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PLENARY LECTURES
To be alive is to be engaged in the striving for control. In the case of humans, this takes many forms and occurs on different levels: physical, perceptual, mental, social. Language is both an instrument and a product of this striving, which thus has numerous linguistic reflexes. In particular, it is evident in modals, as the basis for their force-dynamic nature. The generally successful description of modals along these lines, in English and other languages, has left certain classic issues unresolved. One such issue is “transparency”, the characteristic property of so-called “raising” constructions. Another is the distinction between “root” and “epistemic” modals. A third is the grammatical status of modal elements (e.g. as “main” vs. “auxiliary” verbs). Though related, these issues are distinct and largely independent. They can only be resolved through clarification of the conceptual factors involved. In each case the notion of striving for control proves to be a central factor.

Ronald W. Langacker received his Ph.D. in Linguistics from the University of Illinois in 1966. He was a professor in the Department of Linguistics at the University of California, San Diego from that time until his retirement in 2003. During this period, 31 graduate students received their Ph.D. under his supervision, and 48 Visiting Scholars spent time at UCSD under his sponsorship. He now holds the position of Research Professor.

After his training and early research in generative syntactic theory, Langacker largely devoted the first ten years of his professional career to the comparative grammar and historical reconstruction of the Uto-Aztecan family of Native American languages. In 1976, deciding that a radically different theoretical approach to language was necessary, he began developing the framework that has come to be known as “cognitive grammar”. A fundamental statement of that framework, the two volume work titled Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, was published in 1987 and 1991. Through the years, cognitive grammar has continued to be refined, further articulated, and applied to a progressively wider range of languages and phenomena. An interim summary, Cognitive Grammar: A Basic Introduction, appeared in 2008.

Langacker is a founding member of the International Cognitive Linguistics Association and served as its president from 1997-99. He was chair of the organizing committee for the 2001 International Cognitive Linguistics Conference. He was a co-editor (and is now an honorary editor) of the monograph series Cognitive Linguistics Research, and serves as a member of numerous editorial and advisory boards. He has published other books and many articles dealing with a broad array of issues in cognitive linguistics.
DEFINING FUTURE AND SUBJUNCTIVE IN ENGLISH

In a number of languages Futures and Subjunctives seem to share properties which have supported views that they are very closely related and that they should thus be treated in a similar fashion, e.g. as categories of the same level of grammatical description. Very often they share formal properties; they are both inflectional categories in some languages or they are both periphrases of a similar type. Moreover, it has been variously observed that the connection is not only formal and that the two categories also share a notional core. Most obviously they are both easily treated as irrealis markers at least in the sense that they can never be used to assert the truth of a proposition. Interestingly, however, while ‘future’ has been included in the lists of cross-linguistically attested gram-types in Bybee and Dahl 1989 and Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca 1994, there was not enough relevant evidence for a similar treatment of the ‘subjunctive’.

The aim of this paper will be to accommodate the English facts in this general picture. More particularly, the arguments for and against the assumption of a future tense in English will be reevaluated in view of similar arguments concerning the status of the subjunctive in English. It will be shown that no single level of grammatical analysis can be regarded as the level at which these distinctions can be made; while all morphology, syntax and semantics are relevant to the definition of both future and subjunctive in a given language, the overall analysis needs to consider their interaction with clause types and speech acts. Crucially, as will be argued, it is precisely in cases like these that cross-linguistic data can be used as evidence for language specific decisions.

References


Anastasios Tsangalidis studied English and Linguistics in Thessaloniki, Edinburgh, Dublin and Cambridge and holds an MPhil in Linguistics from the University of Dublin (Trinity College) and a PhD from Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. He is currently Assistant Professor in Syntax and Semantics at the Department of Theoretical and Applied Linguistics, School of English, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. Prior to his employment at Aristotle University, he held academic positions at the Centre for the Greek Language and the Department of Linguistics, University of Ioannina. His research focuses on the description of tense, aspect and modality in Greek and English, from the perspective of grammaticalization and typology. His most recent work concerns the typology of conditional constructions in Greek and the grammaticalization of modal markers. He has also been involved in various teacher-training projects, focusing on the relevance of grammar to language teaching.
A pilot study by van der Auwera and de Wit (in print) on the ‘comparative modals’ of English presents a few hypotheses on the differences between had better, ’d better and better in Present-day English (based on the LOB, FLOB, BROWN and FROWN corpora). These hypotheses concern (i) differences between UK and US English, (ii) semantic differences between advice and wish constructions (as in (1) vs. (2)), and (iii) the presence vs. absence of the subject in better constructions (see (3) vs. (4)).

(1) “Madame Noel, I think you had better go” said Mrs Cupply.
(2) By that time I was chilled to the bone, exhausted from the relentless battering of the traffic, sullen and depressed. This had better be good, I thought grimly as I crossed the road and walked up the cul-de-sac to the Parsonage.
(3) “What? The hell you ain’t. You better get back up here now, if you know what’s good for you.”
(4) Drewitt hesitated. “I would like to go on.” “I wouldn’t like you to. So that’s it! Better get your uniform on and report to the duty sergeant.”

The talk reports on work that checks these hypotheses on bigger corpora, corpora on older English, and puts the English findings in a wider West Germanic perspective.

In this paper I take a closer look at some English adverbs which express the speaker's commitment to the truth of the proposition. The adverbs *actually*, *in fact*, *truly* and *really* have a semantic core which expresses such commitment by referring to acts, facts, truth and reality respectively. Synchronic and diachronic studies of these adverbs have further shown how they have developed multiple pragmatic meanings in present-day English. Most of these studies are monolingual and focus on one of the adverbs. Detailed intra-lingual comparisons are few (exceptions include Oh (2000), Smith & Jucker 2000), and cross-linguistic ones are equally scarce (exceptions include Aijmer & Simon-Vandenbergen 2004; Willems & Demol 2006). Yet the existing research shows how the adverbs overlap in their semantic and pragmatic meanings. This paper examines the connections between the four adverbs making use of monolingual and multilingual corpus data.

Recent cross-linguistic historical research on cognates in English and French, in particular E. *actually*/F. *actuellement* (Defour et al. forthcoming b) and E. *in fact*/F. *en fait, de fait, au fait* (Defour et al. forthcoming a) has shown how references to what is the case ‘in acts’ and ‘in facts’ lead to more subjective meanings of the speaker’s commitment to the truth of the proposition. The studies reveal a close cognitive connection between the concepts *ACT* and *FACT*, as well as between *ACT*, *FACT* on the one hand and *REALITY*, *TRUTH* on the other. Further, Willems & Demol (2006) have shown on the basis of a synchronic contrastive study of French and English how the most frequent equivalents *vraiment* and *really* cover overlapping semantic and pragmatic areas and how the concepts of *TRUTH* and *REALITY* are expressed differently in the two languages concerned.

This paper focuses on the English adverbs and relies on samples from the British National Corpus for comparing their present-day usage. In addition, the study makes use of French and Dutch translation data from the Triptic-Namur Corpus. It is argued that translation data not only provide intersubjective backing of contextual interpretations (as has been well described in the literature, see e.g. Johansson 2007) but also give information on the closeness and distance between the English words by showing up the degree of overlap between the cross-linguistic equivalents. In addition, the corresponding words in different languages cover different aspects of the semantic area and thus show the connections between the ontological concepts more clearly.

The main theoretical approaches to (some of) the adverbs are – broadly speaking – to be situated in the cognitive and functional frameworks. Within these, semantic and pragmatic developments have been treated as reflecting subjectification, grammaticalisation and pragmatisation. Especially relevant is E. Traugott’s work in this area, which explains semantic developments from pragmatic inferencing (e.g. Traugott & Dasher 2002). Cognitive studies include Paradis (2003), who shows how *really* has different readings which – though all expressive of epistemic commitment – can be classified as truth-attesting, emphasizing and degree reinforcing. Paradis establishes a link between the different readings in terms of the relative prominence of the content domains [REALITY] and [TRUTH] and schematic domains such as modality and gradability. Both the grammaticalisation and the cognitive approaches lead us to expect plausible developments in different directions, for example, the development of discourse marker functions such as hedging or of intensifying degree words. Starting from this previous research the paper attempts to show which developments are covered by which words, and which ontological concepts are connected to which other ones.

As more translation data (including back-translations) are brought in, more items are drawn into the semantic map, so that different readings of the four adverbs include them in different paradigms. For example, some readings of *actually* belong in a paradigm including *essentially, basically, fundamentally*, i.e. a paradigm which suggests that *PROTOTYPICALITY* and *ESSENCE* are domains which are connected with the others. Another example is the intensifier reading of *really*, which puts it in a paradigm including degree words such as *very*. This suggests another relevant domain.

The challenging question is how content and schematic concepts such as reality, truth, actuality, factuality, essence, prototypicality, focus, force are connected. The paper makes a modest attempt at a proposal.
References


Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen is Professor of English linguistics at Ghent University. She has published on various aspects of English grammar, especially modality, and on media discourse, focusing on newspapers, talk shows, political interviews and debates. Articles in the field of media discourse have appeared in *Discourse & Society, Language Sciences* and *Journal of Language and Social Psychology*. Her research areas include functional linguistics and she has been one of the founding editors of the journal *Functions of Language*, which she currently edits with L. Mackenzie and Geoff Thompson. Her publications in this area include the co-edited volumes *Reconnecting Language* (1997) and *Grammatical Metaphor* (2003). She has supervised a number of research projects in contrastive linguistics, including the project which has led to the production of a *Contrastive Verb Valency Dictionary of English, French and Dutch*. At the moment she is also co-supervisor of two major contrastive projects at Ghent University, *Meaning in between Structure and the Lexicon* and the IUAP project *Grammaticalization and (Inter)subjectivity*. Her recent publications with Karin Aijmer (in Linguistics, *Journal of Pragmatics and Languages in Contrast*) are in the field of pragmatic markers. Also co-authored with Karin Aijmer is the book *The Semantic Field of Modal Certainty: A corpus-based study of English adverbs* (Mouton de Gruyter, 2007).
Recent corpus research has shown that the core modal auxiliaries in standard British and American written English have been declining in frequency, and in the early years of the twenty-first century this trend appears to have been accelerating. More precisely, in British English, the highest-frequency modals (*will, can, would, could*) have been roughly holding their own, whereas lower-frequency modals (e.g. *may, must, shall, ought*) have been declining rather rapidly. On the other hand, some so-called semi-modals such as *have to, want to* and *need to* have been on the increase: yet this countervailing trend does not account to the ‘missing modals’, nor are they easily accounted for by other expressions of modality such as nominal and adjectival constructions.

In this presentation I will explore various reasons for this apparent loss of modal usage, and present evidence mainly from the Brown family of corpora, tracing corpus evidence from the beginning of the 20th century to the beginning of the 21st century.
THEME AND
GENERAL SESSIONS
A CORPUS-BASED STUDY OF MODALITY BEYOND DOUBT: HAMLET TO THE STAGE

In previous research (Carretero González & Hidalgo Tenorio 2005, Aguilera Carnerero & Hidalgo Tenorio 2009), we could study how relevant linguistic analysis can be to understand characterisation in theatre, and debunk some traditionally accepted depictions of such a fictional creature like Hamlet. This is the basis for the project we present here, in which we will scrutinise how ideology, power, status and gender roles are represented in this Shakespearian masterwork (for further discussion on CDA, see Fairclough 2003). In order to do so, we will look now at all the characters’ verbal behaviour through their recurrent patterns of modality, so that we can decipher the keys of their perception of the world and the way they interact with each other; in other words, in this paper we are going to investigate how the ideational and interpersonal metafunctions (Halliday 2004) are embodied in Hamlet. Although these two notions might seem to be unrelated, they show a gradience. Terms of address and deontic modality are part of the interpersonal metafunction. The ideational function is identified with transitivity and epistemic modality. The speaking voice constructs itself in contrast with other participants and how s/he depicts the world. For our purposes here, we will explain why modality is a complex concept which needs clarification as such. An additional aspect we will pay attention to is whether there is a correlation between modality and sexual stereotypes (see, for example, Hidalgo Tenorio 1999 and 2002, Litosseliti 2006 for gender analysis), which will mean to examine expected conduct traits and subversion in the literature produced in this period. We do not aim to compare Hamlet with other Shakespearian plays, but we have tried to observe similarities and differences between this and an Elizabethan tragedy on which Shakespeare’s masterpiece draws quite clearly: Thomas Kyd’s revenge play, The Spanish Tragedy. From a corpus-based perspective, data will be processed using the concordance kit WordSmith Tools 3.0 (Scott 1999). Thanks to the web-based environment Wmatrix (Rayson 2007) and its word-sense tagger (SEM-TAG), we will check the main semantic fields in the texts under discussion. We strongly believe that this computer-assisted approach can shed light on canonical assumptions and help to refute most of them.

One starting point of most Shakespeare’s scholars is that Hamlet is a play about death, love, duty, power, murder, revenge, grief, rage, pessimism about the world and human beings, procrastination, spiritual discomfort, madness, loyalty and disloyalty, conventional virtue and its lack, fortune, passion, action, honour, memory, conscience and desire, choice and violence. Frequency of occurrence indicates that some of these topics are the ones around which the play revolves. However, this is also indicative of what has not been considered so much in depth by the academe: this is a play about intentions more than about doubt or hesitation; in truth, as we will show, it is a play about certainty. Duty and obligation are present conditions moulding Hamlet’s conduct; however, linguistically speaking, these are not as important as volition. At first, the character seems to be moved by external forces such as the ghost, which might be understood as a source of obligation; this is, however, the source of knowledge that allows Hamlet to know the truth about his father’s death, and moves him to action. His willingness to act depends on his access to information. Thus, it is epistemic modality that encourages deontic modality, expressed as volition. Something internal activates the character’s desire to do something as soon as he knows what caused the king’s death, who carried it out and why.

We hypothesise, then, that Hamlet is more a play about wishes, intentions and determination than about doubt and hesitation. The data will finally indicate how true this is.

References


This paper addresses two main issues related to the concept of evidentiality. The first one refers to the lack of contrastive studies in the field in English and Spanish, especially as for the grammatical marking of evidentiality. Some authors (Lazard 2001) claims that, in the case of English, this does not hold grammatical markers for the source of knowledge in contrast to other languages, e.g. Quechua, that seems to do so. In this respect, Dendale and Tasmowski (2001), however, think that grammatical evidentials are possible in English, and that more research should be done in order to identify and categorize these. The second issue deals with the relationship of evidentiality and stance. Evidentiality understood in its broad sense allows for the interpretation of authorial intention and degree of certainty in their use of expressions indicating their sources of knowledge. In my view, the use of evidential marking rarely is free from the imprint of the author, and hence other meanings rather than sources of knowledge should be taken into account. In this study I will concentrate on modal verbs in both English and Spanish to show (i) their value as grammatical evidential markers, and (ii) their value as stance markers to show the author’s attitude to the proposition manifested. My ultimate goal is to assess the way in which evidentiality and stance is manifested in both languages through modal verbs. For this, I use a corpus of about 30 computing research abstracts per language published in 2008.

Methodologically, I combine the theoretical frameworks of stance, as in Biber et al. (1999), and evidentiality as shown in Chafe (1986), Mithun (1986), Dendale and Tasmowski (2001), and Marín-Arrese (2004), among others. My concept of modality draws on Hoye (1997) and Biber et al. (1999).

The corpus of study is monogeneric, as it only includes abstracts preceding scientific articles; these have been randomly selected from a database of computing scientific journals. The contents of texts are varied but all of them belong to the computing register. The abstracts were published in 2008 in scientific journals circulating in machine-readable soft format, and they are basically retrieved online, although some of these can be also found in hard format. All the abstracts are written by native speakers of English and Spanish. This allows for a unified account of the findings. The number of abstracts amounts to thirty per language in this first phase of the study, but in my research prospects I envisage the addition of another seventy for representativeness and accuracy of results. I also plan to divide analyses according to time in a diachronic span of ten years to examine the degree of variation shown in this genre as for the use of modals. The quick changes in scientific thought and technological advances may have a strong effect on scientific methods and procedures, and this in turn has an effect on language use. More adequate technology may result in more confidence in results, and this implies bigger authorial commitment.

References
MODALITY IN A LEARNER CORPUS, OR ON HOW IDENTITY IS ARTICULATED IN NARRATIVES

Despite very well argued opposition by some scholars (Widdowson 2004), critical discourse analysts (Fowler 1991, Fairclough 2003) have proved how differently the same event can be represented by means of devices that suggest the ideology of the author of a text. We are convinced that it is the way they arrange information (more or less consciously) that shows how someone conceives the world and people, and how they construe the former and depict the latter. This is the starting point of this paper. Social actors build up their public persona through language, and they also represent others’ identities in ways that can produce, reproduce or challenge the status quo. The corpus we study here is a collection of essays written by Spanish students of English as a FL over a period of four years. This will allow us to analyse both how individuals portray various social practices, processes and participants, and how they construct themselves within these social practices through discourse. Due to the narrative nature of the corpus, we will pay attention to the modality patterns detected in these texts. We will not only study the extent to which these are used more or less correctly by these students but also whether some are preferred in comparison with others, leading to some implications as regards representation. We will also associate them with potential relevant variables so that we can explain, whilst detailing the reasons, why this is the case. That is why we will devote a part of this paper to test whether the language used by males and females varies, so that they eventually represent the world in different terms as well. The existence of different types of voices in the corpus can lead us to interesting findings concerning language learning, sociolinguistics and discourse allegiances. For the sake of systematic treatment of the materials selected, we will rely on corpus linguistics.

Theoretical grounds

One of our theoretical foundations is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Here, we will overlook its heterogeneity, only to note some of its most exciting traits such as exploring the trace of ideology in all types of texts. CDA has its origins in certain branches of social theory and earlier discourse analysis, text linguistics, and interactional sociolinguistics. Systemic Functional Grammar (Halliday 1985) has been of special relevance for its development; therefore, we must explain first why, by drawing attention to its basics.

The CD analyst tends to look for what is encoded in sentences (signification) and its interaction with context (significance). Depending on the approach, various linguistic devices are identified with a view to understanding textual meanings; the clues found are interpreted; and some explanation is expected about their implications. In a Hallidayan vein, we describe texts focusing mainly on the ideational and interpersonal metafunctions of language, which are claimed to reveal the author’s positioning and the relationship between author and audience.

The way we represent the world, that is, the events that take place in the space of discourse, the participants in these events, how we depict their roles and attributes and the processes these are involved in, in addition to the circumstances in which these happen; are what the ideational function is all about. The interpersonal function, in contrast, is about how the participants of discourse establish relationships with other participants and, at the same time, how they also construe themselves in and through discourse: They can place themselves at the centre of the act of communication, let distance grow between social actors, impose their authority upon those understood as socially inferior, or just the opposite so that they can prevent interaction from becoming asymmetrical. Modality at this level is essential.

Scholars establish two main categories: epistemic modality is concerned with the speaker’s knowledge of the mental scenario they try to represent. Deontic modality is a key to understand the relations of social asymmetry represented verbally. It is easy to identify the notions of obligation, prohibition and permission as instantiations of how addressee and addressee connect with each other. The notions of willingness and commitment have only to do with the speaker’s inner self, and, therefore, do not fit in so well with this label. We will revisit this issue here.

On the other hand, Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis aims to analyse the relationship between gender and language, which means, among other things, examining enactments of power by men and women in the public domain (see papers in Lazar 2005). The evolution from the deficit, difference and dominance approaches to a shift towards discourse (Litosseliti 2006) has been crucial. Now attention is not directed only towards whether men and women speak differently, or whether the language of females is a deviation from the male norm (which has been the excuse to explain male superiority at some levels), but to comprehend gender as a dynamic construct, which is another of our aims.
The corpus

Our paper is a study based upon NOCE (Díaz Negrillo 2007, Díaz Negrillo 2009), a corpus of English texts written by non-native first year undergraduate students from Jaén University and Granada University (Spain), those of which were collected over a period of four academic years (2003-2007). The corpus comprises over 1000 texts, those of which generate a total word count of 314,000 words.

In each year of the corpus, students were required to write three different compositions at different stages. This procedure was repeated with each new first year intake. During university lecture time, students were given a choice of three specific topics to write about in addition to the option of free writing, and produced a composition of around 250-300 words.

Following collection of the samples, the texts were coded in order to ensure that the identity of students was not diverged to the general public. Each participant was assigned a three digit code which was included in the filename of said text to identify who wrote it. Each filename comprised a code of five elements to distinguish the following:

i) If the student was from Jaén or Granada University (JA or GR).
ii) Which of the three samples the text corresponded to (A/B/C).
iii) Which of the four academic years the text corresponded to (1/2/3/4).
iv) Who wrote the text (a three digit code was assigned, e.g. 001).
v) Which of the topics the student had opted to write about (1, 2, 3, etc).

