americans believe the agreement says, which is that after the protocol we can deploy a mobile missile. He doesn't think the Russians understand that clearly, do they?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Have they agreed to it?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is explicit in the agreement that mobile ICBMs are permitted after the period of the protocol. Neither side has attempted to negotiate particular mobile ICBM concepts. On the other hand, both sides recognize it is incumbent on the one who wants a mobile ICBM system to make it adequately verifiable under the provisions of the SALT agreement. We have not attempted to go to the Soviets and lay out in excruciating detail how we intend to do that. They have not tried to do the same for us with any mobile ICBM systems they might want to deploy.

Q You talked about a three-year protocol. You've talked about 1981. Which is it? Secondly, will the treaty be significantly different from the treaty you were on the verge of completing in October 1977? And is the Administration

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A-18/3/19

doing a stutter step of its own, which you have accused the Ford Administration and Kissinger of doing?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't call it "accused". That was a description.

Q You said they had a treaty but because of politics, they wouldn't put it across.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is not what I said.

Q All right. Please explain if the treaty will be significantly different from the one where you were when Carter, in Des Moines, Iowa, in October 1977, said, "Within weeks we will have the outline of a treaty that will be provided the country." What have you done in the last 18 months to change it?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The basic outline of the treaty that existed in October of 1977 are the same as those that exist today.

Q What has been going on, then?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have been negotiating the details, which has not been easy.

Q That devil. Right?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The devil.

Q These cruise missiles, are they straight air missiles, or maneuvering?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me not try and get into the technical details on that, other than to say there is a very explicit definition as to how you define cruise missile range. It is a little complicated. I am going to have to pass on that.

Q How have you resolved the issue of nuclear and conventionally armed cruise missiles?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is a level of detail I am not prepared to get into.

Q Can I ask a question about the basing mode of the MX? My understanding is there is considerable interest in ways of concealing the location of the MX missiles, either by having some empty silos and shifting them around, or having them in trenches, and so on. Is that prohibited under the terms of outlined concealment as you mentioned?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I indicated to you, what is prohibited is deliberate concealment measures which impede verification. If you will think of it, deception in and of itself is not prohibited, or concealment in the sense

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A-1X/3/20

that, for example, ballistic missile submarines, once they leave their bases, also disappear.

Q Why wouldn't that impede verification? If the Soviets were unable to determine how many MX missiles were concealed because there were a whole bunch of empty silos scattered around the country, why wouldn't that be deliberate concealment?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The issue isn't whether they can determine where they are, but whether they can determine how many there are. It is incumbent upon us to devise a scheme to insure that they can determine how many missile launchers there are.

Q Does that mean the verification problem is not only a question of the U. S. verifying the Soviets, but also of the Soviets verifying what we are doing. Right?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Most assuredly. They frequently point that out to us.

Q How has the issue of telemetry and encryption been resolved, and has it been?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am not prepared to address that issue.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(AT 4:40 P.M. EST)

A-1X/4/1

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

MAY 9, 1979

Office of the White House Press Secretary

15/15

THE WHITE HOUSE  
PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT  
BY  
CYRUS R. VANCE,  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
AND  
HAROLD BROWN,  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Briefing Room

3:00 P.M. EDT

SECRETARY VANCE: Good afternoon. I have an announcement to make and then I would like to make a few brief remarks.

Ambassador Dobrynin and I have concluded our negotiations on SALT. Both governments have now instructed their respective delegations at Geneva to incorporate into the joint draft treaty the agreements reached in negotiations between Ambassador Dobrynin and myself, and to complete negotiations on the few remaining secondary items which have not yet been resolved.

Details concerning the time and place of a summit meeting will be announced in the very near future.

Let me make a few comments about the significance of these negotiations. With this treaty, we will take an essential step toward a safer America and a safer world. Our overriding purpose in these negotiations has been to strengthen our Nation's security and that of our allies with practical and verifiable restraints on the nuclear arms race.

Today we are on the threshold of signing a strategic arms agreement that achieves our purpose.

The treaty will enhance the security of the United States and our allies. It will restrain the nuclear arms race. It will lessen the likelihood of nuclear war. The treaty will serve these essential interests of the American people in several concrete ways. It will establish equal ceilings on the strategic forces of the Soviet Union and the United States. It will begin the process of actually reducing the level of nuclear weapons, and it will limit not only the quantitative but also the qualitative race in nuclear arms.

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- 2 -

As a result, this treaty will limit the strategic challenges we would otherwise have to meet. It will hold down the expense we would have to bear to meet those challenges. And it will avoid much of the uncertainty about Soviet arms that would otherwise prevail.

This treaty will not only mark the end of one negotiation; it will open the way for another. When it is ratified by the Senate, it will become the cornerstone for still further limits in reductions in SALT III.

The national debate which we now commence is not only about this treaty. We are still considering as well the inescapable realities of a nuclear world -- the necessity to our security of a strong defense and the grave danger to our security of an unlimited race in nuclear arms, for our security today lies in maintaining a stable strategic balance between two nations with awesome power.

A SALT II treaty will make a substantial contribution to that stability. We have demonstrated to the SALT process that even as we compete in some areas, the United States and the Soviet Union can and must cooperate to lessen the dangers of war. In this way, the treaty can serve to open the path to a more constructive and peaceful relationship between us.

This treaty is a message of hope for us and for all the people of the world.

Harold?

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SECRETARY BROWN: The highest single priority in our national defense must go to the maintenance of strategic nuclear balance. I want to say a few words about how the SALT II agreement will help us to meet that need.

The outlines of the agreement are well-known. But let me repeat for you some of the main features.

There will be a limit on the number of strategic launchers. Each side can have 2250. With SALT, the Soviets will have to make some reductions. Without SALT, the Soviets could, by continuing at their present rates of deployment of new systems, have a third more than this by 1985.

There will also be sublimits on the numbers of launchers with independently targetable multiple warheads, that is, MIRVs. With the SALT II agreement, the Soviet launchers will be limited to 820 for MIRVed intercontinental ballistic missiles, the most threatening part of their force. This is fewer than we believe they planned. Without the SALT II agreement, they could have many more than that by 1985.

In addition, there will be limits on the introduction of new intercontinental ballistic systems and on the number of warheads they can carry. With a SALT II agreement, the Soviets can have, for example, ten warheads on their largest missile. Without the SALT II agreement, they could have 20, perhaps 40.

Finally, there will be a ban on interfering with international technical means of verification and there will be other provisions to make verification easier.

We now have highly capable monitoring systems. They will be bolstered by measures we are taking to replace expeditiously the capability lost in the Iranian stations.

We will be able to detect any Soviet violation in ample time to protect our military security. With a SALT II agreement, we will be able to verify the agreement from the outset. Without the SALT II agreement, we could be faced with concealment, countermeasures and so-called cheating of all sorts, because without SALT, all of these actions would be permitted.

Even with SALT, we will need to expand our defense efforts, including specifically our efforts devoted to strategic nuclear forces. We are doing so under the program now before the Congress, because SALT won't solve our strategic problems. However, SALT will contribute significantly to our security.

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With the SALT II agreement, we will be able to avoid the pressures and uncertainties of an unbounded numbers race in strategic forces. The U.S. could and would engage in such competition if we had to. But the result would be simply more systems, higher costs, and greater risks with no more security, still less a situation of U.S. superiority.

SALT II will ease some of our other problems. For example, the limit on warhead numbers will make more survivable the mobile missiles whose deployment we are considering as an answer to the growing vulnerability of our Minuteman ICBMs.

SALT II will not prevent us from doing what may be needed in areas where the Soviet challenge is not limited. For example, we will be able to work with our allies on both force modernization and on arms control in response to the problems posed by the Soviet buildup of theater nuclear forces.

SALT II will provide a firmer foundation for other measures to control the growth and spread of nuclear and conventional arms. It will permit continuation of the process of limiting superpowers strategic forces, leading, we hope, to substantial cutbacks in those arsenals.

In sum, SALT will help us maintain flexible and credible deterrence, stability and essential equivalence. Without the treaty, we could also do these things, but it would be more costly and less certain. None of the challenges we face would be less without the treaty, and some would be considerably greater. All the increases we plan in our defense efforts with SALT would still be needed without it. But many more would be needed as well.

I see the treaty as a valuable method of helping, along with our own moderately increased programs, to meet our Nation's strategic needs and, if the Soviet Union will emphasize cooperation rather than competition, SALT will also allow a healthier state of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Thank you.

SECRETARY VANCE: Thank you very much.

MR. POWELL: Ladies and gentlemen, for those of you who do not already know this, there is a background briefing on SALT that we hope to begin in about 20 minutes in Room 450 of the Old Executive Office Building.

END (3:10 P.M. EDT)

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

5/14/79

MEMO FOR: *Speechwriting office*  
FROM: News Summary

Here is the information you  
requested.

*Carleton*  
*don - maw*  
*5/15/79*

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# THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION

For 110 Years the South's Standard Newspaper

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Tom Wood  
President

Hal Gulliver  
Editor

Edward Sears  
Managing Editor

PAGE 4-A, FRIDAY, MAY 11, 1979

## The SALT II Treaty

It took seven years of painstaking, sometimes excruciating negotiations to agree on a SALT II agreement with our main nuclear superpower rival—the Soviet Union.

It can all be undone in a few weeks of debate in the Senate of the United States. The treaty and all it means now literally hang by a vote.

The SALT II treaty places limits on the strategic weaponry both powers may store. It provides for verification procedures by which each country can assure itself that the other is not fudging. It continues previous agreements such as the 1972 ban on anti-ballistic missile systems.

SALT II is one of the most important international agreements of our century—perhaps of all time. Not so much for what it does, but for what it implies, what it promises.

It doesn't end the arms race. It doesn't mean that President Carter or Leonid Brezhnev or their successors will never push the nuclear button. It has nothing to do with the formidable conventional armies still maintained by both nations and their allies. It doesn't do away with the development and deployment of new weapons.

But it does tell the world that the two major nuclear powers are concerned about the future of mankind and that each is willing to take risks, make concessions that it might not otherwise have made for the sake of world peace.

The details of the agreement have to do with technical matters—how many missiles and bombers each side may have, what sort of warheads, what may and may not be built and deployed, the ranges of missiles, etc.

Every word of the agreement, it is safe to assume, represents countless hours of work by many people over a long period of time.

Ratification of the treaty is first on President Carter's list of priorities. It comes before inflation, before energy, before any

other problem foreign or domestic. No surprise in that. The president sees SALT II as a giant step forward for the peace of mankind.

Yet all of that can collapse in the upcoming debate in the U.S. Senate.

Public opinion polls have generally shown that Americans favor a strategic arms limitations agreement.

They and their elected representatives have a right to ask whether this one, no matter how much time and effort was spent on it, is really fair to both sides. No one should dispute that right.

But the American people have a right to ask another question. It is this: should this treaty be considered and debated on its merits alone or should its fate hang on the intricacies of American internal politics?

There are many good men and true in the Senate who have expressed doubts. Our own Georgia Sen. Sam Nunn, who has made himself one of the nation's leading experts on national defense and on SALT, has expressed doubts. Those doubts should be thoroughly aired, and a final vote must take them into account.

But the objectivity of some of the opposition now being voiced is harder to assess. Is it based on sincere doubt or on other considerations? Sen. Howard Baker of Tennessee, for instance, says that at the moment he is inclined to vote against the treaty. Sen. Baker is a possible Republican presidential nominee in 1980. Sen. Henry Jackson has expressed doubts. Sen. Jackson was a possible Democratic nominee in 1976 and perhaps still harbors hopes. These observations are not meant to cast doubt on the sincerity of anybody. But they serve to emphasize the hurdles now remaining. The SALT treaty could fail not on its merits but for other reasons, reasons having little to do with the world's long search for a permanent peace. It is the task of the president and of the Senate to make sure that doesn't happen.



A-1x/6/1

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 13, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

JERRY RAFSHOON 

The consensus of the networks is that they would all like to interview you AFTER the Summit or during the Summit AFTER you have met Brezhnev. Cronkite would do something on Friday, but says he, too, would prefer an after-Summit interview.

Frankly, I think it would be ill advised for you to do any big interview before the two summits are over. We have you live on TV giving a departure statement, an arrival statement, a signing statement and a prime time address to the Congress -- all on SALT and foreign policy. Another appearance would constitute overkill in a short period of time.

In the month of July, we should thoughtfully conduct an "operation repair". During this month I propose that we have a three-network interview (or Cronkite alone) that encompasses domestic as well as foreign issues. It would be a report of your activities after having met and sized up Brezhnev, have gone to the Economic Summit, and having reflected on the domestic issues and institutions, such as Congress, the media, etc. We would work up some themes that you can stress and give it to you in time for study and rest.

Attachment

cc: Hamilton Jordan  
Jody Powell

## Other Voices

# America Isn't Listening

(The following editorial appeared recently in the Manchester (England) Guardian Weekly.)

The heat, then, is on Jimmy Carter. He seeks cautious pursuit of existing Anglo-American policy in Southern Africa. He seeks energy controls at home. He needs SALT II. There can be little Western European argument with the aims the president has set himself. Western Europe is not alarmed about the White House; it is alarmed about Congress and American public opinion. Who runs the United States these days?

The question is a forbidding one because impossible to answer purely in terms of personalities. One may say, simply, that Jimmy Carter is an uninspiring fellow and that Teddy, Jerry or Ronnie would soon restore decisive leadership; but that is an illusion. For two decades now, American presidents have been grappling with the increasingly intractable problems of a dissident and unpredictable Congress. As the thin lines of party loyalty have crumbled, quirks of history have ground them into the dust. Jimmy Carter, an honest, inexperienced, careful man from the South, is president because of those virtues; he was not a crooked, hardened, reckless man from Washington; he was not Richard Nixon.

The crisis, in sum, may be chronic and systemic. The spread of power in the United States may be so thin and various that, in effect, it can be no more than a balance of impotence. Who, with 18 months to go to the polls, is attracting all the attention on the Republican side? Mr. John Connally, a remnant of the Nixon era, a buddy of Big Oil. Those are formidable handicaps and yet — because he says something plain and incisive, tossing his silver locks on the box — his bandwagon is rolling. Meanwhile, amongst the Democrats, it is Teddy Kennedy who attracts all the adulation: an apostle of more taxation, more health services, more liberalism in Southern Africa, an apostle well to the left of Carter as the nation moves right. That makes no sense either.

It forms a pattern though. The interminable American electoral process, baffling though it may seem, is throwing up as major challengers exactly the politicians who, it may be clinically calculated, will experience more rather than less difficulty with Congress. Their strength — the mindless fid-fad of politics — is that they both have physical presence, whilst Carter seems such a dull dog.

Some of this, of course, is his own fault. American foreign policy, eddying between White House and State Department, need not have appeared quite as confused as Vance, Young and Brezinski have contrived to make it. Relations with the Hill need not have started quite so ineptly. Economic policy need not have been such a muddle. Nevertheless, a solid core of achievement remains. Panama was an achievement. The Middle East peace (whether its miscalculations betray it or not) was at least a negotiating tour de force, something done as opposed to something ducked. SALT is an achievement. All these steps, and more, have been accompanied by an open eagerness to learn, a predilection for education above rhetoric, a painstaking attachment to the complexity of decision-making in the real world.

This has been, and is, heavy gruel. Even a week or two ago, one might have thought its virtues strong enough to survive the hazards of re-election campaign. Now there is real peril, on the primary trail, that any one-shot wonder will be able to defeat Carter and plunge him into retirement. He needs a theme, his image merchants say. They were banking on Carter the Peacemaker. Today that seems a shrinking prospect.

Will the real Jimmy Carter stand up and be counted? Leader writers may relish the prospect, but in all probability the real Jimmy Carter has been on his feet, fully countable, for two-and-a-half years; and America has not listened too closely. The president may look forward to some kindly retrospective verdicts from historians, but that is all he will be able to look forward to unless America begins to hear, ponder and understand.

A-IX/711

PRESS COVERAGE OF SALT SUMMIT ACTIVITIES

VIENNA, AUSTRIA

June 14-18, 1979

THURSDAY, JUNE 14, 1979

President Carter's arrival in Vienna

Open Press Coverage

FRIDAY, JUNE 15, 1979

Visit to Austrian President

Open Press Coverage

A-IX/7/2

- 2 -

Mr. Chernaykoff  
*signature*

SATURDAY, JUNE 16, 1979

First Meeting - U.S. Embassy

Open Press Coverage of Arrival\*

U.S., Soviet and possible Third Country  
Pool Photo \*\* inside

Departure of Principals from Meeting

Open Press Coverage

Second Meeting - U.S. Embassy\*\*\*

Open Press Coverage of Arrival and  
Departure

Working Dinner at Ambassador's Residence  
(Toasts only)

Set up TV pool to feed both film and  
Electronic News Gathering (mini-cameras)\*\*\*\*.  
Also stills representing wire services,  
news magazines and agencies for Third-  
Country pool. Approximately 12 people

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\* This would be determined by available space outside U.S. Embassy. Some restrictions may have to be placed on numbers.

\*\* Third-Country Pool could be comprised of Washington-based Correspondents who will travel with the Presidential Party to Austria. We could get worldwide representation this way.

\*\*\* If the 2nd Meeting should go right into Dinner, there naturally would be no coverage of the departure until after the Dinner. Again space constraints would determine the number of Correspondents that could be accommodated.

*Schedule of mtgs  
Press Coverage*

\*\*\*\* American networks could set up a pool for Electronic News Gathering for feed. We would recommend two cameras, because inevitably someone would stand and block the primary camera. Two cameras would eliminate the necessity of roving around the room by one. Film feeds to Third-Country Press could be worked by using Navy Film as a pool or, again, a selection could be made to use one of the White House based foreign networks as pool for film.

SUNDAY, JUNE 17, 1979

Third and Fourth Meetings - Russian Embassy

Open Press Coverage of Arrival

U.S., Soviet and possible Third Country  
Pool Photo inside

Departure of Principals from Meetings

Open Press Coverage

Working Dinner\*

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\* Would suggest exactly the same coverage of Sunday's Dinner as Saturday's Dinner. However, on Sunday, consider possible use of Soviet Film Crew for Dinner Film Pool (USSR does not use Electronic News Gathering).

MONDAY, JUNE 18, 1979

Final Meeting

If location is same as earlier meetings, would propose arrival and departure shots only in an Open Coverage situation.

If location is different from Saturday and Sunday, we would propose inside pool coverage of meeting room.

Signing Ceremony

Propose Open Press Situation available for live pickup on a TV pool basis.

A-1x/8/1

June 15, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: Jerry Rafshoon

Subject: Speeches

~~Attached are drafts of~~

~~--A draft of the first toast;~~

~~--A draft of the signing statement;~~

~~--A~~

Attached are drafts of the first dinner toast, the signing statement and the speech to the joint session.

~~The speech draft is the second draft. The first draft was read and commented on by Brzezinski, Vance, Brown and~~

The first draft of the ~~the~~ joint session speech was read and commented on by Vance, Brown, Brzezinski and Seignious, and this second draft reflects their suggestions. It is being delivered to them at the same time as to you.

The speech avoids the technical detail ~~which~~ of the ANPA speech, and it touches on other summit issues, not just SALT. But it does include the basic SALT arguments, since this will be the first time a national television audience has been exposed to them.

The speech is <sup>about</sup> 25<sup>in</sup> minutes long, by my reckoning. This would leave the networks a minimum of time for instant analysis and interviews with carping Senators, etc.

A-1x/8/2

Self Copy  
Carter Library

June 15

Messrs. Vance, Brown, Brzezinski and Seignious:

Here is draft no. 2 of the speech. You will find it incorporates most if not all your suggestions. The President has also received this draft.

We may be doing another draft tomorrow. If you have further comments or suggestions on it, could you please get them to me or Rick Hertzberg by the middle of tomorrow?

Thanks

Jerry ~~Rafshoon~~ Rafshoon



A-1x/9/1

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 18, 1979

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY  
(Vienna, Austria)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS BRIEFING

BY

JODY POWELL

PRESS SECRETARY

AMBASSADOR RALPH EARLE

CHIEF NEGOTIATOR FOR SALT II

ROBERT GARRY

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

MARK RAMEL

ASSISTANT TO AMBASSADOR EARLE

AND

JERROLD SCHECTER

ASSOCIATE PRESS SECRETARY, NSC

Vienna Hilton Press Center

Vienna, Austria

3:23 P.M. CET

MR. POWELL: Let me establish a few ground rules here and explain how we hope to conduct this thing.

This portion of the briefing is on the record. I will begin by discussing very briefly the two meetings that took place this morning, then Ambassador Earle will discuss the treaty with you, and respond to your questions on the treaty text.

After that, if there are other matters which you wish to pursue -- an expansion, for example, on remarks on these morning meetings, which I will have to warn you I am not in a position to do to any great extent -- then we will reconstitute the briefing on a background basis and see what we can get done.

I think you are all anxious to get filed and get home. So am I. We have as much time as you want to spend, but there is no need to waste it.

Q Will you introduce the other people?

MR. POWELL: That is my next point. Thank you, Gene.

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(OVER)

A-1x/9/2

- 2 -

You know Jerry Schecter with the NSC, and myself. To my left is Ralph Earle, who some of you know. Ambassador Earle is and has been our Chief Negotiator for SALT II at Geneva. We also have Mark Ramee, who is Assistant to Ambassador Earle, and Robert Barry, who is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

Jerry reminds me, also -- and this is a little bit complicated, but it seems to me the only way to do it -- Ambassador Earle's portion of the briefing on the text, it seems to me, should be embargoed until the time of the release of the text. All right? Everything else, what little there may be of it, you are welcome to use whatever you can. That is 5:00 o'clock local time here.

Any questions about that?

All right, very quickly, on the meetings this morning, as you know, the first meeting was a private meeting just with President Carter, President Brezhnev and the two interpreters. I have very little detail on that. It lasted from about 10:00 until about 11:30.

The second meeting was the usual bilateral. It took place at the Russian Embassy. It began at 11:55 and concluded, I think, almost exactly at 12:30.

The agreement had been reached earlier and was confirmed by President Carter and President Brezhnev that if the earlier meeting ran longer, that we would cut the second meeting short.

About the only details that I can give you, or information I can give you, of the first meeting, are those which the President himself recapped in the second meeting. He pointed out in that meeting that he and President Brezhnev had agreed in their private meeting to increase the frequency of their meetings, that mutual invitations had been extended to visit the United States and the Soviet Union, and that they would look for an opportunity to exchange some such visits without waiting for a situation of crisis or some event such as the signing of a treaty.

The President also stated they had agreed that in their relationships with other nations, they would refrain from actions that are a threat to peaceful relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union. He stated

MORE

A-1x/9/3

- 3 -

that they had also agreed to continue their personal correspondence and to keep each other informed on matters of mutual interest to lessen the possibilities for misunderstanding.

He noted that they had found substantial conformity in their general views on the direction of future arms control negotiations. My understanding of that reference was that it was primarily to SALT III.

The President concluded his remarks by saying that it had been a worthwhile meeting; he was grateful for the progress that had been made there, and in the preceding meetings, and he looked forward to more progress in the future.

As you know, the second meeting was focused on bilateral issues. President Brezhnev began and went through a number of areas of our bilateral relationship. President Carter responded by saying that because of time he would not attempt to go into detailed responses to the statements made by President Brezhnev, that they both agreed that they would study the statements and concerns of the other and that when -- well, the President said when it was possible for us to take action that would improve those relationships, we would do so, and that when he found that there was action needed on the part of the Soviet Union to improve that relationship, he would let President Brezhnev know.

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A-1x/9/4

- 4 -

Q Was there anything on MFN in either one of those meetings?

MR. POWELL: I don't know about the first part, about the private meeting. We did not get into MFN. There was a reference to it, or to trade on the part of President Brezhnev. I really don't think I ought to speak for him, however.

Q Was this today?

MR. POWELL: Today.

Q Following up on the MFN question, what sort of assurances did the American side get on continued, liberal emigration from the Soviet Union?

MR. POWELL: I am going to take about two or three questions on this and that is going to be it because we need to get moving along.

The question of emigration, per se, did not come up at this session.

Q You mean at the summit?

MR. POWELL: At the second session I am familiar with. I obviously cannot speak to the first one.

Q But it came up before.

MR. POWELL: I didn't say that.

Q Then it didn't come up at the summit?

MR. POWELL: No, I didn't say that either.

Q Did it come up?

MR. POWELL: I don't know.

Q No. Did it come up at either meetings one, two --

MR. POWELL: Obviously I don't know about meeting one, since it was a private meeting.

Q I am talking about Saturday.

MORE

A-1x/9/5

- 5 -

Q At all during the three days of talks, Jody. That is what we are getting at.

MR. POWELL: Let me see if I can make it as clear as I can. If it came up, it came up at the private meeting this morning. It did not come up at the expanded meeting.

Q Was it alluded to? You said emigration, per se.

MR. POWELL: -- or directly -- not by us. As I say, I don't think it is appropriate to speak for the Russians.

Q Has the question of emigration come up in the preceding two days before today?

MR. POWELL: No. I just said it hadn't.

Q You said it didn't come up this morning.

Q In the communique, the --

MR. POWELL: I am not going to start briefing on the communique at this point. I agreed to do this because people wanted a little stuff on these opening meetings. I am going to do that. We will deal with the communique a little later.

Q This relates to the discussion we are having.

MR. POWELL: All right.

Q In the communique, they said they both have to take steps to remove obstacles to trade. Was that specifically addressed in any way at any time here?

MR. POWELL: Removing obstacles to trade?

Q Relating to this question of MFN and emigration.

MR. POWELL: I don't know whether the specific question of emigration came up at the first meeting this morning. It was not discussed at the second meeting, as such. It was not discussed at other meetings. I think you know -- I think you very well know that the Russians would not have agreed to a statement such as that with reference to emigration because of their position in the matter.

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A-11/9/6

- 6 -

As you also know, we have other matters in our bilateral relationship relating to trade and commerce where we do not see completely eye to eye; questions that arise with regard to civil aviation, maritime and so on, I think that goes to the comment I made about the second meeting in which they both said, we will look at these problems, President Carter said he would study the statements that were made by President Brezhnev and he would respond through Secretary Vance, but he would not do so in detail at the meeting this morning. I think that is what that goes to.

Q What was said by Brezhnev about MFN?

MR. POWELL: I really can't speak for Brezhnev.

Q Just that he wanted it or did he imply they had talked about it in the private meeting by what he said in the summit?

MR. POWELL: I can't speak for him. I certainly won't attempt to assess the implications of the statement about what was discussed ahead of time.

Q Did the question of the Indo-Chinese refugees come up today?

MR. POWELL: Not in the second meeting. I don't know about the first meeting.

Q What about the UNEF force in the Sinai?

MR. POWELL: No. The second meeting today was entirely on the bilateral relationship with such amenities.

Q Carter did not make his presentation --

MR. POWELL: To what?

Q At that bilateral? He did not go through his list?

MR. POWELL: No.

Q Did the question of Soviet dissidents come up, the release of them this morning?

MR. POWELL: I understand that the human rights issue was discussed at the first meeting this morning, but I have no details on the discussion.

MORE

- 7 -

Q Do you know who brought them up?

MR. POWELL: Pardon? (Laughter)

Q Did the President submit to Brezhnev a list of names of families that the U.S. would like to see released?

MR. POWELL: I really don't know the details of the meeting this morning.

Q That was your plan, was it not?

MR. POWELL: Not so far as I am aware. I mean, you are asking me sort of -- I saw a press report that the President planned to hand a list to Brezhnev. That is the only specific reference I have heard from anyone about the President handing a list. I simply do not know exactly in any detail what happened in the discussions. Presidents don't usually hand lists to one another.

Q Let's hear from Ambassador Earle.

MR. POWELL: I agree. Let's do move to that. I know this other stuff is fun, but let's listen to Ambassador Earle. I will come back to this later on.

This portion of the briefing is embargoed until 5:00 p.m., local time.

AMBASSADOR EARLE: This may not be so much fun, because although you have the document in front of you, I would like to walk through it quickly and then take questions. I would appreciate it if you would hold the questions until I have gotten all the way through.

First of all, there have been a number of questions on what exactly was on the table this morning. There was the treaty of 22 pages; the Protocol of 2 pages; what we call ASCU, the document containing the Agreed Statements and Common Understandings of 43 pages; the memorandum on data base which was 2 pages; the individual or unilateral statements of data, which was one page; and the joint statement of principles, which was 3.

The preamble is a preamble. (Laughter)

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A-1x/9/8

- 8 -

Article 1 is simply a general statement regarding commitments to be taken. Article 2, as I trust you will give all of these articles, deserves close attention because it is the definitional article. Paragraph 1 deals with ICBM launchers -- 5500 kilometers, which is simply a numerical manifestation of what was already agreed in SALT I. The Agreed Statements and Common Understandings set forth type rules on that subject, but I will discuss those in a little greater detail when I talk about MIRVed missiles.

Paragraph 2 is simply the carryover from SALT I of the definition of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, SLBMs, with which we have had no problem.

Paragraph 3 deals with heavy bombers. As you see, sub-A simply sets forth the existing heavy bombers on both sides. Both sides agreed that was better than setting some sort of objective standards which would create a design-around problem. B simply relates any future heavy bombers to the capabilities of those listed in A. C is a simple definition of cruise missile carriers, and D deals with bombers equipped for ASST, air-to-surface ballistic missiles, of which there are none.

Now, on Backfire, as you already have in your package, the Soviets gave us a statement that they would not increase the production rate and would limit the upgrade of the capability of this aircraft. And President Brezhnev confirmed that the production rate, which will not be increased, is 30 per year.

Now, the Soviet statement says that they will not give the Backfire an intercontinental capability. As you know by now, the United States regards the Backfire as already having some intercontinental capabilities.

In addition, we have a disagreement with the Soviets. The Soviet view is that radius, that is, two-way missions, rather than range, a one-way mission, is the sole measure of intercontinental capability, and we have been discussing this for quite a few years.

Because of this, the United States stated the view that any significant increase in the range payload capability would be inconsistent with the Soviet statement on Backfire. The Soviets stated that they would not be bound by unilateral U.S. interpretations of their statement. But as with any other situation in which the Soviets had taken action which we believe would be inconsistent with the SALT II treaty, we would seek resolution through the standing consultative mission which already exists under the auspices of SALT I and will be continued under SALT II or any other available channels.

MORE



A-1x/9/9

- 9 -

Ultimately, if we could not resolve the situation satisfactorily through such discussions or other solution, we would have the right to withdraw from the treaty on the grounds that the Soviet side had broken a commitment essential to the obligation of the treaty, just as would be the case with respect to any other provision. We made our position totally clear on that subject.

In addition, the President has also made clear that the United States has the right to develop, produce and deploy an aircraft comparable to Backfire.

Now, paragraph 4 is a straightforward definition of air-to-surface ballistic missiles. I won't dwell on it.

Paragraph 5 is a definition of MIRVs, MIRVed missiles and MIRVed launchers, and I would take a moment here, because it is an example but one of a number wherein the treaty, the provisions have been drafted in order to enhance the capability of verification by national technical means on each side.

If you read carefully through the Agreed Statements and Common Understandings to paragraph 5 of Article 2, the following will come out. If any missile is tested with a MIRV, that missile will be considered to be MIRVed, as will all other missiles of that type, regardless of whether they are MIRVed.

In addition, if any one of that type of missile is tested from a launcher, which it obviously would be, then that launcher and all other launchers of that type would be considered to be MIRVed launchers, whether or not they actually contained MIRVed missiles.

In that context, I would note one of the common understandings in which the Soviets agreed that all 180 launchers at two places called Derazhnva and Pervomaysk where they insist they are not all MIRVed launchers, they agreed they all be included in the MIRVed launcher total.

In addition, we have other provisions which provide that in the future, MIRVed launchers shall be distinguishable through national technical means from non-MIRVed launchers to avoid any Derazhnva-Pervomaysk situation in the future.

Paragraph 6 is a simple extrapolation of the MIRVed rule ASBMs. Paragraph 7, which is a definition of a heavy ICBM in effect provides that neither side will have any more launchers of heavy ICBMs and that the heaviest light ICBM is one with a throw weight and launch weight of the Soviet SS-19.

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- 10 -

Paragraph 0, the cruise missile definition, sets forth in the treaty that the definition of cruise missiles applies to air-launched cruise missiles plus a remote type of cruise missile which is banned, seabed cruise missile. We have type rules for cruise missiles, range type for cruise missiles, distinguishability rules for cruise missiles. We have a ban on conversion. And the cruise missile package, I think as does the MIRV package, makes for greater verifiability.

Article 3 is a principle article of limitation. It sets the 2400 limitation. It provides that from January 1, 1981, the gross number will be 2250. Paragraph 3 is simply the freedom to mix, subject to the other limitations. Paragraphs 4 and 5 deal with ASEMs and MIRVed ASEMS, counting rules and type rules. And paragraph 6 simply is a cross-reference to Article 11 regarding reduction of excess systems.

Article 4 is sort of a catchall. It has a number of things carried over as a result of the Vladivostok Agreement into SALT II -- no new construction of fixed ICBM launchers, no relocation of fixed ICBM launchers, no conversion to heavy launchers and a limitation on silo volume.

In addition, paragraph 5 touches on the subject of some interest, that is rapid reload, and what those words mean is that, read together with the Agreed Statements and Understandings, is that you can only have one missile per launcher, plus a relatively limited number for routine maintenance and training requirements at any given ICBM launcher complex.

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Paragraph 8 is somewhat rephrased carry-over from SALT I regarding limitations on construction rates. Paragraph 7 simply says that the Soviets cannot have a heavy ICBM with a launch weight or throw weight greater than the SS-18.

Eight deals with conversion of non-ICBM launchers to ICBM launchers, primarily aimed at the SS-20 and paragraph 9, a provision of considerable discussion over the last year, is the ban on new types of ICBMs, except one for each side.

There is a myriad of agreed statements and common understandings to this paragraph which not only limits -- well, it amplifies the limitation that there be only one new ICBM, but it also imposes qualitative restrictions on existing ICBMs, that is, that certain parameters may not be increased or decreased by more than 5 percent.

It permits offloading under certain circumstances, but very limited circumstances, which was a provision desired by both sides. It imposes limitations on testing of lighter re-entry vehicles which results in reduction of any breakout potential of an ICBM with a large throw weight.

It also determines how the relevant parameters are to be set for the one new type of ICBM.

Ten is another qualitative limitation. It effectively freezes existing ICBMs to the maximum number of re-entry vehicles which they presently have. It means four re-entry vehicles for the SS-17, 10 for the SS-18, 6 for the SS-19. We agreed that the Minuteman III should be deployed in the future with no more than three. We have no intention of doing that, particularly with the upgrade of the warhead and the Minuteman III will remain at three, although we twice had experimental tests with more than that.

With respect to paragraph 11, with respect to the one new type of ICBM, it limits its re-entry vehicles to 10 SLBMs, present or future, are limited to 14. In other words, any existing SLBM can be given RVs up to 14, and any new one may have up to 14.

Paragraph 13 is a similar provision with respect to ASBMs, the number being 10.

Fourteen was a difficult issue. It remained

MORE

A-1x/9/12

- 12 -

on the table for a long time. The result is that with respect to heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles, the average shall not exceed 20. In addition, the sides have agreed that existing heavy bombers will not be equipped with more than 20 during the life of the treaty and there are also statements of present intention not binding that future new types of airplanes during the life of the treaty will not have 20.

As I repeat, that is simply a statement of intention and not a binding commitment.

Article 5 gets into the sub-aggregates.

One deals with the 1320 limitation on launches of MIRVed ICBMs, MIRVed SLBMs and heavy bombers equipped with cruise missiles, and when I say cruise missiles, I am talking about cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers, but I won't keep repeating it.

Paragraph 2 is the 1200 limitation on launchers of MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs.

Paragraph 3 is 020 MIRVed ICBMs and paragraph 4 is a counting rule for ASBMs and paragraph 5 is a further permission to, freedom to mix subject to the other limitations.

Article 6 I won't spend a lot of time on. It is what we call the "when" article, when things count, when they are considered to be converted one way or another, and so forth.

All of these counting rules will be subject to consideration in the standing consultative commission.

Article 7 deals with test and training launchers. They are exempted, but there are limitations on where they may be placed, and the number which may be added by each party.

In addition, I would mention that there is a common understanding to Article 7 regarding 18 controversial launchers at -- (inaudible) -- which is a test range in the Soviet Union. We took the position that they were operational because of the tender loving care with which the Soviets treated them. They maintained they were testing-training launchers of fractional orbital missiles.

MORE

A-1x/9/13

- 13 -

In Article 9, fractional orbital systems are banned, therefore the missiles have to be destroyed.

We finally got the Soviets to agree to destroy 12 of these 18 heavy launchers, and to maintain 6 in an inactive status until such time as they were converted for other missiles.

Article 5 is a ban on conversion of existing non-bombers to cruise missile carriers as well as a ban on the conversion of existing non-bombers to bombers.

We had a bit of a struggle on this because we wanted to have exemptions to conversion in order to pursue our cruise missile program. It was finally agreed that there should be 16 exemptions for cruise missile test beds which would not count against the aggregate. But they are limited to conversion of non-bombers or construction of non-bombers.

Existing heavy bombers cannot be introduced into the 16 exemptions.

Article 9 is a list of bans. Most of it was agreed on a long time ago. If you skim through it, you will see that there are a number of systems listed which neither side has, nor probably has any intention of having.

There is also a ban on heavy SLBMs and heavy ASBMs, and a ban on cruise missiles with multiple independently-targetable warheads. I am sorry, not cruise missiles, air-launched cruise missiles with multiple independently-targetable warheads. There are no limitations in the treaty itself on cruise missiles other than air-launch cruise missiles and the sea-based cruise missiles, whatever they are.

The ground-launched cruise missile and sea-launched cruise missile limitations are solely in the Protocol and, as I mentioned, paragraph 8, Article 2 of the treaty makes that explicitly clear.

Article 10 is a carry-over from the interim agreement which simply says that modernization can be carried out. Article 11 provides timetables for the destruction of excess systems which would apply to the Soviets only, and also to any system which a side might have which is prohibited. Article 12 is the so-called non-circumvention provision which simply articulates what is the rule of

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international law.

Article 13 is boilerplate regarding other international obligations. Article 14 is a commitment to begin negotiations on SALT III promptly after entry into force of this treaty, and hopefully to conclude another agreement well in advance of 1985.

Article 15 deals with verification. It carries over from the interim agreement; the understanding that the sides will use national technical means, that neither side will interfere with the other sides' national technical means, and that neither side will use deliberate concealment measures. Deliberate concealment measures are further defined in a number of agreed statements and common understandings. They exclude testing of penetration aids which by definition are concealment measures.

There is a common understanding regarding telemetry; and an additional common understanding providing that neither side will use shelters over ICBM launchers which impede verification, whether or not deliberate, over ICBM silo launchers.

On the much discussed point of telemetry, I will just add that here in Vienna the Soviets confirmed the understanding regarding telemetry and that information necessary to verification will not be encrypted.

Article 16 deals with advanced notice of ICBM launches; in effect, one must notify the other side of all ICBM launches except single launches which take place entirely within national territory.

Article 17 deals with the standing consultative commission. It is largely a carry-over from the interim agreement, under which it has worked quite well.

It also provides particularly for procedures to be developed about conversion.

And finally, in paragraph 3, it constitutes a treaty commitment to maintain the data base which I will discuss in just a minute.

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A-1x/9/15

Article 18 is a standard treaty clause regarding future amendments and Article 19 regards entry into force -- that is, after the various constitutional processes have been completed.

The Protocol, as you see, is a short document. It prohibits -- and it should be read carefully -- the deployment of mobile ICBM launchers or the flight testing of ICBMs from such launchers. It means that the MX as a missile system can go ahead with full testing as well as its basing mode. The only thing is that prior to December 31, 1981, an ICBM may not be launched from a mobile ICBM launcher -- I think an impossibility under the timeframe, anyway.

Article 2 I have already touched on, the cruise missile limitations. It is a ban on deployment of sea-based or ground-launched cruise missiles -- there is no prohibition whatsoever on testing of such missiles -- and, again, a ban on such cruise missiles with multiple independently targetable warheads, and another definition of cruise missiles which substantively is identical with the one in the treaty except this one explicitly applies to GLCMs and SLCMs as opposed to the one in the treaty which applies to ALCMs, and a protocol ban on the flight testing and deployment of ASBMs.

It further states the protocol is an integral part of the treaty.

Now, I am probably going on at too great length but I am almost finished. I will jump to the data base documents and let you all read the agreed statements and common understandings on the plane.

The Memorandum of Understanding represents an agreed document between the sides as of November 1, 1978. If you have questions about the numbers, I will answer them as best I can. The subsequent documents represent unilateral statements handed across to each other today, setting forth the figures in each of our own forces as of today. They are not agreed. They will be subject to discussion subsequently in the standing consultative commission.

Finally, on the Joint Statement of Principles, the document dealing with SALT III, I think it is short; you can read it yourself. I would just make a couple of points about it. One, it is not limited to strategic offensive arms but permits further negotiations on all strategic arms, including defensive arms. There is a reference in the second session to cooperative measures which may be necessary, increasingly, in SALT III, given, hopefully, greater limitations and more qualitative limitations.

There is already in SALT II agreement to use so-called cooperative measures with respect to cruise missile carriers.

It lists in general terms the issues to be considered in SALT III and concludes by saying that each party will be free to raise any issue. So SALT III is up for grabs, at least as far as the introduction of proposals by either side.

I am finished.

MORE

Q Mr. Ambassador, could you tell us on the Backfire issue when and why the current formulation was reached? And could you tell us what happened to the idea of there being two letters as opposed to this single statement and the American explanatory note?

Q Question?

AMBASSADOR EARLE: The question is on Backfire and how it got to where it is.

Unfortunately, Backfire was not an issue that I dealt with in Geneva, so I am not the world's greatest expert. The fact is that statements were exchanged. The Soviet statement was handed over in writing. The American statement was not handed over.

The important thing is, one, that the Soviets made their commitment regarding no upgrade to intercontinental range and no increase in the production rate, and they confirmed the current production rate to be 30. And we made it quite clear to them the circumstances under which we were signing this agreement and the effect and importance of their statements on Backfire to our entry into the agreement.

So whether we discuss whether there were two letters and one statement or one letter and two statements, whatever, the fact is subsequently the Backfire issue came out as we anticipated it would. We have their commitment and they have our understanding with regard to how we intend to treat it in terms of being a binding document on them as far as our entry into force of the treaty.

MR. POWELL: Let me add a little bit to that in terms of sort of the play-by-play on this thing.

What we felt we needed here, first of all -- and I can't deal with it without repeating some of what the Ambassador said, but I will try to hold it to a minimum -- we felt that the most important point here was production, how many they had. What we wanted to make sure that we had was a mutual understanding with regard to what that production would be or what it would not exceed.

That was to have been obtained through our statement to President Brezhnev that we understood their production rate to be 30. And that statement having followed their commitment to us not to exceed their existing production rate, we would then respond by saying we understand that to be 30, and they would respond in the affirmative that they agreed that it was; yes, that is correct.

That process, that exchange, took place on the afternoon of the second day. If you will remember, some of you, there was an American official backgrounding on that day who voiced his view that the matter of Backfire -- and I don't know if it was mentioned specifically, but that the matters relating to SALT II had been resolved. He was wrong.

MORE



A-11/9/17

Upon careful examination of the record of that discussion on that afternoon, that evening, by the American side, it was our conclusion that --

Q You are talking about Saturday there? Right?

MR. POWELL: Saturday.

Q Saturday or Sunday?

MR. POWELL: Saturday. my days are all mixed up. The first day, the first full day, Saturday. Yesterday was Sunday; today is Monday. Okay; Saturday.

Saturday afternoon this exchange takes place. Later unnamed American briefer says, "We are done with SALT II." The folks look at the record. They decide we are not done.

We felt that the assurances with regard to the rate of production -- that is to say, 30 -- were not sufficiently specific. As the issue was reraised at the morning session on Sunday, there was an interesting and lively exchange on the matter, which concluded with a statement from President Brezhnev that -- indeed an explicit statement that their production rate was 30, which is, from our point of view, I think, somewhat better even than the original situation of us stating that it was 30 and them simply saying yes or agreeing to that statement.

That having transpired the way it did, the problem, as I understand it, presented to our delegation was how do we present this in its most clear and understandable form. And the form which you see in which their statement is presented -- and then the narrative states that President Brezhnev did indeed explicitly state that their production rate was 30 -- was a form which we came up with.

That is about the best I can do here.

Q Did you come here with the intent of the two letters, though?

MR. POWELL: I think the original idea, I guess, was just a simple exchange of documents, yes. Remember, the same unnamed briefer kept referring to these things as documents, not letters. And I don't think there was a clear sort of when is a letter not a letter, in any case.

Q Do you have any intention of making public the text of what Brezhnev said in that session?

MR. POWELL: The question was do we have any intention of making public the statement Brezhnev made. It is already public for all practical purposes. You know what he said. You know their comments on unilateral statements. You know our statement explicitly with regard to the importance which we attach to this and the fact that we would consider deviations from it to be grounds for -- it was the basis for us signing the treaty. And you know explicitly what President Brezhnev said with regard to -- because I just told you and it is -- reflected there -- with regard to the fact that, yes, they would not exceed 30.

MORE

A-1x/9/18

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- 18 -

Q What about telemetry encryption? Would you  
tell us what the Russian or Soviet assurances were? Or,  
Ambassador, would you do that?

MORE

AMBASSADOR EARLE: The question was telemetry encryption and the assurances, if any, that the Russians gave us here.

First of all, when we came here on Friday, we had agreed in Geneva, and it is part of the signed documents of common understanding providing that encryption which impedes verification is banned, encryption which does not impede verification is not banned. They confirmed that position here. It was just, as we anticipated, the understanding reached previously and was merely a confirmation of what was already in the documents.

Q How did it come up? Did it need confirmation? If it was agreed upon at Geneva --

AMBASSADOR EARLE: Because of the debate that has existed over this, in spite of the clarity of the provision reached by the negotiators in Geneva, the President wanted one more assurance from Mr. Brezhnev, and he got it.

Q On what page is the reference to encryption?

AMBASSADOR EARLE: The reference to encryption is in a common understanding to Article 15.

MR. POWELL: Let me say with regard to encryption -- and this will be a cryptic statement on encryption -- that there were other discussions in that area during the course of the meetings here which we believed -- which we believed to have been positive in terms of their effect, and that is as far as I can go.

Q Could you just explain what the point of encryption is that is not for circumventing verification means -- just to give us a better understanding?

In other words, this encryption which is permitted, what is the point of that? Why would they engage in that at all?

AMBASSADOR EARLE: The question is what encryption is permitted, and why. The fact is I think the Soviets don't wish to turn every military secret they have over to us, whether or not it is relevant to compliance with the provisions of SALT.

Q That is rather a broad answer. Could you be a little more specific as to what kind of encryption they would engage in with regard to telemetry that has nothing to do with national means of verification?

Q What is the question?

AMBASSADOR EARLE: The question is, give an example.

MORE

A-1x/9/20

- 20 -

I think, for instance, you have got to look at the parameters which are to be limited with respect to the new types of ICBMs. Not all parameters are limited. Ergo, telemetry relevant to non-limited parameters would be permitted to be encrypted.

MR. POWELL: Let me say one thing about telemetry encryption. I think it is relevant to other aspects of the treaty as well. One of the advantages of having a treaty now before you and the American people, not to mention the Senate, is that there is no longer any excuse for statements being made about this treaty which are either grossly misleading or factually in error.

One of the statements which I have heard on several occasions about telemetry encryption is the statement that, "Well, we are simply depending upon the Soviet Union to define and determine what it is that they will encrypt." That is exactly the opposite, that is exactly the opposite of the case.