When coding the topic chosen by each student in each of the samples collected, there are ten possibilities. Given that each of the three samples always contains the option of free writing, it was thought best to assign any free writing text the number ten, regardless of the sample it came from. With regards to the pre-proposed topics, of which there were three in each sample, and therefore nine in total, each of those topics was thereby assigned a number from one to nine:

1. The importance of foreign languages nowadays.
2. Getting economically independent: Pros and cons.
3. The Internet in society: Progress or not?
4. A destination for a one week summer holiday: Santo Domingo seaside resort or monumental and bohemian Paris.
5. Justify your position in favour of or against mobile phones as harmful to one's health.
6. Express your opinion on the current topic of food diversification.
7. Terrorism in our society.
8. Do you feel influenced by other cultures' stereotypes?
9. Does your country offer enough job opportunities or would you rather move abroad?

Since one of the purposes of this particular study is to use the NOCE corpus as described above to identify similarities and/or differences in the type of language used by Spanish male undergraduates and Spanish female undergraduates in terms of their written English, the texts have been assigned an additional code element to illustrate the gender of the person who wrote a given text, using an F for females and M for males.

References

This paper addresses the semantics of happen as exemplified in *They happen to have left* (Raising construction type) and *It so happens that they have left* (Non-Raising construction type). The discussion is supported throughout by attested data, culled from the newspapers, magazines and radio and TV transcripts that feed the Factiva database.

In his *Treatise on Human Understanding* (I, iii, 14), David Hume contends that “’tis impossible to admit of any medium betwixt chance and an absolute necessity”. This, according to J. Watkins (1999: 41), amounts to denying chance any reality. While certainly not going as far, the English language does deny to the encoding of chance the same morphosyntactic status as it bestows on that of epistemic necessity: while *must* and *can’t* are core modals, *happen* clearly is not.

We expect a verb of “epistemic chance” to indicate that the state of affairs being referred to is an occurrence divorced from any causal chain and not attributable to any type of human design. The verb *chance* satisfies this definition: *So it seemed fitting that, at that moment, an international expert in conflict resolution named Brian Polkinghorne should chance to walk past on the sidewalk... (Star-Tribune, July 5, 2009). Happen, here, substitutes for *chance* with no discernible change in meaning. Indeed, *happen* and *chance* are the only survivors out of the thirteen raising “verbs of fortuity” that have been attested at one time or another since Old English (Visser, 1969: 1369-70). Both are extensionally vacuous to the extent that their presence or absence has no bearing on the truth value of the sentence in which they act as embedding verbs, as may be demonstrated for instance by deletion of the segment *it just so happened that in Before the concert started, it just so happened that we talked about the future of the symphony (Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Feb. 18, 2010). Interestingly, *happen* shares this characteristic with *will* and *must* when they function as exponents of what P. Larreya (2009: 24-5) calls “constative modalization”.

Among other issues relevant to the semantics of *happen* is its demonstrable affinity with adverbials such as *luckily* as well as with verbs denoting a fortuitous occurrence: *And when the station's owner, Milt Grant, happened to stumble upon the scene, he was furious* (The Washington Post, Jan. 14, 2010). Predictably, it is incompatible with *necessarily*; nor does it lend itself to modalization by *must* or *can’t*. There are no constraints, however, on its being modalized by epistemic *may* or by *will*. In the following example, *happen* and *will* both function as “constative modalizers*: *Traveling, he [François Mitterand] will interview Pablo Neruda... He will happen to be in Madrid when Willy Brandt happens to be there with Gunter Grass, who will happen to explain that “the potato had far more influence on the history of Germany than the Seven Years War ever had.”* (The New York Times, Aug. 17, 1982). The implication here is that while the chance encounters *per se* are supposed to have been utterly unpredictable, their cumulative fortuitousness is to be construed as a defining — and as such predictable! — feature of the individual’s personality.

There are well-defined pragmatic effects that attach to the use of *happen* in interpersonal contexts. In questions like “*Would you by any chance happen to know where the Omni Hotel is?*” (*The Globe and Mail*, March 6, 1987), *happen* partakes of a specific hedging strategy: by suggesting that she would regard it as fortuitous for her co-speaker to be in possession of that knowledge, the speaker is preemptively exonerating him of any blame for not knowing. As Ch. Mair (1990: 83) points out, raising of the embedded subject here is compulsory: *“Would it so happen that you know...?* would be ill-formed. Subject-raising is also compulsory in utterances such as *I happen to believe that we're going to pick up significant seats in the House and in the Senate in the midterm elections* (CNN, Feb. 21, 2010), where the speaker is laying claim to a belief whose foundation is all the more solid, or so he is intimating, as it runs counter to the all too predictable prevailing orthodoxy.

References
LEXICAL COMMITMENT:
DEGREES OF CERTAINTY IN REPORTING VERBS IN ACADEMIC ENGLISH

Academic writing is a vehicle through which scholars try to persuade others of the validity of their arguments. This dialogic process takes place against a complex social background of disciplinary research. Thus, academic writers must signal degrees of certainty both for the propositions that they themselves put forward and for the conclusions of others. The issue of certainty is not trivial; rather it underpins the very nature of scientific endeavor since future findings may disqualify or alter present research conclusions that even the most commonly held “truths” may be subject to revision.

Regardless of discipline, there are certain modes of expression common to all academic writing in English, for example, the tendency to use certain sets of verbs (Biber 1999: 379) whose core meaning indicate academic activity (find), communication (suggest) and mental processes (assume). These often combine with inanimate abstract subjects to a degree not found in other genres and are sometimes followed by that-complement clauses which present the knowledge that is being scrutinized.

This paper is based on a view of modality defined by Stubbs (1996: 202) as language used “to encode meanings such as degrees of certainty and commitment, or alternatively vagueness and lack of commitment.” To explore the degrees of certainty, as well as the source of knowledge, expressed by reporting verbs, this study analyzed their use by three groups: 1) expert academic writers in English (the reference group, Expert Humanities Articles corpus, Rica 2009; Bunce, 2010; 198,363w), American undergraduate writers of English (LOCNESS corpus, CECL, 1995; 149,790w), and Spanish EFL writer of English (SPICLE corpus, Neff et al., 2002; 194,845w). The research team studied 29 reporting verbs, chosen by examining which verbs other scholars had investigated (Biber 1999; Charles 2006; Hyland, 2000; Paquot, forthcoming) and by making a pilot study of the most commonly used reporting verbs in expert texts. It was also necessary to make a pilot study of student texts because they make frequent use of verbs not often found in expert texts (prove, say, etc.).

For the analysis, we classified the verbs into four categories, following Charles (2006): 1) argue verbs (referring to forms of communication); 2) think verbs (referring to mental processes, including assume, believe, feel, know, think, understand, etc.); 3) show verbs (demonstrate, indicate, reveal, show, etc.); and, 4) find verbs (referring to judgements based on consideration of facts, e.g., observe). For the purpose of the presentation, we focused on only a limited selection from each of the four categories. These particular verbs were chosen because they show general tendencies seen in our findings, in that some of them are over- or underpresented by both groups of student writers while others are over- or underused by only the Spanish EFL writers.

A CHI-square comparison of all the reporting verbs showed that there were significant differences between both the student groups and the expert writers. Both LOCNESS (American) and SPICLE (Spanish EFL) underused (p<0.001) reporting verbs in general. There was also a significant different between the LOCNESS novice writers and the SPICLE novice writers, the latter showing a significant underuse (p<0.001) of reporting verbs. A finer-grained analysis revealed that the expert writers have a wider range of verbs to choose from and that they prefer reporting verbs which convey caution (e.g., find) and attribute the source of knowledge to inanimate sources (the tables, the findings, the studies, etc.), thereby following academic conventions of “objective distancing”.

On the other hand, both the student groups relied on verbs that are more categorical (prove, p<0.01) and have more of a tendency to prefer animate sources in the subject position (I and we). They also use mental process verbs more frequently than the experts, e.g. think is over represented in both the novice writer corpora in comparison with the experts (p<0.001).

This study holds important implications for teachers of academic writing to all novice writers, both native and non-native. The findings presented here could be incorporated into materials development for undergraduate teaching. In the European context, with the wide-spread use of English in tertiary education, it is becoming more and more indispensable to provide EFL students with a wide range of academic reporting phraseology which will allow them achieve full literacy in their disciplinary communities.
References

The work reported in this paper is part of the research activities currently carried out within the CONTRANOT project aimed at the creation and validation of contrastive functional descriptions through corpus analysis and annotation in English and Spanish, and to produce an annotated bilingual corpus, called CONTRASTES (Lavid 2008, Lavid et al. 2007). This paper describes the coding schemes designed to annotate the categories of epistemic and deontic modality. These schemes, based on Carretero et al. (2007) approach to modality, should ideally be robust enough to yield similar results when used by different annotators to tag the texts. Due to the fuzziness of the categories of our concern, the principles underlying the design of the coding schemes are the following:

1. Lack of distinction between grammaticalized and lexical expressions. Thus, apart from modal auxiliaries, we will also include adverbs and constructions in which nouns and adjectives related to epistemic and deontic modality are involved.
2. Two independent levels of analysis, one dealing with the semantics of the construction, and the other with the communicative function of the expression in the discourse (speech acts).
3. Multiple tags for each modal expression in the corpora. These tags correspond to a number of relevant parameters to the characterization of the various meanings and functions found within epistemic and deontic modality. Consequently, each modal expression in the corpora receives multiple tags.

**Epistemic modality** consists of the estimation of the chances for a state of affairs to be or become true (Nyts 2001: 21). We have opted for this restrictive definition for the sake of clarity: in contrast to other works (Biber et al. 1999, Kärkkäinen 2003), we will exclude certain kinds of expressions which concern the reliability of information, such as hedges of imprecision (sort of, like...) and expressions showing limitation of a proposition (mainly, typically...). However, we will include other borderline expressions closer to the definition above, such as verbs of ‘epistemic anxiety’ (Givón 1990) such as I expect, I fear and I hope, expressions of opinion (in my opinion, in my view and some cases of I think), some uses of certain verbs of mental processes (I assume, it occurs to me...) or verbs referring to speech acts (I insist, I suggest...). Evidential expressions will be included if they have an epistemic semantic element (apparently, I hear...) but not otherwise (s/he said, s/he goes, according to X...).

**Deontic modality** was initially based on the notion of ‘obligation’ (von Wright 1951), and was later extended to include related meanings such ‘permission’ or ‘advice’ (Coates 1983). Some authors, however, use the label ‘deontic’ in a more restricted way. In Palmer (1986) only examples that contain a subjective element (i.e. some involvement of the speaker) are classified as deontic, the rest being assigned to the category of ‘dynamic’ modality. In Nyuts-Byloo-Diepeveen (2010), expressions interpreted as directives are excluded, and the term ‘deontic’ is reserved for judgements about moral acceptability or necessity. In this paper we argue that a more comprehensive definition of deontic modality (as in Coates 1983) is more adequate to our purposes.

Furthermore, it is our claim that the various meanings associated with the notion of epistemic and deontic modality, as well as the different speech acts present in them, can be explained through the combination of a number of parameters such as:

- Strength, ranging from strong to weak.
- Subjectivity, which indicates the degree to which the speaker / writer is the source of the modality.
- Reality, which captures the fact that we can refer to conditional or counterfactual worlds.
- Source of necessity, which may be the speaker, another clausal participant or the situation to which the deontic expression refers.
- Relationship between the speaker and the addressee.
- Purpose of the utterance: eliciting action or providing information.
- Result of the intended action: benefits for the addressee or for the speaker / writer.

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Within the Appraisal Framework for evaluative language (Martin and White, 2005; White, 2002, 2003), the categories of Attitude and Engagement differ basically in the scope of the evaluation. By and large, Attitude concerns feelings and emotional reactions, while Engagement involves the placement of propositions in relation to implicit or explicit alternative viewpoints. However, Appraisal analyses of naturally-occurring discourse reveals areas of overlap between these two categories.

This paper focuses on the overlap between Attitude and the semantic category of epistemic modality, which cuts across categories within the Engagement system. The work presented here is part of the research on evaluative language carried out within the larger CONTRANOT project, aimed at the creation and validation of a system for corpus annotation which will also cover other categories such as tense, aspect, topic management and information structure. The systems are to be designed for the future annotation of evaluation by non-specialists on evaluation in an English-Spanish corpus, CONTRASTES (Lavid 2008, Lavid et al. 2007); in order to favour cross-annotator agreement, a balance must be achieved between simplicity and accuracy. The results of the annotation will be the bases of functional English-Spanish contrastive descriptions of the categories analyzed.

Epistemic modality will be defined as the estimation of the chances for a state of affairs to be or become true (Nyut 2001, Carretero et al. 2007). Epistemic expressions ground the proposition in the speaker / writer subjectivity. This subjective grounding challenges or discards other possible positions when the epistemic expressions convey total certainty (certainly, I know...), while expressions of less than total certainty present the proposition as one within a range of possible alternative positions. We agree with the re-interpretation of epistemic modality within the Appraisal Framework in the sense that epistemic expressions are often being used for reasons other than the estimation of probability; however, for the sake of simplicity, our scope of epistemic modality will be determined by the definition signalled above. Consequently, certain kinds of expressions which concern the reliability of information, such as those expressing imprecision (sort of, like...) or limitation (mainly, typically...) will be excluded. Evidentials are included if they also have a semantic element of degree of certainty (obviously, evidently, it seems...) but not otherwise (s/he said, s/he goes, according to X...).

The paper will show areas of overlap between Attitude and epistemic modality, as well as the decisions made for the annotation of different expressions belonging to these areas. The issues discussed will be the following:

• Expressions belonging to the subtype of Affect called (In)security (confident, together... / anxious, nervous, uneasy...) communicate (lack of) confidence on the part of the speaker / writer about states or events being or becoming true. The overlap is clearer when the proposition epistemically evaluated is explicit, as with some adjectives (certain, convinced, hopeful, sure...) and lexical verbs (expect, fear, hope, wish...).

• Concerning the subtype of judgement called Normality, high and low degrees of usability are associated with high and low probability, respectively.

• Many expressions belonging to the subtype of Judgement called Tenacity are based on people’s ability to make estimations (i.e. epistemic qualifications) about the future: for example, expressions of (Im)prudence (cautious, patient, wary... / impatient, impetuous, rash...) or of (Un)reliability, such as (un)dependable and (un)reliable.

• The subtype of Judgement called Veracity has an obvious relation with epistemic modality, as may be seen in the expressions used to praise or to condemn information in terms of reliability. For example, the addressee’s (in)sincerity could be communicated by saying I (don’t) believe what you say or What you say is credible / honest / deceitful / dishonest.

These issues are illustrated with authentic examples from the Simon Fraser University Review Corpus (Taboada 2008), which consists of consumer-generated reviews on hotels, books and films. Occasionally, we will resort to larger corpora such as the British National Corpus (BNC) and the Corpus de referencia del español actual (CREA).

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References


A modality of telling in English

This paper explores a fourth kind of modality in English, in addition to the epistemic, deontic and existential types (Palmer, 1979). This fourth type, which I term a modality of ‘telling’, has to do with speech itself. It is the only specifically linguistic kind of modality, and can be said to distinguish the concerns of linguists from those of logicians (Von Wright, 1951). It applies, as an extra level, to epistemic and deontic modalities equally.

Davies 2006 drew on earlier proposals on this topic (Davies 1976, 1979) with respect to the grammatical reflexes of different kinds of telling applied to constructions of epistemic modality. In so doing, it dealt in depth with a narrow range of such epistemic constructions: those involving the knowledge operator (as opposed to operators of belief), and the lexical verb (as opposed to modal auxiliaries), namely, subjunctives (Leech, 1987), indicative declaratives and indicative ‘yes’/ ‘no’ interrogatives. Four telling operators, together with their negatives, were proposed: Declaration, Query, Denial and Suggestion. These were seen as applying to partition subsets of the set of all propositions, as partitioned by the epistemic operators (Davies 2001). Taking only the epistemic operator K(nowledge) and its negative, ¬K, this yielded eight ways of telling the partition subset defined by each, respectively: \{t\}, \{t\}′, where \{t\} is the subset of propositions known to be true, and \{t\}′ is the subset of propositions not known to be true. That is, sixteen semantic categories were established in this way.

Propositional attitudes were defined in terms of the partition subsets of the set of all propositions as defined by the epistemic operators. For example, for any given proposition, p, the statement, ‘p is a member of \{t\}’ (‘p is a member of the subset of propositions that are known to be true’) expresses a propositional attitude. We can write this as ‘KTp’: ‘p is known as true’. Propositional attitudes were associated with the speaker, and with the way in which s/he presents a proposition, rather than with the objective truth or falsity of the proposition itself. To say, The earth is flat, is to utter a well-formed English sentence in which a proposition that is objectively false is presented as being true.

A speaker is said to hold some propositional attitude towards p. For example, we can say that in an assertion, the speaker presents p as being a member of the set of propositions that are known to be true. I propose that what is at issue should be seen as one degree more ‘remote’ than that, and have glossed as follows: the speaker presents him/herself as holding that p is a member of the set of propositions that are known to be true. Propositional attitudes can be shown to be held with varying degrees of commitment, ranging from full certainty through different shades of tentativeness to a complete lack of commitment. This is what is accounted for by telling (Davies, 2006).

The four telling operators are defined in terms of commitment: ‘The speaker conveys through speech that s/he holds a given propositional attitude with a given degree of commitment.’ For Declaration, this degree of commitment is 1; for Query, 0.5 or less; for Suggestion, 0.5 or more; and for denial, 0 (where 1 indicates complete commitment, and 0 represents a complete lack of commitment).

This approach led to the establishment of systematic distinctions between interrogatives conducive to ‘yes’ and conducive to ‘no’ (Quirk et al., 1985), together with a semantic account of a truly neutral/balanced ‘yes’/ ‘no’ interrogative realizing exclusive disjunction (either ‘yes’ or ‘no’, but not both and not neither).

The investigations to be reported on in this paper include the extension of this approach to constructions involving belief operators: declaratives and (‘yes’/ ‘no’) interrogatives containing an epistemic modal verb as finite element. Different degrees and types of conduciveness are again at issue. In particular, an account is offered of different kinds of conduciveness in declarative and interrogative might/mightn’t; could/couldn’t and (‘likelihood’) should/shouldn’t.

References


While aiming to empirically explore the phenomenon of cross-linguistic transfer, this study investigates to what extent the expression of the semantic domain of POSSIBILITY, as conveyed by may and can, differs in native English and French-English interlanguage. I specifically aim to determine:

- how English native speakers use may and can in a more data-driven way than is usually adopted in studies on modality, and
- how the uses of can and may by French learners differs from that of native speakers and what these distributional differences suggest as to what motivates the different patterns.

Existing corpus-based interlanguage studies have generally focused on the phenomena of over- and under-representation of lexical, morphological or syntactic linguistic items in non-native varieties of English (Granger 2004:132). Further, overall reliance on machine-retrievable information has prevented both the emergence of fine-grained semantically-motivated investigations as well as the full exploitation of contexts of occurrence of linguistic forms. However, in an empirical investigation of the English modals, Gabrielatos and Sarmento’s (2006) show that frequencies of occurrence of core English modals reflect the type of syntactic environment in which they feature and they conclude that “there is a great deal of variation in the use of modal verbs and the structures they occur in, depending on the context of use” (p.234).

Theoretically, I adopt Granger’s (1996) Integrated Contrastive Model (ICM). Granger’s approach allows to investigate interlanguage varieties in contrast with a speaker’s target language (L2) and his/her native language (L1). The approach involves, on the one hand, the comparison of original data in different native languages and, on the other hand, the comparison of a native language with a non-native variety of that language (Gilquin 2008). Assuming, following Gabrielatos and Sarmento (2006), that the interpretation of lexical items is context-dependent, methodologically, this study aims to put to the test Gries and Divjak’s (2009) Behavioural Profile (BP) approach to corpus data, currently used in cognitive semantics, by applying it to the field of interlanguage studies. This approach allows to explore how meanings and functions of lexical and syntactic elements are correlated with the distribution(s) of formal elements within their contexts. The approach involves a profiling process of given lexical items which takes into account semantic and morpho-syntactic features from different linguistic levels within the data.

For this study, 3700 instances of may and can in English and French-English interlanguage as well as French pouvoir were investigated in three different corpora: the French sub-section of the International Corpus of Learner English (ICLE), the Louvain Corpus of Native English Essays (LOCNESS) and the Corpus de Dissertations Françaises (CODIF). These instances were annotated for 22 semantic and morpho-syntactic variables, including a total of 98 features. The statistical treatment of the annotated data includes both a monofactorial analysis that involves assessing the behaviour of may and can in relation to individual semantic and morpho-syntactic independent variables; and a multifactorial analysis which involves the statistical modelling of possible interactions between all independent variables and their effects on may and can.