We know through experience what it is that we need in order to verify these parameters, and we will know if that is being encrypted. So it is not a question of us having to depend on them to tell us what we need, and vice versa.

Q Mr. Ambassador, we have been told that the Soviet Union would have to dismantle weapons under this treaty, and that we would not. How do we get the 2250 from the 2280, or whatever total it is in our data base now?

AMBASSADOR EARLIE: The reason that we have said that we will not have to dismantle is because we have been referring to operational systems. Approximately 200 B-52s included in the numbers which we gave to the Soviets, are, to put it mildly, non-operational. Many of them, at least in part, are already dismantled.

Q Jody, can you explain what it was about the notes of Saturday's meeting on Backfire that caused the review on Sunday morning? In other words, why was there an impression that it had been settled when in fact it had not?

MORE

A-11/9/21

MR. POWELL: The question was over whether we felt there were assurances on production rate, i.e., 30 per year were sufficient. We felt that they were not at that point.

It related just to the 30, the production rate.

Q There is something in the communique which refers to a future treaty, limiting weapons involving radiation. Does that involve the neutron bomb? Could you elaborate on that?

MR. POWELL: No.

Q Why not, then?

MR. POWELL: Because it is not, and we have made that clear that the enhanced radiation weapon is not a radiological weapon. The fact of the matter is, I am not sure if I can define for you precisely what a radiological weapon is.

The fact of the matter is there is no such thing at this point. But I believe it is defined -- you will have to check with someone more capable -- it is a weapon that causes death through the natural decay of radioactive material.

The enhanced radiation weapon causes death not through other than the natural decay of radioactive material.

Q On Backfire, could I pursue one other matter?

MR. POWELL: But that is very clear.

Q I don't understand the statement you read out about our disagreement with respect to range. How can you take to the SCC a dispute about a matter which the Soviets claim is not covered by SALT?

AMBASSADOR EARLE: We can take any matter to the SCC we want. But as far as covered by SALT, we have made it clear to them that any significant upgrade, that is, in range payload capability, we will take to the SCC because we will see it as giving the Backfire such capability that either crosses the line or impinges on the line of what constitutes a strategic system.

When you get to the SCC, you just have to see what happens.

Q I guess my question is do you have any assurance that the Soviets would agree to take to the SCC, the Backfire question which they maintain is not a SALT matter at all?

AMBASSADOR EARLE: I have no explicit assurance, but the history of the SCC is that each side has been prepared to discuss any issue brought out by the other side.

Q Ambassador, first of all, just a clarification on the MX. In the agreed statement it says, as you point out, the ban is on deployment. It does not ban testing it.

MORE

But it goes on to say unless the parties agree after the expiration of the Protocol that mobile ICBM launchers shall not be deployed after that date. Does that imply that MX is already, the deployment of MX is already considered to be an appropriate subject for SALT III negotiations?

I would also like to ask you after that, would you explain to us a little more clearly the meaning and implications of the ban on reduced weight?

O Question?

AMBASSADOR EARLE: The first question was regarding the agreed statement, it stipulates the possibility of a ban on mobile ICBM launchers after the period of the Protocol.

As a matter of fact, that provision was put in essentially at our request to make it explicitly clear that the treaty did not cover -- that mobilized ICBM launchers were not banned by the treaty and would only be banned if it was further so negotiated.

And the Joint Statement of Principles provide that the issues arising from the Protocol will be the subject of negotiation, but without creating any precedent for the outcome of those negotiations in the SALT III discussions.

The second question dealt with reduced weight of re-entry vehicles. I must say at first blush, it appears to be a peculiar provision in an arms control agreement, which does not permit a side to have smaller re-entry vehicles.

But the goal, I think reached is that it prohibits a side from testing smaller re-entry vehicles on an ICBM which would, in turn, give that ICBM a break-out potential by increasing the number of re-entry vehicles which it could carry.

MR. POWELL: Let me add one comment from the discussions today -- here in Vienna, that goes with Flora's question: The President on Sunday morning in his discussions with President Brezhnev on SALT III, explicitly stated that the Protocol would not be precedential; that is to say, the terms of that would expire at the time that it expires, and that it would not constitute a precedent for the terms of SALT III.

That, too, is one of the areas in which some of the opponents of the treaty have attempted to pretend that the terms of the Protocol were the same as the terms of the treaty, and I have absolute confidence that that will now cease.

MORE

Q Mr. Ambassador, is the type of MX missile decided upon the other day by the President definable as a light ICBM?

AMBASSADOR EARLE: The question is, is the MX that the President decided to go ahead with last week a light ICBM. Yes, it is. It comes within the numerical limitations which are placed, as I noted in my presentation, with respect to the SS-19. We are quite comfortable that the planning for the MX is within the launch weight and throw weight limitations of the Soviet SS-19.

Q On the Backfire once again, Brezhnev's statement talks about the radius of action of the Backfire. What is your understanding of it? Is it defined explicitly anywhere?

AMBASSADOR EARLE: The question is, what does radius mean in the context of the Backfire. I think it is a well-acknowledged military term meaning "go out and come back." In their view, the position they have taken is that it is not an intercontinental bomber unless it can fly to another continent and return. We have disagreed with that view.

Q What is the Backfire's range?

AMBASSADOR EARLE: I am not at this moment going to get into discussion. There is some debate within the intelligence community. Let me just say our judgment is the Backfire has some intercontinental capabilities; that is, on certain profiles, particularly a high, high, high profile, it can reach the United States. Some think it can recover in Cuba; some think it can not.

Q You used the term "cooperative measures" in the joint statement about SALT III. Were cooperative measures defined anywhere? And, Jody, was the subject of on-site inspections brought up in the talks about SALT III?

AMBASSADOR EARLE: The meaning of cooperative measures has been left open. The sides have agreed that the limitations under SALT III may indeed be more complex, have greater qualitative limitations and that additional steps dependent upon the nature of the limitations may be necessary in order to verify them properly.

There has been no specific discussion of what might be or what might not be a cooperative measure.

Q Mr. Ambassador, "intercontinental" is defined, I think, in the treaty as an agreement between the corner of this nation and the corner of the Soviet Union. Is the Backfire intercontinental within that definition?

MORE

AMBASSADOR EARLE: That definition is limited solely to ICBMs.

Q Mr. Ambassador, was there anything in the presentation by the Russians of their new data base, their updated data base that you found surprising or disturbing?

AMBASSADOR EARLE: The short answer is no. There was nothing surprising. There were a few changes. They had 32 more launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs and 16 more launchers of SLRMs equipped with MIRVs, which is consistent with their current conversion rate since November 1.

Q Mr. Ambassador, will SALT III include the theater nuclear weapons, such as the SS-20?

AMBASSADOR EARLE: It may; it may not.

Q Mr. Ambassador, do you anticipate any European countries will take part in SALT III?

AMBASSADOR EARLE: SALT III is a matter of intensive consideration in Washington right now. I would hesitate to speculate on either the form or the substance of it.

Q Mr. Ambassador, on the basis of how long it has taken you to negotiate SALT II, how long is it going to take for SALT III?

AMBASSADOR EARLE: I am glad you didn't say "How long is it going to take you to negotiate SALT III?"

MORE



Q Why do you think it is going to take sooner than 1985, as you have implied?

AMBASSADOR EARLE: There are certain things that have to be addressed. We would like to address a number of issues early and promptly. The Protocol issues obviously are included among those. We would hope to get other limitations in a shorter period. One thing, if I may say about this treaty is that there is a great deal in it which can be carried over in a SALT III, IV, V, et cetera. For instance, the definitional article which took months and months, indeed years of negotiations, hopefully will not be changed in the future.

In lawyers terms, I think there is a good deal of boiler plate that now exists in the treaty which can be carried forward in any substantive agreement and we would not have to spend time on items of that nature.

Q What issues would you like to address in SALT III?

AMBASSADOR EARLE: I am not going to express a personal opinion and I have no official opinion.

Q In your own judgment, was there any important substantive change in the document that we have here made after the President arrived in Vienna?

AMBASSADOR EARLE: Not one word was changed in this document after it arrived from Geneva; except that the titles of the signatories were typed in.

Q Was there any important, substantive change that resulted from the Geneva summit meeting?

Q Vienna.

Q I mean the Vienna summit meetings regarding SALT.

MR. POWELL: Just from the tone of the briefing, I would assume that you at least consider Backfire to be substantive, although it is not in the text of the treaty. Obviously there were no changes in the text of the treaty. We consider the confirmation review, as we said at the outside, to be important, with regard to that, with regard to telemetry and other matters. There were matters which the Soviets could address if they wished, which they wanted to confirm and review, also.

MORE

Q Can I ask you a general question about this summit? Could you sort of sum up for us your view of what has taken place in the last three days in terms of what you expected to take place? Were there surprises for you?

MR. POWELL: I don't think there were any real surprises. I think the communique sums it up better than I could. And perhaps if you wish, if we completed discussions on SALT III, we can deal with the communique, I really hope briefly.

Q Jody, on that --

MR. POWELL: I will just say this about the communique: I would direct your attention to the importance that the communique places on the effects of nuclear war as -- and this is a quote "as a disaster for all mankind" and on the responsibility of both sides to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

That is and has been, I think, the seed of the beginning of this cooperative relationship in this area between the Soviet Union and the United States. I think this--although I am not personally familiar with earlier communiqués--I think this communique is noteworthy for, as these things go, frankness, and that it does not attempt to conceal the fact that there are differences in our views on the Middle East and on Africa. But at the same time, it underscores the importance of the SALT process and of the need for regional stability.

There are two others I would direct your attention to; the language on pages 4 and 5 beginning on the bottom part of page 4, in which there is some extensive discussion of an area which we consider to be important, and that is the expanding of contacts, discussions and so forth between American and Russian officials as well as more frequent meetings at the summit level.

As you know, that was one of the areas which we felt -- that was the goal which we pursued. Obviously, there is another step between the statement of that agreement in principle and actual implementation. We will have to see what the results of the statement are. But the statement of intent is certainly a first step.

Q Jody, have you finished?

MR. POWELL: Yes.

Q Can you tell us on this--on the question of the meetings between the heads of government, it has been agreed that such meetings be held on a regular basis. Does this take that understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union beyond what has been previously reached in previous summits?

MORE

- 27 -

MR. POWELL: It is my understanding that this is a broader and more explicit statement of that intent, although I can't compare language for you.

Q Is there any time frame in mind, annual?

MR. POWELL: There was no attempt, so far as I know, to set a specific date for a next meeting.

Q I am saying --

MR. POWELL: Or to draw --

Q -- a sequence.

MR. POWELL: Sort of so many of them a month.

Q You are not at the point of saying annual?

MR. POWELL: So far as I know, there was -- no, there was no agreement that we would do so many a month or a year.

Q Was there a proposal by the United States that the two leaders meet or there be these meetings on any kind of specific basis? Did you come here to propose that you might meet in a year?

MR. POWELL: I don't know what discussions might have taken place -- I am not aware of any such proposals between the two Presidents.

Q What was the question?

MR. POWELL: The question was whether we proposed that we meet on a specific timetable and so forth.

Q Was it proposed before the SALT treaty in the pre-planning stages and turned down by the Soviets?

MR. POWELL: I really don't know.

Q Does anybody up there know?

MORE

Q Jody, could you deal now with the U-2 question? Could you tell us whether the U-2 flights over Turkey were ever brought up?

MR. POWELL: Not in the meetings which I attended.

Q What about the Defense Minister's meeting?

MR. POWELL: I don't think so. I have a little bit better feel on the Defense Minister's meeting. That wouldn't have been the place to discuss this, at least not in the terms -- they did talk about a couple of areas that relate to the military aspects of verification in that meeting. But I would be very surprised if they discussed that.

There would have been no reason for them to, unless they wanted to toss it around.

Q When do you expect the SALT III talks to begin?

MR. POWELL: It calls for the beginning of the SALT III talks when the treaty goes into effect.

Q That wasn't my question.

MR. POWELL: That is the best answer I can give you. I have no expectation other than that.

Q If you are talking about an informal sense, obviously, there were discussions of SALT III here in Vienna.

Q Jody, did anybody, Vance, and Gromyko, or anybody at any level, exchange a list from the United States with names of dissidents on it, the United States would like to see released?

MR. POWELL: I don't know.

Q Jody, there appear to have been several subjects, this one of them, the U-2 another, the question of human rights in the Soviet Union, which could have conveniently have come in that morning meeting about which you know nothing. Was there any understanding between the two sides that issues of particular delicacy would be handled at that meeting?

MR. POWELL: I don't know of any such understanding. I mean I suppose there is a reason for having a private meeting, isn't there?

MORE

A-1x/9/29

- 29 -

Ambassador Earle has to catch a plane. If anybody has anything else for him, fine.

Q Mr. Ambassador, the Soviets are permitted one mobile ICBM. Is there anything to prevent that mobile ICBM being something very similar indeed to the SS-16?

AMBASSADOR EARLE: In the first place, the permission for one new ICBM is not limited to a mobile ICBM. It is simply one new type of missile which could be deployed either in fixed launchers, or assuming that there is no further restriction beyond the Protocol on mobiles, it could be a mobile.

There is something to prevent it from being rather like the SS-16 since the Soviets have agreed for the life of the treaty not to produce the SS-16, or any components unique to it. So the SS-16 is banned.

I would suppose that they could develop a missile which was somewhat like it, but I doubt that they would. It is not a very interesting missile. Of course, it would have to be verifiable that it was not the SS-16.

Q Thank you.

MR. POWELL: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Q Was that morning meeting the private meeting for 30 minutes, or an hour?

MR. POWELL: It was scheduled for an hour and ran an hour and a half.

MR. SCHECTER: Yes, one point was they agreed to have it at 10:00, rather than 10:30, as originally scheduled.

Q When did they agree to that?

MR. SCHECTER: Last night.

Q Finally, were the two leaders alone, except for interpreters, the whole time?

MR. SCHECTER: That is correct. They were alone in what is normally the American Ambassador's office. They sat on two armchairs covered with blue brocade and the translators sat nearby on the couch.

MORE

A-12/9/30

- 30 -

Q Jody, I have one more question on this Backfire statement. Was it included in the bounds of volumes that they signed today at all? And did the Soviets approve the language in this statement that we have?

MR. POWELL: Did they approve the language in which?

Q In what is outside of quotes. Obviously quotes are original language. Did they approve the last two paragraphs of this statement?

MR. POWELL: I don't have that statement. I frankly don't know. I didn't bring the Backfire thing down with me. But let me take a look at it. I think it will be obvious.

I don't know whether they approved it in terms of where they read and checked off on this. They were aware and said so, and said explicitly they were aware that we would make public the assurances that they had given us, including this one.

Q But this isn't an agreed-upon statement?

MR. POWELL: In the sense -- well, yes, it is not an agreed-upon statement in the sense that the statement was written and then agreed upon. The specifics of it were agreed upon, however. They agreed that, first of all, a production rate would not exceed 30. They also agreed that we would make that public. They also agreed that we would make public the statements which the President made which were in the second part of the paragraph. In that sense, it is, I guess.

Q But the statement was put out unilaterally by the U. S.?

MR. POWELL: You mean the piece of paper?

Q This one-page statement.

MR. POWELL: That is correct.

Q Can those of us who feel we have been briefed release what has come out here so far?

MR. POWELL: Except for the part on -- that might be a way to break this up, as a matter of fact.

MORE

A-IX/9/31

- 31 -

Q Jody, do you assign any particular significance to the last paragraph on page 11 of the communique? It refers to restraint.

MR. POWELL: I think it is significant -- and that was the point I was going to make, as a matter of fact -- I think it is significant, Jim, the detailed language on restraint there, and the mutual recognition, public and joint recognition of that problem. Again we will have to, of course, see how that is, as I am sure will the Soviets, how that is translated into actions.

Q Is that supposed to refer to specific problem areas like Africa and the Middle East, and Southeast Asia?

MR. POWELL: Yes, of course.

Q The item on the Indian Ocean, on page 10 of the communique would appear to be one of the most specific things decided, or agreed upon outside of SALT. Is that right? And what is the background of the issue?

MR. POWELL: I can't give you a great detail on the background of the Indian Ocean negotiations. As you know, they began, they have been in a period of suspicion -- (laughter) -- suspension -- either or both -- for a period of time, and we now have agreed to meet promptly to discuss this matter again.

Q Was the question of European countries participating in SALT III raised? And if so, was it decided whether SALT III would go ahead, whether or not any other countries would be able to participate?

MR. POWELL: It was not raised in that sense, and such a decision was not made. The discussions on SALT III, as you know, or you may not know, were primarily a discussion on which both sides mentioned, particularly our side, frankly, some of the issues or problems that we would need to address there like vulnerability, like for the need of improved and expanded verification means, and further reductions, and so forth.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. Powell.

MR. POWELL: Thank you, and good night.

END (AT 4:40 P.M. CET)



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

A-1x/10/1

February 1, 1979

UNCLASSIFIED

TO: ACDA - General Seignious  
P - Ambassador Newsom  
C - Mr. Nimetz

FROM: PA - Hodding Carter III *HC*

State-Wide Poll Shows Public Remains  
Dissatisfied with U.S. Military Strength

A Minnesota poll conducted late last year updates earlier, national surveys of (1) how the American public perceives the relative military strength of the United States and the USSR and (2) the public's preferences concerning U.S. strength vis-a-vis the USSR.

The Minnesota results in November were similar to CBS nationwide findings last June: Fifty-five percent of the respondents perceived the United States as weaker than they preferred. Dissatisfaction with U.S. military power thus seems to have reached a plateau by late 1978 after rising markedly from 1976 to 1978. (Minnesota poll findings have been found to approximate nationwide attitudes on a number of other foreign-policy issues.)

Feelings about Military Strength of U.S. Relative to USSR	Minn. Poll Nov. 1978	National Polls		
		June 1978	Feb. 1978	Dec. 1976
Dissatisfied	55%	55%	49%	41%
Satisfied	41	30	37	49

The forty-one percent of Minnesotans who could be termed "satisfied" with U.S. military strength comprised 31 percent who believed the United States was as strong as it needed to be vis-a-vis the USSR and 10 percent who thought the United States was actually stronger than it needed to be.

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A-1x/10/2

- 2 -

The fifty-five percent of Minnesotans who were "dissatisfied" perceived the United States as having less military strength than they wished. In this group, 17 percent wanted the United States to be stronger than the Soviet Union but believed the United States was actually weaker; thirty-eight percent perceived equality but preferred superiority or accepted equality but perceived the United States to be militarily weaker.

The Minnesota results come from comparing responses to these two questions:

Preferred U.S. Position: "In general, do you feel that the United States should have greater military strength than the Soviet Union, strength equal to that of the Soviet Union, or that it is all right for the United States to have less military strength than the Soviet Union?"

Stronger	37%
Equal	53
Weaker	8
No opinion	2

Perceived U.S. Position: "As things stand now, do you think the military strength of the United States is greater than the Soviet Union's, about equal, or not as great?"

Stronger	10%
Equal	44
Weaker	42
No opinion	4

All Minnesota population groups had larger proportions dissatisfied with the level of U.S. military power than found it satisfactory. Most dissatisfied were conservatives, independents/Republicans, adults 50-64, and those with less than college education (about 60 percent dissatisfied vs. about 35 percent satisfied). Least dissatisfied were liberals, Democrats, adults 18-34, and the college educated (about 50 percent dissatisfied vs. about 45 percent satisfied).

Increased concern between 1976 and 1978 about U.S. military strength relative to the Soviet Union produced increased public support for a larger defense budget. Last July, as reported earlier (October 11, 1978), a Harris poll found that for the first time in recent years the number of

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A-12/10/3

- 3 -

Americans who wanted to raise defense spending far exceeded the number who wanted to lower it (by 36 percent to 18 percent, with 41 percent saying they preferred to keep defense spending at its then-current level).

Drafted by: PA/M:AK<sup>AP</sup>richman:reb  
1/30/79 x23165

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

15 May 79



Hamilton Jordan  
Anne Wexler  
Zbig Brzezinski

The attached was returned in  
the President's outbox today  
and is forwarded to you for  
your information.

Rick Hutcheson

The original has been given  
to stripping for mailing.

cc: Stripping

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 15, 1979

To President Spencer Kimball

As you know, our country is now completing seven years of negotiations on a SALT II treaty with the Soviet Union. It is now planned that the treaty will be signed next month in Austria by me and President Brezhnev.

Because of the active role that Mormons play in the life of our country and because of your historic commitment and contribution to world peace, I would personally welcome the opportunity - if you deem it appropriate - to provide a briefing to your Church leadership on SALT II and its importance to our nation and to the cause of peace.

Respectfully,  
Jimmy Carter

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 15, 1979

A-1X/12/1

(2)

Briefing on SALT for National Leaders  
Wednesday, May 16, 1979  
3:30 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.  
East Room

FROM: ANNE WEXLER *AW*  
HAMILTON JORDAN *HJ*

I. PURPOSE

To educate a small group of prominent opinion-makers on SALT in the overall context of U.S.-Soviet relations and global implications.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS PLAN

A. Background

1. This will be the first group to be briefed in the White House exclusively on SALT since the announcement of the summit. The group was carefully selected and represent most of the major interest groups from across the country. It will also be the smallest group that we assemble before the summit.
2. Prior to your arrival the group will have been briefed by Cy Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski. When you arrive to close the meeting, Cy and Zbig will be answering questions. After the meeting there will be a reception in the State Dining Room. (See attached agenda.)
3. It is anticipated that you will speak for about 15 minutes and then take some questions for the remainder of your time.

B. Participants

(See attached list.)

A-1x/12/2

C. Press Plan

White House photo and press pool will be present for the first five minutes of your remarks. The rest of the briefing is closed to the press.

III. TALKING POINTS

(See attached.)

WHITE HOUSE SALT BRIEFING

May 16, 1979

East Room

2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

- |      |                              |  |          |
|------|------------------------------|--|----------|
| I.   | 2:30 p.m.                    | SALT Two agreement, The<br>Case for SALT -- Cy Vance   | 15 mins. |
| II.  | 2:45 p.m.                    | SALT and National Security;<br>The President's Four<br>Questions -- Zbigniew<br>Brzezinski             | 15 mins. |
| III. | 3:00 p.m.                    | Questions and Answers  | 30 mins. |
| IV.  | 3:30 p.m.                    | Remarks and Questions and<br>Answers--The President<br>Note: White House Press<br>pool first 5 minutes | 30 mins. |
| V.   | 4:00 p.m.<br>to<br>5:00 p.m. | Reception - State Floor  |          |

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 15, 1979

A-1x/12/4

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Hamilton Jordan <sup>HS</sup>  
Anne Wexler <sup>AW</sup>

SUBJECT: SALT briefing for national leaders  
Wednesday, May 16  
3:30 p.m.  
East Room

We believe you should talk along the lines of your remarks to the retailers. Here are some suggested points to cover, which we've worked up with Rick Hertzberg of Jerry Rafshoon's office:

1. The SALT II treaty was hammered out by the sustained work of three Administrations: President Nixon's, President Ford's, and yours. It builds on the work of every American President since the end of World War II.

2. SALT must be examined realistically. It is not a panacea. It will not end the arms race. It is a supplement -- not a substitute -- for a strong national defense. But it is a major step in the long, historic process of bringing nuclear weapons under rational control.

3. SALT II is based on self-interest, ours and the Soviet Union's. Although the competition between us will continue as far into the future as anyone can see, we share a mutual interest in survival and in steering our competition away from its most dangerous element, an uncontrolled strategic nuclear arms race.

4. SALT II is not based on trust. The treaty will be adequately verifiable by our own national technical means of verification. In addition, it is in the interest of the Soviet Union to abide by this treaty. Despite predictions to the contrary, the Soviets have observed the terms of the SALT I treaty.



5. Whether or not the treaty is ratified, we must be able to make accurate assessments of Soviet capabilities. But SALT II will make this task much easier -- not only because the treaty forbids concealment measures and interference with means of verification, but also because the treaty gives us basic standards with which we can compare the information we derive independently from our satellites and other methods.