The results of the monofactorial assessment confirm the relevance of a contextually-grounded approach. Linguistic components such as, for instance, the senses of may and can, the type of clauses they occur in, the type of lexical verbs they occur with or the type of (in)animacy of their subject referents have all been identified as highly influencing components within the corpus (each individual component showing a p-value smaller than 0.001). However, results also indicate that the frequencies of may and can differ considerably across the corpora (chi-square= 3716.93, p< 0.001, Cramer’s V= 0.71), thus possibly suggesting that the identified semantic and morpho-syntactic features yield different interaction patterns in each individual sub-corpus. I am currently carrying out a multifactorial analysis to investigate behavioural patterns characteristic of may and can both in L2 and IL.

This work will show that while offering a cognitive perspective for the investigation of learner English, the BP approach provides a useful and empirically-grounded way to address semantic issues characteristic of interlanguage varieties.
References


Making a Bid for Dominance. Surely as a Tool in Interactional Discourse

In this ongoing research, I put forward the claim that in present-day British English the pragmatic marker *surely* can be used to externalise and index dominance in varying degrees in interactive discourse. In purpose-driven language, Brazil postulates a general condition of shared understanding of which participant is in control of the discourse at any one time (1985:131). Certain types of participant are traditionally in control: teachers, doctors and interviewers are the ones who ask questions. However, students, patients and interviewees may compete for control. Where there is no prior distribution of roles, there may be an ongoing albeit incipient competition for dominance (cf. Haviland 1989). The dominant speaker, Brazil claims, has the choice of superimposing or not superimposing an increment of communicative value. In such scenarios, I would suggest that *surely* may be used as the ‘incremental’ step of communicative value that is associated with dominance or the bid for control at that point in the discourse.

I would go further and claim that in the development of surely over time from verb-phrase adverb to initial sentence adverbial, the final stages of its evolution to intersubjective pragmatic marker have been crucial; the resulting flexibility of position and degrees of prosodic and rhetorical strength that it can express enable speakers to adjust their stances to a wide variety of contexts.

The opacity of surely in comparison with other adverbs of certainty, as well as with the relative semantic transparency of its cognates in other European languages, means that surely indexes rather than encodes a moderate-to-strong, though indeterminate, meaning which is inferred by interactants and readers. It is dialogic in all positions and can exert discreet pressure on the recipient by virtue of introducing a leading question.

Specific interactional functions of surely include those of initiating a contradiction, counter-claim or challenge to something in the prior discourse. In interactional dialogue, what has gone before is typically something said by an immediately preceding speaker in the immediately preceding turn. Surely may be triggered, however, by something visual, heard or imagined, or even by a recent well-known event. Evidence may be supplied by the speaker but not necessarily so.

Illustrations are taken from the BNC World 2 edition. Data will not be presented quantificationally but instead will be used to support the claims made in the qualitative analysis.

References


__________ 2010 Surely as a marker of dominance and entitlement in the crime fiction of P.D. James. (in press)


There exists a peculiar chassé-croisé in English between the epistemic uses of MAY and CAN – MAY does not occur in questions, nor CAN in statements:

(1) *May it be John?
(2) *It can be John.

Curiously, these restrictions do not apply to their conditional forms:

(3) Might it be John?
(4) It could be John.

The picture is complicated by the fact that MAY seems possible in questions introduced by wh- words:

(5) And who may this be?

This paper will try to explain these preferences on the basis of the meanings of MAY and CAN and the pragmatics of their interaction with the illocutionary force of the utterance.

A unitary meaning will be posited for the two modals under study, while taking into consideration that “no unitary account of the meaning of any lexico-grammatical item is possible unless supplemented by an adequate theory of pragmatics.” (Walton 1991: 325). A significant difference from Walton will be that greater care will be devoted to the definition of the meanings of MAY and CAN, since if the pragmatic component is made too powerful, to the detriment of the semantics, one risks falling into the absurd position of being able to derive almost any message from any meaning.

The fact that the sole state in which linguistic items can be observed is in use, i.e. where they have already been enriched by context, is argued to imply that non-enriched linguistic meaning exists only as a potential with respect to the actual messages it is used to express – something which cannot be observed directly but whose nature must be inferred from observation. Since linguistic meaning is a potential, it necessarily underlies all of the uses to which it is put. This entails that any hypothesis as to its nature must be based on the complete range of its uses. Another consequence of meaning’s status as a potential is abstractness: a meaning stored outside of any particular context is necessarily more abstract than any of the specific messages it is used to communicate. Consequently, describing meaning in terms of truth conditions does not work, because truth is a characteristic of sentences, which correspond to specific messages communicated in particular contexts, whereas items like MAY and CAN are stored outside of any particular application. The fact that meanings are stored also opens up the possibility that they be defined by their relations with one another.

The approach to MAY and CAN followed here will take into account these characteristics of linguistic meaning and also apply appropriate pragmatic principles. In the literature on MAY and CAN, there is a broad consensus that these modals are semantically related: Bolinger proposes for instance that MAY evokes ‘extrinsic possibility’, while CAN expresses ‘intrinsic potentiality’. The distinction between MAY and CAN will be defined here in terms of an opposition between possibility as attributed to the subject alone and possibility viewed as brought to the subject by some external source. Thus in the permission sense MAY evokes granting permission, i.e. possibility seen as brought to the subject by a permitting authority, while CAN denotes having permission, i.e. the situation resulting for the permittee once permission has been granted (cf. Duffley et al. 1981).

The linguistic meanings of MAY and CAN described above will be applied to the uses in (1)-(5) in order to show how they interact with the pragmatics of the utterance and account for the acceptability vs. unacceptability of certain sequences. For example, the fact that MAY is not normal in yes/no interrogatives is explained by the fact that it denotes a type of possibility which does not logically exclude its negative and so it would make no sense to even answer such a question at all.

The conclusion proposed is that the fact that meaning underdetermines message should not be an excuse not to try to reconstruct meaning as carefully as possible, by means of the principles enunciated above. On the other hand, the abstract nature of meaning – a necessary consequence of its being stored outside of any particular application – compels the speaker to use pragmatic strategies in order to convey messages about situations whose particularity cannot be adequately expressed by the content of the words themselves. Consequently, the complete explanation of why the speaker said what he did must appeal to both semantics and pragmatics, and in the proper proportion to each.
References
The proposed paper aims to address the use of the Present Perfect in Present-Day English—and in particular in a corpus of Australian police reports—in conjunction with implicit or even explicit definite past time reference. Such instances are especially worthy of interest as the English language (in contradistinction to German, for instance) is well-known to distinguish itself by its rejection of such combinations:

1. I [a.*have seen / saw] her yesterday.
2. Ich [a. habe sie gestern gesehen / b. sah sie gestern]. [German]

The reigning consensus is that such instances should be regarded as accidental productions, induced by 'afterthought' (see Abbott, 1869: 245, Poutsma, 1926: 260; and also Fryd, 1998: 43-45, for a critical evaluation of this hypothesis).

However, vigilant observation of ongoing language change has motivated a number of scholars to venture that something might actually be happening to the English Perfect (Cotte, 1987; Fryd, 1998; Engel & Ritz, 2000, Walker, 2008).

Indeed, Australian English—and to a lesser extent other varieties of English—provide a wealth of examples which cannot be accounted for within the boundaries of Standard English grammar (see Engel & Ritz, 2000). Without pretending to account for all driving forces behind present-day changes, this paper proposes to investigate the case of Australian police media reports, which abound in instances of the novel construction, e.g.:

3. "(...) The first aggravated burglary was committed at Marloo Rd. Greenmount where it will be alleged offenders have smashed their way into the property using bricks while the victims were in bed. Once inside they have stolen the keys to a black Holden Marloo Ute and have then stolen the Ute from the driveway outside. (…) It is also alleged one of the offenders has assaulted one of the female victims (…)."

4. "(...) The male driver of the car then wound down the passenger side window and asked the boy if he needed a lift. The boy has refused and kept on walking. (…) As the boy walked past the car the man has reached out to grab the boy. (…)"

The proposed paper will test the hypothesis that narrative strategies translating in terms of Preterite vs Perfect choice may not be, or perhaps not solely, motivated by the mechanics of plot progression, and a dialectics of backgrounding vs foregrounding effects (cf. Bronzwaer, 1970), but by speaker-based considerations of testimonial involvement. Thus, with past events narrated in the Preterite taking on a truth-asserting function, events narrated in the Present Perfect come to convey, contrastively, a form of non-assertive, or non-testimonial distance adopted by the speaker (cf. Willett, 1988: 57, and his definition of “hearsay”). This hypothesis will be articulated with cognate situations prevailing in other languages where the Perfect is motivated by conditions of evidentiality such as mirative connotations, e.g. the case of Ecuadorian Highland Spanish (Olbertz, 2009):

5. Ha habido sólo dos números (= ‘(it turns out) there are only two issues’) [a clerk of a university library has been looking for a journal in the repository]

References
López Izquierdo, Marta. 2006. ‘L’émergence de dizque comme stratégie médiative en espagnol médiéval,’ Cahiers de linguistique et de civilisation hispaniques médiévales, 29, 483–495.


Ward et al. (2003 and 2007) discussed the use of epistemic would in would be and would have been constructions (as in That would be 1992 or That would have been 1992), and showed, among other things, that in these constructions would requires a context with a salient 'open proposition' (i.e. a proposition with one or more unspecified elements). Our purpose is to extend the study of would to a wider range of uses: we will examine the grammar of would in what we will call epistemic contexts – i.e. contexts in which some doubt is expressed or implied concerning the truth of a proposition or concerning some semantic element related to it. As far as the use of would is concerned, these contexts fall into three categories: (i) declarative contexts in which would is constructed either with a state verb (as in the examples above) or with an event verb, as in And work is why he cannot wake her. She’s due in the High Court at ten for an emergency hearing […]. She’d have come in late last night from meetings […] (Ian McEwan, Saturday), and expresses the high probability of the truth of a proposition; (ii) contexts in which would is constructed with a verb of epistemic judgement and qualifies the speaker’s commitment to the truth of a proposition, as in They would appear to have gone without us (cited in Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 200-201) or in But it would seem that maybe she had it done some time ago (Peter Robinson, Friend of the Devil); (iii) in contexts which are “factual” (i.e. in contexts that presuppose the truth of the proposition modalled by would) and in which would seems to simply reinforce the doubt expressed explicitly or implicitly by other elements of the sentence, either in open interrogative constructions (especially those introduced by why, how or who, as in The letter was postmarked the day after he and Harry Rex went to court to open the estate. Why would the IRS be so quick to respond? How would they ever know about the death of Reuben Attlee? (John Grisham, The Summons) / ’But … who’d send me flowers today? It’s not my birthday or anything, is it?’ (Zoë Barnes, Return to Sender), or in nominal clauses which are the object of a verb of knowing/thinking, as in ‘I can’t believe Mark would do this to me,’ she said (A. Craig, A Vicious Circle, p. 53). Ward et al.’s analysis (2003 and 2007) of would be/would have been constructions applies to the second sub-category of type (i) uses – i.e. those in which would is constructed with an event verb – except as regards the choice between the would V and would have V-en constructions. Types (ii) and (iii) uses of epistemic would have in common the fact that they allow the replacement of the would construction by a non-modal construction without considerable semantic change: thus, They would appear to have gone without us and Why would the IRS be so quick to respond? could be replaced by They appear to have gone without us and Why was the IRS so quick to respond? without the meaning being changed very significantly. We will argue that there exists a similarity and a continuum of uses between them and ‘conditional’ uses of would, as well as between type (iii) uses and the use of would in such utterances as He would say that, wouldn’t he? Depending on the context, the sentence Why would he do that? can be either counterfactual (the presupposition being, e.g. “he is not going to do that”) or “factual”, as in the similar examples cited above. We will propose a hypothesis that explains both cases. We will also address the problem of time-reference marking in these types of use of would, and briefly compare the epistemic uses of would, will and must.

References


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A number of studies have analysed the ways speakers and writers include affective meanings in addition to propositional content. Research has focused on lexi-co-grammatical means of expressing attitudes, interpretations and assessment of truth value on readers in genres related to the research article in specific disciplines (Latour & Woolgar, 1979; Thompson & Ye, 1991; Salager-Meyer, 1994; Skelton, 1997; Hyland, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c; Stotesbury, 2003; Koutsantoni, 2004). These investigations have been carried out from different perspectives and under various labels: evaluation (Hunston, 1994; Hunston & Thompson, 2003), stance (Conrad & Biber, 2003), hedging (Hyland, 1996; Markkanen & Schröder, 1997) and appraisal (Martin, 2003). In addition, the writer's judgements have been related either to attitudinal meanings and value systems or to opinions of likelihood, evidentiality (Chafe & Nichols, 1985) and modality (Halliday, 1994).

Scientific writings state claims which often deny other researchers' claims. Scientists have to seek a balance between achieving a certain consensus with the community and having a new claim to make so as to justify their original contribution. Modality is believed to be one of the linguistic means of securing this balance. Epistemic language showing uncertainty and vagueness has been associated with the adequate degree of accuracy and caution on the part of the scientist to make a claim (Chafe, 1985; Crompton, 1997). Epistemic devices, however, have also been explained by social factors. From a pragmatic perspective, they can be considered as ways of successful interaction with the reader (Holmes, 1984; Hyland, 1996, 2002; Myers, 1989; Vassileva, 2001). They reflect the relation between the author and the audience: they allow room for alternative interpretations and soften claims in order to obtain acceptance for them. Credibility and acceptance by the scientific community can be acquired by inviting readers to become involved in the discourse and participate in negotiating the status of the information presented. In this sense, modality helps perform the interpersonal function of language and is used for the realisation of certain politeness strategies. It serves to protect the participants' faces from the threat of certain acts (Brown & Levinson, 1987). On the one hand, modality is used to protect the author's face from criticism and refutation by reducing her/his commitment to the truth of her/his statements. On the other hand, it also protects the reader's face because it makes her/him feel free to decide.

This paper will explore epistemic devices as elements aiding to the author's visibility and the reader's engagement in the construction of claims. To this end a total of 46 research article discussions written in English from the engineering fields of computing, robotics, telecommunications and nanotechnology have been selected. The articles were published between 2000 and 2003 in 18 leading international journals in the specific fields. The discussion section seems to favour hedging, since it is the place where authors' claims are put forward, strengthened or mitigated. Writers include their own attitude and evaluation in addition to propositional content and create solidarity and deference relations between themselves and their readers.

The methodological approach adopted in this study will be qualitative and will serve to identify pragmatic usage. First, we will identify the linguistic occurrences of epistemic modality in context. Next, we will examine the roles these devices perform in the text. They will be analysed both as interactional and lexi-co-grammatical strategies and from the point of view of their orientation towards both the writer and the reader.

The analysis of results will be based on the description of previous taxonomies of hedges proposed by Hyland (1996, 1998b) under the categories: modal verbs, epistemic lexical verbs, epistemic adjectives, epistemic adverbs and epistemic nouns.

The expected results will indicate different choices in the overall distribution of epistemic devices throughout the specific rhetorical functional units in research article discussions. They will also show the degree of the writer's commitment and the effect on the intended reader.

References


It is generally acknowledged that modal auxiliaries belong to the central linguistic means of expressing modality in English. Auxiliaries in turn make up a special class of function words which both express particular meanings rooted in their lexical origins and contribute, as shown in Langacker (1991; 2009), to the construction of clauses and generation of utterances. The role of English modal auxiliaries at the level of finite clause and utterance raises the issue of how the expression of a particular modal meaning combines with the respective auxiliary’s functional load in an utterance.

On the other hand, modal auxiliaries belong to a class of expressions which enter two kinds of correlations with other (analogous) function words. First, English modals correlate with one another as different means of expressing modality (Larreya 1996; Cotte 2000). Second, modal auxiliaries can correlate with their non-modal counterparts in particular types of utterances. A case in point is alternations of *would* and *used to* in habitual utterances (Binnick 2005). The auxiliary *would* (representing the past-tense form of *will*) is a modal, even though the meaning of inductive truth (Palmer 1974: 112), or propensity (Huddleston 2002: 197) is generally regarded as a special and not quite typical modal meaning. Unlike *would*, the (semi-)auxiliary *used to* is qualified as an aspectual (Huddleston 2002: 115) which frequently (though not necessarily) conveys the sense of iterativity. The issue involved in the alternations of *would* and *used to* is that of the basis for the correlation of modal and aspectual meanings.

The proposed paper addresses both of the mentioned issues by looking at the factors which motivate the choice of *would* or *used to* in habitual utterances. The approach being followed throughout the study is a semiotic one, which implies that grammatical auxiliaries are regarded as special kinds of linguistic signs that invoke complex and multi-faceted content structures. In elaborating a semiotic account of the English (modal) auxiliary the paper takes up the following theoretical points suggested by H. Adamczewski in Adamczewski & Delmas (1982): (1) the functioning of grammatical markers, or “operators” (including, in common terminology, modal and non-modal auxiliaries), as “tracers”, “indices”, and thus, – indexical signs which point to internal(ized) operations of the mental processing and syntactic structuring of utterances; (2) the use of modals as meta-predicates that signify, on the one hand, the degree to which the speaker (or other subject of mental activity) is involved in establishing the subject-predicate relationship and, on the other hand, - the nature of relationship linking the referents of the subject-predicate group.

The analysis of linguistic data has involved a corpus of 250 examples drawn from English-language fiction. The main method applied in the study is based on contrastive analysis of *would* and *used to* in habitual utterances.

The study establishes three factors which motivate the correlation of modal *would* and aspectual *used to*. First, it is shown that similarly to *would* which signals modalization *a posteriori*, or reference to a set of known facts (Larreya 2009), the auxiliary *used to* carries experiential connotations. However, with *would*, the utterance gets indexed only to (the speaker’s) individual experience, whereas with *used to*, reference could be made to both individual and generalized experience: *I heard he used to* (vs. *would*) *travel a lot*. *Was it not Gautier who used to* (vs. *would*) *write about la consolation des arts*. Second, *would* and *used to*, while equally implying distributive characterization of a habitual event (Binnick 2005: 352), conjure up contrastive perspectivization: whereas with *used to*, the past event is viewed from the present-time perspective, with *would*, the same event should necessarily be temporally aligned with the viewpoint: *Some time ago / Earlier / Previously he?* *would* (vs. *used to*) *travel a lot*. Finally, there is evidence which shows that *would*, contrastively to *used to*, points to a significant (vs. minimal) engagement of the speaker-experiencer in establishing a subject-predicate (inherent) link. Linguistic data also reveal that habitual *would* implies the experiencer’s generalization over separate instances of an event, whereas habitual *used to* characterizes an event’s recurrence in a factual, or objectivized manner.

Results of the proposed study suggest that functional properties of a modal auxiliary could be accounted for within the framework of the auxiliary’s indexical values relating to knowledge type, viewpoint, the structuring of clausal predication.
References


In the past few decades, epistemic modal marking, i.e. the linguistic encoding of the degree of certainty with which a proposition is asserted, appears to have undergone some interesting changes in English. In particular, a quantitative shift seems to have taken place from (more) lexical to (more) grammatical markers of epistemic modality. For instance, the frequency of modal auxiliaries (e.g. *This may be our last chance*) has increased at the expense of ‘more lexical’ types of expressions (e.g. *It seems to me that this is our last chance*). This is surprising in view of the results reported by Leech (2004), who has shown that the overall frequency of modal auxiliaries in English has decreased considerably between the 1960s and the 1990s (cf. also Leech and Smith 2006).

In this talk, we will provide quantitative evidence substantiating the tendency pointed out above on the basis of data from the Brown, LOB, Frown and FLOB corpora. The selection of corpora allows us to identify both regional differences (British vs. American English) and recent diachronic changes (between 1961 and 1991). Results obtained on the basis of a manually coded sample of approx. 75,000 words show that in both British and American English the relative frequency of modal adverbs in epistemic function is significantly higher in the two more recent corpora (Frown and FLOB), while the opposite trend can be observed with respect to lexical paraphrases ($X^2=4.39$, df=1, p<0.05). The relative frequency of epistemic adverbs does not seem to show any significant changes. We interpret these figures as demonstrating that the way of encoding epistemic modality has moved rightward on the ‘scale of grammaticality’ shown in (1) (note that this scale is not intended to show diachronic developments; it merely captures degrees of grammaticality; while lexical means of encoding modality often do develop into modal auxiliaries, a development of modal adverbs to modal auxiliaries is very rare cross-linguistically).

(1)  lexical paraphrases > modal adverbs > modal auxiliaries

The question arises how the trend towards a more grammatical encoding in the domain of epistemic modality can be explained. We will pursue two hypotheses. First, it is conceivable that the tendency for epistemic marking to be encoded more grammatically is another instance of the trend towards ‘colloquialization’ (cf. Leech 2004, Leech and Smith 2006). Lexical constructions generally make the epistemic marking (often also the source of the epistemic evaluation) more explicit than modal verbs (cf. *Present research suggests that* P is true vs. *P may be true*), and the parameter ‘explicit vs. implicit’ is often taken to correlate with the parameter ‘written vs. oral’ (cf. Biber 1988, among many others). This hypothesis entails that the use of modal auxiliaries is not per se a feature of written language, and that the register distribution of modals is sensitive to their function.

Our second hypothesis regards the shift in epistemic marking as a symptom of a more general reorganization of the modal system of English. As Leech (2004) has shown, the (overall) loss of modal auxiliaries is countered by an increasing use of semi-auxiliaries. It is conceivable, thus, that modal auxiliaries are more and more specialized to an epistemic function while other modal domains are covered by less grammatical means. For example, *may* seems to be increasingly used with epistemic readings while the corresponding deontic functions are more often expressed using *can* or lexical paraphrases (e.g. *be allowed to*). Our findings would thus reflect an ongoing reorganization of the entire modal domain in English which is in line with common cross-linguistic developments (cf. van der Auwera & Plungian 1998).

**Literature**


THE INTERPERSONAL METAFUNCTION IN ENGLISH AND SPANISH SLOGANS OF COSMETIC AND FASHION ADVERTISEMENTS

This paper provides an analysis of the language used in advertising slogans from the Systemic Functional Linguistics point of view, focusing on Halliday’s interpersonal metafunction. Special emphasis will be given to the role of modality in the slogans.

The increasing interest in the effects of advertisements in the consumer’s attitudes has heightened the need for the analysis of the language used in advertising. Broadly speaking, the language of advertising has been analyzed from two perspectives. Some studies concentrate on the persuasive effects of advertising (Vestergaard and Schroder, 1985; Cook, 2001; Goddard, 2002). Other studies analyze advertising texts from a more linguistic point of view, mostly focusing on commercials in a single language. Furthermore, the advertising discourse has become a favourite topic for analysis from a functional linguistic perspective and recently, there has been some research about the interpersonal metafunction in advertising (Fuertes-Olivera et al., 2001; Hidalgo, 2003; Zhang & Yang, 2004; Vellón Lahoz, 2007). However, there is little information about this metafunction in advertising slogans in Spanish, and, to my knowledge, there is not a comparative study of this metafunction across advertisements in English and Spanish.

The aim of this paper is to analyze advertising slogans so as to find out similarities and differences in the role of the interpersonal elements in advertisements in English and Spanish languages. The texts selected will be 200 slogans of cosmetic and fashion advertisements in UK, US and Spanish issues of the women’s magazine Cosmopolitan. The study will concentrate on how these slogans contribute to the main purpose of advertising, which is selling the product. The interpersonal elements analyzed will be mood structures, person, polarity, temporality and modality. The approach followed for the analysis of these elements will be Halliday (2004), except for the study of modality, for which I will use the classification made by Carretero et al. (2007), who distinguish between epistemic, deontic, dynamic and boulomaiic modality.

As is well-known, advertisers try to give information, but also, and more importantly, to persuade the consumer to buy a particular product. This balance between the informative and persuasive aims is visible in the interpersonal elements of advertising slogans, since they focus on the relation between the addressee (potential consumer) as well as on the addresser’s attitude towards the product. In particular, the following elements will be shown to be crucial: imperative and interrogative structures, ellipsis, modal verbs, mood adjuncts and evaluative expressions.

The results of this analysis will show that, at a general level, there is a great degree of similarity in the mood structure and modality of advertising slogans in English and Spanish. However, at a more specific level, some differences will be appreciated across both corpora; the main differences are found in the use of personal pronouns and in the higher frequency of negative and interrogative clauses in English advertisements. Other differences will be due to the particular grammatical characteristics of each language; for example, in Spanish the pronoun usted is used in a formal context, whereas in English we can find abbreviated clauses (i.e. clauses consisting only of mood elements), in Spanish they are not grammatically possible. Finally, the most important differences will be found in the use of modality: there are more clauses containing modality in the English corpus than in the Spanish corpus. Mood adjuncts and modal verbs are more prevalent in English than in Spanish. Spanish prefers the use of other structures indicating modality (periphrases, noun phrases, adjectives...). With regard to the different types of modality, the results will be similar in English and Spanish: epistemic and dynamic modalities are the most common, and advertisers prefer to use median and high value modal verbs and expressions.

References
The relationship between the expression of modal necessity and impersonality is well attested (cf., for example Pocheptsov 1997, Pantaleo 2002, Lourei ro-Porto 2009). The underlying link between both phenomena is the fact that necessity usually affects an unvolitional experiencer. Ample evidence of this relationship can be found in the history of English (cf. Lourei ro-Porto forthcoming); the Present-Day English (modal) verb need used to be found in constructions involving an impersonal experiencer in Old English, as in sentence (1) below, and so did its semantic competitors (þurfan in Old English, and thurven, misteren and behoven in Middle English). One of them, behove, which was personal in Old English (cf., for example, we sólice ne behofiað þyssera eorðlicera æhta ‘we truly do not need this/these earthly wealth/possessions’), evolved into Modern English as an exclusive impersonal verb (cf. Allen 1997, Lourei ro-Porto forthcoming), as seen, for example, in (2):

(1) ðonne þe martirlogium geneodie
‘then, martyrlogy is necessary for you’
(OE example from Visser 1963-1973: 1424, §1345)

(2) It behooves us to know as much as possible about this problem
(1955, example from the OED s.v. behove v.,4)

Cross-linguistic evidence also supports this relationship. Galician, for example, a Romance language spoken in NW Spain, has a defective verb of necessity which is only inflected for the third person (singular and plural), cómpre/ cómpren ‘it is necessary’ (infinitive cumprir, literally ‘comply’). A preliminary overview of its use reveals that its meanings include, at least, weak internal obligation, ‘should’, as in sentence (3); absence, ‘lack’ (very much like early English want, cf. Krug 2000), as in sentence (4), and general necessity, as in sentence (5):

(3) A nosa memoria, polo tanto, é quen de provocar choiva para que afogue o que non nos cómpre ouvir
‘Our memory, therefore, is able to provoke rain so that what we should not hear will drown out’
(Estévez, Xosé, A lagoa da memoria, 2002, from TILGA)

(4) Ao Manifiesto só lle cómpren unhas palabras, aquelas de Antonio Machado…
‘the Manifest only lacks (and needs) some words, those by Antonio Machado…’

(5) Cómpre unha economia que non precise medrar
‘the world needs a sort of economy that does not need to grow up’

The survival of need and behove as personal and impersonal in Present-Day English is claimed to have been caused (at least partially) by the different modal meanings they came to express in the course of time: while need survives expressing different necessity meanings (volition, external obligation, general need, etc.), behove develops an exclusive preference for meanings related to appropriateness, i.e. ‘circumstances are such that the experiencer would be better off if he/she…’ (cf. Lourei ro-Porto forthcoming). Likewise, this syntactic-semantic difference appears to have played a role in the development of need as a modal auxiliary, while behove never enters the group of grammaticalized verbs.

The present paper addresses the following issues: i) to what extent Galician cómpre / cómpren is semantically closer to need (‘necessity’) or to behove (‘appropriateness’), ii) the correlation between the semantic and pragmatic implications and the syntactic preference for an impersonal construction in the history of need, behove and cómpre / cómpren, and finally iii) the relationship between the preference for personal contexts (i.e. nominative experiencers) and the grammaticalization of lexical verbs into modal auxiliaries.
With the aim of addressing these issues, and adopting a corpus-based approach, this paper explores the historical evolution of Galician cómpre / cómpren and its present-day status and compares its pragmatic and semantic features to those of English need and behove in the history of English. Both diachronic and synchronic corpora will be used, including, among others, the Helsinki Corpus, ARCHER and the BNC (for English), and the TILGA and the CORGA (for Galician).

References
Archer (A Representative Corpus of Historical English Registers).
BNC (British National Corpus), http://corpus.bmu.edu/bnc/ (Mark Davies interface).
CORGA (Corpus de Referencia do Galego Actual), at http://corpus.cirp.es/corga/.
Cognitive Grammar (Langacker, 1987, 1991a, 1991b, 2000, 2008a, 2008b) is a constructivist and connexionist approach which analyses the main cognitive mechanisms through which meaning is built by the human mind and which considers language a "structured inventory of symbolic units" (Langacker, 1987: 289). Every unit vehicles a particular interpretation of a situation, unique and different from any other linguistic expression.

The focus of this study deals with Modality as Cognitive Grammar approaches it, in combination with the conceptualisation of the network of fear in English (Luque Agulló, 2006, 2008, 2009 in press). The former is applied as a research tool to analyse the concept of (PHOBIA)\(^1\), also from the assumption that this emotive domain is an experiential one, i.e., conceptualised following the experience humans have with and about it (Martín Morillas, 1999, 2001-02).

To analyse this experiential basis, work such as that of neurologists Buck (Buck, 1984) and Öhman (Öhman, 2004) is considered in this paper. Therefore, the emotive event is viewed as a concept with an experiential basis, which integrates a sequence of elements (Martín Morillas, 2001-02). The first one is the stimulus –"S"- which 'affects' the experiencer –"Exp"-, producing the emotion/feeling\(^2\) (Damasio, 1994, 1999) of fear –"F"-. This fear, then, leads to a bodily response –"Y"- and a behavioural one –"Z"-. (See Fig. 1) When a conceptualiser selects a lexical unit or produces a more complex linguistic expression, s/he activates one/some of those elements in a particular usage event\(^3\), construing a unique and particular image (Langacker, 1987: 77).

R. W. Langacker develops the ‘Time Line’ and ‘Basic Epistemic Model’ (Langacker, 1991b: 240ss) to account for the concepts of tense and modality and the way we conceptualise them. They are essential for the characterisation of the concept (PHOBIA), analysed in this paper.

Time is an epistemic predication which links the ground –a speaker, a listener and the interaction between both in the speech event- to an event and the space of reality or irreality. In brief, present tense locates the event in the space of immediacy, whereas past tense, in that of non immediacy. The

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\(^1\) The concepts shall be represented in capital letters and between brackets, following Cognitive Grammar. In addition, the concepts with nominal profile are represented against a blue background for methodological reasons.

\(^2\) The two terms are used indistinctly in this paper.

\(^3\) Following Cognitive Grammar, the model of the usage event accounts for the symbolic relation between semantic space and phonological space. It analyses both the symbolic relation between semantic units and phonological units with respect to linguistic convention and also the process of meaning creation of target structures which link conceptualization and vocalization in a usage event.
absence of a modal implies that the conceptualiser accepts the process as being real, whereas its absence implies the opposite (Langacker, 2008b).

The conceptualiser ‘C’ is located on the front side of the ‘reality’ cylinder, i.e., in the space of immediate reality. S/he is the point of reference of the events and s/he is the one who locates events closer or farther from him/her. But also, time develops and also present reality, and anything beyond those limits belongs to potential reality or irreality. That is why a concept such a vampire, which is not part of external reality, does exist in a child’s world and may unleash an emotive experience in him. (See Fig 2)

Figura 2. THE BASIC EPISTEMIC MODEL

(PHOBIA) is a concept which profiles an intense emotive and long lasting state, sometimes even pathological, which is prototypically disproportionate to the stimulus which unleashed it. The experient feeling (PHOBIA) is not able to break the link between the identifiable stimulus which produced the emotive event in the past, and the present situation (Öhman, 2004: 589). Therefore, the impact of that emotive event is a cognitive stimulus per se, which makes the experiencer feel (FEAR) and (DISGUST) (Damasio, 1994:50ss). Alternative linguistic expressions show different construals of the emotive episode.

Figura 3. PHOBIA and the EPISTEMIC MODEL FOR MODALITY AND GROUNDING

As a final consideration, in this paper we hope to shed some light on the conceptualization of the concept (PHOBIA) using Cognitive Grammar as a research tool. We hope to contribute to the analysis of the conceptualisation of time and reality applied to a particular emotion concept and also to the analysis of the conceptual network of fear in English from its experiential basis (Buck, 1984; Ohman, 2004).
References


Stancetaking and Subjectivity in Political Discourse: Legitimising Strategies and Mystification of Responsibility

Stancetaking is a form of social action, involving the expression of the speaker/writer’s personal attitudes, beliefs, or evaluations concerning the narrated state of affairs and their commitment with respect to the communicated proposition (Biber and Finegan 1989; Ochs 1989; Hunston and Thompson 2000). Stance is indexical in that it evokes the speaker/writer’s subjective construal of the stance object, their intersubjective positioning, and their alignment with other subjects in the discourse (Du Bois 2007; Marín-Arrese 2007, 2009). Stance is also consequential in that it involves responsibility and consequences for the stancetaker in social terms (Berman 2004; Kockelman 2004; Englebretson 2007).

This paper presents a model for the analysis of stancetaking in discourse on the basis of two macro categories, the effective and the epistemic, which subsume the various categories proposed in the literature (Marín Arrese 2009). In characterising the domain of stance, I draw on Langacker’s (2009) distinction between the effective and the epistemic level, which involves a systematic opposition of English grammar that is manifested at various levels of structural organization. The category of effective stance pertains to the control or influence on the course of reality itself, to the ways in which the speaker/writer expresses his/her inclination, decision or intention to carry out an event, or his/her emotive/affective position with regard to the event. The category of epistemic stance pertains to epistemic control of the conception of reality, to the degree of certainty of the speaker/writer regarding the realization of the event and/or to his/her assessment of the validity of the proposition designating the event.

Stance resources include modal, evidential and attitudinal expressions, as well as expressions of speech and thought representation (Mushin 2001; Palmer 2001; Aikhenvald 2004). In addition to their contentful meaning, these expressions are indexical of the speaker/writer’s subjective construal and intersubjective positioning (Langacker 1991, 2002; Marín-Arrese 2007, 2009). Stancetaking and the dimensions of subjectivity vs. intersubjectivity also relate to the responsibility of the stancetaker (Nuyts 2001). The model presented here accounts for the ways in which stancetaking is systematically related with subjectivity and intersubjectivity. On the basis of the notions of subjective construal, intersubjective positioning, and responsibility of the stancetaker, a set of categories of subjectivity and intersubjectivity is proposed resulting from the interaction of two parameters: degrees of ‘salience and explicitness of the role of the conceptualizer’ and ‘specificity vs. generality of reference’.

Political language use is a form of communication which is particularly sensitive to distortion, subject to the interests and power relations of participants; as such, it is a preferred locus for the strategic use of language in the Habermasian sense. It will be argued that the use of stance resources serves the strategic functions of legitimisation whereby speakers/writers manage their interests (Chilton and Schaäffner 1997, Chilton 2004). The use of legitimisation strategies can be judged coercive in that their main rhetorical goal is to persuade (Hart and Lukes 2007). By means of these resources, speakers/writers not only manage their interests with respect to their goal of persuasion, but also manage their responsibility for the use of legitimising strategies, through strategies of mystification such as implicitness of the role of conceptualizer and the appeal to shared responsibility (Marín-Arrese in press).

This paper presents a case study on the use of these linguistic resources in political speeches and Parliamentary statements by Bush, Blair and Aznar on the war in Iraq. On the micro-level of identity, the use of stance resources contributes to index ideological positioning and political identity, which is reflected in these politicians’ stancetaking acts and their expression of inter/subjectivity, and in the similarities and/or differences in their interpersonal styles and their strategic use of language.
This study focuses on the linguistic organization of narrative discourse for young readers of English, with the aim of describing and identifying variation in terms of target age and target native/non-native addressee. To this purpose, a corpus of over thirty narratives has been analyzed, with a similar proportion of, on one hand, stories linguistically graded to meet different levels of non-native reading proficiency—from Starter to Advanced,— and, on the other hand, non-graded stories aimed at young readers of English as L1, from four/five-year-old starters to advanced pre-adolescents, consumers of cross-over fiction (Walsh 2007).

The cognitive principles of foreground and background (Vernon 1970; Talmy 1978; Wallace 1982; Ungerer and Schmid 1996; Talmy 2001a; Talmy 2001b; Brïseard 2002; Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007; Brône 2009; Tsur 2009) have provided a theoretical framework for the analysis. In narrative discourse, certain events are presented as central and perceptually salient, providing the sequenced narrative skeleton or main story line (Hopper 1979; Semino and Culpeper 2002; Stockwell 2002; Gavins and Steen, 2003; Sternberg 2003; Herman 2005; Lambrou and Stockwell, 2007). These are usually encoded using the simple past tense, receptive aspect, and assertive modality. Other events, however, are presented as part of the narrative background, in the form of description, pre-history, commentary, or evaluation, and their most frequently associated linguistic features are non-sequenced tenses other than the simple past, imperfective aspect, and non-assertive modality.

The underlying assumption is that, both in native and non-native contexts, the narrative discourse to which young readers are exposed is graded in order to help them develop a future proficient reader awareness of which events in a narrative ought to be perceived as perceptually salient, in the midst of what is presented as complementary ground. As the semantics of time, aspectuality, and modality, and the linguistic systems involved in their expression, are of vital importance in this perspectivizing function, their presence in the narratives in the analysis has been studied and compared, with the aim of revealing patterns of gradual development along the starter-advanced continuum, as well as differences in these patterns across graded (G)/non-graded (NG) texts.

The analysis confirms the gradual exposure assumption: at starter levels, both in G and NG narratives, the percentage of events presented as salient is much higher than in advanced levels, and this percentage gradually decreases along the starter/beginner/intermediate/upper-intermediate/advanced axis, till, at the higher level of cross-over narratives like Treasure Island, the percentage of events presented as salient falls to the near 30% in adult narrative discourse (Martínez 2006). Conversely, the presence of events presented as part of the ground, which is minimum in starter levels and almost exclusively reduced to evidential hearsay in the form of direct quoting—“"[...]"the wolf said”—gradually increases to the approximate 70% in advanced levels.

But the analysis also shows that, although the gradual development of salient/non-salient event perception is similar in G and NG narrative discourse, there are significant differences in the way native and non-native apprentice readers are exposed to the different types of narrative background, namely temporal dislocation, imperfective incompleteness, and non-assertive uncertainty. The most noticeable of them affects the development of modality awareness. While the increasing presence of events presented imperfectively and as part of the story pre-history—pluperfect—, shows a parallel growth in G and NG extracts, the number of events presented non-assertively is consistently much lower in graded environments addressed at young foreign learners than in non-adapted narratives addressed at young native speakers of English. The latter are eventually exposed, in the advanced levels, to a percentage of events presented non-assertively similar to that in adult narrative discourse. However, the EFL adapted discourse analysed falls considerably behind in terms of modality awareness development at all levels of proficiency, with much lower percentages not only at starter levels, but also at advanced.

A possible implication of this finding is that young readers of English as a foreign language may not be receiving an appropriate training in the processing of parts of a narrative encoded using non-assertive modality, with the consequent entailments of lower ability to distinguish what is presented factually and non-factually in the L2, and lower ability to adopt the desired vantage point (Dunchan, Bruder and Hewitt, 1995; Segal 1995; Herman 2005; Jeffries 2008) which the linguistic organization of a narrative in English is intended to prompt in a reader. This will inevitably hinder the reading process, as it suggests that supposedly advanced young EFL readers are not trained as consistently as native readers in perceptually identifying the complex interplay of main story line and narrative background in English.
References

Wallace, Stephen (1982) “Figure and Ground: the interrelationship of linguistic categories.” In Paul Hopper (ed.) Tense-Aspect: Between Semantics and Pragmatics. 201-223.
The two central meanings within the area of modality in language comprise the expression of the speaker’s attitude towards factuality and the speaker’s attitude towards actualization of a future situation (Huddleston 2002: 173). The former, concerned with presenting a state of affairs, not as something directly known but rather as inferred, falls into the area of what is generally called epistemic modality. The latter relates to the area of deontic modality. In this paper we investigate the use of the English expression *No wonder,* as in the example *No wonder voters are angry,* as a marker of epistemic modality. As such a marker, this expression mainly indicates the speaker’s opinion concerning the likelihood of the event described, a central aspect of its meaning relating to the dichotomy certain/uncertain, applied to propositions rather than entities. Furthermore, the results of our observation and analysis have led us to conclude that the type of modality and stance found in the expression goes beyond the proposition, affecting a given discursive situation, into the realm of pragmatic, rather than semantic-propositional meaning, thus giving *No wonder* a certain ‘pragmatic strength’ (Huddleston 2002: 176).