6. The details of ICBMs and SLEMs, throwweight and yield and all the rest are important. It was largely because of these details that the treaty took seven years to negotiate. But these details should not blind us to the real significance of the treaty as a contribution to stability, security and peace.

7. The treaty must be judged on its merits, but we must consider the consequences of rejection:

- radical departure from the process of arms control that began with the atmospheric test ban and SALT I and will continue with SALT III and a comprehensive test ban;

- heightened possibility of confrontation in each local crisis;

- triggering an expensive, dangerous race for a nuclear superiority that each side has the means and will to prevent the other from attaining, with a loss of security for both;

- calling into question our ability to manage a stable East-West relationship, thus undermining our leadership of the Western alliance;

- implications for nuclear proliferation;

- gravely compromising our Nation's position as a leader in the search for peace.

8. Importance of the coming debate; solicitation of support.

A-1x/12/6

Expected Attendees  
VIP Briefing on SALT.  
May 16, 1979  
2:30 P.M.

Dr. Jimmy Allen  
Southern Baptist Convention

The Honorable William Baroody, Sr.  
American Enterprise Institute

The Honorable Ellsworth Bunker

Mr. Carter Burgess  
Foreign Policy Association

The Honorable Yvonne Braithwaite Burke

Dr. Marjorie Bell Chambers  
American Association of University Women

The Honorable Clark M. Clifford  
Clifford, Glass, McIlwain & Finney

The Honorable Orville Freeman  
Business International, Inc.

General Andrew Jackson Goodpaster  
United States Military Academy

Mr. Donald Graham  
The Washington Post

Mr. Maxwell E. Greenberg  
ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE

Ambassador W. Averell Harriman

Mr. Billy O. Hightower  
Disabled American Veterans

Ms. Ruth J. Hinerfeld  
League of Women Voters

Mr. William Howard  
National Council of Churches

Mr. Wm. G. Hyland  
Georgetown University Center  
for Strategic & International Studies

Reverend Jesse Jackson  
People United to Save Humanity

Ms. Mildred Jeffrey  
President  
National Women's Political Caucus

The Honorable U. Alexis Johnson

Mr. Vernon Jordan, Jr.  
National Urban League

Bishop Thomas C. Kelly  
United States Catholic Conference

The Honorable Coretta Scott King  
Martin L. King Center for Social Change

The Honorable Lane Kirkland  
AFL-CIO

Ms. Esther Landa  
National Council of Jewish Women

Ambassador Sol Linowitz  
Coudert Brothers

Mr. Winston Lord  
Council on Foreign Relations

Mr. Richard Maass  
American Jewish Committee

Dr. Benjamin Mays  
Morehouse College

A-1x/12/8

Mr. John J. McCloy  
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McClay

Ms. Joyce Miller  
Coalition of Labor Union Women

Mr. Donald Pacheco  
American GI Forum

Mr. Ed Pena  
League of United Latin American Citizens

Ms. Lynda Bird Robb  
Chairperson  
National Advisory Committee for Women

The Honorable William Scranton  
Northeastern Bank

Mr. James Shepley  
TIME, Inc.

Mr. J. E. Slater  
Aspen Institute

Mr. Martin Ward  
United Association of Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Industry

Mr. Thomas Watson  
IBM

Ms. Alice H. Weber  
Association of Junior Leagues, Inc.

Mr. John White  
Chairman  
DNC

Mr. Walter Wriston  
Citibank

Rabbi Israel Miller  
Chairman, Israel Task Force

Frank Lautenberg  
President, United Jewish Appeal

Morton Mandel  
President, Council of Jewish Federation  
and Welfare Funds

A-1X/12/9

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Carter Library

Rabbi Joseph Sternstein  
President, American Zionist Federation

Lawrence Weinberg  
President, American Israel Public  
Affairs Committee

Theodore Mann  
Chairman, The Conference of Presidents  
of Major Jewish-American Organization

Howard Squadron  
President, American Jewish Congress

Ivan Novick  
President, Zionist Organization of  
America

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

5/24/79

ham --

enclosed is your caddell  
memo, with copies of pages  
on which president made  
notations/comment inserted  
in place of originals.

a copy of those pages (as  
a set) has been sent to  
jerry rafshoon.

-- *A* Susan

A-1x/13/2

3-30-83

Confidential  
To: Project Center  
From: Y.H. Jordan  
SALT survey for your info.

Cambridge Survey Research

Jerry. Prepare  
all speeches (incl standard one  
for cabinet, etc) accordingly

Suite 1250 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20006 Telephone (202) 223-6345

A MEMORANDUM ON CURRENT PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON SALT

FROM PATRICK H. CADDELL

Summary

One fact stands out in the recent survey on SALT -- the American people stand firmly behind the idea of arms limitation and, to the extent they know and understand it, behind the SALT treaty. Support for SALT can be seen in three separate types of questions:

--more than two to one support for the specific SALT treaty among the approximately two-thirds of the population who claim to have heard of it.

--overwhelming support for the general idea of limiting nuclear arms among the whole population, and

--strong support for the SALT treaty when we presented a description of it and both pro and con arguments.

People who support SALT do so out of the hope that it will reduce war and the threat of nuclear holocaust. Furthermore, most people recognize that the failure of SALT will lead to more defense spending and a greater danger of war. Even people who have some doubts about SALT have doubts about what would happen without it.

In many ways support for SALT is both broader and deeper than we would have imagined. One major problem does exist

IN CAMBRIDGE  
10 Moulton Street  
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138  
(617) 661-3212

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -2-

though. While people want arms limitation, they want it to be meaningful. The major reason that the current minority opposition to SALT exists as it does is lack of trust in the Russians. That lack of trust extends beyond the current opponents however and thus opposition to SALT has a potential for growth. Indeed, on a question which posed the idea that there was no point in making a treaty because the Russians wouldn't keep it, the American public was virtually evenly divided, coming down on the pro-SALT side by a mere 6-point margin.

Thus, one major task facing the Administration in presenting SALT is not convincing people about the details of the bargain, but instead convincing people that the bargain will be kept. The Administration has to show people that trust plays no part in the enforcement of SALT. It has to show people that the treaty can be policed whatever the Russians do.

More importantly, SALT must be presented to the American people in a larger context. To the extent the public has focused the issue, it is over large issues; war vs. peace, an unlimited arms race, and much greater defense budgets. The public concern over possible nuclear confrontation is much deeper than many would predict. Oddly, in some ways the accident at Three Mile Island may well have intensified that concern.

Another factor that we have seen in our survey work is the uneasiness the public has over prospective clashes with the

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Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -3-

Soviet Union. Despite great support for Human Rights the public becomes skittish when it relates to the Russians, fearing any side issue that could endanger the relative status quo between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and lead to confrontation. Such concerns were in evidence when the problems in the Horn of Africa arose.

In summary, it would seem that the best public strategy should address these larger concerns, emphasizing the rocky road of "waging peace" but pointing out the unknown but possible consequences of not having a SALT treaty. The public is far less concerned with the details or technical issues of the treaty and far more concerned with these larger issues. Finally, attention must be given to the verification/trust question which in great part must be assured by the President.

This memorandum will outline the results of the most recent survey conducted by the Democratic National Committee as it pertained to public attitudes on SALT. The survey was based on personal, in-home interviews with a representative sample of about 1500 registered voters designed to reflect the likely 1980 voting behavior of the United States.

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -4-

The Basic Question

We began our inquiry by asking respondents to tell us whether they had heard of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and, if so, what they thought about them. As the table shows, almost two-thirds of the voting population have heard enough about SALT to have formed an opinion and they are slightly more than two-to-one favorable in their opinion.

Have you heard of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks -- or SALT -- with the Russians? [IF YES] Do you have a generally favorable or unfavorable opinion of such talks?

	<u>Yes, favorable</u>	<u>Yes, unfavorable</u>	<u>Yes, don't know</u>	<u>No, haven't heard</u>	<u>Not sure</u>
Today	46%	18	16	11	8
R17 - 1978 IV	37%	19	17	21	6
R11 - 1977 II	39%	15	24	22	--
R 6 - 1976 I	33%	18	15	21	12
R 3 - 1975 II	37%	13	15	22	13

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A-1x/13/6

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -5-

Looking at the demographic breakdowns on the following pages, we see some interesting points:

- \* Democrats and Republicans show equal percentages in favor of SALT. However, Democrats who are not favorable tend to be undecided while Republicans are more likely to have a critical opinion.
- \* Liberals are more favorable than conservatives, but it is notable that even a substantial plurality of conservatives favor SALT.
- \* Men are more likely to have an opinion -- either favorable or unfavorable -- than women. In any educational effort, women are the most likely to be undecided and thus should be prime targets for persuasion.
- \* Not surprisingly, knowledge about SALT increases as both the income and educational level of the respondents increase. Perhaps surprisingly, the ratio of support to opposition also increases steadily with both increasing income and education.
- \* The Northeast and Industrial areas are most likely to support SALT; the Pacific and South least likely to back it.

A-1X/13/7

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -6-

Have you heard of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks -- or SALT -- with the Russians? [IF YES] Do you have a generally favorable or unfavorable opinion of such talks?

	Yes, favorable	Yes, unfavorable	Yes, don't know	Haven't heard of talks	Don't know
<u>Overall</u>	46%	18	16	11	8
<u>Party preference</u>					
Democrat (44)	47	13	16	13	10
Independent (37)	46	22	17	9	6
Republican (17)	47	24	13	8	8
<u>Political ideology</u>					
Liberal (26)	57	13	14	10	6
Moderate (24)	45	14	20	8	12
Conservative (42)	44	25	14	11	7
<u>Carter favorability rating</u>					
Favorable (54)	51	12	16	13	8
Unfavorable (39)	42	27	15	8	8
Can't rate (7)	46	15	23	11	6
<u>Carter job performance rating</u>					
Excellent (4)*	55	18	6	13	8
Good (29)	52	11	16	12	9
Only fair (44)	46	19	18	10	8
Poor (21)	41	27	15	10	7
<u>Democratic primary for President</u>					
Carter (44)	48	15	11	15	11
Lean Carter (12)	40	12	25	9	14
Undecided (17)	43	9	19	16	13
Brown (22)	55	13	17	11	5
Lean Brown (5)	52	17	18	7	7
<u>Democratic primary for President</u>					
Kennedy (53)	47	14	18	14	8
Lean Kennedy (9)	44	15	20	9	13
Undecided (11)	41	10	16	16	18
Carter (22)	53	13	11	11	12
Lean Carter (5)	49	15	7	18	11

A-1X/13/8

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -7-

Opinion of SALT (continued)

	Yes, <u>favorable</u>	Yes, <u>unfavorable</u>	Yes, don't know	Haven't heard of talks	Don't know
<u>Overall</u>	46%	18	16	11	8
<u>Sex</u>					
Female (50)	41	15	19	15	11
Male (50)	52	22	14	7	6
<u>Race</u>					
White (89)	48	19	16	10	8
Black (10)	33	15	23	19	10
<u>Occupation</u>					
Professional (5)	67	19	7	--	7
White collar (14)	53	20	18	6	3
White collar clerical (9)	47	15	21	10	8
Government (4)*	55	19	18	2	6
Skilled blue collar (14)	44	23	14	10	9
Unskilled blue collar (14)	38	16	20	17	9
Retired (26)	46	19	13	13	10
Self-employed (6)	54	18	15	6	8
<u>Ethnic background</u>					
Irish (11)	52	15	18	9	6
English (20)	47	25	16	6	7
French (4)*	42	16	19	18	6
German (17)	50	18	16	8	8
Italian (5)	53	14	18	8	7
Eastern European (7)	54	8	13	13	12
Scandinavian (4)*	45	31	6	7	11
Spanish (4)*	35	15	6	31	14
<u>Education</u>					
Some grade school (10)	35	14	14	27	10
Some high school (15)	36	15	17	16	16
Graduated high school (32)	43	18	20	10	10
Technical/vocational (5)	51	24	12	6	7
Some college (20)	47	22	19	7	6
Graduated college (12)	67	18	10	2	3
Graduate/professional (7)	67	22	7	4	1

A-1X/13/9

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -8-

Opinion of SALT (continued)

	Yes, favorable	Yes, unfavorable	Yes, don't know	Haven't heard of talks	Don't know
<u>Overall</u>	46%	18	16	11	8
<u>Religion</u>					
Protestant (58)	44	20	17	10	9
Catholic (30)	50	15	14	12	9
Jewish (4)*	61	4	15	17	4
Other (4)*	39	36	16	8	2
None (4)*	52	17	12	12	7
<u>Income</u>					
\$0-3,999 (5)	26	24	8	28	15
\$4-6,999 (11)	43	12	16	20	9
\$7-9,999 (11)	39	19	17	14	11
\$10-14,999 (16)	49	16	19	7	10
\$15-19,999 (18)	54	15	18	7	6
Over \$20,000 (29)	53	21	14	6	6
<u>Union membership</u>					
Respondent (17)	56	20	13	7	4
Family member (13)	38	19	21	12	11
No member (70)	46	18	16	11	9
<u>Age</u>					
18-25 (12)	52	18	12	12	7
26-35 (17)	41	19	19	12	9
36-45 (17)	46	14	23	8	9
46-55 (18)	51	20	15	8	7
56-65 (17)	49	15	13	13	10
Over 65 (19)	42	23	14	12	9
<u>Urban/rural</u>					
Urban (46)	45	19	16	14	7
Suburban (35)	50	18	17	8	8
Rural (20)	44	18	15	10	12
<u>Area I</u>					
Northeast (15)	53	15	16	9	7
Industrial (25)	50	15	18	9	8
Midlands (15)	49	19	14	10	9
South (19)	41	17	16	14	12
Central (14)	44	26	13	13	5
Pacific (13)	40	21	20	11	9

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -9-

Opinion of SALT (continued)

	Yes, favorable	Yes, unfavorable	Yes, don't know	Haven't heard of talks	Don't know
<u>Overall</u>	46%	18	16	11	8
<u>Area II</u>					
California (10)	> 37	24	15	12	12
West (11)	46	24	19	9	3
New York (8)	50	10	19	13	8
South (13)	40	18	15	16	12
Industrial (28)	49	14	18	10	9
Border (8)	51	17	13	9	10
New England (7)	57	19	14	6	5
Midwest (15)	44	23	15	11	7
<u>Area III</u>					
South (24)	44	19	15	12	11
Industrial (52)	47	16	17	11	9
Other (24)	48	22	16	9	5

Given that SALT is a specific, and perhaps confusing, issue to many people, we also asked respondents the more general question of whether or not they favored limiting nuclear by agreement with the Soviet Union. As the table shows, respondents are overwhelmingly in favor of this idea.

Do you favor or oppose an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union limiting nuclear weapons?

Favor	> 74%
Don't know	12
Oppose	14

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Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -10-

When asked why they took that position, we found that those who supported such an agreement felt it would reduce the chance of war and bring some control to the arms race.

[IF FAVOR/OPPOSE AGREEMENT BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET UNION LIMITING NUCLEAR WEAPONS] Why do you take that position?

---

FAVOR

Would decrease chance of war	13%
Nuclear war could be the end	10
Need an agreement	7
Limit weapons, limit arms	6
Need to be in control of these weapons, would give us some kind of control	6
No one would have an edge, keep things equal, limit arms for both sides	5
To stop a nuclear war	5
A step toward peace, a step in the right direction	4
Don't believe in nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons are insane	4
Too much is being spent for weapons and defense	4
We already have enough weapons to destroy each other	3
Good if Russians follow or keep their word	3
We have enough weapons	3
Arms race is getting out of hand	2
Good for our country, good idea	2
Good if it can be policed or enforced properly	2
Would decrease weapons	1
Good if we can get equal terms	1
It won't work	1
Other	15
Don't know	3

People who opposed reaching an agreement overwhelmingly cited a lack of trust in the Russians as the major issue

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Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -11-

preventing them from supporting the idea of such an agreement. Quite clearly, the whole "verification" issue that has already been raised by people with doubts about the agreement will be a decisive factor in the public debate.

[IF FAVOR/OPPOSE AGREEMENT BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET UNION LIMITING NUCLEAR WEAPONS] Why do you take that position?

---

OPPOSE

Can't trust the Russians, Soviets can't be trusted,	
Russians will never keep their word	51%
U.S. would get the short end of the deal, we give	
too many concessions and get nothing in return	8
It won't work	6
Russia hasn't lived up to what she has said before	5
Can't police the treaty, impossible to check up	
on what they're doing and to enforce it	3
Bad idea	3
We should not make any deals	2
We have enough weapons	2
Other	18
Don't know	3

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -12-

To try to gain some notion of how intensely people felt about the question of concluding an arms agreement, we also asked them how important such an agreement was to them personally. As the table shows, a majority rated such an agreement as very important. The number rating it important has remained relatively stable over the last two years.

How important is it to you personally that the U.S. and the Soviet Union reach an agreement limiting nuclear weapons: very important, important, somewhat important or not important at all?

	<u>Very important</u>	<u>Important</u>	<u>Somewhat important</u>	<u>Not important at all</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
Today	52%	22	11	10	5
CR17 1978 IV	52%	24	12	7	5
CR11 1977 II	56%	21	10	7	6

Demographic breakdowns -- in the Appendix to this report -- show that the percentage assigning great importance to the issue is relatively uniform throughout most demographic and political groups.

#### Aided awareness

The preceding questions rest on what people already know and feel about arms limitation and SALT. No one can doubt that as the public debate heats up after a treaty is actually

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -13-

signed people will receive much more information about SALT. This new information may very well lead to changes of position as people discover new facts and hear new arguments.

To try and obtain some reading of what might happen in that circumstance, we presented respondents with a relatively long -- though, of course, grossly simplified -- description of SALT and of some arguments pro- and con-. That description is shown below.

#### SALT DESCRIPTION

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) were begun ten years ago to limit the number and kinds of nuclear weapons possessed by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

President Nixon signed the SALT I agreement in 1972. It provided for a freeze on the construction of new missile systems and banned anti-missile missiles.

In 1974, President Ford signed an agreement at Vladivostok that limited both countries to 2,400 strategic nuclear weapons.

The new agreement would extend this limit to 2,400 strategic weapons including land-based missiles, submarine-based missiles, heavy bombers and cruise missiles.

2250

Those who favor the new agreement say it stabilizes the nuclear arms race and makes war less likely. They argue that we do not have to trust the Russians to observe the treaty since our intelligence, including spy satellites, will enable us to detect any cheating. They say that the treaty will keep us roughly equal, though different. For example, the Russians tend to have bigger rockets while ours are more accurate. We also have more missiles on submarines.

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -14-

SALT DESCRIPTION (continued)

Furthermore, they argue that failure to ratify the treaty would set off a new arms race, force increased defense spending and hurt the economy.

Opponents of the treaty say it would leave us behind in overall strength. They argue that the heavier Russian missiles might be able to knock out our land-based "Minuteman" missiles. Furthermore, they claim the Russians might develop more accuracy to complement the larger size of their missiles. Finally, they say that we cannot trust the Russians to obey the agreement anyway and that we shouldn't sign anything unless we can get a better deal.

After this presentation, we asked respondents whether they favored or opposed the treaty as it had been presented. As the table shows, a majority favored the treaty while about one-fifth of the public opposed it.

Having heard all of this, are you strongly in favor, somewhat in favor, somewhat opposed or strongly opposed to signing the new SALT treaty?

Strongly in favor	29%	67
Somewhat in favor	38	
Somewhat opposed	12	21
Strongly opposed	9	
Don't know	13	

Looking at demographic breakdowns of this new question, we see patterns that are, not surprisingly, much like those for the previous question.

Cambridge Survey Research

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -15-

Having heard all of this, are you strongly in favor, somewhat in favor, somewhat opposed or strongly opposed to signing a new SALT treaty?

	Strongly in favor	Somewhat in favor	Somewhat opposed	Strongly opposed	Don't know
<u>Overall</u>	29%	38	12	9	13
<u>Party preference</u>					
Democrat (44)	29	37	11	7	17
Independent (37)	28	40	11	11	10
Republican (17)	29	36	15	11	9
<u>Political ideology</u>					
Liberal (26)	35	36	12	5	12
Moderate (24)	29	43	8	7	13
Conservative (42)	27	36	15	13	10
<u>Carter favorability rating</u>					
Favorable (54)	32	40	11	6	11
Unfavorable (39)	24	60 36	13	14	13
Can't rate (7)	27	27	10	8	28
<u>Carter job performance rating</u>					
Excellent (4)*	38	33	9	7	13
Good (29)	35	40	10	5	10
Only fair (44)	27	37	12	9	14
Poor (21)	21	36	12	15	16
<u>Democratic primary for President</u>					
Carter (44)	29	70 41	9	8	13
Lean Carter (12)	36	35	13	1	15
Undecided (17)	24	23	11	8	34
Brown (22)	30	41	10	7	12
Lean Brown (5)	38	36	16	3	7
<u>Democratic primary for President</u>					
Kennedy (53)	28	63 35	11	8	19
Lean Kennedy (.9)	29	37	10	4	20
Undecided (11)	27	31	14	8	21
Carter (22)	35	44	7	7	7
Lean Carter (5)	32	36	17	3	11

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -16-

Favorability toward signing of SALT treaty (continued)

		<u>Strongly in favor</u>	<u>Somewhat in favor</u>	<u>Somewhat opposed</u>	<u>Strongly opposed</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
<u>Overall</u>		29%	38	12	9	13
<u>Sex</u>						
Female (50)		28	37	12	7	17
Male (50)		30	38	11	11	10
<u>Race</u>						
White (89)		29	38	12	9	12
Black (10)		25	31	8	11	25
<u>Occupation</u>						
Professional (5)		30	48	11	5	7
White collar (14)		34	39	11	9	7
White collar clerical (9)		27	41	10	11	11
Government (4)*		35	35	12	10	8
Skilled blue collar (14)		27	38	14	6	15
Unskilled blue collar (14)		30	38	8	10	14
Retired (26)		27	35	12	11	15
Self-employed (6)		25	41	15	9	9
<u>Ethnic background</u>						
Irish (11)		33	39	13	5	11
English (20)		30	37	13	11	9
French (4)*		27	41	10	9	13
German (17)		31	38	10	10	12
Italian (5)		39	27	12	12	12
Eastern European (7)		25	40	14	7	14
Scandinavian (4)*		19	46	19	10	7
Spanish (4)*		27	42	6	6	18
<u>Education</u>						
Some grade school (10)		23	30	11	10	27
Some high school (15)		29	36	11	7	18
Graduated high school (32)		27	39	11	10	13
Technical/vocational (5)		33	35	12	12	8
Some college (20)		27	39	14	10	10
Graduated college (12)		36	39	10	8	7
Graduate/professional (7)		36	40	10	8	6

A-1X/13/18

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -17-

Favorability toward signing of SALT treaty (continued)

	Strongly in favor	Somewhat in favor	Somewhat opposed	Strongly opposed	Don't know
<u>Overall</u>	29%	38	12	9	13
<u>Religion</u>					
Protestant (58)	27	39	11	9	14
Catholic (30)	31	38	11	8	12
Jewish (4)*	33	35	9	7	16
Other (4)*	20	24	28	16	13
None (4)*	40	32	6	10	12
<u>Income</u>					
\$0-3,999 (5)	22	27	8	11	32
\$4-6,999 (11)	27	40	11	8	15
\$7-9,999 (11)	27	36	11	13	12
\$10-14,999 (16)	29	39	12	7	13
\$15-19,999 (18)	32	36	10	8	13
Over \$20,000 (29)	31	41	13	9	7
<u>Union membership</u>					
Respondent (17)	34	36	11	12	8
Family member (13)	31	36	12	9	11
No member (70)	27	38	12	9	15
<u>Age</u>					
18-25 (12)	36	38	12	7	8
26-35 (17)	25	40	12	8	17
36-45 (17)	27	43	10	8	12
46-55 (18)	28	36	15	10	12
56-65 (17)	28	37	11	9	16
Over 65 (19)	30	33	11	11	14
<u>Urban/rural</u>					
Urban (46)	28	38	12	9	13
Suburban (35)	31	37	11	9	14
Rural (20)	27	37	13	9	14
<u>Area I</u>					
Northeast (15)	39	27	12	12	11
Industrial (25)	29	38	11	7	16
Midlands (15)	32	38	11	7	13
South (19)	27	64 37	11	11	14
Central (14)	18	42	14	12	14
Pacific (13)	27	42	11	9	11

Cambridge Survey Research

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -18-

Favorability toward signing of SALT treaty (continued)

		<u>Strongly in favor</u>	<u>Somewhat in favor</u>	<u>Somewhat opposed</u>	<u>Strongly opposed</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
<u>Overall</u>		29%	38	12	9	13
<u>Area II</u>						
California	(10)	28	38	12	11	12
West	(11)	20	49	12	8	11
New York	( 8)	48	21	12	9	10
South	(13)	28	35	12	12	15
Industrial	(28)	31	34	12	6	17
Border	( 8)	27	45	9	6	13
New England	( 7)	29	33	11	14	13
Midwest	(15)	23	43	13	11	10
<u>Area III</u>						
South	(24)	26	40	11	9	14
Industrial	(52)	33	34	11	8	14
Other	(24)	22	42	13	12	11

When we asked people to pick out things on the card that had helped them make up their minds we found that people who favored the agreement tended to go simply to the core issue -- the arms race and the chances of war might be reduced. People also picked the notion that our technology is sufficient to detect cheating.

[IF STRONGLY FAVOR/OPPOSES SALT TREATY] What one thing on the card was most significant to you in helping you decide about the treaty?

STRONGLY FAVOR

Limit arms, limit production of arms	25%
Limit chances of war	21
Balance of nuclear arms	9



Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -19-

What one thing was most significant to you (continued)

STRONGLY FAVOR (continued)

Stabilize arms race	8
We have technology to detect cheating	8
Prevent new arms race	5
Reduce number of arms	3
Can't trust Russians	3
Nothing on the card	3
Don't know	16

SOMEWHAT FAVOR

Limit arms, limit production of arms	16%
Limit chances of war	14
Balance of nuclear arms	13
Stabilize arms race	12
Prevent new arms race	5
Can't trust the Russians	4
Too difficult to police	3
We have technology to detect cheating	2
Nothing	2
Other	19
Don't know	9

People who opposed the treaty, not surprisingly, picked out the idea that we cannot trust the Russians, though many also cited the idea that the U.S. is not getting a good deal.

[IF STRONGLY FAVOR/OPPOSE SALT TREATY] What one thing on the card was most significant to you in helping you decide about the treaty?

SOMEWHAT OPPOSE

Can't trust the Russians	61%
U.S. not getting a good deal, making more concessions	16
Limit chances of war	7
Other	16
Don't know	—

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -20-

What one thing was most significant to you (continued)

STRONGLY OPPOSE

Can't trust the Russians	30%
Russians won't obey or abide by treaty	25
U.S. not getting a good deal	23
Nothing on the card	15
Double talk, too confusing, don't understand	7
Other	--
Don't know	--

We also asked people who indicated that they supported "an agreement to limit nuclear arms" on the earlier general question but who oppose this version of the treaty what, if anything, made them switch. About 8% of the total population were in this group and the reason given again centered on a lack of trust in the Russians or a fear that the Russians could grow too powerful. (Remember the figures shown in the table below are percentages of the 8% in the group; not of the whole population. Thus, 25% is actually about 2% of the total population.)

[IF SUPPORTED ARMS AGREEMENT BUT NOW OPPOSE] Earlier you said you favored an agreement to limit nuclear weapons; now you oppose this one. Why did you switch?

Can't trust the Russians	23%
Russia could easily become stronger than the U.S., would give Russia an edge	16
Understood it better after reading card	7
Can't force the Russians to abide by the treaty, have no means of enforcement	6

Current public attitudes on SALT

Page -21-

Why did you switch? (continued)

Terms are better for the Russians than for the U.S., bad deal for the U.S.	5
Can't police the treaty	2
Other	25
Don't know	16

What if no treaty?

One news commentator has recently argued that perhaps the strongest argument the treaty has going for it in the Senate is that no Senator likes to imagine what would happen if we don't have a treaty. In this survey we tried to find out what our respondents felt would happen if we fail to get a treaty.

As the first table shows, about one-third of the public weren't informed enough to even venture a guess on this topic. Another group felt that the status quo would persist. However, most people felt in some way that defense spending would have to increase and a new arms race would be on.

If the Senate of the United States refuses to approve a new SALT treaty, what do you think will happen?

Nothing will happen, status quo	15%
Have to come up with new approach or solution, more negotiations	10
New arms race, an arms race	7
Russians will get ahead, Russians will become stronger than the U.S., throw us behind Russians	6

Cambridge Survey Research

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -22-

If the Senate refuses to approve a new SALT treaty (continued)

Increased defense spending	5
Increased weapons production, countries will go crazy building weapons, will build weapons more rapidly, great production of war materials	5
Increased chance of another war	4
Another war	4
Will strain U.S.-Soviet relations	3
Continued weapons production	2
Continued arms race	2
Go on as before, country will continue as before	2
I am not concerned	1
Other	5
Don't know	30

To try to pin down expectations more accurately, we asked respondents if the chances of a nuclear war would increase or decrease in the absence of a treaty. As the table shows, the plurality volunteered the idea that the chances would not really change, but one-third felt they would increase while virtually no one felt they would decrease.

Do you think the chances of a nuclear war will increase or decrease if the Senate refuses to approve the SALT agreement?

Increase	32%
Decrease	5
Stay the same	44
Don't know	19

A-1X/13/20

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -23-

Demographic breakdowns show that liberals are more likely than conservatives or moderates to see the chances of a nuclear war increasing if the treaty is not passed. Feelings that the chances of nuclear war will increase are otherwise fairly uniform in most demographic groups.

Do you think the chances of a nuclear war will increase or decrease if the Senate refuses to approve the SALT agreement?

	<u>Increase</u>	<u>Decrease</u>	<u>Stay the same</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
<u>Overall</u>	32%	5	44	19
<u>Party preference</u>				
Democrats (44)	34	6	37	23
Independents (37)	30	5	49	17
Republicans (17)	31	5	50	15
<u>Political ideology</u>				
Liberal (25)	40	6	38	16
Moderate (24)	26	4	51	19
Conservative (41)	31	6	46	17
<u>Carter favorability rating</u>				
Favorable (53)	35	6	41	19
Unfavorable (39)	28	5	49	19
Can't rate (7)	25	5	43	27
<u>Carter job performance rating</u>				
Excellent (4)*	30	19	33	17
Good (29)	37	4	39	20
Only fair (44)	32	5	46	17
Poor (21)	24	5	49	22
<u>Democratic primary for President</u>				
Carter (18)	34	7	37	22
Lean Carter (5)	35	5	37	24
Undecided (7)	24	3	34	39
Brown (9)	40	6	37	16
Lean Brown (2)*	36	6	47	10

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -24-

The chances of nuclear war (continued)

	<u>Increase</u>	<u>Decrease</u>	<u>Stay the same</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
<u>Overall</u>	32%	5	44	19
<u>Democratic primary for President</u>				
Kennedy (23)	38	5	34	24
Lean Kennedy ( 4)*	32	3	40	25
Undecided ( 4)*	23	7	39	31
Carter ( 9)	35	10	39	16
Lean Carter ( 2)*	15	--	55	30
<u>Sex</u>				
Female (50)	33	4	39	23
Male (50)	30	6	48	16
<u>Race</u>				
White (88)	31	5	45	19
Black ( 9)	35	10	30	25
<u>Occupation</u>				
Professional ( 5)	31	6	55	9
White collar (14)	33	5	48	14
White collar clerical ( 9)	31	3	51	15
Government ( 4)*	27	5	49	20
Skilled blue collar (14)	37	5	41	17
Unskilled blue collar (14)	34	5	39	22
Retired (26)	31	5	41	23
Self-employed ( 6)	26	7	52	15
<u>Ethnic background</u>				
Irish (10)	32	6	45	18
English (20)	32	4	45	18
French ( 4)*	41	6	37	16
German (17)	29	3	50	17
Italian ( 5)	34	7	40	19
Eastern European ( 7)	34	6	45	15
Scandinavian ( 4)*	37	4	50	8
Spanish ( 4)*	26	6	31	37
Italian (29)	30	6	41	23

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -25-

The chances of nuclear war (continued)

	<u>Increase</u>	<u>Decrease</u>	<u>Stay the same</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
<u>Overall</u>	32%	5	44	19
<u>Education</u>				
Some grade school (10)	35	6	31	28
Some high school (14)	31	7	32	30
High school graduate (32)	31	5	47	17
Technical/vocational (5)	33	3	45	18
Some college (20)	33	5	45	17
College graduate (11)	24	6	55	14
Graduate/professional (7)	39	2	52	7
<u>Religion</u>				
Protestant (58)	32	4	45	19
Catholic (29)	31	7	43	19
Jewish (4)*	38	4	36	22
Other (4)*	17	8	58	17
None (4)*	37	8	35	21
<u>Income</u>				
\$0-3,999 (5)	34	3	29	35
\$4-6,999 (11)	37	8	34	21
\$7-9,999 (11)	30	8	40	22
\$10-14,999 (16)	30	8	46	15
\$15-19,999 (17)	33	3	46	18
Over \$20,000 (29)	33	4	50	13
<u>Labor union membership</u>				
Respondent (17)	37	7	41	15
Family member (13)	35	4	42	20
No member (70)	29	5	45	20
<u>Age</u>				
18-25 (12)	41	6	38	14
26-35 (17)	30	7	43	20
36-45 (17)	29	3	51	18
46-55 (18)	28	5	50	17
56-65 (17)	33	5	39	23
Over 65 (19)	30	6	42	22
<u>Urban/rural</u>				
Urban (46)	30	5	44	20
Suburban (35)	32	5	46	17
Rural (20)	33	5	39	22

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -26-

The chances of nuclear war (continued)

	<u>Increase</u>	<u>Decrease</u>	<u>Stay the same</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
<u>Overall</u>	32%	5	44	19
<u>Area I</u>				
Northeast (15)	29	5	47	19
Industrial (25)	34	6	43	17
Midlands (15)	38	3	40	19
South (19)	30	6	42	22
Central (14)	32	7	42	19
Pacific (13)	23	3	52	22
<u>Area II</u>				
California (10)	21	4	49	26
West (11)	32	7	46	16
New York ( 8)	24	5	50	22
South (13)	31	7	41	22
Industrial (28)	36	5	39	19
Border ( 8)	31	5	46	17
New England ( 7)	35	4	46	15
Midwest (15)	34	5	44	17
<u>Area III</u>				
South (24)	31	7	41	21
Industrial (52)	31	5	44	20
Other (24)	33	5	47	16

Interestingly, voters were somewhat more evenly divided on whether the security of the United States will increase or decrease if the treaty is rejected, though again the largest number felt that it would not be affected. This would seem to indicate that at least part of the current high level of support for the treaty is based on "hope" rather than on a firm belief that the treaty will pay off with actually improved security.



A-1x/13/28

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -27-

Do you think the security of the United States will  
increase or decrease if the Senate refuses to ratify  
the SALT agreement?

Increase	21%
Decrease	22
Stay the same	39
Don't know	19

Interestingly, demographic breakdowns show little difference between groups on this question. Women are slightly inclined to feel security will decrease without the treaty; men are slightly inclined the other way. Feelings that failure to pass a treaty will actually hurt security do increase somewhat as educational levels rise.

Respondents are much more in agreement over what will happen to the defense budget if the SALT treaty is not ratified; they believe it will go up.

Do you think the defense budget will increase or decrease if  
the Senate refuses to ratify the SALT treaty?

Increase	53%
Decrease	10
Stay the same	18
Don't know	19

Demographic breakdowns show that belief the budget will go up is greater among higher income and better educated respondents. However, few political differences can be seen; Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives all see the budget increasing.

Cambridge Survey Research

A-1X/13/29

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -28-

One point closely related to this has been raised by a number of observers. That is, that given the mania in the country for reducing government spending and balancing the budget, the defense department is a logical place to look for cuts. The problem of war is an argument frequently raised against the Constitutional amendment to require a balanced budget.

When we tested this idea with our respondents, however, we found that less than one-fifth found a lot of truth in it. As we have seen in the Cambridge Report analyses over the last four years, support for increasing defense spending has been on the rise while the desire to cut has waned.

Some people say that the only way the U.S. can ever hope to balance its budget and reduce taxes is to cut down the costs of defense spending. Do you think there is a lot of truth, only some truth or hardly any truth to this argument?

A lot of truth	16%
Only some truth	42
Hardly any truth	23
No truth at all	12
Don't know	7

Demographic breakdowns can be found in the Appendix of this report.

Cambridge Survey Research

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -29-

Competition with Russia

Obviously, one factor in deciding where you stand on the SALT treaty is deciding where the U.S. stands compared to the Russians. Critics of the treaty paint an apocalyptic picture of mighty Russian power spreading influence and control all around the world. On the other hand, many observers see the Soviet Union as a nation filled with problems and surrounded by enemies and doubtful allies.

We began our inquiry into how the American people see the issue by asking them to tell us whether they felt the U.S. or the Soviet Union had been more successful in world affairs in recent years. As the table below shows, by a modest plurality Americans chose the U.S.

In the last two years, which major power -- the United States or the Soviet Union -- has been more successful in world affairs?

The United States	42%
Don't know	26
The Soviet Union	32

Cambridge Survey Research

A-1x/13/31

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -30-

Demographic breakdowns show that Democrats are slightly more likely than Republicans to choose the U.S. but that pluralities of both chose the U.S. Feelings that the United States has done better also increase if people feel that President Carter has been doing a good job.

Lower income and less educated respondents tend to be more undecided on this question. The idea that the Soviet Union is doing better -- though always a minority sentiment -- actually increases with education and income, despite the fact that higher income and better educated people are, as we have seen, more likely to be treaty supporters.

In the last two years, which major power -- the United States or the Soviet Union -- has been more successful in world affairs?

	<u>The United States</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>The Soviet Union</u>
<u>Overall</u>	42%	26	32
<u>Party preference</u>			
Democrat (44)	45	28	27
Independent (37)	39	22	38
Republican (17)	37	29	33
<u>Political ideology</u>			
Liberal (26)	43	25	32
Moderate (24)	39	30	31
Conservative (42)	43	23	35
<u>Carter favorability rating</u>			
Favorable (54)	50	26	24
Unfavorable (39)	32	25	43
Can't rate (7)	30	38	32

Cambridge Survey Research

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -31-

Which major power has been more successful (continued)

	<u>The United States</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>The Soviet Union</u>
<u>Overall</u>	42%	26	32
<u>Carter job performance rating</u>			
Excellent ( 4)*	59	21	20
Good (29)	54	26	20
Only fair (44)	40	26	34
Poor (21)	26	27	47
<u>Democratic primary for President</u>			
Carter (44)	53	27	20
Lean Carter (12)	49	37	15
Undecided (17)	32	35	33
Brown (22)	41	20	39
Lean Brown ( 5)	40	27	33
<u>Democratic primary for President</u>			
Kennedy (53)	45	27	28
Lean Kennedy ( 9)	35	37	29
Undecided (11)	49	28	23
Carter (22)	50	25	25
Lean Carter ( 5)	43	39	18
<u>Sex</u>			
Female (50)	41	31	28
Male (50)	42	22	36
<u>Race</u>			
White (89)	41	25	34
Black (10)	44	36	20
<u>Occupation</u>			
Professional ( 5)	52	22	27
White collar (14)	40	23	37
White collar clerical ( 9)	46	19	35
Government ( 4)*	47	13	40
Skilled blue collar (14)	43	28	29
Unskilled blue collar (14)	41	27	32
Retired (26)	41	30	29
Self-employed ( 6)	34	29	37

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -32-

Which major power has been more successful (continued)

	<u>The United States</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>The Soviet Union</u>
<u>Overall</u>	42%	26	32
<u>Ethnic background</u>			
Irish (11)	44	23	33
English (20)	42	21	38
French (4)*	42	32	27
German (17)	42	28	30
Italian (5)	36	29	35
Eastern European (7)	39	21	40
Scandinavian (4)*	47	28	25
Spanish (4)*	45	33	21
<u>Education</u>			
Some grade school (10)	47	35	18
Some high school (15)	42	35	24
High school graduate (32)	40	27	33
Technical/vocational (5)	34	30	36
Some college (20)	45	18	37
Graduated college (12)	38	23	39
Graduate/professional (7)	45	18	37
<u>Religion</u>			
Protestant (58)	42	28	30
Catholic (30)	42	25	33
Jewish (4)*	32	26	42
Other (4)*	34	25	42
None (4)*	55	13	32
<u>Income</u>			
\$0-3,999 (5)	29	54	17
\$4-6,999 (11)	43	30	27
\$7-9,999 (11)	40	33	28
\$10-14,999 (16)	46	23	31
\$15-19,999 (18)	43	20	37
Over \$20,000 (29)	43	22	35
<u>Union membership</u>			
Respondent (17)	41	26	33
Family member (13)	46	24	30
No member (70)	41	27	32

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -33-

Which major power has been more successful (continued)

	<u>The United States</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>The Soviet Union</u>
<u>Overall</u>	42%	26	32
<u>Age</u>			
18-25 (12)	45	19	35
26-35 (17)	41	23	36
36-45 (17)	48	26	26
46-55 (18)	38	25	37
56-65 (17)	41	31	29
Over 65 (19)	40	32	29
<u>Urban/rural</u>			
Urban (46)	43	26	31
Suburban (35)	40	27	33
Rural (20)	42	27	31
<u>Area I</u>			
Northeast (15)	29	32	38
Industrial (25)	46	26	28
Midlands (15)	55	22	23
South (19)	38	29	33
Central (14)	44	25	31
Pacific (13)	35	23	42
<u>Area II</u>			
California (10)	34	24	42
West (11)	44	22	34
New York ( 8)	24	41	35
South (13)	39	29	32
Industrial (28)	46	27	27
Border ( 8)	46	24	31
New England ( 7)	34	23	43
Midwest (15)	50	24	26
<u>Area III</u>			
South (24)	42	27	32
Industrial (52)	42	27	31
Other (24)	41	24	35

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -34-

However, when respondents are asked not about success in the world but about nuclear arms development, we see a different picture. A slim plurality of our respondents feel we are behind the Soviets in developing nuclear arms.

Do you think we are currently ahead of or behind the Russians in nuclear arms development?

Ahead	25%
The same	22
Behind	31
Don't know	22

Of course, many people argue these days that "ahead" and "behind" don't really mean all that much when both sides have enough weapons to destroy each other several times over. When we raised this point, the table shows, people were almost evenly divided with a slim plurality coming down on the side that the distinction did not in fact mean much.

Some people say that we are falling behind the Soviet Union and that we need to build more weapons. Other people say that both we and the Soviet Union have enough weapons to destroy each other totally and, therefore, it is pointless to talk of being ahead or behind. First of all, do you think it means anything to talk about being "ahead" or "behind" these days or not?

Yes	36%
Not sure	19
No	45



Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -35-

When we compare the two questions, however, we find that it is the people who feel the distinction is meaningful who are most likely to feel that we are behind at this time. Thus, the perception of being behind is strongest among those who care.

	<u>Those who feel we are:</u>			
	<u>Ahead</u>	<u>Even</u>	<u>Behind</u>	<u>Not sure</u>
Those who feel it matters	29%	16	42	13
Those who feel it doesn't matter	24%	28	25	23

Looking at the demographic breakdowns of whether people feel we are ahead or behind, we find that Republicans and conservatives are the most inclined of political groups to feel that the U.S. is behind. Less educated respondents are more undecided on the question, but also they are proportionately more likely than the well educated to feel that we are behind.

Regionally, the South and Central areas -- traditionally most conservative -- are most likely to feel that the U.S. is behind Russia.

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -36-

However, even the people who feel the U.S. is currently ahead of the Soviet Union tend to see the Russians making progress and catching up. As the table shows, two-thirds of those who currently see us as being ahead see the Russians catching up.

[IF AHEAD] Do you think the Russians are catching up, staying about the same distance behind or actually falling farther behind?

---

Catching up	62%
Staying about the same distance	26
Falling farther behind	5
Don't know	7

All in all, this widespread perception that the Russians are either ahead or gaining on us militarily can only contribute to the unease with which some people view the treaty. Since it appears that "trust" in the Russians is the major obstacle to treaty support in the minds of many opponents, a further growth of the perception of Russian military strength can only hurt chances for ratification.

Cambridge Survey Research

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -37-

Arguments pro and con

We also tested reaction to several arguments in the arms control area. The first of these was the idea that the treaty will leave us weaker than the Russians. As the table shows, this is rejected by more than a two-to-one margin, but many people are undecided and could be swayed either way.

The new SALT agreement will leave us weaker than the Russians.

Agree	22%
Don't know	31
Disagree	47

Demographic breakdowns show that even Republicans and conservatives reject the idea that the treaty will leave us weaker, but by smaller margins than other political groups. People favorable to Jimmy Carter are more convinced that the treaty will not leave us weaker than people who dislike him. Indecision is particularly great among women, blacks and poorer, less educated respondents.

Cambridge Survey Research

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -38-

Would you agree or disagree: The new SALT agreement will leave us weaker than the Russians.

	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
<u>Overall</u>	22%	31	47
<u>Party preference</u>			
Democrat (44)	20	36	45
Independent (37)	24	26	50
Republican (17)	25	26	50
<u>Political ideology</u>			
Liberal (26)	18	30	52
Moderate (24)	16	37	47
Conservative (42)	30	24	46
<u>Carter favorability rating</u>			
Favorable (54)	16	31	53
Unfavorable (39)	31	27	42
Can't rate (7)	13	44	43
<u>Carter job performance rating</u>			
Excellent (4)*	20	30	50
Good (29)	18	29	53
Only fair (44)	19	33	48
Poor (21)	32	29	39
<u>Democratic primary for President</u>			
Carter (44)	20	32	48
Lean Carter (12)	11	41	48
Undecided (17)	21	55	25
Brown (22)	24	24	52
Lean Brown (5)	17	31	52
<u>Democratic primary for President</u>			
Kennedy (53)	24	33	43
Lean Kennedy (9)	17	37	47
Undecided (11)	12	51	37
Carter (22)	14	31	55
Lean Carter (5)	21	32	47

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -39-

...SALT will leave us weaker than Russians (continued)

	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
<u>Overall</u>	22%	31	47
<u>Sex</u>			
Female (50)	18	34	48
Male (50)	25	28	47
<u>Race</u>			
White (89)	22	29	49
Black (10)	19	48	33
<u>Occupation</u>			
Professional (5)	16	26	58
White collar (14)	18	25	57
White collar clerical (9)	22	31	47
Government (4)*	28	29	44
Skilled blue collar (14)	26	28	46
Unskilled blue collar (14)	22	31	46
Retired (26)	22	34	43
Self-employed (6)	24	16	60
<u>Ethnic background</u>			
Irish (11)	19	30	52
English (20)	23	25	52
French (4)*	19	26	55
German (17)	17	29	55
Italian (5)	26	22	52
Eastern European (7)	19	34	47
Scandinavian (4)*	25	30	46
Spanish (4)*	24	49	27
<u>Education</u>			
Some grade school (10)	23	45	32
Some high school (15)	24	38	38
Graduated high school (32)	19	31	50
Technical/vocational (5)	25	31	45
Some college (20)	26	25	49
Graduated college (12)	15	27	58
Graduate/professional (7)	20	20	60
<u>Religion</u>			
Protestant (58)	22	31	47
Catholic (30)	21	30	49
Jewish (4)*	15	40	46
Other (4)*	32	33	35
None (4)*	21	29	50

Cambridge Survey Research

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -40-

...SALT will leave us weaker than Russians (continued)

	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
<u>Overall</u>	22%	31	47
<u>Income</u>			
\$0-3,999 (5)	22	50	27
\$4-6,999 (11)	15	43	42
\$7-9,999 (11)	25	34	41
\$10-14,999 (16)	23	31	46
\$15-19,999 (18)	21	29	50
\$20,000 or over (29)	20	22	57
<u>Union membership</u>			
Respondent (17)	25	25	50
Family member (13)	23	26	52
No member (70)	21	34	46
<u>Age</u>			
18-25 (12)	22	31	48
26-35 (17)	21	31	48
36-45 (17)	18	30	53
46-55 (18)	25	29	46
56-65 (17)	21	33	47
Over 65 (19)	23	33	44
<u>Urban/rural</u>			
Urban (46)	22	34	45
Suburban (35)	21	29	51
Rural (20)	24	30	46
<u>Area I</u>			
Northeast (15)	21	36	43
Industrial (25)	20	27	54
Midlands (15)	17	32	52
South (19)	21	36	43
Central (14)	32	28	40
Pacific (13)	22	31	48
<u>Area II</u>			
California (10)	21	33	46
West (11)	33	25	42
New York (8)	17	46	37
South (13)	24	38	37
Industrial (28)	17	29	54
Border (8)	20	24	56
New England (7)	25	26	50
Midwest (15)	22	32	47

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Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -41-

...SALT will leave us weaker than Russians (continued)

	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
<u>Overall</u>	22%	31	47
<u>Area III</u>			
South (24)	25	32	43
Industrial (52)	18	32	50
Other (24)	26	28	46

A second question tested the idea that one cannot trust the Russians to keep an agreement, so there is no point in having a SALT treaty. Since this is the central point on which most opposition to SALT seems to hinge, it is disturbing to note that agreement -- i.e.: potential opposition to SALT -- is much higher than on the actual SALT questions. As the table shows, while a plurality still back SALT, it is a razor thin six point margin.