The expression *No wonder* can be also seen as an attitudinal stance marker, indicating the speaker’s attitude or stance towards what is said, that is, as a marker of evaluative language. As was described in Alba Juez & Martinez Caro (2009), *No wonder* indicates a *covert* rather than *overt* expression of, mainly, negative evaluative meaning, especially in the genre of everyday conversation. The analysis underlying this study suggests that *No wonder* usually collocates with words expressing undesirable things, that is, having a negative evaluative orientation. As a result, the expression takes on an association with the negative, which is exploited by speakers to make evaluations and judgements covertly, even when the semantic features of *No wonder* may not indicate any negative orientation as such (cf. Channel 1999), for, in effect, it does not contain any semantic feature that would prevent a speaker from using it in a positive context, as could be the case of, for instance, *No wonder you passed the exam!*

In their use of the term, Thompson and Hunston (1999) consider *evaluation* as a broad cover term which may comprise modality as a sub-category. As said above, evaluation is seen as the expression of the speaker’s attitude or stance towards the event described; “that attitude may relate to certainty or obligation or desirability or any of a number of other sets of values” (Thompson and Hunston 1999: 5). Considering the parameters which evaluation is seen to cover and the areas of grammar which may contribute to it (cf. Thomson and Hunston 1999), an investigation of the use of *No wonder* in discourse should take into account the parameters of desirability, acceptance, certainty and expectedness as well as an examination of areas of grammar such as the ‘packaging’ of *that*-clauses in the extraposition construction, the use of ellipsis and reduced units at various levels, discourse markers, the semantic distinction between propositions and entities, textual (and structural) cohesion and others.

This paper presents a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the expression *No wonder* in English, taking these notions into consideration. Our analysis is derived from concordanced examples taken from the BNC (British National Corpus) and the COCA (Corpus of Contemporary American English), in an attempt to demonstrate that a corpus-based analysis can reveal aspects of the semantic and pragmatic functions of language that even native speaker’s intuitions can fail to pick up.

Following on Thompson and Hunston’s ideas, “it seems essential to view grammar from the evaluative perspective and to build up a coherent overall picture from that angle to complement the ‘propositional’ or ‘content’ perspective that has traditionally dominated grammatical approaches” (1999: 22). In the same vein, a complete account of an expression such as *No wonder* should cover both the ‘propositional’ (or ‘content’), meaning and the pragmatic evaluative meaning of the expression.

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REAL ACADEMIA ESPAÑOLA: Banco de datos (CREA) [on line]. *Corpus de referencia del español actual.* http://www.rae.es.
MODAL ADVERBS IN ENGLISH AND GERMAN:
CROSS-LANGUAGE STUDY OF EPISTEMIC MODALITY AND EVIDENTIALITY

Being the most precise way of expressing the degree of likelihood of a state of affairs, modal adverbs are a very illustrative material for describing the overlap of the domains of evidentiality and epistemic modality. Although recently the problem of interrelation between evidentiality and epistemic modality has been widely discussed, still there is no unanimity among the researchers. There are several main theories. The first theory is adopted by Oswalt, Chung and Timberlake and De Haan, who suggest that the categories are autonomous and have no intercourse between them. The second theory (Nuyts, Van Der Auwera and Plungian) treats the relation of these two categories as overlapping. According to the third theory (Willet, Palmer, Bybee, Perkins, Pagliuca and Givon) evidentiality makes part of the domain of epistemic modality. Nicolova offers yet another approach, stating that both epistemic modality and evidentiality have an overlapping interrelation and are subdomains of a bigger domain called “the speaker’s characteristic of the information he/she reports”. In the current study the above mentioned approaches are described in detail. The link between epistemic modality and evidentiality is investigated through analyzing meaning, pragmatic functioning and semantic classification of modal adverbs in English and German. Although there are several modal adverbs both in English and in German, which are traditionally believed to have either pure evidential meaning (seemingly, apparently, clearly and their German equivalents) or pure epistemic meaning (all other modal adverbs), linguists admit that sometimes it is difficult or even impossible to make clear distinction between such modal adverbs as they can have both evidential and epistemic nature (e.g., presumably, vermutlich). Under this study a comprehensive investigation of modal adverbs will be held on the parallel proprietary corpus of English and German fiction, developed by the author during previous studies. The corpus contains several text pairs by Gr. Green, B. Show, F. S. Fitzgerald, J. D. Salinger, F. Kafka, T. Mann, H. Hesse, and H. Böll. Both directions of translation will be analyzed – English originals and their German translations as well as German originals and their English translations.

A data-justified step towards the clarification of the problem of the overlap between evidentiality and epistemic modality being the main objective of the current research, the comparative analysis of means of expression of epistemic and evidential meanings in English and German may give us other interesting outcomes. For instance, we may verify, whether modal adverbs which have evidential meaning according to the dictionaries are translated as relevant evidential modal adverbs. If the percentage of such examples prevails over the cases, when evidential modal adverbs are translated differently (as non-evidential modal adverbs, modal verbs, etc.), this can be interpreted as demonstration of strict differentiation of means of expression of epistemic modality and evidentiality in English and German. If, on the contrary, in most cases evidential adverbs turn out to have a corresponding non-evidential linguistic unit in translation, this will be interpreted as absence of any efficient distinction between means of expression of epistemic modality and evidentiality, at least for the languages in question. Furthermore, the analysis of correspondence of English and German modal adverbs can provide the basis for creating semantic classification of modal adverbs unique for both languages. Likewise, the research will help to determine all ways of translating modal adverbs in each translation direction, i.e. quantitatively define the cases when modal adverbs are translated as modal verbs, modal particles, special constructions, prepositional groups with modal meaning and so on.

Taking into consideration ambiguity of interrelation between evidentiality and epistemic modality and their linguistic means of expression, quantitative analysis supplying essential statistical information on the occurrences of English and German modal adverbs will be performed. On the one hand, this data will provide an insight on the potential language specific regularities in terms of these linguistic phenomena, and on the other hand it will illustrate cross-language discrepancies occurring as a result of translation.

References


1 Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English and McMillan English Dictionary for English and Duden - Deutsches Universalwörterbuch for German
The expression of speaker stance involves assessment of the likelihood concerning the described situation (epistemic modality) as well as attitudinal stance, which indicates feelings or judgments about what is said (e.g. unfortunately).

The aim of this paper is to explore quantitatively and qualitatively how these categories are expressed in three different types of speech events: one of large lectures, one of colloquium and one of dissertation defense which form part of MICASE. The goal is to identify which meanings are most frequently found in each speech event.

The epistemic markers commenting on the certainty (or doubt), reliability or limitations of a proposition under analysis are the following:

a) verbal markers expressing epistemic possibility and necessity (Leech 1971; Coates, 1983): cannot, could, may, might, must, shall, should, would;

b) Non-verbal markers: adverbs and adverbial expressions (certainly, definitely, doubtless, improbably, maybe, no/without doubt, perhaps, possibly, probably, surely, sure enough, undoubtedly); adjectives (bound (to), doubtful, impossible, likely, possible, probable, unlikely).

The attitudinal stance markers conveying the speaker’s attitudes, feelings or value judgments include a wide range of meanings (Hoye, 1997, Biber et al. 1999). Attention will be paid to the following ones: fortunately, surprisingly of all, unfortunately, sensibly, amazingly.

RESULTS

A quantitative analysis yields the following results:

- Large lectures use significantly more verbal markers: would, could, might. May and must are less used.
- Adverbs & Adverbial expressions: large lectures use again significantly more these than colloquia or dissertation defenses. The most popular ones are: maybe, probably, certainly & perhaps and the least popular are possibly, surely, sure enough.
- Adjectives: likely is the most used, chosen especially in lectures. Possible is significantly higher in colloquium, impossible is more used in large lectures than in the other 2 sub-corpora.
- Attitudinal stance markers: unfortunately significantly outnumbers other stance markers in large lectures and colloquia. Not used in dissertation defenses.

A qualitative analysis of the three sub-corpora renders four basic results:

1) The main objective of lectures is to introduce students to different topics. When they move into the realm of hypothesis/speculation about the reasons behind certain results, they use could/may.
2) An important feature of academic spoken discourse in the use of the three sub-corpora is the use of modal certainty. The modal choices are purposeful and can be related to the speakers’ role in the discourse, their commitment to propositions and their aims in such discourse events.
3) Patterns that signal probability express epistemic possibility, and therefore are those most often followed by additional proof, such as it is likely that: probably, maybe.
4) Attitudinal stance markers are not used in dissertation defenses. This may be due to the asymmetrical relationship of the speaker with the board of examiners.

CONCLUSIONS

Five main conclusions emerge from the analysis of the MICASE data analyzed:

- Findings clearly suggest that the expression of writer stance in the three sub-corpora relies mainly on markers of epistemic modality rather than attitudinal markers.
- Epistemic verbal markers in the three MICASE sub-corpora predominate, followed by adverbs and adjectives.
- Modal particles are syntactically integrated but dispensable items which express pragmatic meanings related with the knowledge of speaker or hearer as regards the utterance where they appear.
• The attitudinal stance markers conveying the speaker’s attitudes, feelings or value judgments are scarcely used, with the exception of unfortunately.
• Speakers demonstrate their authority to students through the use of disciplinary conventions and also take a personal position towards issues in an unfolding explanation using hedging.

References
This paper explores the verbal expressions of obligation/necessity, such as MUST, SHOULD, HAVE (GOT) TO, GOT TO, NEED TO, OUGHT TO and WANT TO, in selected spoken registers of the British National Corpus (BNC). The analysis is restricted to all contexts in which the subject is second person you and which encode the deontic meaning ‘it is necessary for’, i.e., the meanings of the variants range from strong to weak obligation.

This study is motivated by recent corpus-based findings that there is major reorganization going on in the obligation/necessity domain (Krug 2000; Leech 2003; Smith 2003; Tagliamonte 2004; Tagliamonte and D’Arcy 2007). Not only have the frequencies of the various forms changed, but there are also shifts in their semantic functions. The use of SHOULD with its weak obligation meaning has remained rather stable, but MUST in its strong obligation meaning has been declining. In contrast, the use of the semi-modals has been rising. NEED TO and WANT TO are the most recent layers in the system. These shifts have been associated with an extra-linguistic tendency to avoid overt claims to authority by the speaker, i.e. democratization (cf. Myhill 1995). MUST may simply seem too authoritarian, whereas, e.g., NEED TO may offer a more polite way of obliging by claiming that the action is recommended for the doer’s own sake (see also Nokkonen 2006). This presents an interesting background for a study of deontic modality, and provokes the research question concerning the patterns of variation. What is the system underlying the variation like?

So far, not enough research has been done on spoken language, not to mention the different spoken registers, and modal use can vary a great deal across registers. Forms such as HAVE (GOT) TO and GET TO are much more frequent in the spoken than in the written medium (Biber et al. 1999). In addition, certain spoken registers have more obligation/necessity modals than, e.g., ordinary informal conversation. Such registers are persuasive and argumentative in nature. With this in mind, the primary material of this study consists of the spoken genres of Classroom, Tutorial, Consultation and Broadcast discussion in the context-governed component of the BNC.

As regards the methodology adopted here, first of all, I chose to study the modals with second person subjects, because it is in these contexts that the selected forms, including the new-comers NEED TO and WANT TO, mark without doubt deontic modality. Second, the data come from conversational genres with many argumentative and persuasive situation types, e.g., teaching situations in the genres of Classroom and Tutorial. Third, following variationist methods, the analysis is restricted to those contexts where variability between the selected forms is possible, i.e., present tense affirmative utterances. Fourth, both quantitative and qualitative methods are applied when analysing distributional evidence.

In the empirical part of this study, I conduct an analysis of factors that rise from the linguistic context and the context. The internal grammatical factors include the type of reference encoded by the subject (generic vs. definite), and the type of the main verb (punctual vs. durative/stative). Considering the pragmatic meaning of the utterance, special attention is paid to the involvement and authority of the speaker.

Expected/preliminary results show some clear patterns in the dynamics of the obligation modals. For example, there are instances of deontic MUST with definite subjects in the genres of Classroom and Tutorial: the speaker is the teacher guiding the students. In contrast, most instances of SHOULD appear in the genre of Consultation where the authority structure is less clear as the conversation is between adults. In Broadcast discussion the frequencies of the all the modals are the lowest – the instances are weak with generic subjects.

References


Research on political discourse has stressed the role of pronouns in the ideological construction of subject positions and group relations (Chilton, 2004; Fairclough, 1989; van Dijk, 1998). Within the appraisal framework (Martin and White, 2005), intersubjective positioning is achieved through a wide range of evaluative and attitudinal resources. Starting off from the idea that both the pronominal system and the appraisal system can contribute to the expression of intersubjectivity and the construction of identity, this paper explores the function of pronouns and its relation to stance categories in a set of three interviews to public figures. Unlike other studies within the framework of Appraisal Theory, which have focused mainly on journalistic discourse (see Martin 2004, Martin and White 2005, White, 2003), the present analysis examines the genre of interviews. The interest of this type of genre lies in the fact that they typically display a combination of resources which are aimed partly at informing and partly at persuading the audience (Fairclough 1992: 216). At the same time, it may also be argued that the interview is a genre in which intersubjective positioning and identity construction play crucial roles.

The three interviews selected for this study address a controversial topic such as the topic of global warming, which is likely to demand a clear positioning from the interviewees, namely, David Miliband, British Foreign Secretary; Bill McKibben, an environmentalist who became popular for organising the biggest demonstrations against global warming in the US; and, Dr. Jonathan Patz, a researcher and public health expert.

Regarding methodology, the search of occurrences of pronouns and stance categories was carried out by means of a concordancer (MonoConc). Once the quantitative analysis was conducted, a qualitative analysis was carried out with the aim of identifying the functions of pronouns and their occurrence within verbal clusters associated with the categories of engagement.

The results show that major differences concern the use of first person pronouns and their occurrence with verbs of cognition. Whereas the politician’s discourse exhibits more instances of the cluster “I think”, the environmentalist’s and the scientist’s discourses show a higher use of verbs of cognition with the pronoun “we” (e.g. “we know”), which is found to refer either to people or to the scientific community, respectively. By contrast, in the politician’s discourse, “we” mainly represents the speaker’s party or the whole nation and tends to collocate with modal verbs expressing deontic modality (e.g. “we have to”) desires and expectations (e.g. “we want to”). Other pronominal features that are worth noting are related to differences in the referents assigned to the forms “you” and “they”. Whilst the politician uses “you” mainly to refer to the interviewer, the environmentalist and the expert use this form with impersonal reference. In doing so, the politician tends to use this form with verbs of saying (e.g. “you call it aspirational”, “you referred to”), thus distancing himself from the interviewer’s point of view or presenting this information in a neutral way. On the other hand, the environmentalist and the expert seem to make extensive use of an impersonal type of “you”, thus presenting the issue of global warming as one that affects everyone and focusing on what can be done (Likelihood) or needs to be done (Enforcement). Likewise, whereas in the discourse of the latter speakers, “they” refers mainly to “people”, in the discourse of the politician, the referents of “they” range from a particular country (i.e. a national “they”) to those affected by the consequences of climate change. What is more, “you” and “they” only co-occur with attitudinal markers (i.e. markers of Appreciation) in the discourses of the environmentalist and the expert.

All in all, the analysis suggests that pronominal variation and distribution within verbal clusters associated with particular stance categories seem to correlate with differences in the way that speakers construct their public identities. These different representations are, in turn, in accordance with the particular aims of their social/political group (i.e. present themselves in positive terms and legitimise a political position, raise environmental awareness or draw attention to the causes of global warming and its effects on health).

References


Grades of modality have been suggested (Kratzer, 1981) to be represented semantically using quantification over worlds within sets established by (i) the propositions which are known to be true (the modal base, denoted $\cap f(w)$) and (ii) proximity to a perceived ideal $\rangle$ (the ordering source, denoted $\rangle$, creates a context-dependent set of "sufficiently ideal" worlds we'll call $G$). Within this framework, five single-place modal operators and one two-place operator are defined:

1. **Necessity** (the natural language phrase "necessarily p"): p is necessary in a world w if f it is true in all worlds within $\cap f(w)$.
2. **Human Necessity** ("probably p"): p is a human necessity in w if it is true in all worlds within $\cap f(w) \cap G$.
3. **Human Possibility** ("it can well be that p"): p is a human possibility in w if it is true in some world within $\cap f(w) \cap G$.
4. **Possibility** ("possibly p"): p is possible in w if it is true in some world within $\cap f(w)$.
5. **Slight Possibility** ("a slight chance of p"): p has slight possibility in w if it is true in some world within $\cap f(w) - G$.

6. **Comparative Probability** ("p is more probable than q", "it is more likely that p than q"): p is more probable than q in w if the following two conditions hold:
   a. For every $u$ in $\cap f(w)$ where q is true, there exists a world v in $\cap f(w)$ such that $v \leq_g u$ and p is true in v.
   b. There exists some $v$ in $\cap f(w)$ where p is true, such that for no world $u$ in $\cap f(w)$ satisfying $u \leq_g v$, q is true in u.

Where $\leq_g$ is the incomplete weak order "proximity to the ideal world", taken as a primitive for our purposes.

I note that this representation makes a number of correct predictions. However, the following consistent discourse is incorrectly predicted by Kratzer as inconsistent:

(7)

i. Paul will probably dance tonight.
ii. Quentin will probably dance tonight.
iii. It is more probable that Paul will dance tonight than that Quentin will dance tonight.

Here, two claims are considered probable (a human necessity), but one is perceived as more probable than the other. These three sentences can easily be considered true when uttered together. However, Kratzer's theory fails to capture this situation: Under any choice of worlds for G, worlds which are sufficiently close to the ideal, Quentin will dance tonight, and there is no world that satisfies the second condition (6b) for sentence (iii)'s comparative operator. We thus find a serious empirical flaw in Kratzer's theory.

I propose the following definition:

(8) **Comparative Probability**: p is more probable than q in w if f:

   a. A world $v$ in $\cap f(w)$ exists where p is true and q is false in v.
   b. For every world $u$ in $\cap f(w)$ where q is true and p is false, there exists a world v in $\cap f(w)$ such that $v \leq_g u$, and p is true and q is false in v.

This definition does not lose the successful predictions mentioned above, and it also captures the validity of the three sentences in (7) put together: in all worlds "sufficiently close" to the ideal,

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1 I also formalized a model for creating the "sufficiently ideal" set G: it assumes not every two worlds are comparable under $\rangle$, however $\leq_g$ is transitive and antisymmetric. By "rescaling" every comparable subset of $\leq_g$, a consistent G may be constructed.
both statements (i) and (ii) are true, meaning both Paul and Quentin dance tonight. However, these worlds are of no concern to us when following definition (8), since none of them validates the restriction of condition (8) and so are not bound by its consequence. Now, since (7) should be true, it must be the case that in some world (i) is true and (ii) isn’t (otherwise they would be equal in probability), verifying condition (8), with condition (b) being satisfied in the same way as it would be for any other case of modality comparison.

In fact, any two propositions which are ideally true (that is, true in \( \tilde{1} \)), are incomparable within Kratzer’s definition, contrary to intuition. This false prediction is amended by my modification.

Let me explain the rationale behind this new definition: while the original definition looked at each of the propositions \( p \) and \( q \) as separate entities, each defining its corresponding set of worlds (where it is true) and thus comparable only by means of comparing their sets, my definition takes constructs new sets of worlds from \( p \) and \( q \) put together: one where both truth values (of \( p \) and \( q \)) are the same, and its complement, where the truth values are opposite. It then looks only at the latter, makes sure it is nonempty (to assure comparability). Next, it checks for the world closest to the ideal, which of the two propositions is true in it. I feel that ignoring the worlds of same truth values reflects a better perception of what underlies our concept of comparison. In addition, I note that using my definition, the order \( \leq_g \) may be changed into a strong order \( <_g \) without further adaptations, and so better reflect the wording "more probable than" (or "less probable than") naturally used for comparisons.

References

I WANT YOU TO AND I NEED YOU TO IN MODERN AND PRESENT-DAY ENGLISH

The aim of this submission is to compare the uses of the want someone to and need someone to constructions in Modern and Present-Day English. It relies on the Helsinki Corpus, C. Peiser (2004)’s investigation of the ARCHER Corpus, and M. Bertschinger (1941)’s extensive study, as well as a personal corpus of contemporary novels.

Following C. Peiser (2004)’s hypothesis that “The structure want + direct object + purposive group is extended from inanimate to animate subjects”, it is possible to argue from the data that want someone to is derived from a construction with an object followed by an infinitive relative clause, as in:

1) He wanted pikes to set before his archers

W. Shakespeare, 1 Henry 6, i. 116, 1589, quoted by M. Berstchinger [1941]

2) Lazarotto.
Lorenzo.