There is no point in negotiating a SALT agreement since the Russians won't keep their part of the bargain anyway.

Agree	37%
Don't know	21
Disagree	43

In some ways, it seems to us, this question may represent a better barometer of where people will end up after a long SALT debate than the actual SALT questions we saw earlier. It is, therefore, essential that the Administration clearly

Cambridge Survey Research

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -42-

make the point over and over again that we don't have to trust the Russians to verify SALT.

Looking at the demographic breakdowns, we see surprisingly little difference between Republicans and Democrats. Conservatives actually agree with the statement, while a plurality of liberals reject it. However, it is notable that even one-third of the liberals accept the idea. Disagreement increases with income and education; it is poorer and less educated voters who are least willing to trust the Soviet Union to abide by the treaty. Mistrust also increases as the age of the respondent increases.

Would you agree or disagree: There is no point in negotiating a SALT agreement since the Russians won't keep their part of the bargain anyway?

	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
<u>Overall</u>	37%	21	43
<u>Party preference</u>			
Democrat (44)	41	31	46
Independent (37)	38	16	46
Republican (17)	40	15	45
<u>Political ideology</u>			
Liberal (26)	31	22	48
Moderate (24)	30	26	44
Conservative (42)	44	17	40
<u>Carter favorability rating</u>			
Favorable (54)	31	20	49
Unfavorable (39)	46	19	35
Can't rate (7)	29	36	34

Cambridge Survey Research



Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -43-

...since the Russians won't keep their part of the bargain (continued)

	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
<u>Overall</u>	37%	21	43
Carter job performance rating			
Excellent (4)*	37	17	46
Good (29)	28	22	50
Only fair (44)	38	19	43
Poor (21)	46	23	31
Democratic primary for President			
Carter (44)	32	25	44
Lean Carter (12)	37	25	37
Undecided (17)	40	35	25
Brown (22)	33	21	46
Lean Brown (5)	41	26	34
Democratic primary for President			
Kennedy (53)	37	26	37
Lean Kennedy (9)	27	26	47
Undecided (11)	36	41	24
Carter (22)	27	20	53
Lean Carter (5)	53	17	29
<u>Sex</u>			
Female (50)	34	23	43
Male (50)	40	19	42
<u>Race</u>			
White (89)	36	19	45
Black (10)	39	39	23
<u>Occupation</u>			
Professional (5)	25	10	65
White collar (14)	30	18	52
White collar clerical (9)	32	22	47
Government (4)*	37	18	46
Skilled blue collar (14)	40	22	39
Unskilled blue collar (14)	31	25	45
Retired (26)	47	19	35
Self-employed (6)	39	14	47

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -44-

...since the Russians won't keep their part of the bargain (continued)

	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
<u>Overall</u>	37%	21	43
<u>Ethnic background</u>			
Irish (11)	36	21	43
English (20)	37	13	50
French (4)*	38	18	44
German (17)	35	19	45
Italian (5)	39	19	42
Eastern European (7)	36	21	43
Scandinavian (4)*	36	15	49
Spanish (4)*	38	41	22
<u>Education</u>			
Some grade school (10)	49	21	30
Some high school (15)	39	27	34
Graduated high school (32)	38	22	40
Technical/vocational (5)	31	26	43
Some college (20)	35	20	45
Graduated college (12)	28	14	58
Graduate/professional (7)	28	12	60
<u>Religion</u>			
Protestant (58)	37	20	42
Catholic (30)	36	22	42
Jewish (4)*	31	34	35
Other (4)*	47	13	40
None (4)*	34	16	50
<u>Income</u>			
\$0-3,999 (5)	48	29	23
\$4-6,999 (11)	41	25	34
\$7-9,999 (11)	43	21	36
\$10-14,999 (16)	35	18	47
\$15-19,999 (18)	34	21	46
\$20,000 or over (29)	31	18	52
<u>Union membership</u>			
Respondent (17)	37	19	45
Family member (13)	30	25	46
No member (70)	38	21	41

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -45-

...since the Russians won't keep their part of the bargain (continued)

	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
<u>Overall</u>	37%	21	43
<u>Age</u>			
18-25 (12)	32	20	48
26-35 (17)	30	27	44
36-45 (17)	32	23	45
46-55 (18)	36	20	44
56-65 (17)	37	17	46
Over 65 (19)	49	18	33
<u>Urban/rural</u>			
Urban (46)	34	26	40
Suburban (35)	39	17	45
Rural (20)	40	16	44
<u>Area I</u>			
Northeast (15)	39	23	38
Industrial (25)	31	18	51
Midlands (15)	30	22	48
South (19)	40	25	36
Central (14)	48	17	35
Pacific (13)	37	20	44
<u>Area II</u>			
California (10)	39	21	41
West (11)	40	19	41
New York (8)	33	36	31
South (13)	44	22	35
Industrial (28)	30	21	49
Border (8)	29	24	47
New England (7)	44	10	46
Midwest (15)	42	18	41
<u>Area III</u>			
South (24)	39	23	38
Industrial (52)	33	22	45
Other (24)	43	16	42

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -46-

Finally, we tested the idea that even if we don't have a SALT agreement we should take some steps on our own to reduce the arms race. While over one-third of the people accepted this, a plurality of respondents rejected it. It seems crystal clear that most people are not, at the moment, in a trusting or disarming mood.

Would you agree or disagree with the following statement:  
Even if we can't reach an agreement with the Russians, we  
should take some unilateral steps to reduce arms to show  
that we really want peace.

---

Agree	38%
Don't know	15
Disagree	48

Demographic breakdowns in the appendix show the same general patterns as other questions in this section.

### Conclusion

This survey clearly shows that the American people at this time support a SALT agreement and want it ratified. However, much of that support is shaky and laced with mistrust. Nonetheless, support seems deeper than we might have imagined. The essential issue for most Americans does not appear to have anything to do with the details of the agreement itself; it boils down to the essential question: can we trust the Russians to keep the treaty?

Current public attitudes on SALT  
Page -47-

As we see, current opponents of the treaty almost universally cite this as at least one reason for opposition. Even many current treaty supporters, however, are doubtful.

In presenting the treaty to the American people, therefore, supporters have to demonstrate that "trust" is not an element of the treaty. They must show that the U.S. can monitor and respond to any cheating before any serious damage or threat of damage arises.

The President will have to carry the argument on this point. It seems clear that with the exception of this point that support due to fear of nuclear war and an arms race is quite great and should be maintainable.

SALT APPENDIX

SALT

Do you think the defense budget will increase or decrease if the Senate refuses to ratify the SALT treaty?

	<u>Increase</u>	<u>Decrease</u>	<u>Stay the same</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
<u>Overall</u>	53%	10	18	19
<u>Party preference</u>				
Democrats (44)	49	11	16	23
Independents (37)	58	10	19	13
Republicans (17)	54	9	21	16
<u>Political ideology</u>				
Liberal (25)	58	14	13	14
Moderate (24)	54	5	23	19
Conservative (41)	54	11	19	16
<u>Carter favorability rating</u>				
Favorable (53)	53	11	16	20
Unfavorable (39)	55	8	21	16
Can't rate (7)	46	12	22	20
<u>Carter job performance rating</u>				
Excellent (4)*	49	11	22	18
Good (29)	52	9	19	20
Only fair (44)	57	11	15	16
Poor (21)	51	8	22	19
<u>Democratic primary for President</u>				
Carter (19)	44	12	19	24
Lean Carter (5)	56	3	19	22
Brown (9)	58	16	14	13
Lean Brown (2)*	43	21	13	23
Undecided (7)	50	7	10	33
<u>Democratic primary for President</u>				
Kennedy (23)	51	11	15	23
Lean Kennedy (4)*	46	11	20	23
Carter (9)	49	14	18	19
Lean Carter (2)*	53	4	17	25
Undecided (4)*	46	10	15	28
<u>Sex</u>				
Female (50)	51	10	19	21
Male (50)	56	11	18	16
<u>Race</u>				
White (88)	55	10	18	17
Black (9)	43	11	18	28

SALT

Defense budget if SALT not ratified (continued)

		<u>Increase</u>	<u>Decrease</u>	<u>Stay the same</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
<u>Occupation</u>					
Professional	( 5)	65	15	8	12
White collar	(14)	61	9	20	10
White collar clerical	( 9)	55	7	24	14
Government	( 4)*	52	13	18	17
Skilled blue collar	(14)	55	14	15	16
Unskilled blue collar	(14)	44	15	20	21
Retired	(26)	50	7	19	23
Self-employed	( 6)	62	7	16	15
Other	( 9)	50	5	15	29
<u>Ethnic background</u>					
Irish	(11)	52	10	21	17
English	(20)	59	8	16	17
French	( 4)*	61	7	16	16
German	(17)	51	12	19	17
Italian	( 5)	56	17	16	11
Eastern European	( 7)	71	6	12	12
Scandinavian	( 4)*	59	14	16	11
Spanish	( 4)*	38	13	25	25
Italian	(29)	47	10	20	24
<u>Education</u>					
Some grade school	(10)	46	13	11	30
Some high school	(15)	44	13	17	26
High school graduate	(32)	50	11	21	17
Technical/vocational	( 5)	56	7	17	20
Some college	(20)	59	7	19	15
College graduate	(11)	68	7	15	10
Graduate/professional	( 7)	57	10	23	10
<u>Religion</u>					
Protestant	(58)	50	9	21	20
Catholic	(29)	55	12	16	17
Jewish	( 4)*	75	4	9	11
Other	( 4)*	52	10	16	22
None	( 4)*	70	10	12	8



SALT

Defense budget if SALT not ratified (continued)

		<u>Increase</u>	<u>Decrease</u>	<u>Stay the same</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
<u>Income</u>					
\$0-3,999	( 5)	38	6	18	38
\$4-6,999	(11)	48	15	14	23
\$7-9,999	(11)	49	8	19	23
\$10-14,999	(16)	56	13	16	15
\$15-19,999	(17)	58	7	20	16
Over \$20,000	(29)	59	11	18	12
<u>Union membership</u>					
Respondent	(17)	56	10	18	16
Family member	(13)	55	13	16	16
No member	(70)	52	9	19	20
<u>Age</u>					
18-25	(12)	68	11	11	10
26-35	(17)	51	11	20	19
36-45	(17)	54	12	19	16
46-55	(18)	55	12	16	17
56-65	(17)	47	9	22	22
Over 65	(19)	49	8	20	24
<u>Urban/rural</u>					
Urban	(45)	57	10	14	19
Suburban	(35)	53	11	21	15
Rural	(20)	45	8	23	24
<u>Area I</u>					
Northeast	(15)	67	3	15	15
Industrial	(25)	46	17	19	18
Midlands	(15)	55	10	19	16
South	(19)	47	6	22	25
Central	(14)	58	13	14	15
Pacific	(13)	54	8	17	21
<u>Area II</u>					
California	(10)	52	9	18	21
West	(11)	62	10	15	13
New York	( 8)	74	1	11	14
South	(13)	46	8	21	25
Industrial	(28)	45	16	20	19
Border	( 8)	59	6	15	19
New England	( 7)	58	5	23	15
Midwest	(15)	54	10	18	18

Cambridge Survey Research

SALT

Defense budget if SALT not ratified (continued)

	<u>Increase</u>	<u>Decrease</u>	<u>Stay the same</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
<u>Overall</u>	53%	10	18	19
<u>Area III</u>				
South (24)	52	7	19	22
Industrial (52)	51	12	19	18
Other (24)	60	9	16	15

A-12/13/54

SALT

Do you think the security of the United States will increase or decrease if the Senate refuses to ratify the SALT agreement?

	<u>Increase</u>	<u>Decrease</u>	<u>Stay the same</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
<u>Overall</u>	21%	22	39	19
<u>Party preference</u>				
Democrat (44)	20	22	35	23
Independent (37)	23	21	41	14
Republican (17)	18	23	40	20
<u>Political ideology</u>				
Liberal (26)	21	25	38	17
Moderate (24)	16	22	43	19
Conservative (42)	23	23	38	17
<u>Carter favorability rating</u>				
Favorable (54)	21	25	35	19
Unfavorable (39)	20	19	43	19
Can't rate (7)	17	15	42	26
<u>Carter job performance rating</u>				
Excellent (4)*	29	24	36	11
Good (29)	22	25	32	20
Only fair (44)	19	23	41	17
Poor (21)	21	15	44	21
<u>Democratic primary for President</u>				
Carter (44)	21	22	37	21
Lean Carter (12)	22	27	29	22
Undecided (17)	14	16	30	40
Brown (22)	21	26	37	16
Lean Brown (5)	28	25	40	7
<u>Democratic primary for President</u>				
Kennedy (53)	20	23	33	24
Lean Kennedy (9)	19	24	37	20
Undecided (11)	26	19	26	29
Carter (22)	18	22	43	17
Lean Carter (5)	17	15	43	25

SALT

The security of the United States (continued)

		<u>-----</u> Increase	Decrease	Stay the same	Don't Know
<u>Sex</u>					
Female	(50)	19	24	34	23
Male	(50)	23	19	43	15
<u>Race</u>					
White	(89)	20	22	40	19
Black	(10)	27	19	29	25
<u>Occupation</u>					
Professional	(5)	21	36	33	10
White collar	(14)	23	21	44	13
White collar clerical	(9)	14	23	50	14
Government	(4)*	20	20	42	18
Skilled blue collar	(14)	24	22	38	16
Unskilled blue collar	(14)	26	21	29	24
Retired	(26)	17	22	39	22
Self-employed	(6)	25	19	40	16
<u>Ethnic background</u>					
Irish	(11)	19	22	39	20
English	(20)	20	25	40	15
French	(4)*	27	26	29	18
German	(17)	17	21	42	20
Italian	(5)	24	26	37	14
Eastern European	(7)	25	20	42	13
Scandinavian	(4)*	23	25	37	15
Spanish	(4)*	25	9	34	33
<u>Education</u>					
Some grade school	(10)	18	24	25	33
Some high school	(15)	22	16	34	28
Graduated high school	(32)	22	20	43	16
Technical/vocational	(5)	15	29	39	17
Some college	(20)	23	24	35	18*
Graduated college	(12)	21	22	45	11
Graduate/professional	(7)	11	27	51	10
<u>Religion</u>					
Protestant	(58)	19	22	39	20
Catholic	(30)	22	23	37	18
Jewish	(4)*	20	21	40	19
Other	(4)*	22	22	39	17
None	(4)*	26	18	35	21

A-18/13/56

The Security of the United States (continued)

	<u>Increase</u>	<u>Decrease</u>	<u>Stay the same</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>
<u>Income</u>				
\$0-3,999 (5)	17	22	21	41
\$4-6,999 (11)	18	22	37	22
\$7-9,999 (11)	26	18	33	23
\$10-14,999 (16)	20	24	39	17
\$15-19,999 (18)	21	23	38	18
\$20,000 or over (29)	22	24	43	12
<u>Union membership</u>				
Respondent (17)	21	21	43	15
Family member (13)	21	24	33	22
No member (70)	21	21	38	20
<u>Age</u>				
18-25 (12)	25	27	35	14
26-35 (17)	25	19	38	18
36-45 (17)	18	23	43	16
46-55 (18)	20	19	42	19
56-65 (17)	20	24	36	19
Over 65 (19)	16	21	37	27
<u>Urban/rural</u>				
Urban (46)	22	20	40	18
Suburban (35)	21	21	40	18
Rural (20)	16	27	33	24
<u>Area I</u>				
Northeast (15)	23	16	40	22
Industrial (25)	22	23	39	16
Midlands (15)	15	32	36	17
South (19)	19	19	36	25
Central (14)	27	19	37	17
Pacific (13)	17	20	44	19
<u>Area II</u>				
California (10)	18	20	42	21
West (11)	25	21	39	15
New York (8)	23	11	40	26
South (13)	20	19	35	26
Industrial (28)	20	26	36	18
Border (8)	19	25	39	17
New England (7)	21	21	42	17
Midwest (15)	20	23	41	17
<u>Area III</u>				
South (24)	21	20	37	22
Industrial (52)	20	23	38	19
Other (24)	22	21	41	16

Cambridge Survey Research

SALT

Do you think we are currently ahead of or behind the Russians in nuclear arms development?

	<u>Ahead</u>	<u>The same</u>	<u>Behind</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
<u>Overall</u>	25%	22	31	22
<u>Party preference</u>				
Democrat (44)	26	20	28	25
Independent (37)	27	23	31	19
Republican (17)	18	26	40	16
<u>Political ideology</u>				
Liberal (26)	30	21	28	20
Moderate (24)	25	27	25	23
Conservative (42)	23	20	38	19
<u>Carter favorability rating</u>				
Favorable (54)	28	22	27	24
Unfavorable (39)	22	21	39	18
Can't rate (7)	19	29	20	32
<u>Carter job performance rating</u>				
Excellent (4)*	38	22	20	19
Good (29)	30	21	27	22
Only fair (44)	25	24	29	23
Poor (21)	17	20	44	19
<u>Democratic primary for President</u>				
Carter (44)	34	15	27	24
Lean Carter (12)	18	35	19	28
Undecided (17)	17	19	36	27
Brown (22)	24	24	28	24
Lean Brown (5)	28	17	27	28
<u>Democratic primary for President</u>				
Kennedy (53)	25	18	31	26
Lean Kennedy (9)	23	37	21	19
Undecided (11)	24	20	24	33
Carter (22)	33	17	26	25
Lean Carter (5)	25	29	21	25

SALT

Ahead or behind Russians in development (continued)

	<u>Ahead</u>	<u>The same</u>	<u>Behind</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
<u>Overall</u>	25%	22	31	22
<u>Sex</u>				
Female (50)	21	21	32	26
Male (50)	29	23	31	18
<u>Race</u>				
White (89)	25	22	33	21
Black (10)	25	20	23	33
<u>Occupation</u>				
Professional (5)	24	25	32	19
White collar (14)	29	24	30	17
White collar clerical (9)	31	28	23	19
Government (4)*	28	19	36	17
Skilled blue collar (14)	21	24	35	20
Unskilled blue collar (14)	24	27	27	23
Retired (26)	25	17	35	23
Self-employed (6)	20	14	40	26
<u>Ethnic background</u>				
Irish (11)	21	22	31	26
English (20)	28	20	33	19
French (4)*	29	18	36	17
German (17)	19	26	35	21
Italian (5)	31	25	20	24
Eastern European (7)	31	25	25	19
Scandinavian (4)*	33	6	40	21
Spanish (4)*	29	23	25	23
<u>Education</u>				
Some grade school (10)	21	15	32	32
Some high school (15)	27	20	24	29
Graduated high school (32)	23	25	32	21
Technical/vocational (5)	24	30	25	21
Some college (20)	27	21	36	17
Graduated college (12)	25	25	32	18
Graduate/professional (7)	33	16	33	18
<u>Religion</u>				
Protestant (58)	25	19	34	22
Catholic (30)	24	27	29	20
Jewish (4)*	36	21	22	21
Other (4)*	16	30	26	28
None (4)*	35	13	27	25

Cambridge Survey Research

SALT

Ahead or behind Russians in development (continued)

	<u>Ahead</u>	<u>The same</u>	<u>Behind</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
<u>Overall</u>	25%	22	31	22
<u>Income</u>				
\$0-3,999 (5)	17	20	33	30
\$4-6,999 (11)	23	20	32	25
\$7-9,999 (11)	27	16	29	28
\$10-14,999 (16)	27	25	29	18
\$15-19,999 (18)	26	22	32	20
\$20,000 or over (29)	26	23	32	19
<u>Union membership</u>				
Respondent (17)	31	23	26	21
Family member (13)	21	27	30	22
No member (70)	24	21	33	22
<u>Age</u>				
18-25 (12)	27	23	30	21
26-35 (17)	24	24	30	22
36-45 (17)	21	26	32	22
46-55 (18)	26	20	31	23
56-65 (17)	25	18	36	22
Over 65 (19)	27	21	29	23
<u>Urban/rural</u>				
Urban (46)	27	22	30	20
Suburban (35)	23	24	31	22
Rural (20)	22	19	33	26
<u>Area I</u>				
Northeast (15)	24	18	26	32
Industrial (25)	25	30	28	17
Midlands (15)	32	20	26	22
South (19)	23	17	35	26
Central (14)	21	18	43	19
Pacific (13)	25	24	32	19
<u>Area II</u>				
California (10)	25	25	32	19
West (11)	24	17	43	17
New York (8)	27	20	18	35
South (13)	25	12	39	25
Industrial (28)	26	28	28	18
Border (8)	20	27	28	25
New England (7)	22	19	33	27
Midwest (15)	27	22	29	22

Cambridge Survey Research



SALT

Ahead or behind Russians in development (continued)

	<u>Ahead</u>	<u>The same</u>	<u>Behind</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
<u>Overall</u>	25%	22	31	22
<u>Area III</u>				
South (24)	23	18	34	25
Industrial (52)	26	25	27	21
Other (24)	24	19	37	21

A-1x/13/61

SALT

Do you favor or oppose an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union limiting nuclear weapons?

	<u>Favor</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>Oppose</u>
<u>Overall</u>	74%	12	14
<u>Party preference</u>			
Democrat (44)	75	13	12
Independent (37)	74	11	15
Republican (17)	69	12	19
<u>Political ideology</u>			
Liberal (26)	76	13	11
Moderate (24)	77	12	10
Conservative (42)	73	9	18
<u>Carter favorability rating</u>			
Favorable (54)	77	13	10
Unfavorable (39)	69	11	21
Can't rate (7)	72	19	9
<u>Carter job performance rating</u>			
Excellent (4)*	77	9	13
Good (29)	81	12	8
Only fair (44)	73	13	14
Poor (21)	67	11	22
<u>Democratic primary for President</u>			
Carter (44)	78	12	9
Lean Carter (12)	73	14	14
Undecided (17)	67	18	15
Brown (22)	77	8	15
Lean Brown (5)	77	13	10
<u>Democratic primary for President</u>			
Kennedy (53)	75	13	12
Lean Kennedy (9)	69	18	13
Undecided (11)	67	14	19
Carter (22)	83	8	9
Lean Carter (5)	72	14	14

A-1X/19/62

SALT

Agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union limiting nuclear weapons  
(continued)

	<u>Favor</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>Oppose</u>
<u>Overall</u>	74%	12	14
<u>Sex</u>			
Female (50)	72	16	12
Male (50)	75	9	16
<u>Race</u>			
White (89)	75	11	14
Black (10)	64	22	15
<u>Occupation</u>			
Professional (5)	73	11	16
White collar (14)	83	7	10
White collar clerical (9)	78	10	12
Government (4)*	73	11	16
Skilled blue collar (14)	73	12	15
Unskilled blue collar (14)	73	14	13
Retired (26)	70	13	17
Self-employed (6)	75	7	18
<u>Ethnic background</u>			
Irish (11)	76	10	14
English (20)	77	8	15
French (4)*	77	2	21
German (17)	74	12	14
Italian (5)	85	3	13
Eastern European (7)	72	22	7
Scandinavian (4)*	86	7	8
Spanish (4)*	60	24	16
<u>Education</u>			
Some grade school (10)	65	19	16
Some high school (15)	67	20	13
Graduated high school (32)	76	11	13
Technical/vocational (5)	73	11	17
Some college (20)	74	10	17
Graduated college (12)	84	7	9
Graduate/professional (7)	77	8	15
<u>Religion</u>			
Protestant (58)	72	13	15
Catholic (30)	76	12	12
Jewish (4)*	78	17	6
Other (4)*	72	5	23
None (4)*	77	14	9

SALT

Agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union limiting nuclear weapons  
(continued)

	<u>Favor</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>Oppose</u>
<u>Overall</u>	74%	12	14
<u>Income</u>			
\$0-3,999 (5)	63	25	12
\$4-6,999 (11)	74	16	11
\$7-9,999 (11)	68	15	17
\$10-14,999 (16)	76	11	13
\$15-19,999 (18)	76	10	14
\$20,000 or over (29)	81	8	12
<u>Union membership</u>			
Respondent (17)	75	11	15
Family member (13)	72	13	15
No member (70)	74	13	14
<u>Age</u>			
18-25 (12)	79	11	10
26-35 (17)	69	16	15
36-45 (17)	76	12	12
46-55 (18)	75	11	14
56-65 (17)	75	13	12
Over 65 (19)	72	11	18
<u>Urban/rural</u>			
Urban (46)	74	13	13
Suburban (35)	75	11	14
Rural (20)	71	13	17
<u>Area I</u>			
Northeast (15)	71	14	15
Industrial (25)	73	14	13
Midlands (15)	82	9	9
South (19)	72	14	15
Central (14)	73	9	18
Pacific (13)	72	13	15
<u>Area II</u>			
California (10)	66	16	18
West (11)	79	8	13
New York (8)	70	16	14
South (13)	68	15	18
Industrial (28)	75	14	11
Border (8)	77	11	12
New England (7)	73	11	17
Midwest (15)	78	7	15

SALT

Agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union limiting nuclear weapons  
(continued)

	<u>Favor</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>Oppose</u>
<u>Overall</u>	74%	12	14
<u>Area III</u>			
South (24)	71	14	15
Industrial (52)	74	14	12
Other (24)	77	7	17

SALT

How important is it to you personally that the U.S. and the Soviet Union reach an agreement limiting nuclear weapons: very important, important, somewhat important or not important at all?

	<u>Very important</u>	<u>Important</u>	<u>Somewhat important</u>	<u>Not important at all</u>
<u>Overall</u>	52%	22	11	10
<u>Party preference</u>				
Democrat (44)	52	24	11	8
Independent (37)	53	20	12	11
Republican (17)	49	22	11	14
<u>Political ideology</u>				
Liberal (26)	56	20	12	8
Moderate (24)	57	17	10	11
Conservative (42)	48	25	12	12
<u>Carter favorability rating</u>				
Favorable (54)	57	19	13	8
Unfavorable (39)	45	26	11	14
Can't rate (7)	55	23	6	11
<u>Carter job perfor- mance rating</u>				
Excellent (4)*	69	7	13	8
Good (29)	58	19	10	8
Only fair (44)	49	24	13	10
Poor (21)	46	27	9	15
<u>Democratic primary for President</u>				
Carter (44)	57	20	11	6
Lean Carter (12)	50	19	11	13
Undecided (17)	43	29	7	11
Brown (22)	46	30	13	7
Lean Brown (5)	60	24	10	3
<u>Democratic primary for President</u>				
Kennedy (53)	52	22	12	8
Lean Kennedy (9)	59	29	2	5
Undecided (11)	44	28	11	6
Carter (22)	52	24	12	7
Lean Carter (5)	46	23	11	21

A-1x/13/66

SALT

Importance of U.S. and Soviet Union reaching an agreement (continued)

		Very important	Important	Somewhat important	Not important at all	Don't know
<u>Overall</u>		52%	22	11	10	5
<u>Sex</u>						
Female (50)		51	25	10	8	6
Male (50)		52	19	13	13	3
<u>Race</u>						
White (89)		52	23	12	10	4
Black (10)		52	13	11	15	9
<u>Occupation</u>						
Professional (5)		51	20	19	8	1
White collar (14)		54	21	14	9	3
White collar clerical (9)		51	23	10	13	4
Government (4)*		54	25	11	9	2
Skilled blue collar (14)		50	24	12	10	4
Unskilled blue collar (14)		51	24	8	11	6
Retired (26)		53	20	10	12	5
Self-employed (6)		48	30	14	7	1
<u>Ethnic background</u>						
Irish (11)		46	29	10	8	7
English (20)		50	25	12	10	3
French (4)*		62	13	8	13	4
German (17)		59	20	10	8	3
Italian (5)		50	18	19	9	4
Eastern European (7)		52	22	13	9	4
Scandinavian (4)*		67	19	2	8	4
Spanish (4)*		38	20	10	20	12
<u>Education</u>						
Some grade school (10)		50	23	8	10	10
Some high school (15)		48	23	11	10	8
Graduated high school (32)		52	21	13	10	4
Technical/vocational (5)		47	25	11	15	1
Some college (20)		57	19	11	11	3
Graduated college (12)		50	24	13	10	3
Graduate/professional (7)		54	23	11	11	2
<u>Religion</u>						
Protestant (58)		52	22	11	10	5
Catholic (30)		51	23	12	10	4
Jewish (4)*		55	17	17	9	2
Other (4)*		46	25	9	20	—
None (4)*		47	23	12	13	5

SALT

Importance of U.S. and Soviet Union reaching an agreement (continued)

	Very important	Important	Somewhat important	Not important at all	Don't know
<u>Overall</u>	52%	22	11	10	5
<u>Income</u>					
\$0-3,999 (5)	53	24	6	8	10
\$4-6,999 (11)	55	18	12	8	7
\$7-9,999 (11)	50	19	12	17	2
\$10-14,999 (16)	54	21	9	10	6
\$15-19,999 (18)	51	24	10	11	4
\$20,000 or over (29)	53	23	14	8	3
<u>Union membership</u>					
Respondent (17)	56	18	9	15	3
Family member (13)	51	26	9	9	4
No member (70)	51	22	13	9	5
<u>Age</u>					
18-25 (12)	53	21	14	8	4
26-35 (17)	44	17	14	18	7
36-45 (17)	50	24	14	8	4
46-55 (18)	55	23	10	9	3
56-65 (17)	53	25	12	7	3
Over 65 (19)	55	22	7	11	6
<u>Urban/rural</u>					
Urban (46)	53	20	11	11	5
Suburban (35)	51	22	13	9	4
Rural (20)	50	27	8	11	5
<u>Area I</u>					
Northeast (15)	46	18	11	17	7
Industrial (25)	51	23	15	8	3
Midlands (15)	63	18	6	11	3
South (19)	51	22	11	9	7
Central (14)	50	27	13	9	1
Pacific (13)	49	24	11	11	6
<u>Area II</u>					
California (10)	49	20	14	11	7
West (11)	52	26	9	11	2
New York (8)	44	17	13	17	9
South (13)	52	20	8	10	10
Industrial (28)	59	18	12	7	4
Border (8)	44	34	15	7	1
New England (7)	49	20	10	17	5
Midwest (15)	48	27	12	13	1



A-IX/13/68

SALT

Importance of U.S. and Soviet Union reaching an agreement (continued)

	<u>Very</u> <u>important</u>	<u>Important</u>	<u>Somewhat</u> <u>important</u>	<u>Not</u> <u>important at all</u>	<u>Don't</u> <u>know</u>
<u>Overall</u>	52%	22	11	10	5
<u>Area III</u>					
South (24)	48	26	12	8	6
Industrial (52)	53	20	12	10	5
Other (24)	53	23	9	13	2

A-1x/13/69

SALT

Some people say that the only way the U.S. can ever hope to balance its budget and reduce taxes is to cut down the costs of defense spending. Do you think there is a lot of truth, only some truth or hardly any truth to this argument?

	<u>A lot of truth</u>	<u>Only some truth</u>	<u>Hardly any truth</u>	<u>No truth at all</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
<u>Overall</u>	16%	42	23	12	7
<u>Party preference</u>					
Democrat (44)	18	40	21	11	9
Independent (37)	16	44	24	12	4
Republican (17)	10	41	28	16	5
<u>Political ideology</u>					
Liberal (26)	26	43	19	6	6
Moderate (24)	15	47	21	12	6
Conservative (42)	10	38	29	17	6
<u>Carter favorability rating</u>					
Favorable (54)	16	45	21	11	7
Unfavorable (39)	15	40	28	13	5
Can't rate (7)	16	36	13	18	17
<u>Carter job perfor- mance rating</u>					
Excellent (4)*	21	38	28	5	8
Good (29)	16	45	19	12	8
Only fair (44)	16	43	25	11	5
Poor (21)	15	37	25	17	7
<u>Democratic primary for President</u>					
Carter (44)	16	41	22	12	9
Lean Carter (12)	15	49	17	9	10
Undecided (17)	27	37	10	12	14
Brown (22)	16	38	30	9	7
Lean Brown (5)	24	31	34	11	--
<u>Democratic primary for President</u>					
Kennedy (53)	20	39	21	10	10
Lean Kennedy (9)	21	37	20	11	12
Undecided (11)	17	39	16	19	9
Carter (22)	15	40	26	10	9
Lean Carter (5)	10	56	23	10	--

SALT

Only way to balance budget is to cut down the cost of defense spending (continued)

	<u>A lot of truth</u>	<u>Only some truth</u>	<u>Hardly any truth</u>	<u>No truth at all</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
<u>Overall</u>	16%	42	23	12	7
<u>Sex</u>					
Female (50)	17	42	21	10	10
Male (50)	15	42	25	14	4
<u>Race</u>					
White (89)	15	42	24	13	7
Black (10)	26	41	19	4	11
<u>Occupation</u>					
Professional (5)	16	43	28	7	6
White collar (14)	17	46	26	10	1
White collar clerical (9)	22	44	18	10	6
Government (4)*	19	46	12	23	—
Skilled blue collar (14)	15	44	24	9	8
Unskilled blue collar (14)	15	40	26	9	10
Retired (26)	15	39	22	16	8
Self-employed (6)	6	45	32	12	5
<u>Ethnic background</u>					
Irish (11)	15	38	29	10	8
English (20)	11	40	27	16	6
French (4)*	11	37	35	11	5
German (17)	15	42	25	13	6
Italian (5)	19	46	20	7	8
Eastern European (7)	27	47	18	6	2
Scandinavian (4)*	10	56	18	10	7
Spanish (4)*	14	44	9	17	16
<u>Education</u>					
Some grade school (10)	17	37	22	12	13
Some high school (15)	16	38	24	14	8
Graduated high school (32)	15	46	21	10	8
Technical/vocational (5)	12	39	27	14	9
Some college (20)	15	39	28	13	4
Graduated college (12)	19	41	27	12	1
Graduate/professional (7)	20	52	11	13	4
<u>Religion</u>					
Protestant (58)	14	41	25	13	7
Catholic (30)	17	44	21	11	7
Jewish (4)*	40	40	13	4	4
Other (4)*	10	43	27	13	6
None (4)*	20	44	21	9	5

A-1x/13/71

SALT

Only way to balance budget is to cut down the cost of defense spending (continued)

	<u>A lot</u> <u>of truth</u>	<u>Only</u> <u>some truth</u>	<u>Hardly</u> <u>any truth</u>	<u>No</u> <u>truth at all</u>	<u>Don't</u> <u>know</u>
<u>Overall</u>	16%	42	23	12	7
<u>Income</u>					
\$0-3,999 (5)	14	36	20	15	15
\$4-6,999 (11)	22	34	24	11	8
\$7-9,999 (11)	21	41	20	12	7
\$10-14,999 (16)	14	49	21	10	7
\$15-19,999 (18)	12	47	23	13	6
\$20,000 or over (29)	16	42	27	13	3
<u>Union membership</u>					
Respondent (17)	19	39	27	12	3
Family member (13)	18	43	22	8	10
No member (70)	15	42	23	13	7
<u>Age</u>					
18-25 (12)	23	47	17	7	5
26-35 (17)	21	44	23	8	5
36-45 (17)	14	42	24	12	8
46-55 (18)	13	42	26	12	7
56-65 (17)	11	44	24	15	5
Over 65 (19)	17	35	23	16	10
<u>Urban/rural</u>					
Urban (46)	18	42	21	11	8
Suburban (35)	17	43	23	12	5
Rural (20)	9	39	29	15	9
<u>Area I</u>					
Northeast (15)	25	36	17	9	14
Industrial (25)	16	47	23	9	4
Midlands (15)	17	45	22	12	5
South (19)	12	34	30	16	9
Central (14)	10	45	25	13	7
Pacific (13)	16	44	22	13	5
<u>Area II</u>					
California (10)	17	41	23	14	5
West (11)	12	47	25	13	4
New York (8)	29	29	20	6	16
South (13)	10	32	32	17	10
Industrial (28)	16	46	24	10	5
Border (8)	14	46	21	13	7
New England (7)	20	44	15	11	11
Midwest (15)	16	45	21	12	6

Cambridge Survey Research

A-18/13/72

SALT

Only way to balance budget is to cut down the cost of defense spending (continued)

	<u>A lot of truth</u>	<u>Only some truth</u>	<u>Hardly any truth</u>	<u>No truth at all</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
<u>Overall</u>	16%	42	23	12	7
<u>Area III</u>					
South (24)	11	39	28	14	8
Industrial (52)	18	42	23	11	6
Other (24)	16	44	20	13	7

Cambridge Survey Research

A-1x/13/73

SALT

Some people say that we are falling behind the Soviet Union and that we need to build more weapons. Other people say that both we and the Soviet Union have enough weapons to destroy each other totally and, therefore, it is pointless to talk of being ahead or behind. First of all, do you think it means anything to talk about being "ahead" or "behind" these days or not?

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Not sure</u>	<u>No</u>
<u>Overall</u>	36%	19	45
<u>Party preference</u>			
Democrat (44)	35	22	44
Independent (37)	38	14	48
Republican (17)	38	16	45
<u>Political ideology</u>			
Liberal (26)	31	16	53
Moderate (24)	34	19	48
Conservative (42)	42	16	42
<u>Carter favorability rating</u>			
Favorable (54)	35	19	46
Unfavorable (39)	39	16	45
Can't rate (7)	32	24	44
<u>Carter job performance rating</u>			
Excellent (4)*	22	21	57
Good (29)	37	22	42
Only fair (44)	35	17	48
Poor (21)	41	16	43
<u>Democratic primary for President</u>			
Carter (44)	35	22	43
Lean Carter (12)	31	19	50
Undecided (17)	38	28	33
Brown (22)	31	20	49
Lean Brown (5)	34	11	55
<u>Democratic primary for President</u>			
Kennedy (53)	37	19	44
Lean Kennedy (9)	20	28	52
Undecided (11)	33	35	32
Carter (22)	33	21	46
Lean Carter (5)	41	14	46

SALT

Ahead or behind the Soviet Union (continued)

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Not sure</u>	<u>No</u>
<u>Overall</u>	36%	19	45
<u>Sex</u>			
Female (50)	32	22	46
Male (50)	40	16	45
<u>Race</u>			
White (89)	37	17	46
Black (10)	30	25	45
<u>Occupation</u>			
Professional (5)	38	18	44
White collar (14)	41	10	49
White collar clerical (9)	30	14	55
Government (4)*	31	14	55
Skilled blue collar (14)	35	20	45
Unskilled blue collar (14)	29	22	48
Retired (26)	39	22	39
Self-employed (6)	39	14	48
<u>Ethnic background</u>			
Irish (11)	33	17	50
English (20)	41	16	43
French (4)*	37	13	51
German (17)	36	17	47
Italian (5)	33	16	51
Eastern European (7)	36	17	47
Scandinavian (4)*	49	18	33
Spanish (4)*	25	37	39
<u>Education</u>			
Some grade school (10)	33	30	38
Some high school (15)	31	31	39
Graduated high school (32)	35	19	46
Technical/vocational (5)	35	13	52
Some college (20)	36	13	50
Graduated college (12)	43	11	47
Graduate/professional (7)	48	9	43
<u>Religion</u>			
Protestant (58)	39	20	42
Catholic (30)	33	17	51
Jewish (4)*	27	21	53
Other (4)*	35	13	52
None (4)*	27	23	50

SALT

Ahead or behind the Soviet Union (continued)

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Not sure</u>	<u>No</u>
<u>Overall</u>	36%	19	45
<u>Income</u>			
\$0-3,999 (5)	37	25	38
\$4-6,999 (11)	30	26	44
\$7-9,999 (11)	36	20	44
\$10-14,999 (16)	39	17	44
\$15-19,999 (18)	35	17	49
\$20,000 or over (29)	38	12	50
<u>Union membership</u>			
Respondent (17)	35	14	52
Family member (13)	31	23	47
No member (70)	37	19	44
<u>Age</u>			
18-25 (12)	31	22	47
26-35 (17)	32	18	50
36-45 (17)	37	12	51
46-55 (18)	37	20	43
56-65 (17)	41	14	45
Over 65 (19)	37	25	38
<u>Urban/rural</u>			
Urban (46)	36	18	46
Suburban (35)	38	17	46
Rural (20)	34	23	43
<u>Area I</u>			
Northeast (15)	35	24	42
Industrial (25)	32	14	54
Midlands (15)	39	19	42
South (19)	40	17	43
Central (14)	40	19	42
Pacific (13)	33	24	44
<u>Area II</u>			
California (10)	31	25	44
West (11)	38	19	44
New York (8)	31	31	38
South (13)	43	15	42
Industrial (28)	33	17	50
Border (8)	31	18	51
New England (7)	37	16	47
Midwest (15)	42	17	41



SALT

Ahead or behind the Soviet Union (continued)

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Not sure</u>	<u>No</u>
<u>Overall</u>	36%	19	45
<u>Area III</u>			
South (24)	39	16	45
Industrial (52)	34	20	46
Other (24)	38	18	44

SALT

Would you agree or disagree: Even if we can't reach an agreement with the Russians we should take some unilateral steps to reduce arms to show that we really want peace?

	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
<u>Overall</u>	38%	15	48
<u>Party preference</u>			
Democrat (44)	39	19	42
Independent (37)	38	10	51
Republican (17)	33	10	58
<u>Political ideology</u>			
Liberal (26)	45	15	40
Moderate (24)	38	17	46
Conservative (42)	34	11	55
<u>Carter favorability rating</u>			
Favorable (54)	40	16	44
Unfavorable (39)	34	12	54
Can't rate (7)	44	16	40
<u>Carter job performance rating</u>			
Excellent (4)*	44	15	41
Good (29)	40	16	44
Only fair (44)	39	13	48
Poor (21)	32	14	55
<u>Democratic primary for President</u>			
Carter (44)	38	18	44
Lean Carter (12)	42	25	33
Undecided (17)	35	29	36
Brown (22)	42	13	45
Lean Brown (5)	39	11	51
<u>Democratic primary for President</u>			
Kennedy (53)	40	18	42
Lean Kennedy (9)	41	22	38
Undecided (11)	31	24	45
Carter (22)	41	17	41
Lean Carter (5)	29	26	45

SALT

Even if we can't reach an agreement with the Russians..... (continued)

	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
<u>Overall</u>	38%	15	48
<u>Sex</u>			
Female (50)	39	16	45
Male (50)	36	13	51
<u>Race</u>			
White (89)	37	13	50
Black (10)	42	27	31
<u>Occupation</u>			
Professional (5)	46	7	47
White collar (14)	39	11	50
White collar clerical (9)	41	12	47
Government (4)*	26	9	65
Skilled blue collar (14)	44	16	40
Unskilled blue collar (14)	34	19	47
Retired (26)	38	14	49
Self-employed (6)	27	10	63
<u>Ethnic background</u>			
Irish (11)	40	14	46
English (20)	32	11	57
French (4)*	37	7	56
German (17)	39	9	52
Italian (5)	44	19	37
Eastern European (7)	41	19	39
Scandinavian (4)*	36	17	47
Spanish (4)*	36	23	41
<u>Education</u>			
Some grade school (10)	34	25	42
Some high school (15)	38	23	38
Graduated high school (32)	38	13	48
Technical/vocational (5)	40	10	50
Some college (20)	37	10	54
Graduated college (12)	43	11	46
Graduate/professional (7)	28	13	59
<u>Religion</u>			
Protestant (58)	35	15	50
Catholic (30)	40	16	44
Jewish (4)*	49	11	40
Other (4)*	41	9	50
None (4)*	44	14	42

SALT

Even if we can't reach an agreement with the Russians ..... (continued)

	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
<u>Overall</u>	38%	15	48
<u>Income</u>			
\$0-3,999 (5)	40	28	32
\$4-6,999 (11)	39	20	41
\$7-9,999 (11)	45	16	39
\$10-14,999 (16)	36	14	50
\$15-19,999 (18)	33	15	51
\$20,000 or over (29)	39	8	53
<u>Union membership</u>			
Respondent (17)	38	14	48
Family member (13)	39	14	47
No member (70)	38	15	47
<u>Age</u>			
18-25 (12)	51	16	33
26-35 (17)	36	17	47
36-45 (17)	36	16	49
46-55 (18)	36	14	50
56-65 (17)	36	12	53
Over 65 (19)	38	14	49
<u>Urban/rural</u>			
Urban (46)	39	15	45
Suburban (35)	37	15	49
Rural (20)	35	14	51
<u>Area I</u>			
Northeast (15)	36	19	45
Industrial (25)	41	14	45
Midlands (15)	43	14	43
South (19)	31	18	51
Central (14)	39	7	54
Pacific (13)	36	15	49
<u>Area II</u>			
California (10)	32	15	53
West (11)	43	11	47
New York (8)	41	27	32
South (13)	25	18	57
Industrial (28)	41	14	45
Border (8)	45	17	39
New England (7)	29	12	59
Midwest (15)	41	9	50

A-1 x/13/80

SALT

Even if we can't reach an agreement with the Russians ..... (continued)

	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Don't know</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
<u>Overall</u>	38%	15	48
<u>Area III</u>			
South (24)	33	18	49
Industrial (52)	40	16	44
Other (24)	37	9	54

Recd. 6/13/79

A-1x/14/1

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

TO: Judy Powell  
FROM: Arne Kesler  
DATE: 6/4/79

The attached is for your:

- |                 |                  |
|-----------------|------------------|
| Information     | Review & Comment |
| Letter Response | Action           |
| Signature       | File             |
| Other           |                  |

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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A-1x/14/2

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 2, 1979

REPORT ON SALT BRIEFINGS & MEETINGS FOR INTEREST GROUPS  
(Washington-based Staff)

Pro-SALT Groups -- Three meetings held to date. The first, on May 1, included an update on the negotiations (not yet completed) and a summary of the outreach and media activities in progress or planned by State, ACDA, and the White House. The second, on May 16, was a briefing on the just-concluded agreement. The third, on May 23, involved a summary by each organization of its activities and concluded with suggestions as to how the groups might coordinate activities by organizing into subcommittees. The fourth meeting is scheduled for June 6 and is expected to include a report on how the coordination or subcommittee organizing effort is working out.