... I have mischief
Within my breast, more then my bulke can hold:

I want a midwiue to deliuer it.

T. Kyd, Ieronimo, 208 [I. iii. 8], 1605, quoted by M. Berstchinger [1941]

3) ”The modern young man,” said Aunt Dahlia, ”is a congenital idiot and wants a nurse to lead him by the hand and some strong attendant to kick him regularly at intervals of a quarter of an hour.” P. G. Wodehouse, Very Good, Jeeves, p.78, QPD, 1930

In these early examples, the noun phrase after want remains its object. This is not the case in Present-Day English, as in (4), where them is the subject of the subordinate verb to believe due to the scarcity of a passive equivalent:

4) You wanted them to believe you were their partner in working this out.


(4a) ??They are wanted to believe you were their partner in working this out.

The move from an infinitive relative clause to an infinitive complement of the main verb is also confirmed by the possible presence of for in Present-Day (mainly American) English which ”marks [the noun phrase] as the subject of the infinitive clause” (see R. Quirk et al. (1985: 1193)):

5) ’Sweetie, I wouldn’t want for you to get in a hassle with our government.’

The crocus list. Gavin Lyall, London: Coronet Books, 1993, pp. 95-207, BNC online

It seems that want moved from a covert to an overt intersubjective use. Although want someone to mainly expresses an overt intersubjective constraint in Present-Day English, its first instances expressed a covert one with a view to efficiency and politeness, as in (2): Lazarotto’s covert request seems to be efficient since Lorenzo complies with it.

This study is therefore based on a speaker-centred approach which considers the speaker-addressee relationship as a catalyst for the verbs’ intersubjective use and constructions. More precisely, it is possible to argue that want subjectified through its use in the first person: the more it was used covertly to get the addressee to act, the more obviously it expressed the speaker’s point of view to the addressee. Want to came to express the speaker’s private state and want someone to an overt intersubjective constraint. In that situation, the use of for can also be meant to defuse that overt constraint from the speaker.

Need is also followed by an infinitive complement endowed with a subject in Present-Day English. Although this structure is certainly of a different origin from that of want, the two share some properties:

6) “Daydreaming as usual. (...) I need you to go into the village and fetch some food for me.”

“Yes, Mother, I’ll go at once;” (...).

(J. Archer, A Quiver full of Arrows, p. 60, Penguin, 1980)

6a) ???”You are needed to go into the village and fetch some food for me.”

6b) I need for you to go into the village.

This paper therefore aims at determining if need someone to is meant to replace want someone to for a covert request in Present-Day English, in spite of the differences between the two verbs. In the same way, this use of want in Modern English aimed at replacing the overt intersubjective use of will someone to, which dates back to Old English:

7) He wilnade me to cumenne.

As a consequence, verbs may function within systems in which the overt use of one verb is regularly replaced by the covert use of another, which M.-L. Groussier (2000 and 2002) contends for modal auxiliaries.

References


MODALITY, CAUSATION AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN THE EXPRESSION OF FIRST TIME MOTHERHOOD – A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

This paper proposes to apply some aspects of Systemic Functional Linguistics theory to the analysis of a corpus of oral semi-structured pre-birth and post-birth interviews (each lasting 60-90 minutes) with a selected sample of 22 primiparous women in Sydney Australia. The interviews were conducted in the context of Berinda Immelman’s research project on maternal practices before and after the birth of a first child. The interviews conducted during pregnancy investigated four areas: the desire for maternity; perceptions and fantasies about the baby; expectations about parenthood; historical perspectives about the mother’s past. Post-birth interviews explored, among other issues, the need to re-negotiate intersubjective relationships in relation to the new challenges and demands posed by motherhood.

The participants’ narratives also provide a wealth of oral linguistic material related to the articulation of a significant life event which involves not only the mother but also partners, family and friends.

After briefly locating these texts in their context of culture and their context of situation, this paper will consider how linguistic analysis can provide a "deconstructive" practice which involves detailed assessment of the participants' world. It is proposed to do this through the analysis of selected aspects of modality and causation patterns in these oral texts. The main focus will be to consider how these linguistic resources are used to express experiential meanings and how and to what extent these texts are indicative of the respondents’ experience. The ways in which such analysis assumes a particular mobility between and within fields of action expressed through language and mediated by social and cultural factors will be highlighted. In this context it is proposed to explore the idea that identity is an issue of reflexive self-transformation, which claims to illuminate issues such as emotionality, connections, relationality and culture in motherhood and which leads to the non-emphatic reconfiguration of motherhood seen for its entirely social character.

Within the time constraints allowed for the delivery of the paper it is proposed discuss examples taken from the interviews that can be considered indicative of the linguistic features stated. The discussion of the linguistic features will focus on: modality patterns (i.e. which modality types are used and their relative frequency); predominant actors; the correlation between actors and patterns; the sense of a causer expressed; the relationship between modality and causation; causation expressed through clause complexes. The implications for extrapolating the analysis to the whole sample will then be discussed briefly.

Finally the paper proposes to appraise the way in which respondents apply linguistic resources to express feeling states related to the experience of first time motherhood and to compare emerging trends in the linguistic and psychological analysis.
The use of expressions that mitigate the author’s degree of commitment with his/her statements is a fundamental strategy in research articles in order to make assertions accepted by the scientific community. In a previous study (Rezzano 2004) an analysis was performed of modal expressions encoding degrees of certainty in the Discussion/Conclusion Sections of research articles in English (RAEs) in the field of education. The data were categorized on the basis of a bidimensional matrix relating degrees of certainty with degrees of modal responsibility, this is to say, whether the judgment is presented as objective or subjective.

The purpose of the present work is to perform an analysis of probability and evidentiality in RAEs and relate the linguistic expression of these meanings with discoursal features above the clause level, in particular, with the typical generic structure components of the RAE and in particular of the Discussion/Conclusion Section.

The lexico-grammatical description and categorization is based on the options proposed within the framework of Systemic Functional Grammar (SFL) for the area of Modality (Halliday y Matthiessen, 2004), considering the subdomain of Modalization:Probability, which roughly coincides with epistemic modality. However, it is assumed that degrees of certainty in scientific writing can be expressed either by indicating that a proposition is possible, probable or necessary (Modalization: Probability) and also by evaluating the evidence the writer has for his/her assertion. Therefore, the meanings considered in this work also include evidentiality, understood as the assessment on the reliability of information in relation to the source of knowledge or the way in which the knowledge was acquired. In fact, according to Palmer (1986), evidential meanings that encode judgements on the source of information or on the type of available evidence are indications of the speaker’s (lack of) commitment with the truth of the proposition.

The study is based on a corpus of 30 Discussion/Conclusions sections of RAEs in the field of medicine. Lexico-grammatical realizations of probability and evidentiality are categorized in an integrated system of options based on SFL, which accounts for the communicative effect of each choice in terms of orientation (subjective, objective) and manifestation (implicit, explicit). The model thus includes the following categories: subjective implicit (modal operators such as may and predicative expansors such as seem to); objective implicit (adjuncts such as probably and apparently), subjective explicit (projecting clauses such as It is possible that or It seems that…) and subjective explicit (first person projecting clauses such as We assume that…). Also included in the analysis are modal meanings encoded in lexis, for example, epistemic verbs such as suggest or demonstrate.

In a previous study of the same corpus Miret (2002) described the internal structure of the Discussion/Conclusions and identified its typical components. The Interpretation of Results (IR) component was selected for this study on account of three reasons: it is obligatory, it is the most frequent, and it is the component where modal meanings tend to concentrate.

The IR generic component was found to realize cyclically. Each IR text fragment extends through between one and five orthographic sentences and includes what is here referred to as the Central Claim, which is the fragment in which the author presents a proposition that is derived from or provides and explanation for the results obtained. The Central Claim is potentially regulated according to different degrees of certainty, categorized as Low, Medium and High. In turn, strategies to relate the results and their interpretation are identified in the corpus, and the possibilities to encode modal meanings activated by each strategy are described. The results obtained are presented as a network of options that describe a repertoire of functional patterns, taking the Central Claim as the entry point to the system and accounting for different realizations of the Central Claim in relation to the strategy used to link the results with their interpretation, the presence or absence of modal assessment, and the modal assessment degrees and types.

References
Several studies have shown modality to be an important feature of academic writing. Expressions of modality have an important pragmatic function in conveying writers’ assessment of their propositions and the degree of their confidence in these claims. Modal expressions also enable writers to express deference and modesty to their readers, an interpersonal function central to academic discourse. In other words, modal devices serve to transmit authors’ stance, not only towards their statements, but also towards their audience.

However, the literature also acknowledges learners’ difficulty in acquiring modality as a rhetorical strategy (Hyland & Milton, 1997; Aijmer, 2002; Neff, et al., 2003, 2004). Various authors give several reasons for this lack of control of modal expressions among L2 writers: the wide range of meanings these expressions can convey; the enormous variety of ways in which doubt and certainty can be expressed, from modal verbs such as will, may and would to lexical devices such as epistemic verbs (think, know, believe), adjectives (likely, perhaps, clear), adverbs (indeed, probably, definitely) and nouns (doubt, possibility); the absence of adequate pedagogical materials that present modal expressions and their correct use in categorical assertion; and cross-cultural and cross-linguistic variations with regard to writer stance (Holmes, 1988; Mauranen, 1993; Hyland, 1994; Bloch and Chi, 1995; Hyland & Milton, 1997; Aijmer, 2002; Neff & Bunce, 2006; Neff, 2008).

The present paper will report on the results of a corpus-based investigation of modality in native and non-native written language using corpus data. Three corpora are compared in the study. The first corpus is a 200,000-word sample from the Louvain Corpus of Native English Essays (LOCNESS), which contains argumentative essays written by native-speaker American students. The second is a corpus of argumentative essays written in English by Filipino students compiled using the same guidelines used in the collection of the LOCNESS sample. Also following the same design is the third corpus, a sub-corpus from the International Corpus of Learner English (ICLE) (Granger, 1996) containing around 200,000 words of essay writing by advanced Spanish-speaking learners of English. These corpora were chosen to represent three contexts of English-language use: as a first language (LOCNESS), as a second language (Filipino corpus) and as a foreign language (ICLE Spanish).

The study followed a corpus-based methodology similar to previous studies by Milton and Hyland (1997) and Aijmer (2002). Concordancing software was used to determine the over-all range and frequency of a list of 107 lexical devices used to express modality, taking into account not only modal auxiliaries but also a wider range of modal expressions that includes adverbs and lexical verbs. The paper also focused on aspects such as the grammatical distribution of modal devices, their use in personalized and impersonalized forms and in modal combinations.

The study aimed to find differences among the three corpora with regard to the range of modal devices used, the appropriateness of the degree of commitment expressed and the precision of the degree of certainty conveyed. It also investigated the role of cultural and linguistic variations in the acquisition and use of modality as a rhetorical strategy.

The analysis revealed that while the Filipino student writers tended towards hyperclarity, the Spanish foreign-language learners’ texts seemed to transfer Spanish rhetorical strategies to English. Both non-native groups overused personalized forms and had difficulty establishing appropriate author distance through impersonalized constructions. All three groups appeared to rely heavily on modal verbs and adverbs, to the detriment of lexical verbs, adjectives and nouns. Spoken-language features and inappropriate degrees of author commitment were also detected in all texts. The characteristics shared by the native and non-native subjects support the hypothesis that problems with the expression of modality in academic writing may not only be due to language-learning factors but to novice-writer factors as well.

As the corpora used in the study contained only non-professional writing, it was later expanded by carrying out comparisons with similar corpora of editorials to further examine the novice-writer effect. The presentation will also include the initial findings of this latter part of the analysis.

References


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MODALITY IN AMERICAN, FILIPINO AND SPANISH ARGUMENTATIVE WRITING:
A corpus-based comparative study


Virginia Woolf is known to have addressed the common reader in her first published collection of essays, in a space contained for contemplation and measured thought. Indeed, when writing for this special reader, she is content with acknowledging that "he reads for his own pleasure rather than to impart knowledge or correct the opinions of others (1984)". The views exposed in this book portray a varied array of topics that ranges from the work and circumstances of male and female recognised authors, to the rescue of works and circumstances of less privileged women writers who suffered a more than unfair position in history. Despite the importance of her words for women and, especially, for feminists, her intention was not to be radical. As she affirms in “The Modern Essay”, the principle which controls the text is “that it should give pleasure”, and the reader’s motivation “simply to receive pleasure (1992a)".

Much of Woolf’s essayistic writing illustrates the subjective depiction of both fictitious and real characters, contemporary authors and from previous times. Her essays present the common principles of the argumentative genre. This proposes a type of standardised communicative action that will work as a model of production and reception of other texts in a literary context. Different rhetorical principles are present in its textual construction, where Woolf’s essays are included. They refer to the invention of arguments, their order and disposition, and their expressive manifestation (Arenas 1997). In the rhetorical organisation of her texts, the interpersonal function plays an important role. This function is expressed primarily by the grammatical system of modality, that is, the way in which the author is going to project her attitude into her texts, focusing on the degree of certainty contained in the utterances (Hyland, 2000). Modality has been also defined as “the grammar of explicit comment”, including “signals of the varying degrees of certainty we have about the propositions we express, and of the sorts of commitment or obligation that we attach to our utterances” (Simpson 2004). In this study I will distinguish between assertive and non-assertive epistemic modality (López Ferrero 2005).

I seek to show that Woolf uses different epistemic markers when transmitting her criticism to, sometimes, women’s inferiority condition in History. These are different from those used in more “gentle” themes related to reviewing an author and his or her work. In the first case, for example, there prevails the assertive epistemic modality, revealing the author’s more confident stance. In “Professions for Women”, she complains that the Angel in the House prevents nineteen-century women from writing freely: “And while I was writing this review, I discovered that if I were to review books I should need to do battle with a certain phantom (…) And when I came to know her better I called her after the heroine of a famous poem, The Angel in the House (1942)”. The lexical verbs discover and know allude to her conviction as exposing those facts.

In the second case, non-assertive epistemic modality is more frequent. Being less harsh towards an author’s surroundings and his or her literary production, Woolf’s stance proves less self-assured. Therefore, in the beginning of “Jane Austen” she states that “it is probable that if Miss Cassandra Austen had had her way we should have had nothing of Jane Austen’s except her novels (1984)”. The adjective probable reflects the doubt about our knowledge about the novelist’s life had not we had some family records and letters.

The methodological approach that I follow in this study is both qualitative and quantitative. The corpus consists of ten essays taken from several collections of short essays, namely The Common Reader, A Woman’s Essays, The Death of the Moth, and Granite and Rainbow. I also refer to her longer texts A Room of One’s Own and Three Guineas. They were selected bearing in mind their subject-matter. Half of them deal with literature and women writers, their lives and works; the other half also have to do with women-related topics, but referring to their position in History and their difficulties to undertake, for example, a literary career.

References

A corpus-based contrastive study of modality in English and German newsgroup texts from a Systemic Functional perspective

In the past few years, corpus-based studies have added new insights (e.g. Coates 1983, Biber et al. 1999) to the long history of research on modality (e.g. Jespersen 1914). The paper presented here is a corpus-based, contrastive study of modality in two languages, English and German. The data I use is a comparable corpus of newsgroup texts discussing eating disorders and relationship problems. The corpus comprises 10,000 words in each language and is a part of the Bremen Translation Corpus. I explore how speakers in such problem discourses add their judgement to what they say by way of modality, and “not represent situations as straightforward facts” (Depraetere & Reed 2006: 269). Do participants construe their problems differently in the two languages by downplaying or intensifying them with the help of modality?

The theoretical background for addressing this question is provided by Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG; Halliday & Matthiessen 2004). In SFG, any option in the language system is seen to have a function on one of the three metafunctions of language. First, the textual metafunction is represented by the thematic organisation of discourse and is instantiated in the theme-rheme structure. Second, the interpersonal metafunction describes the relation between the participants in a discourse; the focus here lies on the systems of modality and polarity. Third, the experiential metafunction tells us about the topic of a discourse. Here, discourse participants organise their view of the world as processes, i.e. functional types of predicates such as action, relational or mental processes and the semantic roles (participant roles) involved in these processes (Fawcett forthcoming). The 20,000 word comparable corpus is annotated manually for SFG features for all three metafunctions in both languages. The tables below give an example of the annotation of an English clause.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>And</th>
<th>sometimes</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>really feel rejected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Textual theme</td>
<td>Interpersonal theme</td>
<td>Topical theme</td>
<td>Rheme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Textual metafunction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>And</th>
<th>sometimes</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>Epistemic modality, adverbial phrase</th>
<th>feel rejected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal metafunction</td>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>Epistemic modality, adverbial phrase</td>
<td>Finite</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>And sometimes</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>really</th>
<th>feel</th>
<th>rejected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carrier</td>
<td>Main verb</td>
<td>Attribute</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiential metafunction</td>
<td>Process: relational attributive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The annotation of modality, for example, includes the two types of modality, i.e. epistemic modality (likelihood / probability) or root modality (some authority exerts control over a situation), and the different ways of realizing these types: both in English and in German, we find auxiliaries, adjuncts and grammatical metaphors; German additionally has modal particles (e.g. ja, doch, eigentlich) and the subjunctive to express modality. Following from this there must be some differences in the realization of modality.

The annotated corpus, however, does not only allow to look at individual features, but also to investigate combinations of SFG features. How does modality behave in combination with negation (interpersonal metafunction), with process types (interpersonal + experiential metafunction), and with theme-rheme structure (interpersonal + textual metafunction)?

The results suggest, for example, that ability, one type of root modality, is negated more often than the other two types of root modality, i.e. obligation & permission and inclination. The speakers thus tend to say that they cannot do something rather than saying that they can. Supposing there are more such tendencies in the corpus of individual features occurring together to a significant degree, can we speak of semantic prosody in the context of the construal of modality, and will the tendencies be the same in the two languages?

References
The functional employment, distribution and positioning of discourse markers has gained attention in linguistics during the last 25 years. Despite the increasing amount of research, the issues concerning the functional employment and distribution of LIKE as a discourse marker remain controversial. One of the most prominent functions assigned to the discourse marker LIKE is hedging. While it is commonly attested that discourse markers do neither depend on syntactical constraints nor interfere with the truth conditions of propositions, the discourse marker LIKE contradicts both assertions: In Toronto English LIKE clearly underlies syntactic constraints (D’Arcy 2005). Furthermore, LIKE can also interfere with or change the truth conditions of propositions (Siegel 2002).

(1) a. John has six sisters. True only if John has exactly six sisters.
   b. John has like six sisters. True if John has five, six or seven (many) sisters.

(2) a. The weather is like bad.
   b. Like, the weather is bad.
   c. (*)The weather is bad like. (restricted to Indian English / Hiberno-English)
   d. *The like weather is bad.

The question this paper deals with is whether D’Arcy’s findings that discourse marker LIKE underlies syntactical constraints and Siegel’s findings that LIKE interferes with truth conditions hold across varieties of English. Thus, this paper uses a variationist approach to analyze the use of LIKE across a sample of varieties of English, i.e. British English (ICE GB), Hiberno-English (ICE Ireland), Indian English and American English (Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English).

Preliminary results confirm that actual usage of LIKE does indeed interfere with the truth conditions in all varieties of English. In fact, Siegel’s claim that LIKE interferes with truth conditions before numerals needs to be extended to expressions relating to spatial or temporal relations (right outside, shortly after, etc) and expressions which relate to quantities (whole, little, etc.). However, salient interference can only be demonstrated beyond doubt, if LIKE precedes such expressions.

Furthermore, results confirm that LIKE underlies syntactic constraints which, however, vary with respect to the variety in which LIKE occurs. Concerning Hiberno-English, we found that this data exhibits a distinct pattern with regard to the positional distribution of LIKE, as it is used predominantly in clause-final position (46,4%), while Indian English prefers clause-initial position (52,4%). Hence, the English spoken in Ireland and India poses idiosyncratic constraints on LIKE leading to higher probability of clause-marginal use (India 83,7%, Ireland 74,5%). This characteristic distinguishes these two from the other two varieties which exhibit a strong tendency to use LIKE in clause-medial position (USA 68%, GB 63,8%). It is this fact that allows a classification of the varieties in two specific groups: group A: Hiberno-English and Indian English vs. group B: British and American English. By implication, this clustering could prove to be indicative of other variety specific characteristics in further research.

Interestingly, this clustering can also be observed with regard to progressives (cf. Collins 2008) and pronominal variation in IT+BE sentences and IT-clefts (Siemund et al. forthc.). Thus, this pattern could prove to be indicative of other variety specific characteristics in further research.

References


DO AS A GRADE ONE MODALITY

Is do a mere dummy, as Chomsky put it? The difficulty of translating this operator into French, whether it is stressed or unstressed in positive statements, is just proof enough that it is not a word devoid of meaning. Moreover, do can also be stressed in questions. So we cannot content ourselves with saying that do serves as a mere support for the tense mark. It obviously carries a meaning of its own.

Our purpose then is to define the true nature of this morpheme. We shall posit that do corresponds to a grade one modality in Culioli’s Theory of Enunciative Operations.

It may sound daring to consider do as a modal since this word lacks some of the characteristic properties of the English modals. But we should not forget that “modals have become part of speech through a process of historical change including a syntactic analysis” as R. S. Jackendoff wrote in Semantic Interpretation in Generative Grammar. And what we now call modals in present day English were just plain verbs in Middle English. Therefore, we may venture to say that the use of do just evolved slightly differently in so far as it still bears the mark of the third person singular in the present tense while modals do not.

We shall analyse the use of this operator in questions first, then in assertive statements, be they positive or negative.

When do is used in You seem to like it, don’t you?, for instance, it is the predicative relation <you – like it> that has been taken into account. The appreciative verb seem has to be deleted from the first part of the sentence. So do stands as the marker of the questioning of the predicative relation.

This is to be observed in assertions too whenever there is a sway between the positive and negative values of a notion, that is when the utterer decides between them and states that one is validated while the other is not, though it might have been the case. And then the verb is stressed while do is not - or slightly so. Thereby the enunciator expresses a problematic judgement, according to Kant’s definition. Here again, do stands as the marker revealing the utterer’s work upon the validity of a predicative relation.

Likewise, in contexts where the enunciator asserts his point contradicting his co-utterer who thinks a predicative relation has not been validated, do is present too and must be stressed. Still, such a situation of utterance is not absolutely necessary for do to be used. Do will also occur when the opposite value is simply implied by the context, or when the utterer takes it into account. He then makes his point clear for or against the validity of the predicative relation. As a result, we are faced with an assertoric judgement, that is, another level of judgement.

We will then explain why, apart from I think ..., one can also say: I do think..., with think being stressed, just as much as I do think... with do being stressed, as we heard it in a conference while no one was even trying to contradict the utterer. This is proof enough that do corresponds to the enunciator’s viewpoint which may vary from one situation to another. So there actually exists three distinct levels of assertion.

The same explanation will then be proposed regarding negative statements, and we shall distinguish three levels of assertions as well. Our analysis will also aptly apply to examples in which do occurs together with the adverb never.

This value of do can be traced as far back as the beginning of the XVIIth century in Elizabethan plays. At that time, questions were constructed with or without do. For instance in The Alchemist by Ben Jonson, we came across these two questions: How like you her? and How do you like the Lady Pliant? Both of them are asked by the same character, Face, but the conditions of utterance are not the same.

Then we may conclude saying that, within Culioli’s theoretical framework, do can be considered as a grade one modality, expressing the utterer’s certainty concerning the validity of the predicative relation at hand.
**Temporal Interpretation of English and Greek Modals**

**Previous Analyses:** Condoravdi (2002) proposes an analysis of non-root modal verbs (i.e. may, might (have)) in English where the modals are both modal and tense operators. They contribute both a modal base and a temporal orientation (modals for the present and for the past). In this theory, the modal itself is inherently present or past oriented, though it can be embedded under higher present PRES\(^1\) (present) in which case the PRES gives no orientation, but perspective. Condoravdi argues that modals do not embed tensed complements. In her decompositional analysis, two tense operators PRES (present) and PERF (perfect) are involved in scopal relations and determine the temporal relation and perspective of modals. If modals scope over PERF, they exhibit a forward shifting and have an epistemic reading. If PERF scope over modals, they exhibit a backward shifting reading and have a counterfactual reading. Interpretive principles namely, *settledness* and *diversity* conditions work together deriving the right kinds of modal interpretations. These conditions require that if a modal is non-future, it has an epistemic modal base.

**Data:** In this paper, we show that this unified model of modal/temporal syntax-semantics for modals is not generalizable to a language like Greek, where the temporal and modal information are teased apart clearly by separate temporal and modal morphology. Moreover, we argue that Greek modals are compatible with both nonpast and past complements (for earlier observations see Tsangalidis 1999, Giannakidou 2009) illustrating the existence of inner and outer tense, as in (1) – (6). Specifically, example in (4) shows that the counterfactual reading does not yield only from modals for the past, as in (2) - (3) and (6), as follows:

1. **(1)** O Janis bori na kerdisi *epistemic*
   The John CAN.3sg.PRES SUBJ win.3sg.PNP
   John may win. (Epistemic: It is possible that John will win now or in the future)

2. **(2)** O Janis borouse na kerdisi *epistemic and counterfactual*
   The John CAN.3sg.IMPF SUBJ win.3sg.PNP
   John may have won (Epistemic: It is possible in the past that John wins in the past;
   Counterfactual: At some point in the past it was possible that John would win but he didn’t.)

3. **(3a)** Boruse na ehi kerdisi *counterfactual*
   CAN.3sg.IMPF SUBJ has. 3sg.PRES win.PNP
   He may/might have won (Counterfactual: At some point in the past it was possible that
   John would win but he did not.)
   **(3b)** Tha boruse na ehi kerdisi *counterfactual*
   FUT CAN.3sg.IMPF SUBJ has. 3sg.PRES win.PNP
   He may/might have won (Same interpretation as example in (3a))

4. **(4)** O Janis bori na kerdize *epistemic and counterfactual*
   The John CAN.3sg.PRES SUBJ win.3sg.IMPF
   John may have won (Same interpretation as example in (2))

5. **(5)** O Janis bori na kerdise *epistemic*
   The John CAN.3sg.PRES SUBJ win.3sg.PAST
   John may have won (Epistemic: It is possible that John won)

6. **(6)** O Janis borouse na kerdize *counterfactual*
   CAN.3sg.IMPF SUBJ win.3sg.IMPF
   John may have won. (Same interpretation as example in (3))

From the examples above, we realize that all combinations are possible, including past under the modal with both present and past in the modal. (Likewise, for *prepi*, the modal for necessity). Given this variability, it seems impossible to argue that the complement of the modal is untensed in Greek, and it is impossible to argue that the modal itself contributes tense-temporal orientation in the modal comes from the tense morphology that applies on the modal. If we use PERF operator approach in Greek, then we do not yield the readings suggested by Condoravdi. Counterfactual reading in Greek has a past perspective, as in (3a), and a present perspective (Future marker as the Now TP, see Giannakidou 2009), as in (3b). This shows that we cannot exclude the metaphysical reading if we follow Condoravdi’s *settledness* and *diversity* principles. Crucially, PERF (no matter if perfect comes

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\(^1\) FUT = future marker, IMPF = imperfective, PAST = past, PNP = perfective nonpast, PRES = present, SUBJ = subjunctive marker
from the modal or the embedded VP) is not a necessary condition in order to yield the counterfactual reading. In fact, the semantics that Condoravdi proposes for her PERF is the semantics of simple past tense (PERF: $\lambda P \lambda w \lambda t \exists t' [t' < t \& AT(t', w, P)]$), and not a real perfect—thus essentially admitting that there can indeed be a past under a modal. PERF operator does not refer to the extended now (EN) (McCoard 1978; Dowty 1979; von Stechow 1999, among others).

Proposal: We take Giannakidou’s 2009 semantics (see formulas in (7)) as the starting point for the analysis of Greek tense and aspect. Giannakidou’s account proves superior because the present is an actual nonpast with an interval denoting function with no reference to the utterance time, only particles na, tha make reference to the utterance time. Specifically, we argue that the perspective of Greek modals is always set in the present (or, nonpast), as in (7a). In addition, particles like na (SUBJ) and tha (FUT) introduce the parameter n, for now - either the utterance time in main clauses or a relative now in embedded clauses. Employing the formulas in (8), we can yield the semantics for both epistemic and counterfactual reading in an economical and sufficient way that takes in account tense and aspect:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(7)} & \quad \text{a. } [\text{nonpast}] = \lambda P \lambda t P((t, \infty)) \\
\text{b. } & \text{GEN } = \lambda P \lambda i \text{GEN} \left( \{ t \in C \land t \subseteq i; P(t) \} \right) \text{ accounting for the IMPF} \\
\text{c. } & [\text{na}] = n \text{ and Now-TP} \left\{ \text{tha} \right\} = n
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(8)} & \quad \text{Epistemic} \\
\text{a. } & \text{CANPOS} \{j, t_2, \lambda n \exists e \text{[win}(j,e) \land e \subseteq (n, \infty)] \land t_2 < n \\
\text{b. } & \text{CANPOS} \{j, t_0, \lambda n \exists e \text{[win}(j,e) \land e \subseteq (n, \infty)] \land t_0 < n \\
\text{Counterfactual}
\end{align*}
\]

Conclusion: We conclude that languages vary on how their modals contribute temporal information. Greek modals convey more transparent morphological options than English modals, and show that the modal and the embedded clause can be tensed, tense and modality are interpreted separately and can both have their compositional contribution. Hence, Condoravdi’s account cannot be proposed as a general theory of interaction of tense and modality.

Selected References


A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO THE THREE ADVERBS NO DOUBT, DOUBTLESS AND UNDOUBTEDLY

The principal concern of this study is to try to determine how the choice among synonymic expressions is made. In this paper, I will show the factors that strongly determine which of the three adverbs from among no doubt, doubtless and undoubtedly is used in a given case. They are examined with the aim of exploring how their actual patterns of use vary, by analyzing corpus data.

As is well-known, these three expressions fall into the same semantic category and express a speaker's judgment about the certainty or probability of a proposition. However, a clear-cut usage determinant for them has not been provided in the literature. This paper, therefore, proposes some new clear guidelines for the use of the three expressions.

For this purpose, I analyzed the data from the British National Corpus (BNC). First, all occurrences of the three expressions were extracted from the corpus. The search in the BNC yielded 5,955 occurrences of no doubt, 844 of doubtless and 2,343 of undoubtedly. Second, I examined these occurrences and collected and enumerated all the examples functioning as sentence adverbs. In all, 2,701 instances of no doubt, 734 of doubtless and 2,202 of undoubtedly were identified. Third, they were coded for selected variables. The factors to be considered for this study are (i) whether or not they co-occur with modal expressions such as modal verbs, modal adverbs, and comment clauses (I'm sure, I suppose, it seems, ...); (ii) in what position they occur initial, medial or final; and (iii) whether the subject in the clause where they appear is a pronoun or full NP.

One important finding is that doubtless displays a tendency toward the higher frequency of co-occurrence with modal expressions in contrast with the other two expressions: no doubt and undoubtedly, as shown in Table 1. In other words, doubtless turns out to be closely linked to the expression of the speaker's mental attitude.

Table 1: Frequencies and proportions of the co-occurrence with the modal expressions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no doubt</td>
<td>1086</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>doubtless</td>
<td>333</td>
<td><strong>45.4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undoubtedly</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another finding is interpreted from the viewpoint of discourse structure. With regard to (ii), despite the fact of a preference for stance adverbs in medial positions (Biber et al. 1999:872), the trend that emerges, as illustrated in Figure 1, is the higher overall proportion of no doubt occurring in the sentence-initial position. A modal adverb positioned initially expresses the topic or theme of modality (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004, Hovey 1997, Halliday 1970, cf. Thompson 1985), so that no doubt tends to serve the function of the expression of the topic in discourse.

Figure 1: Proportions of the positions of the three adverbials
With regard to (iii), the quantitative distribution of the instances of the three expressions among the clause subjects is presented in Table 2. This gives a clear indication that the proportion of no doubt is very high in the use of pronouns. No doubt exclusively deals with the explicit topicality in discourse.

Table 2: Frequencies of the co-occurrence with clause subject pronoun vs. full NP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pronoun</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Full NP</th>
<th>Pronoun</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Full NP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no doubt</td>
<td>1014</td>
<td>(37.5%)</td>
<td>1687</td>
<td>(62.5%)</td>
<td>2701 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>doubtless</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>(28.7%)</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>(71.3%)</td>
<td>734 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undoubtedly</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>(24.4%)</td>
<td>1665</td>
<td>(75.6%)</td>
<td>2202 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results of this analysis show that there is a strong tendency for doubtless to fulfil the modal function, whereas no doubt correlates more closely with discourse function. In sum, the three adverbs no doubt, doubtless and undoubtedly differ in the part that they play in fulfilling the communicative function, that is, at a discourse-pragmatic level. The factors influencing the use of the three adverbs are strongly associated with the parameters of modality and discourse.

References


Controversies surrounding the relationship between modality and evidentiality have contributed to the diversity of definitions of modality and the way modals are analysed.

We address three controversial issues to do with evidentiality and modality. Firstly, is evidentiality a type of modality (as argued by Palmer 1986, 2001; Bybee (1985), Bybee et al. (1994); Kiefer 1994, Plungian 2001, van der Auwera & Plungian 1998) or a separate category (the position of de Haan (2001, 2006) and Aikhenvald 2006)? Secondly, is evidentiality best seen as encoded in particular expressions and grammatical constructions, or as crucially dependent on context? The former position, advocated by de Haan (2006), focuses on cases where speaker involvement is realised syntactically; the latter view is suggested by Aikhenvald (2006: 320), who argues that evidentiality has “source of information” as its primary meaning, regardless of how that information is obtained: the narrator either saw what actually happened, or made inferences based on some evidence available, or was told about it.

Thirdly, what is the relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality? The analysis of this relationship in the literature suggests that the “source” is important for both: evidentiality is an “extension” of epistemic modality and “can be placed one a par with judgements of necessity and possibility” (Kiefer 1994: 2517), and it indicates “something about the source of the information in the proposition” (Bybee 1985: 184). Evidentiality is “subsumed” under modality, where “evidential values indicate the source of information the speaker has” for a described situation (Plungian 2001: 351). For van der Auwera and Plungian (1998: 85), evidentiality “concerns the indication of the source or kind of evidence speakers have for their statements”. Recent research has addressed the question of “source” of modality in general: Depraetere and Verhulst (2008) argue that where modality originates from, and whether we are dealing with a variety of sources of modality, is not due to a modal's syntactic behaviour, but it is due to “pragmatic differences between [in this case] markers of necessity” (2008: 1). The ICE-GB corpus evidence contradicted “many of the supposedly strong ties described in reference grammars between a particular kind of source and a particular modal (Depraetere and Verhulst 2008: 4). The question then is how this approach can be applied to the analysis of evidentiality: is the source of evidentiality the same as that of epistemic modality; and what are the consequences of treating the two as belonging to two different systems?

The principal aim of this paper is to offer a new perspective on these controversies by applying some key notions from a theoretical position known as Contextualism (cf. Recanati 2004). The central claim of Contextualism is that a clear distinction between semantics and pragmatics is not possible, because the processes involved in what a speaker says and what he/she implies both belong to what a speaker means and are both pragmatic: what a speaker says is not therefore part of semantics. Using this framework we will argue that there is a close link between semantics and pragmatics in the interpretation of evidential expressions: speaker-involvement in modal expressions and the ‘source’ of evidence are not realised syntactically, and nor is evidentiality a semantic, inherent feature of epistemic modals.

Thus, the first proposal in this paper is that evidentiality and modality are two separate categories: one should look for the expression of evidentiality in context because its expression essentially involves pragmatics.

Secondly, we call for a reassessment of evidentiality as a pragmatic notion, on the grounds that it is not solely ‘found’ in epistemic expressions.

Thirdly, ‘speaker involvement’ as the source is not grammatically realised and does not underpin the semantics of modals; the analysis will show that ‘evidence’ comes from a variety of sources.

Our theoretical claims will be illustrated using data from the British National Corpus.

References


The paper investigates how modal *hedges* (Coates 1983) understood as *expressions of procedural meaning*, i.e. expressions which instruct the addressee/reader how to process the propositional content of an utterance/statement (Watts 2004) are used in product descriptions, advertisements and consumer instructions leaflets for a number of products belonging to the Consumer Health Care category for the purposes of complying with consumer protection laws on the one hand and serving as an implicit disclaimer of manufacturer’s responsibility on the other. The analysis is carried out contrastively for two languages, English and Serbian.

A preliminary study of a smaller corpus of prescription medicines descriptions and patient instructions leaflets has shown that modals *can* and *may* are predominately used in their Root Possibility meanings when occurring in statements concerning adverse reactions and unwanted side effects of certain drugs or preparations, as in

(1) Like all medicines, D*****E can cause side effects, although not everybody gets them.

In case of *May*, it is supposed that it occurs in its ‘merger’ meaning (Coates 1995) as a consequence of the week Root/Epistemic contrast, as in:

(2) Like all medicines, D*****N may cause some side effects that are usually mild to moderate.

*Can* and *may* in these instances stand as verbal substitutes for a piece of quantitative data, i.e. the relative frequency of incidence of the effects listed/described.

The use of modal verbs in prescription medicines descriptions do not differ from that in scientific/academic writing, especially in the parts presenting research results. A number of studies show similar results, and the motivation for such ‘fuzziness’ is usually saving the author’s/researcher’s face and ‘the fear of being proved wrong later on’ (Markkanen and Schröder 1997).

When patient instructions leaflets in English (both from the US and EU manufacturers) are compared to their counterparts in Serbian, modals *can* and *may* clearly stand against either (1) their Serbian correspondent, modal verb *moći* and/or (2) other devices equivalently expressing Root Possibility or merger of Root/Epistemic Possibility.

However, when verbs *may* and *can* are found in those patient/consumer instruction leaflets that describe the merits of the product in question and state the desirable outcome of its application, they are used for somewhat different purposes. The examples like

(3) A**I may help you reduce weight

are clear instances of epistemic use for hedging purposes, but the motivation for their use turns out to be twofold, as stated in the first paragraph of the Abstract.

The analysis of English instruction leaflets shows an array of hedges, mostly epistemic modals but other as well, whereas the analysis of Serbian corpus (that contains both translations of the English leaflets – for products sold in the Serbian market – and a number of instructions leaflets originally in Serbian) does not yield a single instance of hedging achieved by means of epistemic modal verbs and very few achieved by means of other hedging expressions, such as (rare) conditional clauses.

Finally, the paper discusses the obtained results viewed as a matter of cultural variety and difference, especially taking into consideration the fact that consumer protection laws are equally strict in US, UK, Europe and Serbia. The discussion is carried out relying to a certain degree on Wierzbicka’s theory of cultural scripts (Wierzbicka: 1996), which attempts at solving the problem of terminological variety and overlapping in the studies of communicative styles of various cultural groups on the one hand, as well as the problem of ethnocentrism in such studies. So, ‘cultural scripts’ are but hypotheses – definitely not rules of behaviour – about culture specific norms of communication formulated by means of universal semantic primes. In this paper I shall assume that consistent failure to use epistemic hedges the written discourse of consumer health care product instruction leaflets may be an instance of cultural behaviour in accordance with a possible cultural script regulating ‘directness’ in Serbian. In that respect, the present research moves within the field of ethnopragmatics (Goddard 2002).
References


A CROSS-LINGUISTIC LOOK AT THE MULTIFUNCTIONALITY OF PROBABILITY VERBS IN ENGLISH

Over the last decade an increased interest in evidentiality has instigated a number of studies into both grammatical and lexical realisations of this linguistic category (Faller 2002; Aikhenvald 2004; Carretero 2004; de Haan 2007; Dendale & Van Bogaert 2007; Boye & Harder 2009; Cornillie 2009, Wiemer [forthcoming]). Much attention has been devoted to discussions on the relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality as well as on the status of the area where the two qualifications seem to intersect (Nuyts 2001; Plungian 2001; Faller 2002; Squartini 2004). The issues raised highlight the multifunctionality of certain linguistic expressions and point to specific contextual environments in which one meaning component becomes prevalent over the others.

The issues of multifunctionality are increasingly addressed in studies of discourse markers, modal auxiliaries and modal particles employing contrastive analysis based on translation corpora (Aijmer 2001, 2007; van der Auwera, Schalley, Nuyts 2005; Simon-Vandenbergh & Aijmer 2002-2003). This methodology according to Traugott (2007) is a significant tool in pin-pointing multifunctional uses of linguistic units.