The groups involved in these meetings include Americans for SALT, the Religious Committee on SALT, the UAW, the Center for Defense Information, the Council for a Livable World, New Directions, the Arms Control Association, and others. They are eager to help on SALT and have already invested substantial resources in such activities as films (two exist, one by the Center for Defense Information, one by the Committee on East-West Accord), publications, press briefings and press conferences, and grass-roots organizing (the weakest activity to date, but the one on which several groups are now beginning to focus in a concerted manner). Many of the groups are very concerned about related defense issues like the MX and have made it clear that, if the President makes decisions on these issues with which they are unhappy, it could affect their support (or at least their active support) for SALT.

State & Local Government Groups -- Briefed May 18 by David Aaron. Audience included executive directors of National Governors Ass'n, National Conf. of State Legislatures, National Ass'n of Counties, Conf. of Mayors, and others. Generally concerned about extent to which they should become involved, given the large domestic agendas of their groups. Jane Hartley to follow up.

A-1x/14/3

- 2 -

Religious Groups -- Briefed May 18 by Roger Molander. Audience included Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant denominations. Will be favorable to SALT, but concerned about other defense issues like MX. Religious Committee on SALT has already organized most of these groups into pro-SALT force. Phil Spector to follow up.

Corporate Representatives of Member Companies of US/USSR Trade Council -- Briefed May 24 by David Aaron. Audience included reps of International Harvester, 3M, Pullman, and the like. Generally favorable to SALT and interested in being helpful. Steve Selig and Richie Reiman to follow up.

Corporate Representatives of Defense Contractors -- Briefed May 30 by Walt Slocombe. Audience included reps of Lockheed, Litton, Bell Aerospace, Goodyear, and the like. More skeptical than first corporate rep group, and concerned about whether support of SALT by the "arms merchants" would help or hurt with American public and Senate. Selig and Reiman to follow up.

Trade Associations with Interests in USSR Trade -- Briefed May 31 by Kempton Jenkins and Al Pierce. Audience included reps of American Gas Ass'n, Electronic Industries Ass'n, International Chamber of Commerce, and the like. Many personal doubts about SALT expressed, but interest in having boards briefed as step toward possible later involvement. Selig and Reiman to follow up.

Agricultural and Rural Groups -- Briefed May 31 by Bob Bergland and Roger Molander. Audience included major farm groups and more specific agricultural interests (e.g., soybeans, cotton, rice, etc.). Interested in relationship between SALT and US-Soviet trade. Spector and Lynn Daft to follow up.

Future Briefings -- Planned: June 4, veterans & military groups, Slocombe; June 4, environmental groups, Molander; June 5, additional corporate representatives, Bill Dyess. Under consideration: minority groups, women's groups, ethnics.

→ All attendees at these briefings will receive a letter around the time of the summit, offering a briefing for group members, boards of directors, and the like, either in Washington or at a place convenient to the group.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

A-18/15/1

TO: Indy Powell  
FROM: Donna Widen  
DATE: 6/13

The attached is for your:

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Information	<input type="checkbox"/> Review & Comment
<input type="checkbox"/> Letter Response	<input type="checkbox"/> Action
<input type="checkbox"/> Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> File
<input type="checkbox"/> Other	

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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*International*

LONGSHOREMEN'S and WAREHOUSEMEN

*Union*

84 UNION STREET ▲ SEATTLE 1, WASHINGTON

SEATTLE ILWU PENSIONERS' CLUB

June 6, 1979

*Done  
We filed*

*Jody*

President Jimmy Carter  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.  
Washington D. C.

Dear Mr. President;

We wish to thank you and to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your staunchness and accomplishment thus far on the vitally important issue of SALT 11 Agreement.

Also, we feel that the ratification of SALT 11 is the most important question now before the American people, in-as-much, as the security of the United States and the world largely depends on the agreement, which you have stated.

The outspoken support for SALT 11 by the distinguished Social Democratic Statesman, Willy Brandt Helmut Schmidt, of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) is a clear indication of where the trade union rank and file of Germany and Europe as a whole stand on this question.

Therefore, again, Mr. President regardless of what Senator Jackson may or may not do, we will do everything within our power to help win support for SALT 11 in the labor movement and especially among our fellow senior citizens in our great State of Washington.

Respectfully yours

*Thomas R. Richardson*  
Tom R. Richardson, President

*Rosco G. Craycraft*  
Rosco G. Craycraft  
Recording Secretary

A-1x/15/3

RESOLUTION

WHEREAS, the United States of America and the Soviet Union are on the verge of signing a new Arms Limitation Treaty; and

WHEREAS, the new proposed Salt Treaty will greatly restrict military arms development; and

WHEREAS, it is the belief of this governing body that such Treaty will be disregarded by the Soviet Union in the same manner as they have ignored past treaties; and

WHEREAS, the President's support of this Treaty will only hinder United States military development while allowing Russia to continue her relentless efforts towards world military domination; and

WHEREAS, this governing body supports the rejection of this Treaty by the United States Senate.

NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved by the Mayor and Council of the Borough of Seaside Heights, County of Ocean, State of New Jersey, as follows:

1. That the Mayor and Council of the Borough of Seaside Heights hereby formally oppose the new Salt Treaty between the United States and Russia as an ill-conceived agreement that will be detrimental to the military strength of the United States of America.

2. That the Borough Clerk is hereby authorized and directed to forward a certified copy of this resolution to the following:

- a. President Carter,
- b. United States Senators Harrison Williams and Bill Bradley,
- c. New Jersey Congressional Delegation.

CERTIFICATION

I, BARBARA SIMONIELLO, Clerk of the Borough of Seaside Heights, in the County of Ocean, State of New Jersey, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of a resolution adopted by the Mayor and Council of the Borough of Seaside Heights at a regular meeting of said governing body duly held on the 29<sup>th</sup> day of May, 1979.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the Borough of Seaside Heights this 8<sup>th</sup> day of June, 1979.

Barbara Simonello  
BARBARA SIMONIELLO, Borough Clerk

RESOLUTION

WHEREAS, there is now a proposal before the United States Congress authorizing the expenditure of funds for the transfer of the Panama Canal to the government of Panama; and

WHEREAS, it is the belief of this governing body that the United States Government should not appropriate any funds for this purpose since it has already committed itself to transferring this multimillion dollar canal.

NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved by the Mayor and Council of the Borough of Seaside Heights, County of Ocean, State of New Jersey, as follows:

1. That the Mayor and Council of the Borough of Seaside Heights hereby oppose the United States government spending any funds to implement the transfer of ownership to the Panama Canal since the people of this Country have already paid for this facility.

2. That the Borough Clerk is hereby authorized and directed to forward a certified copy of this resolution to the following:

- a. President Carter,
- b. United States Senators Harrison Williams and Bill Bradley,
- c. New Jersey Congressional Delegation.

CERTIFICATION

I, BARBARA SIMONIELLO, Clerk of the Borough of Seaside Heights, in the County of Ocean, State of New Jersey, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of a resolution adopted by the Mayor and Council of the Borough of Seaside Heights at a regular meeting of said governing body duly held on the 29<sup>th</sup> day of May, 1979.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the Borough of Seaside Heights this 8<sup>th</sup> day of June, 1979.

Barbara Simonello  
BARBARA SIMONIELLO, Borough Clerk



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

A-12/16/11  
7915214

To: ACDA - General Seignious  
C - Mr. Nimetz ✓

From: PA - William J. Dyess, Acting

Margin of Support for SALT  
Narrowed Before Congress Recessed

Summary

The latest NBC and Roper polls show increased opposition to SALT between early May and mid-July. Both polls repeated questions asked previously, and both revealed more opposition than previously. Roper's question, which highlighted the signing of the treaty, was asked before the speech of July 15, while the sojourn at Camp David dominated the news. The NBC question was asked immediately after the speech, while it dominated the news.

The percentaged responses produced by the NBC and Roper questions are not comparable because the questions are quite different. Both questions, however, evoked a markedly diminished spread between the favorable and unfavorable responses. SALT supporters were ahead of opponents by 2 points in the Roper poll (instead of 9 in May) and by 4 points in the NBC poll (instead of 19 in May).

The two sets of July percentages were:

	<u>Roper</u>	<u>NBC</u>
For SALT	31%	21%
Against SALT	29	17
Don't know enough	--	58
Mixed feelings	21	--
No opinion	19	4

End Summary

Self Copy  
Carter Library

Roper

Roper interviewers repeated a question asked four times since November 1978 (except for a change in the first sentence, inserted this time):

"In June, President Carter for the U.S. and President Brezhnev for Russia signed a new SALT TREATY. (Previously, the opening sentence was, "The U.S. and Russian negotiators have about reached agreement on a SALT Treaty.") The treaty, which would last until 1985, limits each country to a maximum of 2,250 long-range nuclear missiles and bombers. As you know, there's a good deal of controversy about this proposed treaty. Do you think the U.S. Senate should vote for the new SALT treaty or against it?"

	July 7-14 1979	Apr. 18- May 5 1979	Jan. 1979	Nov. 1978
For	31%	33%	40%	42%
Against	29	24	21	20
Mixed feelings (volunteered)	21	20	19	17
Don't know	19	23	20	21
<u>Net difference between</u> <u>"For" and "Against"</u>	+2	+9	+19	+22

For this question, Roper interviewers have been regularly instructed to accept--but not invite--ambivalent answers rather than follow the usual procedure of trying to prod respondents to give a committed response. This accounts for the high proportion of "mixed-feeling" responses in the Roper data.

Between May and July, union members, blue-collar workers, and those with a high-school education or less increased their opposition to SALT markedly. Regionally, the West showed the greatest increase in opposition to SALT, swinging from a plurality supporting SALT to a plurality opposing it. Republicans and Conservatives also switched from plurality support to plurality opposition.

Groups that continued to show sizable margins of support for SALT were the college-educated, young adults (18-29), executives and professionals, liberals. The young adults were the only group showing no increase in opposition between

A-1x/16/3

- 3 -

May and July, and the change among liberals was minimal. Regionally, the Midwest retained the largest margin of support for SALT, though it was smaller than in May. The South's pro-SALT margin, though minimal in statistical terms, was apparently unchanged.

The May and July responses for specific groups follow (mixed-feeling and no-opinion responses are omitted):

	<u>July</u>		<u>May</u>	
	<u>For</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>For</u>	<u>Against</u>
Total	31%	29%	33%	24%
18-29 years old	33	26	33	26
45-59 years old	30	33	34	23
\$15-\$25,000 annually	34	28	36	23
\$25,000-plus annually	35	33	39	27
Northeast	27	28	34	23
Midwest	33	25	36	22
South	32	28	28	25
West	30	37	36	25
Democrats	35	27	35	21
Republicans	30	35	34	27
Conservatives	28	33	30	28
Liberals	40	25	39	19
Executives/Professionals	39	26	46	23
Union members	30	35	37	27
College-educated	39	26	44	23
High school-educated	29	31	30	25
Catholics	31	27	34	25
Protestants	30	30	31	23

#### NBC

NBC's latest SALT poll was conducted several days after the Roper interviewing was completed. NBC interviewers allowed respondents to avoid giving an opinion by offering them the option of saying they didn't "know enough." Like Roper, NBC was repeating its question for the first time since the treaty was signed and therefore changed some of the opening words of the question:



A-IX/16/4

"Recently the United States and the Soviet Union reached ("At the present time, the United States and the Soviet Union are close to reaching") agreement on a new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, usually called SALT II. Have you already heard enough about it to have an opinion?" (If respondent answered "yes," then was asked) "Do you favor or oppose this new SALT agreement?"

	1979		
	July 16-17	Apr. 30-May 1	Mar. 19-20
Don't know enough	58%	64%	79%
Favor	21	26	13
Oppose	17	7	6
Not sure	4	3	2
<u>Net difference between</u> <u>"Favor" and "Oppose"</u>	+4	+19	+7

NBC also repeated its question asking about attitudes toward the idea of a nuclear-arms agreement rather than SALT, itself. The question had been asked previously in April, and the responses showed no statistically meaningful change between April and July. We still maintain, as in the past, that responses to this question do not reflect attitudes toward the actual treaty.

"Do you favor or oppose agreements between the United States and Russia which limit nuclear weapons?"

	<u>July</u>	<u>April</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>February</u>
Favor	65%	68%	71%	81%
Oppose	25	22	18	14
Not sure	10	10	11	5
<u>Net difference between</u> <u>"Favor" and "Oppose"</u>	+40	+46	+53	+67

PA/OAP:Broshco:bds  
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6  
A-1x/17/1  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 18, 1979

Here are some of the recent  
SALT endorsements.

One list is organizations  
and one is prominent citizens,  
by state.

Anne Wexler

Alabama

David Matthews  
President  
University of Alabama

General Ray Furlong  
(U.S. Army-Retired)

California

Mayor Thomas Bradley  
Los Angeles

Jonas Salk

Thornton Bradshaw  
Chief Executive Officer  
ARCO

Edmund G. (Pat) Brown  
former Governor

Paul J. Flory  
Stanford University

Armand Hammer  
Chairman of the Board  
Occidental Petroleum Corp.

Marina Von Neuman Whitman  
Center for Advanced Study  
in the Behavioral Sciences

Colorado

Walter Orr Roberts  
Aspen Institute

Connecticut

Edward Gant  
Acting President  
University of Connecticut

Peter McColough  
Chairman  
Xerox, Inc.

Paul Newman

A-1x/12/3

Delaware

Irving Shapiro  
Chairman of the Board  
DuPont de Nemours

District of Columbia

Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker

Marjorie Bell Chambers

William E. Colby

Arthur Goldberg

Ambassador Averell Harriman

Christian Herter

Townsend Hoopes

Mildred Jeffrey  
National Women's Political Caucus

Ambassador Sol Linowitz

Ambassador George McGhee

Thomas J. McIntyre  
former senator

Patsy Mink  
President  
Americans for Democratic Action

Ambassador Kenneth Rush

Sargent Shriver

Stuart Symington  
former senator

Ambassador Charles Yost

William Winpisinger  
International Association of Machinists

William Wynn  
United Food and Commercial Workers

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Carter Library

A-1x/17/4

Florida

Radford D. Lovett  
President  
Piggly Wiggly Corporation

Georgia

James E. Andrews  
Stated Clerk  
Presbyterian Church in the USA

Coretta Scott King

Donald Stewart  
President  
Spelman College

Illinois

Reverend Jesse Jackson

Phillip M. Klutznick

Brooks McCormick  
Chairman  
International Harvester

Indiana

Reverend Theodore Hessburg

John Ryan  
President  
Indiana University

Reverend Kenneth Teegarden  
President  
Disciples of Christ Church

Maryland

Dr. Milton Eisenhower

Massachusetts

Graham Allison  
Dean, Kennedy School of Government

A-1K/17/5

Professor Paul Doty  
Director, Center for Science and  
International Affairs, Harvard

John Kenneth Galbraith

General James Gavin

George Kistiakowski

John W. McCormack  
former Speaker

Donald K. Price  
Dean Emeritus, Kennedy School

Jerome Weisner  
President, M.I.T.

Michigan

E. M. Estes  
President  
General Motors Corporation

Douglas Fraser  
President, UAW

Minnesota

David W. Preus  
President  
American Lutheran Church

Burton Joseph  
Honorary National Chairman  
B'nai B'rith

Missouri

James McDonnell  
Chairman  
McDonnell Douglas

New York

Robert Benjamin  
United Artists Corporation

A-1x/17/6

Norman Cousins

Angier Biddle Duke

Murray Finley  
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers

Clifton Garvin  
Chairman of the Board  
Exxon Corporation

Malcolm S. Forbes  
Forbes Magazine

Donald M. Kendall  
Chairman  
Pepsico, Inc.

Richard Gelb  
Chairman  
Bristol-Meyers Company

Robert Hatfield  
Chairman  
The Continental Group, Inc.

Vernon Jordan  
National Urban League

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Alfred A. Knopf

George P. Livanos  
Seres Shipping Company

Betty Goetz Lall  
New York State School of Industrial Relations

Joyce D. Miller  
Coalition of Labor Union Women

Stewart Mott

William S. Paley  
Chairman  
CBS, Inc.

Avery D. Post  
President  
United Church of Christ

A-1X/17/7

Robert V. Roosa  
Brown Brothers, Harriman and Company

Harrison E. Salisbury  
New York Times

Rabbi David Saperstein  
Union of American Hebrew Congregations

Theodore Sorenson

Marietta E. Tree

Richard Shinn  
President  
Metropolitan Life Insurance

J. Stanford Smith  
Chairman  
International Paper Company

Martha Wallace  
Henry Luce Foundation

George Weissman  
Chairman  
Philip Morris

North Carolina

William Friday  
President  
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Terry Sanford  
President  
Duke University

Pennsylvania

Lloyd McBride  
President  
United Steelworkers

Martin Myerson  
President  
University of Pennsylvania

L. Stanton Williams  
Chairman  
PPG Industries



Library  
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Tennessee

A-1x17/8

Benjamin Hooks  
NAACP

Dr. Herman Postma  
Director  
Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Dr. Foy Valentine  
Southern Baptist Convention

Texas

Harding Lawrence  
Chairman  
Braniff Airlines

Virginia

Admiral Isaac Kidd

Vice Admiral Gerald E. Miller  
(USN-Retired)

General Bruce Palmer  
(U.S. Army-Retired)

Vice Admiral William Raborn  
(USN-Retired)

Dr. Herbert Scoville

Wisconsin

Robert E. Matteson  
former director of White House  
Disarmament Staff

Martin Schreiber  
former governor

Progressive Alliance Board--Unions'  
Representatives Who Endorsed  
SALT II

Douglas Frasier, UAW  
Jerry Wurf, American Federation of State, County, and  
Municipal Employees  
Tony Dechant, American Farmers Union  
J.C. Turner, Operating Engineers  
William Wimpisinger, International Association of Machinists  
Addie Wyatt, Food and Commercial Workers (Meatcutters and  
Retail Clerks unions)

A. Philip Randolph Institute  
Action for Children's Television  
Amalgamated Clothing & Textile  
Workers Union  
American Association of University  
Professors  
American Business Association  
American Business Women's  
Association  
American Civil Liberties Union  
American Federation of State,  
County & Municipal Employees  
American Federation of Teachers  
American Indians Movement  
American Parents Committee  
American Veteran's Committee  
Americans for Democratic Action  
Association National Pro Personas  
Mayores  
Association of Community  
Organizations for Reform NOW  
California Conference (Alternative  
State and Local Public Policies)  
Campaign for Economic Democracy  
CAPE/Interchange  
Center for Community Change  
Children's Defense Fund  
Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition  
Coalition of American Public Employees  
Coalition of Black Trade Unionists  
Coalition of Labor Union Women  
Committee for National Health  
Insurance

Communications Workers of  
America  
Community for National Health  
Insurance  
Conference on Alternative State  
and Local Policies  
Consumer Federation of America  
Day Care & Child Development Council  
of America  
Democratic Agenda  
Democratic Conference  
Democratic Socialist Organizing  
Committee  
District 65 - Distributive  
Workers of America  
Energy Action  
Energy Policy Task Force  
Environmental Action Federation  
Environmental Action, Inc.  
Environmentalists for Full  
Employment  
Federation of Southern  
Cooperatives  
Friends of the Earth  
Frontlash  
Graphic Arts International Union  
Industrial Union Department,  
AFL-CIO  
Institute for Policy Studies  
International Association of  
Machinists  
International Association of  
Machinists & Aerospace Workers

A-1X/12/11

International Chemical Workers Union  
International Ladies Garment Workers  
Union  
International Longshoremen's &  
Warehousemen's Union  
International Union of Electrical,  
Radio and Machine Workers  
International Union of Operating  
Engineers  
International Woodworkers of America  
Jewish Labor Committee  
Laborers International Union  
Leadership Conference on Civil  
Rights  
Martin Luther King Center  
Massachusetts Fair Share  
Midwest Academy & Citizen Labor  
Energy Coalition  
NAACP  
National Association of Farmworker  
Organizations  
National Association of  
Neighborhoods  
National Association of  
Social Workers  
National Center for Economic  
Alternatives  
National Citizens Communications  
Lobby  
National Council of LaRaza  
National Council of Negro Women  
National Council of Senior Citizens,  
Inc.  
National Education Association  
National Farmers Union  
National Football League  
Players Association  
National Lawyers Guild  
National Organization of Women  
National Union of Hospital  
& Health Care Employees,  
District 1199

National Urban League  
National Women's Political Caucus  
National Women's Political  
Organization  
New American Movement  
New Democratic Coalition  
The Newspaper Guild  
Ohio Public Interest Campaign  
Retail Clerks International  
SANE  
Scientists Institute for Public  
Information  
Sheet Metal Workers' International  
Association  
Sierra Club  
Southerners for Economic Justice  
UAW Retired Workers Advisory  
Council  
United Association Journeymen &  
Apprentices of the Plumbing &  
Pipe Fitting Industry  
United Brotherhood of Carpenters  
& Joiners of America  
United Electrical, Radio and  
Machine Workers of America  
United Farm Workers of America  
United Paperworkers International  
Union  
United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum &  
Plastic Workers of America  
United States Student Association  
Urban Bishops Coalition  
Urban Environment Conference  
Women's Action Alliance  
Women's Equity Action League  
Women's International League for  
Peace and Freedom  
Women's Lobby  
Working Women Organizing Project

SALT ENDORSEMENTS  
(7/19/79)

Religious Committee on SALT

American Baptist Churches  
American Ethical Union  
American Humanites Association  
Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs  
Christian Church, Disciples of Christ  
Christian Feminist  
Church of the Brethren  
Church Women United  
Friends Committee on National Legislation  
National Assembly of Women Religious Council  
National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA  
National Federation of Priest Council  
Network  
Passionist Social Concerns Center  
The Reformed Church in America  
Southern Baptist Convention  
Unitarian Universalist Association  
United Church of Christ  
United Methodist Church, Global Ministries  
Women's Division  
United Methodist Church, Board of Church and Society  
United Presbyterian Church in the USA  
United States Catholic Conference  
Union of American Hebrew Congregation  
Clergy and Laity Concerned

Other Religious

Alabama Episcopal Diocese  
Baptist General Convention of Texas  
Episcopal Peace Fellowship  
Joint US/USSR Church Leaders  
Mennonite Central Committee, Peace Section  
National Baptist Convention, USA, Inc.

Unions

Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers  
Communications Workers of America  
International Association of Machinists  
International Longshoreman's and Warehouseman's Union,  
Seattle Pensioner's Club  
Hotel and Restaurant Workers  
Progressive Alliance (list of members attached)  
National Education Association  
United Auto Workers  
United Steelworkers of America

Minority

Black Leadership Forum  
Joint Center for Political Studies  
Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change  
NAACP  
National Black Veterans Organization  
National Business League  
National Council of Negro Women  
National Urban Coalition  
National Urban League  
Operation PUSH  
World Community of Al-Islam in the West

IMAGE (Hispanic Government Employees Union)

Arms Control Organizations

Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy  
Business Executives Move for New National Priorities  
New Directions  
SANE  
Western New York Peace Center  
Women Strike for Peace  
World Federalist Association

A-1X/17/14

State and Local Organizations

City Council of Chicago  
City Council of Plainville, Conn.  
New Jersey State Senate  
New York State Liberal Party  
Nassau Democratic County Committee


Miscellaneous

Americans for Democratic Action  
American Committee on East-West Accord  
National Board of the YWCA  
National Council of Senior Citizens  
National Gray Panthers  
National Federation of Democratic Women  
National Women's Political Caucus

## **Humor de la New Age**


Fuente: Great Decisions'81





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*"Too many strings, Comrade  
... too many strings. ..."*



Peterson in the Vancouver Sun



ROTICO CARTOONS




BAŞ in Tachydromos, Greece

*"I'll smell better as time goes on . . ."*



"Sure it's vague, but at least it's belligerent!"



Auth in *The Philadelphia Inquirer*



MacNelly in *The Richmond News Leader*

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