The subject under study is the so called English verbs of probability seem, appear, look which can function as markers of epistemic modality by indicating that “the proposition presented in the to-clause has a certain degree of likelihood” (LGSWE 1999: 708). The majority of scholars claim them to be used primarily as evidentials (Mithun 1986, Aijmer 1996; Gisborne 2007; de Haan 2007). Verbs of probability do not only combine epistemic and evidential semantic properties, but also employ the pragmatic function of hedging which is especially visible in academic discourse (Hyland 1998; Varttala 2001). Acting as hedges, they create distance between the author and the proposition thus establishing a strategic option for the author to avoid full responsibility for the statement. This combination of probability verb properties results in their semantic multifunctionality, which has been demonstrated in contrastive corpus-based studies of the verb seem in English and Swedish (Aijmer 1996), in English and Norwegian (Johansson 2001). The purpose of the present study is to check the validity of the classification of functions and meanings of seem proposed by Aijmer (2009) against the findings in English vs. Lithuanian data analysis. The scholar has made a distinction between: (a) seem to (the most grammaticalized form) as an evidential marker which has “the function of ‘epistemic qualification’ <...> and functions as a hedge” (2009: 86); (b) seems that as a hedge with an intersubjective meaning; (c) copula seem as an approximator (similar to sort of); (c) seem to X as a “subjectifier” (2009: 85).

Quantitative and qualitative analysis is employed to explore the range of meanings and functions of probability verbs in English and Lithuanian. It is based on a bi-directional translation parallel corpus ParaCorpELTE compiled from fiction (about 1 million words). The crosslinguistic analysis of the multifunctionality of English probability verbs will be extended to the Russian and Polish languages. A special parallel corpus of electronic texts of J. K. Rowling Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone and its translations into Russian and Polish has been compiled for this purpose. The basic patterns that the probability verbs occur in have been matched against their translational correspondences and analysed in terms of their syntax and semantics. Different translation correspondences, especially those of the verb seem, indicate multifunctional nature of probability verbs, whereas frequent zero correspondences seem to suggest differences in the conceptualization of the attitudinal categories under study in different languages.

References


VOLITION-BASED EXPRESSIONS OF ADVICE: AN ENGLISH-DUTCH CONTRASTIVE APPROACH

This paper focuses on the interplay between the modal semantics of volition and the weaker necessity-based meaning of advice. The construction under investigation is the use of 'wanna / want to' with second person subjects for the expression of advice (e.g. You want to be careful with that saw). This construction has gained great frequency in the second half of the previous century (cf. Krug 2000). Analysis of the patterns of use (mainly) with the form 'want to' in the informal spoken language data of the British National Corpus (Spoken Demographic subcorpus) has established this use as the third most frequent pattern for the full second person form, with approximately 12% of the utterances (Verplaetse 2008).

Further analysis of this pattern with and added question tag (e.g. You don't want to get involved with that sort of people, do you?) has revealed the added pragmatic dimensions and interpretative layers of the forms 'wanna' and 'want to' for advice in comparison with use of the root modal 'should' or the (marginal) modal form 'ought to' for the same speech act. This involved interpretation in terms of frames and blending (cf. Fillmore 1982, Fauconnier and Turner (1996) and Desagulier (2003), (2005a), (2005b)), as well as force dynamic barriers. In the expression of advice with 'wanna' or 'want to' the added question tag may mitigate a force dynamic barrier and thus internalize the advice in the addressee's own mental framework in a more easily acceptable way. As the addressee's cognitive state is reshaped in this way a force dynamic barrier has (possibly) been removed (cf. Talmy: 1988), thus averting the face threatening act of giving advice (cf. also Langacker's 2006: 22 description of 'want to' as a 'mental extrapolation' which extends from the speaker's own experience to an other party in a vicarious way).

The current paper starts from the English constructions and considerations described above, and aims to provide a comparison with the use of the Dutch volitional modal form 'willen' for similar speech acts. This will be accomplished following different methods and sets of data. First the use of the pattern with Dutch 'willen' in declarative utterances (e.g. Je wilt niet weten hoe laat het is) will be considered on the basis of the Corpus Gesproken Nederlands (CGN – Corpus Spoken Dutch). It is expected that the hypothesis will be confirmed that this Dutch construction displays much more limited potential for actual use than the English counterpart, in that it is limited in terms of semantic types of verb complements and is further restricted to negated utterances. But the paper will also attempt to provide an answer for this expected outcome in contrastive diachronic and language typological terms.

For the second part of the methodology the analysis will rely on data from the Dutch Parallel Corpus (DPC - STEVIN-project): Dutch translations of the English second person pattern of advice with 'want to' / 'wanna' in its various possible configurations will be investigated.

This will be complemented with a third resource for data analysis, viz. Dutch subtitles from various English film scripts. Data from this resource are considered useful for the purposes of this paper (despite some typical requirements of subtitling vs. other types of translation) in view of the informal spoken character typical of the you wanna/want to-construction under investigation.

The expected results of the monolingual part of the analysis (Spoken Dutch Corpus – CGN) have been stated above. It is expected that the comparative part of the analysis based on a parallel translation corpus will yield a varied sample of different means to express advice in Dutch as translations for the English you wanna/want to-construction. These translations will be considered in terms of different parameters in interpersonal conversational relations, such as impersonal / personal address and degrees of subjectivity and objectivity. In this way the paper aims to fill in part of the area of interplay between volition and the necessity-based meaning of advice, as it is manifested in English and in Dutch.

References


Corpora and electronic sources

Oxford University Computing Services / BNC Consortium
http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk [accessed 02/08/2008 - re: British National Corpus]
http://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu/ [accessed 15-01-2010 – re. Framenet]
While automatic corpus annotation is currently the object of extensive research in the NLP community, the possibilities of the basic preliminary process of manual annotation for a number of linguistic and didactic purposes are virtually unexplored. In this paper we explore the potential of manual corpus annotation for the teaching of modal meanings in English and Spanish in the context of the contrastive linguistics classroom. The modal meanings selected for this study, defined in (Carretero et al. 2006), are:

- The epistemic meaning of ‘probability’, as in it may/could rain tomorrow.
- The deontic meaning of ‘permission’, as in you may/can go home.
- The dynamic meanings of ‘capacity’, as in things can go wrong.

The reason for choosing these modal meanings is that, as shown in Zamorano-Mansilla & Arús (2007), there is a significant disparity in how they are realized in English and Spanish. Thus, whereas the three modal meanings under study may find in Spanish the realisation poder (e.g. epist. Puede que esté aquí, deont. ¿Puedo ir contigo?, dyn. No puedo encontrarlo), there is no single realisation covering this wide spectrum in English, where the verb can realises deontic and dynamic meanings, and the verb may epistemic and deontic meanings (see examples above).

In addition, the expression of modality through a modal auxiliary is much more pervasive in English than in Spanish, where alternative realisations (e.g. by means of a projecting modal clause such as puede que ‘it is possible that’) are often favoured.

In this presentation we propose a methodology for the teaching of the above-mentioned modal meanings using contrastive corpus annotation as the fundamental tool in the learning process. We also describe a number of classroom activities to illustrate the proposed methodology. The methodology consists of two main steps: the first step is to use a corpus of English and Spanish texts previously annotated by experts as a ‘gold standard’. The texts should ideally belong to different genres to ensure variability in the realisations of the modal meanings, and they must be comparable in terms of register features such as field, tenor and mode. During this activity, students will be able to study examples of tags assigned to exemplars in the annotated corpus as an illustration of how the definition of the given modal meaning is applied to actual data. This will allow them to discuss difficult cases, and later to reproduce the annotations in a new set of texts. The second step is to work with students as annotators (see Lavid 2007). Here students are provided an annotation or coding scheme designed by experts. Such coding scheme includes a definition of the meanings represented by each tag, an illustration through examples and guiding questions that help the learner choose between the tags available. During the classroom activity, learners are requested to annotate a training text with clearly identifiable markables or elements susceptible of modal annotation. The purpose of this activity is multifold:

- to increase the learners’ awareness of the various modal meanings covered by verbs such as poder in Spanish and the variety of realizations in English.
- To increase their awareness of the different lexico-grammatical resources employed by each language to express modal meanings (e.g. the above-mentioned projecting modal clauses in Spanish.
- To provide data which experts can use to check whether the proposed tag definitions can account for all exemplars in the data.

The outcome of the annotation process may lead to the creation of new tags to cover those cases, which are not accounted for in the original theory, and/or to the redefinition of the existing ones when they are not clear or accurate enough to ensure annotator agreement. The changes to the original coding scheme will help language experts to create a model of the behaviour of the linguistic phenomenon, which can then be applied to a larger set of texts.

**References**


In an previous study (Ziegeler 2004; 2006), it was found that the earliest uses of the modal verb *will* in Old English were frequently observed appearing with a generic or non-specific subject, reflecting a significant function of expressing habitual aspect (which shall be referred to in the present study as a form of expressing genericity). Later studies which followed also confirmed the same results (e.g. Wischer 2006), and a study of the periphrastic modal verb *be supposed to* found that a large number of its early uses (with non-stative verbs) in Middle English were associated with generic descriptions as well. The earlier studies had considered the appearance of generic functions in the early stages of such modal development to be important in the understanding of modality, since they referred to events which were projected into the future but had origins rooted in the quasi-modal, timeless-truth-conditions that generic situations convey. Thus, the generic hypothesis on the origins of future-projecting modal meanings was maintained due to the evidence of a strong metonymic link between meanings that had an omnitemporal grounding and the more specialized time reference of future modality alone. In other words, the semantics of generics may be seen to bear the propensity for modal inferences simply because they refer to situations that are not anchored in time or space, and hence are not actualized, situations having a space-time grounding being generally considered as factual in the sense of actualization. Deontic modality, on the other hand, reflects the involvement of participants (e.g. Van der Auwera and Plungian 1998), in the predicted actualisation of events in future time, while epistemic modality reflects the involvement of the speaker in evaluating the content of the proposition. The category of generic modality, though, can never be considered in the same way as epistemic modality, since in generic modality speaker involvement is reduced to a matter of objective reporting of quasi-factual states and events.

The present paper will extend the work of such previous research in the area of generic modality, and argue for a stronger case for generic situations as the historical sources for modal meanings, in the evidence obtainable from newly-developing varieties of English. The study will begin by examining the distribution of functions of *will* and *be supposed to* in Singapore Colloquial English, a Southeast Asian contact variety spoken alongside languages such as Mandarin Chinese, Malay, and Tamil, but with a number of southern Chinese dialects forming the substrate as well. In previous studies of the grammar of this dialect, many distinctive features have been attributed to the role of the substrate languages, in particular, Chinese (e.g., Alsagoff and Ho 1998, Bao 2005, Ho and Platt 1993). However, it has been observed in previous studies (Deterding (2007), Guerti (2009), Ziegeler, to appear) that habitual aspect is amongst the most frequently occurring uses of the modal verb *will* in this newly-emerging dialect. It was also seen that *will* is frequently used as a habitual marker in Trinidadian English (Deuber 2009). The present study will explore such observations further, investigating the Singapore data from elicited materials as well as from an internet corpus of chat-line discourse, in order to estimate the frequency of occurrence of *will* in such contexts, and additional research will be conducted within the ICE Corpus in order to assess whether habitual functions of *will* are found to predominate in other new varieties of English as well. It will be then assessed whether the pathways of the development of such a modal form may be considered as pre-determined and universal, regardless of the time dimension in which it is located.

References
Wischer, Ilse. 2006. Will and Shall as Markers of Modality and/or Futurity in Middle English. 14th International Conference on English Historical Linguistics, University of Bergamo, Italy.
POSTERS
The aim of this poster is to provide a syntactic and semantic description of the constructions of the form: *it + take + NP + CLAUSE*, which can express a modal meaning related to necessity. (1) can thus be paraphrased as (2).

(1) It takes a special person to become a teacher. (Collins)
(2) It requires a special person to become a teacher.

This study is based on several corpora of contemporary British English (*BNC, Collins Worldbanks, Web Concordancer* and *OED*).

This syntactic pattern corresponds to five different constructions, exemplified in (3-7), which fall into two main categories: Extraposited and Impersonal constructions. The defining property of the former class is the capacity for the subordinate clause to be moved to the subject position, as in (3') and (4'). (5'), (6') and (7') show that the Impersonal construction cannot undergo this transformation.

(3) It takes *time* to produce a good CV. (Collins)
(3') To produce a good CV takes time.
(4) It takes an awfully long time *getting* anywhere backstage at the Chatelet theatre (...). (Web Concordancer)
(4') Getting anywhere backstage takes an awfully long time.
(5) (...) how many repeated *exposures* it takes before a baby stops responding (...) stimulus. (Collins)
(5') *Before a baby stops responding* takes many repeated exposures.
(6) It would take armed security guards in *order to* really get humanitarian supplies through. (Collins)
(6') *In order to get supplies through* would take armed security guards.
(7) It has taken a woman to remind us all that there are people out there (...). (BNC)
(7') To remind us of that has taken a woman.

I therefore propose the syntactic typology in table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construction-type</th>
<th>Type of subordinate clause</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extraposed</strong></td>
<td><em>to-nominal clause</em></td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>-ing clause</em></td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impersonal</strong></td>
<td><em>Finite time clause</em></td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>in order to-purpose clause</em></td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>to-purpose clause</em></td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1

The direct object of *take* can refer to 6 semantic types: *duration*, as in (3), *effort/labour*, as in (8), a *quality*, as in (9), a (telic) *event*, as in (5), an *object*, as in (10), and a *person*, as in (7).

(8) It will take a supreme *effort* by Mr Major to pull ahead of Labour (...). (BNC)
(9) It took the very considerable diplomatic *skills* of Macmillan (...) to win reluctant acceptance of Duncan Sandsy’s theory (...). (BNC)
(10) It takes five thousand *nuts* to make a ton of copra. (BNC)

Although there is not a one-to-one correspondence between the semantic and syntactic types (NPs of a semantic type can enter into more than one construction), there exist some constraints on which types of complement a construction can take. This is summarized in table 2 where ‘+’ indicates that the combination is found in the corpora, ‘(+)’ that it is deemed acceptable by native speakers, ‘‐’ that it is unacceptable and ‘?’ that it is problematic.

Unsurprisingly, the aforementioned parameters (syntactic and semantic types) are related to the semantics of the constructions.
According to the OED, the string *it take* has two meanings: (i) **Consumption** (metaphorically, *it takes some effort to do that*) means that some effort fuels the event denoted by the non-finite clause; as in *I put some effort into doing that*; (ii) **Necessity** (e.g. in *It takes a special person to become a teacher*, where being a special person is presented as a necessary condition for becoming a teacher).

I show that the primary meaning of the Extraposed constructions is the sense of consumption, because the non-finite clause is then the real subject of *take* and is thus construed as absorbing the ressource denoted by the direct object. In those constructions, the meaning of necessity is inferred. By contrast, the Impersonal constructions primarily express necessity, and the reference of the direct object sometimes excludes the meaning of consumption, as in (1) and (7).

**References**


1. Introduction

The linguistic material of the presented study includes a particular group of grammatical constructions that convey the meaning of comparison in the English language. A specific characteristic of the constructions that were included in this study was the coreference of the comparee and the standard within each individual construction (i.e., reflexive comparison). Thus, utterances under consideration expressed the comparison of two mental images of one and the same person.

(1) *Susan was much paler than she had been...* (Lewis 1998, 1: 65)

Constructions of the described kind reveal a change in the characteristics of a particular person mentioned by the speaker. In (1) the coreferring comparee and standard (*Susan* and *she*) represent two different stages of life of one and the same girl. The comparison made between those stages reveals the dynamics in Susans's face. This dynamics was witnessed by the speaker and is presented in discourse as a fact. However, in many cases the dynamics revealed in the utterance occurs merely in the mind of the speaker, not in reality.

(2) *She was sweet and relaxed as if she had just awakened from sleep.* (Rendell, 1998)

(3) *"...And you talk as if you were afraid of everything, when you're really as brave as – as a lion"* (Lewis 1998, 6: 183)

In (2) and (3) we also see a comparison of two mental images of one and the same person; however, in this case the first image ("she was sweet and relaxed" and "you talk" respectively) is depicted as real, while the second one is an abstract concept that exists only in the mind of the speaker.


The study of a vast group of constructions with coreferring comparee and standard in terms of Mental Space Theory (Fauconnier 1985, 1997) revealed typical patterns in mental modeling of dynamical concepts. As Mental Space Theory is grounded on the philosophical proposition of possible worlds, a relevant distinction of modal meanings expressed in the utterance should include real modality, virtual (or possible) modality and modality of irreality (Bybee et al. 1994; Rescher 2003; Zelenshchikov 1997). Those respectively correspond to Fauconnier's Base Space, Possibility Space and Counterfactual Space.

The material under study showed that in cases like (1) Past Space is structured similarly to Base Space (Fig. 1), which can be explained by the fact that they all correspond to real-life situations.

![Diagram](image)

**Fig. 1**

In their own turn, Possibility Space (2) and Counterfactual Space (3) are opposed to one another in terms of modal meanings: the former is associated with virtual modality and can be interpreted as
possibly overlapping with reality (Fig. 2), while the latter reveals modality of irreality and is incompatible with reality and Base Space (Fig. 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base Space</th>
<th>Possibility Space</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A = woman</td>
<td>SWEET A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELAXED A</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(as)... as if</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Fig. 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counterfactual Space</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A = boy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAVE A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(as)... as if</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| A' = boy             | TALK A'             |
| COWARD A'            |                     |

Fig. 3

However, this traditional triadic distribution of modal meanings does not fully describe possible mental models of reflexive comparatives. In certain situations mental representation structure can become more complex in case epistemic modality is explicated in the utterance.

(4) At five o’clock I looked in on him, and found Brian seemingly as happy and contented as he used to be. (Stoker 1990, 184)

Epistemic modality is understood in its traditional sense (De Haan 2006; Halliday 1970; Papafragou 2006), and thus corresponds to Belief Space, which reflects the speaker’s evaluation of how truthful or likely the statement is. In terms of mental modeling, epistemic modality is revealed on a different level: it sets up a mental space that serves as a buffer between the base space and a derivative space.
3. Conclusions

We have revealed a hierarchy between different types of modal meanings expressed in utterances conveying the meaning of a reflexive comparison. As has been shown, modality of reality, possibility and irreality is expressed within lower-lying mental spaces. These meanings can be derived from and subordinated to both Base Space and Belief Space. In its own turn, epistemic modality occurs directly below the Base Space and governs the Past, Possibility and Counterfactual Spaces determining their composition and frame structure.

4. References


5. Quotes taken from:

AFFIRMATION AS A TYPE OF MODALITY

By modality in the broadest sense we mean the modification of a whole sentence or clause by specifying the attitude of the speaker (writer) with regard to the content of the sentence (Palmer 2001). In the case of affirmative modality the speakers transform their utterances by stressing or attributing a positive value as an additional component to the semantic structure of a proposition. This type of affirmative polarization is triggered in opposition to negation or hypothetically negative contexts. Like other types of modality, affirmation may be lexically, syntactically or pragmatically represented, however, in most cases weak affirmation is a default, covert and formally unmarked category. As a result, negative sentences are morphologically or syntactically more complex than their affirmative counterparts and the status of negation as a type of modality seems to be more readily recognized. On the other hand, very little attention has been paid to relatively rare syntactic realizations of marked or emphatic affirmation - closely associated with tense and aspect, generally marked within the verbal complex and based on binary oppositions (Martins 2004).

The goal of the present paper is twofold: on the one hand to compare and contrast quasi affirmative mood periphrastic constructions in English and Slavic and on the other hand, to ascertain what these constructions reveal regarding the organization of grammatical categories in general and the status of affirmative modality as a coherent and homogenous category that has linguistic validity. The sample examples below come from three different language systems which accounts for the lack of total uniformity, both formally and functionally, in the marking of the category and a range of possible meanings associated with the constructions. All of them, however, rely on oppositions in the distribution of auxiliary verbs with the auxiliary forms of the verb to be being of primary importance:

Indicative mood/weak affirmation | Quasi affirmative mood/strong affirmation
--- | ---
**English**
I love you | I do love you
They understood the problem | They did understand the problem
She's a writer | She is a writer
I'll tell you about it | I will tell you about it

**Serbian**
On je dobar igrač | On jeste dobar igrač
He 3sgBE weak good player | He 3sgBE strong good player
Mi smo ga tamo našli | Mi jesmo ga tamo našli
We 1plBE weak him there find/perf | We 1plBE strong him there find/perf
Ja ću ti napisati pismo | Napisatiću ti pismo
I will you/dativ write letter | Write/1sg fut(will) you/dativ letter

**Bulgarian**
Tja sLEDVALA v Sofija | Tja e sLEDVALA v Sofija
She study/perf in Sofia | She 3sgBE study/perf in Sofia
Toj pročel tazi kniga | Toj e pročel tazi kniga
He read/perf this book | He 3sgBE read/perf this book

We will argue that affirmative modality cannot be equated or confined to either assertion or realis assertion (Givón 2001) although it may be considered to be its core as in most cases the proposition is strongly asserted to be true and speakers confirm their confidence in the reality status of a given state of affairs. We will also argue that linguistically manifested affirmative modality corresponds to human cognitive structures which may be both lexically and syntactically coded.

**References**

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